uipl_4389a.pdf

ETA Advisory File Text

NOTE Where it is feasible a syllabus headnote will be released as is being done in connection with this case at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co. 200 U.S. 321 337. SUPREME COURT OF THEUNITED STATES Syllabus APPEAL FROM THE APPELLATECOURT OF ILLINOIS THIRD DISTRICT Argued March 1 1989--Decided March29 1989 Appellant who refused a temporary position offered to him by Kelly Services because the job would have required him to work on Sunday applied for and was denied unemployment compensation benefits. The denial was affirmed by an administrative review board an Illinois Circuit Court and the State Appellate Court which found that since appellant was not a member of an established religious sect or church and did not claim that his refusal to work resulted from a tenet belief or teaching of an established religious body his personal professed religious belief although unquestionably sincere was not good cause for his refusal to work on Sunday. Held The denial of unemployment compensation benefits to appellant on the ground that his refusal to work was not based on tenets or dogma of an established religious sect violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Sherbert v. Verner 374 U. S. 398 Thomas v. Review Bd. of lndiana Employment Security Div. 450 U. S. 707 and Hobbie v Unemployment Appeals Comm n of Florida. 480 U. S. 136 rested on the fact that each of the claimants had a sincere belief that religion required him or her to refrain from the work in question not on the consideration that each of them was a member of a particular religious sect or on any tenet of the sect forbidding such work. While membership in a sect would simplify the problem of identifying sincerely held beliefs the notion that one must be responding to the commands of a particular religious organization to claim the protection of the Free Exercise Clause is rejected. The sincerity or religious nature of appellant s belief was not questioned by the courts below and was conceded by the State which offered no justification for the burden that the denial of benefits placed on appellant s right to exercise his religion. The fact that Sunday work has become a way of life does not constitute a state interest sufficiently compelling to override a legitimate free exercise claim since there is no evidence that there will be a mass movement away from Sunday employment if appellant succeeds on his claim. Pp. 3-5. 159 Ill. App. 3d 474 512 N.E. 2d 789 reversed and remanded. White J. delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. NOTICE This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions Supreme Court of the United States Washington D.C. 20543 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THEUNITED STATES No. 87-1945 WILLIAM A. FRAZEE APPELLANT v. ILLINOIS DE- PARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ETAL. ON APPEAL FROM THEAPPELLATECOURT OF ILLINOIS THIRD DISTRICT March 29 1989 JUSTICE WHITE deliveredthe opinion of the Court. The Illinois Unemployment InsuranceAct provides that An individual shall be ineligible for benefits if hehas failed without good cause either to apply for available suitablework when so directed . . . or to accept suitable work when offered him. . . . Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48 433 1986 . In April1984 William Frazee refused a temporary retail position offered him byKelly Services because the job would have required him to work on Sunday. Frazee told Kelly that as a Christian he could not work on the Lord sday. Frazee then applied to the Illinois Department of Employment Security for unemployment benefits claiming that there was good cause forhis refusal to work on Sunday. His application was denied. Frazee appealed the denial of benefits to the Department of EmploymentSecurity s Board of Review which also denied his claim. The Boardof Review stated When a refusal ofwork is based on religious convictions therefusal must be based upon some tenets or dogma accepted by the individualof some church sect or denomination and such a refusal based solelyon an individual s personal belief is personal and noncompelling and does not render the work unsuitable. App. 18-19. The Board of Reviewconcluded that Frazee had refused an offer of suitable work without goodcause. The Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit of Illinois Peoria County affirmed finding that the agency s decision was not contraryto law nor against the manifest weight of the evidence thereby rejectingFrazee s claim based on the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.Id. at 23. Frazee s free exercise claimwas again rejected by the Appellate Court of Illinois Third District. 512 N.E. 2d 789 1987 . The court characterized Frazee s refusalto work as resting on his personal professed religious belief and madeit clear that it did not question the sincerity of the plantiff id. at 790 791. It then engaged in a historical discussion of religiousprohibitions against work on the Sabbath and in particular on Sunday. Nonetheless the court distinguished Sherbert v. Verner 374 U.S.398 1963 Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div. 450 U.S. 707 1981 and Hobbie v. Unemployment Compensation AppealsComm n of Florida 480 U.S. 136 1987 from the facts of Frazee scase. Unlike the claimants in Sherbert Thomas and Hobbie Frazee was not a member of an established religious sect or church nordid he claim that his refusal to work resulted from a tenet belief orteaching of an established religious body. 512 N.E. 2d at 791. To the Illinois Court Frazee s position that he was a Christian andas such felt it wrong to work on Sunday was not enough. For a FreeExercise Clause claim to succeed said the Illinois Appellate Court T heinjunction against Sunday labor must be found in a tenet or dogma of anestablished religious sect. Frazee does not profess to be a memberof any such sect. Id. at 792. The Illinois SupremeCourt denied Frazee leave to appeal. The mandatory appellate jurisdictionof this court was invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1257 2 since the statecourt rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of Illinois statutory good cause requirement as applied in this case. We noted probablejurisdiction 488 U.S. ---- 1988 and now reverse. We have had more than oneoccasion before today to consider denials of unemployment compensationbenefits to those who have refused work on the basis of their religiousbeliefs. In Sherbert v. Verner supra at 410 the Court held that a Statecould not constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions of its unemploymentcompensation program so as to constrain a worker to abandon his religiousconvictions respecting the day of rest. Thomasv. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div. supra also held that the State s refusal to award unemployment compensation benefitsto one who terminated his job because his religious beliefs forbade participationin the production of armaments violated the First Amendment right to freeexercise. Just two years ago in Hobbiev. Unemployment Appeals Comm n of Florida supra Florida s denial of unemployment compensation benefits to an employeedischarged for her refusal to work on her Sabbath because of religiousconvictions adopted subsequent to employment was also declared to be a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. In each of these cases theappellant was forced to choose between fidelity to religious belief and. . . employment id. at 144 and we found the forfeiture ofunemployment benefits for choosing the former over the latter brings unlawfulcoercion to bear on the employee s choice. Ibid.Ineach of these cases we concluded that the denial of unemployment compensationbenefits violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of theConstitution as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. It is true as the Illinoiscourt noted that each of the claimants in those cases was a member ofa particular religious sect but none of those decisions turned on thatconsideration or on any tenet of the sect involved that forbade the work the claimant refused to perform. Our judgments in those cases restedon the fact that each of the claimants had a sincere belief that religionrequired him or her to refrain from the work in question. Never didwe suggest that unless a claimant belongs to a sect that forbids what hisjob requires his belief however sincere must be deemed a purely personal preference rather than a religious belief. Indeed in Thomas there was a disagreement among sect members as to whether their religionmade it sinful to work in an armaments factory but we considered thisto be an irrelevant issue and hence rejected the State s submission thatunless the religion involved formally forbade work on armaments Thomas belief did not qualify as a religious belief. Because Thomas unquestionablyhad a sincere belief that his religion prevented him from doing such work he was entitled to invoke the protection of the Free Exercise Clause. There is no doubt that o nlybeliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause Thomas supra at 713. Purely secular views do not suffice. UnitedStates v. Seeger 380 U.S. 163 1965 Wisconsin v. Yoder 406U.S. 205 215-216 1972 . Nor do we underestimate the difficultyof distinguishing between religious and secular convictions and in determiningwhether a professed belief is sincerely held. States are clearlyentitled to assure themselves that there is an ample predicate for invokingthe Free Exercise Clause. We do not face problems about sincerity and the State concedes it. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. Furthermore the Board of Review characterized Frazee s views as religious convictions App. 18 and the Illinois Appellate Court referred to his refusal to workon Sunday as based on a personal professed religious belief. 512N.E. 2d at 790. 1 Frazee asserted that he wasa Christian but did not claim to be a member of a particular Christiansect. It is also true that there are assorted Christian denominationsthat do not profess to be compelled by their religion to refuse Sunday work but this does not diminish Frazee s protection flowing from the FreeExercise Clause. Thomas settled that much. Undoubtedly membership in an organized religious denomination especially one witha specific tenet forbidding members to work on Sunday would simplify theproblem of identifying sincerely held religious beliefs but we reject the notion that to claim the protection of the Free Exercise Clause onemust be responding to the commands of a particular religious organization. Here Frazee s refusal was based on a sincerely held religious belief. Under our cases he was entitled to invoke First Amendment protection. 2 The State does not appearto defend this aspect of the decision below. In its brief and atoral argument the State conceded that the Free Exercise Clause does notdemand adherence to a tenet or dogma of an established religious sect. Instead the State proposes its own test for identifying a religious belief asserts that Frazee has not met such a test and asks that we affirmon this basis. We decline to address this submission for asthecase comes to us Frazee s conviction was recognized as religious but foundto be inadequate because it was not claimed to represent a tenet of a religiousorganization of which he was a member. That ground for decision wasclearly erroneous. The State offers no justificationfor the burden that the denial of benefits places on Frazee s right toexercise his religion. The Illinois Appellate Court ascribed greatsignificance to America s weekend way of life. The Illinois court asked What would Sunday be today if professional football baseball basketball and tennis were barred. Today Sunday is not only a dayfor religion but for recreation and labor. Today the supermarketsare open service stations dispense fuel utilities continue to serve thepeople and factories continue to belch smoke and tangible products concludingthat i f all Americans were to abstain from working on Sunday chaoswould result. 512 N.E. 2d at 792. We are unpersuaded however that there will be a mass movement away from Sunday employ if William Frazee succeeds in his claim. As was the case in Thomaswhere there was no evidence in the record to indicate that the numberof people who find themselves in the predicament of choosing between benefitsand religious beliefs is large enough to create widespread unemployment Thomas 450 U.S. at 719 there is nothing before us in this case to suggest thatSunday shopping or Sunday sporting for that matter will grind to a haltas a result of our decision today. And as we have said in the past there may exist state interests sufficiently compelling to override a legitimateclaim to the free exercise of religion. No such interest has beenpresented here. The judgement of the AppellateCourt of Illinois for the Third District is therefore reversed and thecase is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion It is so ordered. 1 Fromthe very first report of the Illinois Division of Unemployment Insuranceclaims adjudicator Frazee s refusal of Sunday work has been describedas due to his religious convictions. In his application for reconsiderationof the referee s determination Frazee stated I refused the job whichrequired me to work on Sunday based on Biblical principles scripture Exodus20 8 9 10. Remember the Sabbath day by keeping it holy. Sixdays you shall labour and do all your work but the seventh day is a Sabbathto the Lord your God. On it you shall not do any work. 2 Wenoted in Thomas v Review Board 450 U. S. 707 715 1981 thatan asserted belief might be so bizarre so clearly nonreligious in motivation as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause. But that avails the State nothing in this case. As the discussionof the Illinois Appellate Court itself indicates claims by Christiansthat their religion forbids Sunday work cannot be deemed bizarre or incredible.