Administrative Review Board Decisions

The following case summaries were created by the Administrative Review Board staff.

Keller v. Pittsburgh Baptist Church, ARB No. 2025-0008, ALJ No. 2023-TAX-00012 (ARB July 30, 2025) (Decision and Order Vacating and Remanding)

DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE AS DISCOVERY SANCTION; ABUSE OF DISCRETION BECAUSE OF ABSENCE OF ANALYSIS

In Keller v. Pittsburgh Baptist Church, ARB No. 2025-0008, ALJ No. 2023-TAX-00012 (ARB July 30, 2025), the ARB vacated the ALJ's dismissal of Complainant's TAX complaint and remanded for the ALJ to reevaluate whether such an extreme sanction was warranted.

The ARB found it was unable to conclude that the ALJ had not abused her discretion in dismissing the Complaint. The ALJ's order dismissing the complaint stated her reasons for doing so were detailed in a prehearing conference call, and did not conduct an analysis of that conduct to demonstrate the basis for a case-ending sanction. During the prehearing conference call the ALJ mentioned three areas of conduct on the part of Complainant: discovery non-compliance, the submission of a settlement removing a general release tentatively agreed to by the parties without informing opposing counsel, and the filing of a motion for a three-week hearing postponement the day before settlement was due or the parties were scheduled to proceed to a hearing.

The ARB explained that all litigation-ending sanctions, regardless of the authority invoked, were subject to closer scrutiny within the abuse of discretion framework. It outlined that in determining whether dismissal with prejudice or default judgment is warranted it is normally appropriate for ALJs to consider and balance the non-exhaustive factors: (1) the culpability, willfulness, or bad faith of the non-compliant party; (2) whether the non-compliant party was warned their conduct or failure to comply could result in dismissal or default judgment; (3) the efficacy of less drastic sanctions; (4) whether the party failed to comply with an order; (5) whether the non-compliant party engaged in dilatory conduct; (6) whether and to what extent there was prejudice to the opposing party; and, (7) the interference with the judicial process. The ARB clarified that the test was not a rigid test as certain factors may take on greater importance depending on the circumstances of the case, but that the ALJ must sufficiently articulate conclusions drawn from their application. The ARB explained that the factor of culpability, willfulness, or bad faith must be met prior dismissing a case with prejudice or issuing a default judgment for a party's failure to comply with a discovery order, and that ALJs should warn non-compliant parties of the possibility of a case-ending sanction in an order that gives them an opportunity to comply.

The ARB also noted that it did not discern a basis in the record for dismissal with prejudice based on Complainant's failure to comply with a discovery order as of the date of the ALJ's dismissal. For this reason and due to the absence of analysis justifying dismissal with prejudice, the ARB vacated the dismissal order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Administrator, Wage and Hour Div., USDOL v. A&M Labor Management, Inc., ARB No. 2023-0038, ALJ Nos. 2022-MSP-00002, 2022-TAE-00004 (ARB July 17, 2025) (Decision and Order Affirming in Part and Reversing in Part)

H-2A VIOLATIONS; DEBARMENT

In Administrator, Wage and Hour Div., USDOL v. A&M Labor Management, Inc., ARB No. 2023-0038, ALJ Nos. 2022-MSP-00002, 2022-TAE-00004 (ARB July 17, 2025), the ARB affirmed in part and reversed in part the Chief ALJ's ruling.

Gonzalez Sr. is the owner and manager of A&M, while Gonzalez Jr. is also a manager of A&M and the son of Gonzalez Sr. In 2018, the DOL certified A&M's applications for Temporary Employment Certifications (TEC 1 and TEC 2). TEC 1 and 2 authorized A&M to employ foreign workers for two different harvesting operations in 2018 and 2019.

On December 15, 2020, the WHD issued a Notice of Determination of H-2A violations (NOD) in TEC 1 and 2, finding back wages owed, assessing civil money penalties (CMPs), and debarring Respondent. Respondent sought review of the NOD and requested a hearing.

On March 23, 2023, the Chief ALJ issued a D. & O. after a hearing. The Chief ALJ affirmed one of the H-2A violations found in the NOD—specifically, WHD's determination that A&M failed to hire a qualified U.S. worker in TEC 2. However, the Chief ALJ rejected the rest of the WHD's determinations in the NOD and found A&M did not commit any other H-2A violations, reduced the amount of back wages and CMPs owed, and declined to debar A&M from receiving future labor certifications.

On April 24, 2023, the Administrator of WHD filed a Petition for Review with the ARB, raising three primary arguments: (1) the evidence did not support the Chief ALJ's conclusion that A&M did not unlawfully lay off 13 U.S. workers and A&M did not violate the three-fourths guarantee; (2) the ARB should reverse the Chief ALJ's dismissal of WHD's charge that A&M failed to satisfy the conditions in its job order; and (3) the Chief ALJ's decision that debarment was not warranted should be vacated and remanded.

On appeal, the ARB concluded that: (1) the Chief ALJ correctly found that A&M fired the workers for refusal to work in muddy conditions; (2) the Chief ALJ erred in finding that A&M did not violate 20 C.F.R. § 655.121(a)(3)'s requirement to satisfy the conditions listed in its job order; and (3) the Chief ALJ correctly found that debarment is not warranted.

A&M FIRED THE U.S. WORKERS FOR REFUSAL TO WORK IN MUDDY CONDITIONS IN TEC 1; NO VIOLATIONS OF 20 C.F.R. § 655.135(G) OR 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(I)

On appeal, the Administrator argued the Chief ALJ failed to properly consider evidence showing that A&M laid off the 13 U.S. workers for discriminatory reasons and that A&M's claims about why it fired 13 U.S. workers were pretextual. Furthermore, the Administrator argued that the Chief ALJ erred in concluding that A&M did not violate 20 C.F.R. § 655.135(g) (protecting against improper layoffs) and 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(i) (requiring employers meet the three-fourths guarantee).

The ARB disagreed. First, the record supported the Chief ALJ's finding that A&M fired the workers for refusing to work in rainy and muddy conditions, not for discriminatory reasons. Second, because A&M did not improperly lay off the workers, the ARB affirmed the Chief ALJ's ruling that A&M did not violate 20 C.F.R. § 655.135(g) or 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(i).

A&M Fired Workers for Refusal to Work in Muddy Conditions, Not Discriminatory Reasons

The ARB found that the record supported the Chief ALJ's finding that A&M fired the 13 U.S. workers for refusing to work in rainy and muddy conditions and that the workers were not laid off for discriminatory reasons. Notably, the Chief ALJ found Gonzalez Jr.'s version of events to be credible as to why the U.S. workers were sent home from Indiana in TEC 1. The ARB only disturbs credibility findings when "they are inherently incredible or patently unreasonable." Far from being "inherently incredible," Gonzalez Jr.'s version of events was reasonable and logical. Gonzalez Jr. testified that A&M paid approximately $4,500 for the charter bus to transport the workers to Indiana. Once in Indiana, A&M "needed all hands on deck" because the "crops were completely ready and [they] were behind." However, the U.S. workers refused to work in the rain and muddy conditions, and A&M "could not afford to" continue paying for their hotel rooms. Therefore, A&M fired the U.S. workers for refusing to work and A&M "paid approximately $2,200 for the charter bus" to transport those workers back to Florida. The ARB affirmed the Chief ALJ's findings.

On appeal, the Administrator argued the Chief ALJ failed to properly consider certain evidence showing that A&M discriminated against the U.S. workers and that A&M's claims about why it fired the U.S. workers were pretextual. The ARB disagreed.

First, in support of pretext, the Administrator highlighted how the Chief ALJ did not address "evidence in the record that shows that A&M had repeatedly hired many of the same U.S. workers for years" and that "the record does not contain any evidence that A&M had ever objected to those workers' performance."

The ARB disagreed that this showed pretext. In fact, the evidence that A&M had a long history of employing and hiring the same workers undermined the Administrator's theory. It strained credulity that A&M would repeatedly hire the same workers for many years, pay to transport the workers to Indiana, and then abruptly fire them in the middle of a busy season for discriminatory reasons (which had not prevented A&M from hiring the same workers in the past). The more reasonable explanation, and the explanation that the Chief ALJ found to be credible, was that the workers refused to work in the rainy conditions, it was expensive to continue paying for the workers' hotel rooms, and A&M fired the workers.

Next, the Administrator relied heavily on the statements of four fired workers to show that A&M's actions were driven by racial animus and preference for H-2A workers, arguing that the Chief ALJ did not provide an adequate analysis of the worker statements. However, ARB's review indicated that the statements could not be provided the weight argued for by the Administrator. The four statements were without context. Because the Investigator translated and transcribed the worker statements, the ARB did not know the exact questions asked by the Investigator and the statements were not subject to cross examination. In addition, the worker statements appeared to contain errors, raising questions about their reliability.

Further, since it was apparent that the interviews were done over the phone, there appeared to be no reason in the record, or offered by the Administrator, as to why the workers could not have testified at least virtually, with the opportunity for cross examination, either in the hearing or through depositions. In sum, the ex parte witness statements from four impacted workers did not persuade the ARB to disturb the Chief ALJ's finding that A&M fired the workers for failure to work in rainy conditions, not for discriminatory reasons.

The Administrator also claimed the Chief ALJ did not consider other evidence of pretext, including that "A&M changed its story and claimed for the first time at trial that it had laid off the 13 workers because of their refusal to work due to the weather." The ARB disagreed.

The record before the Chief ALJ seemed to have gaps, and it appeared that WHD may have failed to fully develop the context and evaluate both sides when determining that A&M violated H-2A regulations. The Investigator testified that he never interviewed A&M for an explanation of why the U.S. workers left Indiana. Without asking that crucial question of A&M, the Investigator may not have learned of the muddy and rainy conditions until the hearing and would not have known to ask the workers about the rain or muddy conditions earlier. Therefore, the ARB did not find it persuasive that A&M changed its story.

Finally, in support of the argument that A&M had a discriminatory motive in laying off the workers, the Administrator claimed the Chief ALJ overlooked a statement by Gonzalez Jr. of A&M, who testified at the hearing that: "[a]nybody that works in farm labor contracting can tell you that a Haitian worker will not work in adverse weather. They just will not work in the rain or muddy conditions." The ARB did not assign much weight to one stray comment, and the remark did not overcome the evidence supporting the Chief ALJ's finding that A&M fired the workers for refusal to work in rainy and muddy conditions.

No H-2A Violations of 20 C.F.R. § 655.135(g) or 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(i)

The Administrator argued that, because A&M improperly laid off the workers, the Chief ALJ erred in finding no violations of 20 C.F.R. § 655.135(g) (protecting against improper layoffs) and 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(i) (requiring employers meet the three-fourths guarantee). However, because the ARB found that the record supported the Chief ALJ's findings that A&M fired the workers for refusing to work in rainy and muddy conditions and A&M did not lay them off, the ARB affirmed the Chief ALJ that A&M did not violate either provision.

First, 20 C.F.R. § 655.135(g) protects against improper or impermissible layoffs. The ARB agreed with the Chief ALJ that A&M fired the workers for refusal to work in rainy and muddy conditions and did not lay off the workers. Because 20 C.F.R. § 655.135(g) only applies when there is a layoff, and no layoff occurred, the ARB affirmed the Chief ALJ that A&M did not violate the provision.

Second, 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(i)'s three-fourths guarantee requires that an H-2A employer must offer each worker "employment for a total number of work hours equal to at least three-fourths of the workdays of the total period[.]" However, under 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(n), an H-2A employer is relieved of the three-fourths guarantee when a worker is "terminated for cause." The ARB found that A&M terminated for cause the U.S. workers. Therefore, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(n), A&M was relieved of the three-fourths guarantee obligation.

20 C.F.R. § 655.121(A)(3); A&M FAILED TO SATISFY THE CONDITIONS IT LISTED IN ITS JOB ORDER IN TEC 2

The ARB reversed the Chief ALJ's ruling that A&M did not violate 20 C.F.R. § 655.121(a)(3). The ARB found that A&M failed to satisfy the requirements of the job order in two respects. Accordingly, the ARB assessed a penalty of $1,412.80 for each violation of 20 C.F.R. § 655.121(a)(3), totaling a CMP of $2,825.60 for both violations. 

H-2A Violation; A&M Violated 20 C.F.R. § 655.121(a)(3)

The Chief ALJ found that WHD had cited the incorrect regulatory provision in its NOD: WHD had cited 20 C.F.R. § 655.121(a)(3) and the Chief ALJ ruled that WHD should have cited subparagraph (a)(4) of that regulation.

The ARB disagreed with the Chief ALJ because the Chief ALJ relied on the 2022 version of 20 C.F.R. § 655.121(a)(3) when dismissing WHD's charge. The ALJ should have relied on the 2010 version of that regulation which was operative at the time of A&M's 2019 violation. In 2022, the Department moved what had been in subparagraph (a)(3) to subparagraph (a)(4). Thus, the Chief ALJ was correct that the 2022 version of 20 C.F.R. § 655.121(a)(3) did not apply, but that was not the provision WHD had relied on in the NOD: WHD's NOD properly referred to the 2010 version of 20 C.F.R. § 655.121(a)(3).

Thus, the ARB reviewed whether violations should be assessed for failure to comply with the job order in accordance with the 2010 version of 20 C.F.R. § 655.121(a)(3).

The 2010 version of 20 C.F.R. § 655.121(a)(3) states: "The job order submitted to the SWA must satisfy . . . the requirements set forth in § 655.122." In the December 15, 2020 NOD, the WHD charged A&M with the following two violations of 20 C.F.R. § 655.121(a)(3) in TEC 2:

  • The "employer listed false experience requirements in the job orde[r] that were not actually considered when hiring H[-]2A workers."
  • "[T]he investigation disclosed that the employer placed workers at worksites in Homestead, FL, which are not listed on the certified H-2A contract and are not within the area of intended employment."

The ARB found two violations for TEC 2 under the 2010 version of 20 C.F.R. § 655.121(a)(3), which incorporates requirements for 20 C.F.R. § 655.122.

First, 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(b) requires that "[e]ach job qualification and requirement listed in the job offer must be bona fide[.]" Here, A&M listed a job qualification requirement in the job order that required three months of corn harvesting experience. However, both Gonzalez Sr. and Gonzalez Jr. admitted they did not enforce the experience requirement. Accordingly, the ARB found that A&M violated 20 C.F.R. § 655.121(a)(3), which incorporates the 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(b) requirement.

Second, 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(c) requires that "[e]very job order accompanying an" application for TEC must include the "working condition provisions[.]" On appeal, the Administrator argued that A&M failed to disclose in the job order that the employer had another worksite in Homestead, Florida. In its response, A&M did not address this argument from the Administrator. Instead, A&M argued that if the ARB agrees "that the appeal is proper on this issue" and not waived, "the issue is due to be remanded" because the "Board cannot render a decision on the propriety of CMPs" and the "Board cannot engage in fact-finding."

The ARB disagreed with A&M. In H-2A cases, the Administrative Procedure Act governs ARB review, and "[t]he ARB, on review from the Chief ALJ, reviews the record de novo, including the CMP assessments." Because A&M did not address the Administrator's argument, the ARB adopted the Administrator's position and found that A&M violated 20 C.F.R. § 655.121(a)(3), which incorporates 20 C.F.R. § 655.122(c)'s obligation.

H-2A Violation; CMPs for Violations of 20 C.F.R. § 655.121(a)(3)

Having found two violations, the ARB proceeded to consider penalties. In determining the monetary amount that should be assessed for each violation, several non-exclusive factors may be considered, including any history of noncompliance, the number of affected workers, the seriousness of the violations, efforts made in good faith to comply, the explanation for noncompliance, a commitment to future compliance, and any financial gain from the violations.

The ARB agreed with WHD that a 10% reduction should apply to the maximum CMP of $1,766.00 because A&M did not have a previous history of H-2A violations. The ARB also applied an additional 10% reduction because of the small size of A&M's business. Therefore, the ARB applied a 20% reduction to the maximum CMP of $1,766.00. Accordingly, the ARB assessed a penalty of $1,412.80 for each violation of 20 C.F.R. § 655.121(a)(3), resulting in a total CMP of $2,825.60 for both violations. 

DEBARMENT WAS NOT WARRANTED

An employer may be barred from receiving future labor certifications for up to three years if the employer has "substantially violated a material term or condition of its temporary labor certification, with respect to H-2A workers . . . or U.S. workers improperly rejected for employment, or improperly laid off or displaced . . . ."

 The question was whether A&M's violations of 20 C.F.R. § 655.135(d) (unlawful rejection of a qualified U.S. worker) and 20 C.F.R. § 655.121(a)(3) (for failure to satisfy conditions it listed in its job order) are "so substantial as to merit debarment." The ARB agreed with the Chief ALJ that "debarment is a severe punishment," and after consideration, the ARB found that debarment was not warranted under the circumstances.

Debarment would be inappropriate and unduly harsh for these violations. The ARB agreed with the Chief ALJ that A&M did not commit a "substantial" violation when it unlawfully rejected one U.S. worker in January 2019. In addition, as the Chief ALJ pointed out, "[b]ack wages have been ordered to make the single U.S. worker whole." Similarly, the ARB did not find that A&M engaged in "substantial" violations when A&M failed to satisfy conditions listed in its job order, and the ARB had also ordered A&M to pay CMPs for the violations. Notably, A&M also did not have any previous history of H-2A violations related to these provisions. Thus, the ARB found that the violations at issue were not so substantial as to merit debarment.

Simmons v. Fourteenth Avenue Cartage Co., Inc., ARB No. 2025-0057, ALJ No. 2020-STA-00092 (ARB July 17, 2025) (Decision and Order Dismissing Petition for Review)

DISMISSAL; COMPLAINANT FAILED TO FILE A TIMELY OPENING BRIEF AND RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

In Simmons v. Fourteenth Avenue Cartage Co., Inc., ARB No. 2025-0057, ALJ No. 2020-STA-00092 (ARB July 17, 2025), the ARB dismissed Complainant's petition for review because Complainant failed to show good cause for failing to file a timely opening brief.

On May 7, 2025, Complainant filed a Petition for Review with the ARB. On May 12, 2025, the ARB issued a Briefing Order instructing Complainant to file an opening brief within twenty-eight (28) days. Complainant did not submit an opening brief as ordered. Consequently, on June 18, 2025, the ARB issued an Order to Show Cause ordering Complainant to explain why the ARB should not dismiss the appeal for failing to timely file an opening brief. The ARB cautioned Complainant that failure to comply may lead to dismissal without further notice. Complainant did not respond or file an opening brief. Accordingly, the ARB dismissed the appeal.

Robles v. Quirch Foods, LLC, ARB No. 2024-0034, ALJ No. 2023-STA-00016 (ARB July 15, 2025) (Decision and Order Affirming Dismissal)

REMOVAL TO FEDERAL COURT; ARB AFFIRMED DISMISSAL WHERE COMPLAINANT FILE ORIGINAL ACTION IN DISTRICT COURT

In Robles v. Quirch Foods, LLC, ARB No. 2024-0034, ALJ No. 2023-STA-00016 (ARB July 15, 2025), the ARB affirmed the ALJ's dismissal of Complainant's complaint where Complainant filed an original action in a U.S. District Court.

Complainant filed a claim with OSHA under the STAA. OSHA dismissed the claim, and Complainant requested a hearing with an ALJ. Before the ALJ, Complainant and Respondent had difficulty completing discovery, resulting in the ALJ ordering Complainant to produce documents and respond to interrogatories. The ALJ also ordered Complainant to sit for a deposition. During a hearing regarding the ALJ's discovery orders, Complainant indicated he wished to file contempt proceedings against the ALJ and the Secretary of Labor for colluding with Respondent's counsel. The ALJ stayed the case while Complainant pursued these options.

On January 26, 2024, Complainant informed the ALJ that he had filed a complaint in federal district court on January 25, 2024. The ALJ asked Complainant to file a copy of the federal complaint by February 9, 2024, which Complainant did on or about February 7, 2024. Accordingly, on March 26, 2024, the ALJ, noting more than 60 days had passed since the filing in federal court, there had been no objection or other opposition filed with the ALJ, and there had been no remand order from the District Court, dismissed the case. Complainant appealed this dismissal to the ARB.

The STAA contains a kick-out provision whereby a whistleblower may remove the matter to federal district court, if the Secretary has not issued a final decision within 210 days of the filing of the complaint. Filing a kick-out in federal district court under this provision divests the Department of Labor of jurisdiction over the case.

Complainant filed the OSHA complaint on May 18, 2022; the 210-day period was reached on December 14, 2022; and Complainant filed a federal district court complaint on January 25, 2024. Because Complainant filed in federal court under STAA's kick-out provision and more than 210 days had passed, the ALJ dismissed Complainant's case on March 26, 2024.

The ARB determined that it was clear that Complainant intended the complaint he filed in U.S. District Court as a kick-out. In a category entitled "Basis for Jurisdiction," Complainant indicated to the District Court that the kick out was ripe under STAA because the Secretary had failed to issue a final decision within the 210-day period. Among other remedies, Complainant asked the District Court to award damages, lost wages, compensatory damages, and other remedies consistent with STAA. Accordingly, the ARB affirmed the ALJ's dismissal of the case.

Carmack v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., ARB No. 2024-0052, ALJ No. 2024-FRS-00014 (ARB July 10, 2025) (Decision and Order Affirming Dismissal)

REMOVAL TO FEDERAL COURT; ARB AFFIRMED DISMISSAL WHERE COMPLAINANT FILE ORIGINAL ACTION IN DISTRICT COURT

In Carmack v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., ARB No. 2024-0052, ALJ No. 2024-FRS-00014 (ARB July 10, 2025), the ARB affirmed the ALJ's dismissal of Complainant's complaint where Complainant filed an original action in a U.S. District Court.

Complainant filed a claim with OSHA under the FRSA. OSHA dismissed the claim, and Complainant requested a hearing with an ALJ. In the pre-hearing submissions and responses, the ALJ discovered that Complainant had filed a complaint in a U.S. District Court, arising out of the same facts as those underlying his case with the ALJ. Specifically, the District Court Complaint had a section on the FRSA, requesting similar remedies as those sought through the complaint before the ALJ.

Examining the District Court Complaint in detail, the ALJ issued an Order to Show Cause on May 23, 2024, asking the parties why he should not dismiss the case under the FRSA's kick-out provision. This provision, 49 U.S.C. § 20109(d)(3), allows a complainant to remove or kick-out his case to federal district court if the Secretary of Labor has not issued a final agency decision within 210 days of the complainant's filing of the complaint with OSHA. Filing a kick-out in federal district court under this provision divests the Department of Labor of jurisdiction over the case.

On May 29, 2024, Complainant responded to the Order, arguing that his complaint with the federal district court only referred to FRSA "as evidence related to allegations in actions pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act ('ADA'), the Rehabilitation Act ('RA'), and the Railway Labor Act ('RLA') separate and apart from the FRSA actions . . . ." Complainant urged that none of the counts in the District Court Complaint applied the FRSA against the Respondent. Further, Complainant added his desire to retain his FRSA claim before the ALJ. Nevertheless, the ALJ deemed the federal complaint a kick out of his FRSA complaint and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Complainant appealed this dismissal to the ARB.

Although Complainant claimed he did not pursue his federal court claim formally as a kick out, the ARB agreed with the ALJ that his federal complaint was a kick out because it in effect asserted FRSA claims and asked for remedies available under the FRSA. For example, his federal complaint stated that he "brings this action as a remedy for major and minor dispute violations of . . . whistleblower protections of the Federal Railways Safety Act . . . ." Elaborating on his claim, Complainant also stated that "[t]he carriers have discriminated against the Plaintiff and executed a wrongful discharge in violation of: . . . the FRSA . . . ." Complainant also stated "[t]he carriers' violations of the FRSA and other regulations include the following actions . . . ." Complainant then included numerous counts spanning over 600 pages. Many of the facts underlying these claims were based on retaliation for engaging in protected activity similar to if not identical to the protected activity alleged under the FRSA. For Count Fifteen of the District Court Complaint, "wrongful discharge in violation of public policy," Complainant included "Retaliatory Discrimination in violation of the Federal Railroad Safety Act . . . ." The Complainant then listed over 25 bullet points alleging adverse actions under the FRSA. In his prayer for relief before the District Court, he also asked for all the remedies a successful whistleblower would be entitled to under the FRSA, including reinstatement, backpay, and compensatory damages.

Accordingly, the ARB affirmed the ALJ's dismissal of the case.

DeVoe v. Premier Trucking LLC, ARB No. 2025-0056, ALJ No. 2024-STA-00090 (July 1, 2025) (Order Granting Reconsideration, Vacating Order of Administrative Closure, and Notice of Appeal Acceptance and Briefing Order)

RECONSIDERATION; ADMINISTRATIVE CLOSURE; APPEAL ACCEPTANCE AND BRIEFING SCHEDULE

In DeVoe v. Premier Trucking LLC, ARB No. 2025-0056, ALJ No. 2024-STA-00090 (ARB July 1, 2025), the ARB granted the Complainant's request for reconsideration, vacated the Order of Administrative Closure, and accepted Complainant's petition for review.

Complainant did not file a petition for review by June 9, 2025, as required by an Order Granting Extension the ARB had issued.  Given the Complainant's failure to comply with the ARB's extension order and the requirement to file a petition for review under 29 C.F.R. § 1978.110(a), the ARB administratively closed the matter on June 17, 2025.

On June 22, 2025, Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration and a petition for review. Complainant explained that he had not received the ARB's Extension Order and believed that he had until June 23, 2025 to file his petition for review. He further explained that he needed sixty days because he does not have a computer and could only work on his appeal on weekends due to his work schedule. He requested that the ARB accept his petition for review and reconsider its decision dismissing his complaint.

In light of the Complainant's arguments, the ARB granted the Complainant's request for reconsideration, vacated the Order of Administrative Closure, accepted the Complainant's petition for review, and established the briefing schedule.