Dear Ms Atkins, attached please find our position statement in response to Mr Doles’ letter of March 11, 2016, as requested by you. Please let me know if you have any questions.
May 25, 2016

VIA EMAIL AND U.S. MAIL

Hen Jung Atkins
District Director
U.S. Department of Labor
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
Greater San Francisco/Bay District Office
90 7th Street, Suite 11-100
San Francisco, CA 94103

Re: Oracle/Redwood Shores--
Submitted in Furtherance of Conciliation and Resolution
Subject to Federal Rules of Evidence 408 Related to Negotiation and Settlement

Dear Ms. Atkins:

Addressing the Rutgers' University class of 2016, President Barack Obama noted:

"Facts, evidence, reason and logic ... these are good things. These are qualities you want in people making policy."

Justice Elena Kagan, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, warned in explaining the need to review EEOC conduct in conciliation:

About such review, the Commission's compliance with the law would rest in the Commission's hands alone. We need not doubt the EEOC's trustworthiness, or its fidelity to the law, to shy away from the result. We need only know and know that Congress knows -- that legal lapses and violations occur, and especially so when they have no consequences. That is why this court has so long applied a strong presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action.

These words and warnings ring true in addressing OFCCP's findings.

Background

On March 11, 2016, Robert Doles, the former San Francisco Director (we understand he has left the Agency), sent a letter to Oracle that he characterized as a Notice of Violations (hereinafter “NOV”). The NOV set forth ten (10) numbered violations including five (5) that alleged unlawful discrimination: one discrete Job Group (PT1) with alleged hiring discrimination, and four (4) discrete areas of alleged compensation discrimination. The remaining five (5) violations alleged technical violations.

Mr. Doles’ letter requested that Oracle respond within five (5) days stating whether Oracle was willing to engage in a conciliation and resolution process. Oracle timely indicated that it was so willing. Mr. Doles thereafter requested a position statement with regard to the NOV’s findings.

In subsequent correspondence, Oracle raised a series of questions and sought additional facts and information with regard to the NOV findings. The Agency responded for the most part by declining to provide any additional facts or information; and instead insisted that Oracle had the burden of providing a substantive response that would rebut the NOV’s 10 findings. We disagree that OFCCP has met its burden, but nonetheless set forth Oracle’s position statement as requested by Mr. Doles.

Overview

In reaching its findings 1 – 5 of alleged unlawful discrimination in discrete areas for a discrete group of Oracle’s Redwood Shores applicants and discrete segments of its employees, OFCCP has committed an extraordinary number of errors and omissions. These include, but are not limited to, reliance upon a large number of false assumptions; reference to and use of irrelevant census and labor force data; erroneous reliance upon, or otherwise misstating, its own regulations; failure and refusal to follow its own mandated processes and procedures; and making patently false statements, including in its NOV and follow-on correspondence. The NOV’s summary findings and statistical data presented are so defective procedurally, as well as substantively (both as to facts and legal standards), that the NOV must be withdrawn in its entirety.

The accompanying Sections I – III of this response address in further detail the reasons why a withdrawal of the NOV is mandated:

I. OFCCP’s compliance review process on which the NOV is purportedly based was so procedurally deficient that the NOV should not have been, and could not properly be, issued.
II. In more recent correspondence after issuance of the NOV, OFCCP cites to case law and contends that that the NOV shifts the burden to Oracle to rebut OFCCP's statistical results. OFCCP contends that it has properly used (relevant) statistics and has met its burden sufficient to require rebuttal. OFCCP's position is factually, procedurally and legally in error. Simply stated, OFCCP has not met its burden of establishing a prima facie case consistent with Title VII or Directive 307, nor has it presented facts and evidence sufficient to make even a minimal showing that any unlawful hiring or compensation discrimination exists.

III. The requirement that employees be similarly situated is a fundamental element of any Title VII-based analysis. Not only did OFCCP ignore this factual requirement; it chose to rely on a statistical model that has no factual or legal basis under Title VII law and its own Directive 307 (which requires application of Title VII standards). We show illustrations of the kind of assessment of similarly situated persons that OFCCP failed and refused to do, thereby failing to meet its burden to establish that there were actual relevant comparators to persons allegedly denied equal pay.

IV. OFCCP's statistical model is defective and no counter-statistical model is warranted. Oracle is a technology company that develops, supports and sells hundreds of products. It has a highly diversified and skilled work force, especially among its myriad technical jobs and roles in development, support and sales. Most jobs and most employees are not fungible or homogeneous. Their skills, their work, and the nature and criticality of the specific products on which they work are wide-ranging. In many cases no two employees at HQCA have the same or similar job, and thus they have no or possibly just one or two comparators. OFCCP has ignored entirely this key factual circumstance.

We would be pleased to engage in further dialogue and discussion as may be appropriate. However, for each and all of these reasons set forth herein, we believe resolution of the OFCCP HQCA evaluation requires OFCCP to withdraw its March 11, 2016 letter and findings and issue a Letter of Compliance.

Very truly yours,

Gary R. Siniscalco

cc: Patricia Shu, Director, OFCCP
    Juana Schurman
    Shauna Holman Harries
Re: Oracle/Redwood Shores
Submitted in Furtherance of Conciliation and Resolution
Subject to Federal Rules of Evidence 408 Related to Negotiation and Settlement

I. OFCCP REPEATEDLY AND FLAGRANTLY VIOLATED GOVERNING FCCM PROVISIONS IN THE LEAD-UP TO THE NOV ISSUANCE.

The Agency's actions have substantially violated its own procedures. These procedural violations are sufficiently significant and prejudicial that the Agency must withdraw the NOV.

The Introduction to the Federal Contract Compliance Manual ("FCCM") establishes that it should control the Agency's actions absent an inconsistency with "other OFCCP policies and its implementing regulations." FCCM at 1 (Introduction). The Introduction further states that the FCCM is intended to provide "contractors ... more transparency and clarity about basic OFCCP procedures and processes." Id. We are not aware of any conflicting policies or regulations that would suggest that the Agency is not subject to the FCCM procedures. If the Agency believes that other policies or procedures set forth its obligations in conducting compliance reviews, please advise us how the appropriate procedures and policies override the FCCM, how those policies apply to the compliance audit at issue, and how the Agency complied with those policies and procedures.

The following sections detail OFCCP's failures and deficiencies in its process, actions and communications with Oracle staff, and show that OFCCP's evaluation process and the resulting NOV are fatally deficient, defective and prejudicial to Oracle. Considered individually—and certainly when considered together—these failures undermine the fairness of the process, the procedural standards required by OFCCP, and any confidence that could be had in the outcome. Therefore, the NOV must be withdrawn.

A. The Compliance Evaluation Was Defective, Non-Transparent and Prejudicial to Oracle.

The FCCM directs that before issuing an NOV, the Agency advise the contractor of its findings. "After advising the contractor of its compliance evaluation findings, the CO must provide formal notification through a Predetermination Notice or Notice of Violation." FCCM § 2P00. At no point prior to issuing the NOV did the Agency advise Oracle what groups showed initial indicators, what violations the Agency was investigating, what comparator groups the Agency was forming, the results of any analysis the Agency was conducting, whether it was investigating disparate treatment or disparate impact discrimination, or any other facts regarding the findings of the compliance evaluation. Rather, the Agency rushed to judgment and issued an NOV.

1 During the course of the compliance evaluation, Deputy S.F. Regional Director Jane Suhr has acknowledged that "if there is inconsistency in the Manual and other OFCCP policies and its implementing regulations, the latter are controlling." Letter from Jane Suhr, May 11, 2015. There is nothing inconsistent with the Manual sections we cite.

2 This complete lack of transparency and gross failure and refusal to engage in any interactive conversation permeated the S.F. District and Regional Office approach to this review. The failure and refusal to engage in such process is not only contrary to the FCCM, but appears contrary to OFCCP's national office expectations. Bloomberg BNA, 5/09/16, 89 DLR A-4, "OFCCP Audits Should be 'Interactive and Conversational,' Official Says."
Following receipt of the NOV, Oracle advised the Agency on March 18, 2016 that OFCCP had failed to comply with its obligations. The Agency, through its District Director Robert Doles, falsely responded as follows:

During the entrance conference held on March 24, 2015, OFCCP discussed with you and other Oracle representatives the preliminary indicators and areas of concern at issue in the compliance evaluation, including Oracle’s compensation and hiring practices. At the exit conference held on March 27, 2015, OFCCP informed you and Neil Bourque that the Agency would conduct further analysis and any Agency findings would be issued in a formal notice. Upon conclusion of the follow-up onsite review on June 25, 2015, OFCCP informed you and Oracle representatives Neil Bourque, Charles Nyakundi, and outside counsel Gary Siniscalco that the Agency would review the information collected and conduct further analysis to determine its findings. On December 22, 2015, OFCCP also indicated to you that additional information was needed to further investigate potential violations. Throughout the compliance evaluation process, OFCCP also requested that Oracle comply with all outstanding data requests (see attachment), some of which had been pending since November 19, 2014 and also indicated the Agency’s preliminary indicators and areas of concern.

Letter from Robert Doles, March 29, 2016, to Shauna Holman-Harrick. This response makes no credible claim that the Agency advised Oracle of its compliance evaluation findings. First, to the extent that the Agency advised Oracle of preliminary indicators or actual evidence at the entrance conference (a representation we deny), this has no bearing on the indicators or actual evidence underpinning the compliance evaluation findings postdating the entrance conference. Second, advising Oracle that the Agency needed additional information to conduct further investigation has no bearing on the compliance evaluation findings, and does not ameliorate the opportunity denied Oracle to understand the findings and provide further relevant evidence per the Manual. FCCM § 2P00.

The Agency cannot have it both ways by arguing on the one hand that it fulfilled its obligation to advise Oracle of its compliance evaluation findings before issuing an NOV, while at the same time claiming that it needed additional information, all the while denying Oracle a fair and transparent opportunity to discuss or address OFCCP’s intended evaluation findings. Indeed, had the Agency ever advised Oracle that its compliance evaluation found evidence of compensation discrimination of comparators in relation to non-Asians in the Professional Technical 1 role, women in the Information Technology, Product Development and Support roles, African Americans in the Product Development role, Asians in the Product Development role or “Americans” in the Product Development role, Oracle would have, and could have, made it very clear that those findings were based on artificial groupings filled with employees who were not similarly situated for Title VII...
purposes, or even comparable under Oracle's compensation system as required by Directive 307. Nonetheless, in a rush to judgment, the Agency issued an NOV laden with unjustifiable groupings and other stark deficiencies, including unjustified adverse inferences, without following its own guidance.

Particularly notable is the Agency's failure to respond to Oracle's numerous requests to explain the indicators. As we noted in our April 11, 2016 letter, Oracle asked OFCCP on at least nine occasions to explain what indicators it found, including on December 31, 2014, February 17, 2015, March 9, 2015, March 12, 2015, March 13, 2015, June 3, 2015, July 2, 2015, and December 17, 2015. OFCCP never responded or provided any specific information. Independently, and contrary to the Agency's Manual, the Compliance Officers ("COs") and the S.F. District Office chose to keep Oracle in the dark. For example, without appropriately attempting to identify possible comparators for purposes of an equal pay analysis, at no time during more than nineteen (19) months of the extensive compliance evaluation did any of the Agency's COs request information or seek to assess which of Oracle's employees were, in fact, similarly situated. Nor did the Agency ever identify any comparator concerns to Oracle's representatives.

B. The Agency Failed to Conduct an Exit Conference Yet Stated Falsely That It Had Done So.

The FCCM provides that "upon completion of the necessary onsite review and evaluation of all information obtained, COs will discuss the tentative findings of the compliance evaluation with the contractor at the onsite exit conference." FCCM § 2N. During the conference, "the CO must be prepared to describe the aspects of the investigation and to discuss the tentative findings of the compliance evaluation in general terms." Id. Also, the CO "will advise ... of the possibility that a PDN or NOV could be issued." Id. § 2N00. The Supreme Court, in interpreting the word "must" (under Title VII), has made clear that agencies cannot skirt their mandatory obligations where law requires fidelity to its rules and policies. See Mach Mining v. E.E.O.C., 527 S. Ct. 1645, 1656 (2015).

The Agency failed to follow this mandatory provision in the Manual, and its failure to do so has plainly prejudiced Oracle by undermining its ability to understand and be informed of the CO's finding and proffer appropriate response to the Agency's asserted evidence.

Instead, OFCCP failed to conduct a proper exit conference or advise Oracle regarding the tentative findings of the compliance evaluation, then claimed falsely that an exit conference occurred. This assertion by OFCCP's former Director Doles is belied by contemporaneous correspondence in response to Oracle's request for an exit conference. First, the Agency's claim that an exit conference occurred on March 27, 2015 is completely false. On June 25, 2015, Shauna Holman Harries asked the Agency for a status conversation related to the investigation and requested that the Agency "let me know when we can talk early next week for an exit conference ..." On July 2, 2016, Hea Jung Atkins responded by email to Ms. Holman Harries by recounting OFCCP's perspectives on various issues and confrontations (which Oracle disputed). In that email, Ms. Atkins refused to schedule an

---

* See infra, listing efforts by Oracle's staff requesting information from OFCCP on "indicators." Instead, OFCCP chose consistently to keep Oracle in the dark.
exit conference, stating that the Agency "was not prepared to conduct an exit conference" based on
the need to conduct additional employee interviews. The email went on to state: "We will schedule
an exit conference at the conclusion of our offsite analysis." This email puts the lie to the Agency's
claim that an exit conference had already occurred some two months earlier. Moreover, no later exit
conference ever occurred.

Notwithstanding the false claim that the March 27 meeting was an exit conference, the Agency's
own version of the events leave unchallenged Oracle's position that the Agency failed to provide any
information regarding its tentative findings. OFCCP repeatedly stated an intent to conduct further
analyses and provide notice of findings at some future point, as Mr. Doles' March 29, 2016 letter
conceives. Tellingly, the Agency fails to state that it advised Oracle of any tentative findings. Even if
an exit conference occurred, therefore, the Agency did not satisfy its obligation to conduct a proper
exit interview as required by the FCCM. Instead, the Agency rushed to issue its fatally flawed NOV.

C. OFCCP Failed to Follow Its Required Procedures to Obtain Additional
Documentation.

The FCCM provides that "if the contractor refuses to provide the requested data or information or
does not allow a follow up onsite visit, the CO will prepare an SCN [Show Cause Notice] for
denial of access.” FCCM § 2O (emphasis added). A Show Cause Notice is required when a
contractor fails to submit an Affirmative Action Program ("AAP"), submits a deficient AAP, fails to
submit employment activity or compensation data or submits deficient employment or
compensation data. In addition, a Show Cause Notice must also be issued when a "contractor
refuses to provide access to its premises for an onsite review.” Id. § 8D01. Although Oracle denies
that it ever refused a request, if OFCCP truly believed Oracle had denied access or failed or refused
to submit relevant and required data, OFCCP was required to issue an SCN. Notably, OFCCP
never pointed to any evidence of such a refusal. At most, Oracle on occasion raised legitimate
concerns, asked questions, or articulated legitimate objections. Oracle sought transparency and
interactive conversation. OFCCP chose silence and kept Oracle in the dark.

During the course of the compliance evaluation, OFCCP launched a barrage of burdensome
information requests. Oracle produced in hardcopy and electronically a huge volume of documents,
at least thirty-five (35) managers and HR Staff were interviewed, and electronic databases were
provided to OFCCP on at least 8 occasions. Oracle believes it fully complied with its obligations
under the regulations to provide information during the compliance evaluation. To the extent that
OFCCP believed that Oracle had not provided information to which OFCCP was entitled and
which it believed was necessary and relevant, the FCCM unequivocally requires that the CO prepare
an SCN. During the course of the review, the Agency made no attempt to take this required step to
obtain records or other materials it believed were necessary to complete its investigation. Nor did
the Agency ever ask for access to review records.

This perhaps represents the most striking example of the Agency's misstatements of the facts and
deliberate disregard of its own policies and procedures in its rush to judgment in issuing an NOV.
Not only did the Agency fail to avail itself of the internal SCN process, but it also failed to take
advantage of the expedited ALJ process under the regulations which could have led to a quick resolution of any outstanding document disputes. Adherence to this important procedural step makes sense; it avoids the exact situation here, where good faith disputes regarding the scope of requests are left unresolved and the Agency reaches unsubstantiated findings with little or no factual basis. Rather than seek to resolve those purported disputes, the Agency chose the course of disregarding its internal processes and improperly relied on adverse inferences in reaching the conclusions in the NOV.\textsuperscript{5}

D. \textbf{OFCCP Failed to Issue an NOV Compliant with FCCM § 8E01.}

The FCCM lays out the necessary contents of an NOV. It provides that the NOV must “[e]stablish the problem, with any modification from the contractor’s response (to the PDN), include specific facts, and where applicable, the results of the analyses that support the violations.” FCCM § 8E01. The NOV is wholly inadequate in this regard. The NOV merely recites the affected groups; asserts that hiring, compensation or recordkeeping violations exist; and attaches summary results of irrelevant standard deviation calculations. The NOV fails to consider Oracle’s response (since no opportunity was given), and fails to include any specific facts regarding the bases of the violations, how the alleged discriminatory practices led to violations, what analyses the Agency conducted, or any other relevant facts specifically informing Oracle how it allegedly violated the law.

The FCCM also delineates the circumstances in which the Agency may issue an NOV. NOVs may be issued for pattern and practice violations or “other” violations. FCCM § 8F00. “Other” violations can include “individual discrimination, lack of recordkeeping and lack of outreach and recruitment.” \textit{Id.} Violation 10 of the NOV alleges that Oracle violated the regulations because it failed to produce records. Yet OFCCP provides no facts supporting that conclusion. Other purported technical violations also cited (in similar summary fashion) alleged failures to produce records as bases for triggering the adverse presumption under 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.12. But failure to produce documents is not a proper violation under the FCCM. Rather, as noted above, the FCCM plainly requires that document production issues be addressed through Show Cause Notices.

E. \textbf{OFCCP Failed to Follow Its Interview Process.}

The FCCM states that “after a formal interview, the CO must ask each person to read, sign and date the CO’s interview notes.” FCCM § 2M00(f). It also provides that the “CO will promptly type the handwritten interview notes using MS Word in order to provide the interviewee with a hard copy to sign as soon as possible after the interview.” \textit{Id.} OFCCP conducted over 35 manager and HR interviews during its two onsite visits, and yet followed neither required procedure.

After the interviews, the CO did not ask the interviewees to acknowledge the notes. Oracle’s compliance staff, on several occasions, asked about the status of the interview documents. Then,

\textsuperscript{5}Even the NOV’s application of the adverse inference rule is defective and misapplied by Mr. Doles. The Agency’s regulation on use of an adverse inference is limited to specific circumstances “[w]here a contractor has destroyed or failed to preserve records....” 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.12(e). There are no facts suggesting that Oracle engaged in any such conduct.
many months after the interviews, the Agency sent interview "statements" to Oracle and asked the Company to have managers sign them. Not only were the statements dilatorily sent; they also failed to provide an accurate depiction of the interview (i.e., questions asked by the respective COs and responses to those questions by the respective interviewee). This failure is particularly notable. During interviews different Oracle managers, in response to specific questions, addressed hiring and compensation practices, multiple factors related to how Oracle hired and paid its employees, various efforts Oracle took to evaluate its pay system and ensure pay equity, and other facts and circumstances related to differences in skills, expertise, responsibility, job content, performance, etc. that bear on compensation at Oracle. Equally noteworthy are topics and questions not covered in interviews, especially regarding job similarity and the actual duties and skill, effort, and responsibilities of possible comparators. In response to questions, managers variously described a range of factors (not OFCCP's simplistic time-at-Oracle and total work experience) relevant to assessing actual pay comparators at Oracle. Despite these responses provided in the interviews and elsewhere, the Agency issued an NOV that failed to take into account how Oracle structures its workforce and pays its employees, notwithstanding Directive 307's mandate that OFCCP evaluate "employees who are comparable under the contractor's wage or salary system." Directive 307 at § 8.B.3. At best, the interviews wasted Oracle's managers' time. At worst, the Agency ignored critical facts provided in the interviews because it had made up its mind—regardless of relevant facts about Oracle's actual practices, pay system and criteria used—that Oracle discriminates against a few selected slices of its Redwood Shores workers.

F. **OFCPP Made Numerous Inappropriate Requests Beyond the Scope of Existing Documents.**

OFCPP's regulations require contractors to provide access to existing documents and records upon request. Specifically, the regulations allow access to "books and accounts and records, including computerized records ...." 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.43. The FCCM provides that COs may review various records during evaluations including but not limited to payroll records, employee activity records, Collective Bargaining Agreements, personnel policies and discrimination and harassment policies. See FCCM § 3H. Nothing in the regulations requires that contractors create records or provide records in anything other than their native format.

Despite the lack of authority, the Agency on numerous occasions asked that Oracle compile and provide documents in Excel spreadsheets and in "usable formats." In the spirit of cooperation, Oracle compiled and provided compensation spreadsheets to the Agency on at least 8 occasions (October 28, 2014, December 11, 2014, December 15, 2014, February 26, 2015, March 17, 2015, May 14, 2015, June 16, 2015, and October 29, 2015). Notwithstanding this cooperation, the Agency has cited Oracle for failing to provide documents and faulted Oracle for not providing documents "in a usable format." The Agency's actions clearly overreach and lack authority, as Oracle had no obligation to create documents.

---

6 Not one interview involved questions about the actual work performed by them; whether others did the same or similar work; or the "relevant factors in determining similarity" set forth in OFCCP's Directive 307 at § 8.3.6.
In another instance of overreaching, the Agency directed Oracle to provide a list of EEOC or state
civil rights charges from Oracle (though the FCCM directs OFCCP to the respective agencies to
obtain this information). OFCCP also requested different variations on and timeframes for
collections of internal complaints. Oracle objected and exercised its right to question whether the
Agency was entitled to collect such information. In response, the Agency engaged in retaliatory and
abusive conduct in changing and then dramatically expanding its request for internal complaints.
Finally, at the March 24, 2015 entrance conference, Agency COs, in the presence of the S.F.
Regional Director, claimed Oracle had lied and threatened Oracle's Director of Diversity
Compliance with criminal sanctions because the Agency located a pending "federal court
complaint." Despite these offensive and untrue accusations, Oracle explained that OFCCP had only
requested a list of "employee complaints," and that Oracle had never claimed that it did not have
any pending discrimination complaints (lawsuits) from former employees. On May 11, 2015, after
some lengthy and contentious correspondence, and recognizing that it did not have the authority to
demand the information, the Agency dropped its request.

II. OFCCP HAS NOT MET ITS BURDEN UNDER THE LAW TO ESTABLISH
ANY SYSTEMIC DISCRIMINATION.

In addition to the grave procedural deficiencies identified above, the NOV suffers from a
substantive failure to adequately establish any violation. OFCCP claims that it has identified
"systemic discrimination" at Oracle, and that "[b]ecause OFCCP has met its burden, Oracle now
bears one." Apr. 21, 2016 Letter at 1-2. OFCCP is incorrect on both counts, and its insistence that
Oracle is obliged to present a "statistical rebuttal" is erroneous.

Despite having investigated Oracle's Redwood Shores facility for over nineteen (19) months,
OFCCP did not adduce a single first-hand account suggesting intentional discrimination in
recruiting, hiring, or compensation. Nor did OFCCP present any facts suggesting such
discrimination, as required by its own manual. See FCCM § 8F01. The NOV rests solely on the
results of a superficial and irrelevant statistical analysis it performed using, "inter alia," some Oracle
data and general labor force statistics. Directive 307 defines systemic discrimination as either (1) "[a]
pattern and practice of discrimination" or (2) "an identified employment practice with disparate
impact." Directive 307 at § 7. But OFCCP has not made an adequate prima facie showing under
either theory.

A. OFCCP Has Not Established Any Disparate Impact Violation.

It is clear that OFCCP has not articulated even a prima facie case of disparate impact. In order to
state such a violation, OFCCP must first "isolate[] and identify[] the specific employment practices
that are allegedly responsible for any" alleged disparate impact on a protected group. Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonic, 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989), superseded by statute on other grounds, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

---

2 Oracle was granted summary judgment by the federal court on the complaint in question. See Order Granting Mot. for
Spandow was not employed by Oracle during the relevant review period.
2(k) (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988)); see also Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005) (quoting Wards Cove Packing, 490 U.S. at 657) ("[T]he failure to identify the specific practice being challenged is the sort of omission that could result in employers being potentially liable for the myriad of innocent causes that may lead to statistical imbalances ... "). Then, OFCCP would be required to "demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact ...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i). "A disparate-impact claim that relies on a statistical disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant's policy or policies causing that disparity," and courts must enforce this "robust causality requirement" in order to "protect [ ] defendants from being held liable for [] disparities they did not create." Texas Dep't of Hous. and Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmty. Proj. et al., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).8 OFCCP has neither identified a specific facially neutral practice, nor demonstrated that any such practice causes the alleged disparities. Thus, it has not stated any disparate impact violation.

B. OFCCP Has Not Established Any Pattern and Practice of Disparate Treatment.

Given its failure to establish any predicate for disparate impact liability, OFCCP is required to establish a "pattern or practice of discrimination" on a disparate treatment theory. But the OFCCP has not met its burden to establish even a prima facie case on this theory, either. Perhaps this is because OFCCP misapprehends and underestimates the weight of its burden—or else, despite many months of "investigation," it rushed to judgment.

1. The Government's Burden of Proof in a Pattern and Practice is Demanding.

"[T]he burden of establishing a pattern or practice of discrimination is not an easy one to carry."

EEOC v. Bloomberg, L.P., 778 F. Supp. 2d 458, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citation omitted). As OFCCP's own authority acknowledges, where the Government "allege[s] a systemwide pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of Title VII rights," it must "establish by the preponderance of the evidence that [] discrimination fits the company's standard operating procedure—the regular rather than the unusual practice." Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977); accord Morgan v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 380 F.3d 459, 463-64 (8th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) ("In a pattern-or-practice class action, the class must prove that the defendant regularly and purposefully treated members of the protected group less favorably than employees not in the protected group, and that unlawful discrimination was the employer's regular procedure or policy."). As compared to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applicable in private, non-class cases, the Teamsters pattern and practice framework "charges the plaintiff with the higher

---

8 See also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) ("[T]he mere claim by employees of the same company that they have suffered a Title VII injury, or even a disparate-impact Title VII injury, gives no cause to believe that all their claims can productively be litigated at once" unless ")their claims ... depend upon a common contention—for example, the assertion of discriminatory bias on the part of the same supervisor ... ")

initial burden of establishing "that unlawful discrimination has been a regular procedure or policy followed by an employer ..." Serrano v. Cintas Corp., 699 F.3d 884, 893 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360); see also id. at 896 (describing initial Teamsters burden as "heightened" and "more arduous"); E.E.O.C. v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, 36 F. Supp. 3d 836, 846 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (citation omitted) (describing Teamsters burden as "more demanding than what McDonnell Douglas requires"). The Teamsters case, of course, was brought by the U.S. Department of Justice; try as it might, the U.S. Department of Labor is subject to no lesser standard of evidence or proof.

Moreover, the Government must present evidence that the "standard operating procedure" of discrimination was intentional in order to establish a pattern or practice of disparate treatment—i.e., the Government must show that "the protected trait ... actually motivated the employer's decision." Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003) (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)). OFCCP must thus "prove[] by a preponderance of evidence facts from which the court must infer, absent rebuttal, that the defendant was more likely than not motivated by a discriminatory animus." Gay v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's Union, Local No. 30, 694 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added). The "burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times" with the Government. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). See also E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 502, 509 (7th Cir. 1988) (rejecting suggesting that employer "had the burden of persuasion" and finding "no support in the case law for [this] contention"); OFCCP v. Bank of America, ARB Case No. 13-099, ALJ Case No. 1997-OFC-1, ARB Apr. 21, 2016 (available at http://www.oal.dol.gov/PUBLIC/ARB/DECISIONS/ARB_DECISIONS/OFC/13-099.pdf) at 13 (rejecting OFCCP's claim that, "after its presentation of evidence, [the employer] had the specific burden of showing that the OFCCP's statistical proof was unsound or to prove that the disparity occurred as a result of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons" because "the burden of proof always remains with the OFCCP"). OFCCP must come forward with proof that suggests deliberate discrimination by Oracle against all of the individuals it identifies—but it has not and cannot do so.

2. Statistics Alone Rarely, if Ever, Suffice to Meet this Burden.

OFCCP attempts to build a case against Oracle founded solely on its own (opaque) statistical analysis. In doing so, it asserts a brightline rule that any statistical evidence indicating a disparity of two or more standard deviations "is acceptable as evidence of discrimination" and, without anything further, constitutes "compelling proof." Apr. 21, 2016 Letter at 2 n.5, n.6. The weight of authority is to the contrary. Indeed, "[i]n most cases, ... more than statistical evidence has been required to satisfy the plaintiff's ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination." B. Lindemann, et al., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 2-116 (5th ed. 2014).

Particularly where the Government alleges a pattern and practice of disparate treatment—i.e., intentional discrimination directed and perpetuated by the company itself—bare statistical evidence is unlikely to suffice. "Without significant individual testimony to support statistical evidence, courts have refused to find a pattern or practice of discrimination." King v. Gen. Elec. Co., 960 F.2d 617, 624 (7th Cir. 1992); accord Adams v. Ameritech Serfs, Inc., 231 F.3d 414, 423 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that "[s]tatistical evidence ... in a case alleging disparate treatment or a discriminatory pattern or practice..."
Re: Oracle/Redwood Shores Submitted in Furtherance of Conciliation and Resolution Subject to Federal Rules of Evidence 408 Related to Negotiation and Settlement

... will likely not be sufficient in itself); OFCCP v. Bank of America, ARB Case No. 13-099, ALI Case No. 1997-OFC-16, ARB Apr. 21, 2016 (available at http://www.caal.gov/PUBLIC/ARB/DECISIONS/ARB_DECISIONS/OFC/13_099_OFC_PDF at 14 (even in straightforward case challenging only hiring practices for entry-level positions, noting that only "[v]ery extreme cases of statistical disparity" could "permit the trier of fact to conclude intentional [ ] discrimination occurred without needing additional evidence"). As the Ninth Circuit has explained:

In order to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment based solely on statistical evidence, the plaintiff must produce statistics showing a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race. But such cases are rare. Absent a stark pattern, impact alone is not determinative, and the Court must look to other evidence. ... Simply put, statistics demonstrating that chance is not the more likely explanation are not by themselves sufficient to demonstrate that race is the more likely explanation for an employer's conduct.

Gay, 694 F.2d at 552-53 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (finding bare statistical evidence insufficient to establish prima facie case). Given these concerns, "[n]ormally, the plaintiff will produce statistical evidence showing disparities between similarly situated protected and unprotected employees with respect to hiring, job assignments, promotions, and salary, supplemented with other evidence, such as testimony about specific incidents of discrimination." Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 731 N.W.2d 465, 469-70 (8th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added).10 Though OFCCP is correct that examples of individual discrimination are not always required, courts are clear that "the lack of such proof reinforces [any] doubt arising from the questions about the validity of the statistical evidence." Starr, 839 F.2d at 311 (citation omitted); accord Morgan, 380 F.3d at 471 ("One of the most important flaws in Plaintiffs' case is that they adduced no individual testimony regarding intentional discrimination."). Although OFCCP acknowledges it interviewed dozens of Oracle managers and HR staff members, as well as individual employees, and despite the OFCCM mandate to present facts, OFCCP has not presented any such proof or facts—either in the NOV, or at any time.

3. OFCCP's Case Law is Not to the Contrary.

The cases OFCCP cites similarly hold that statistics alone rarely (if ever) permit an inference of intentional discrimination.11 In Teamsters, for example, the statistical evidence involving hiring of

---

10 Here, OFCCP asserts bias at most, in just a few slices of the organization, and for just a few slices of the protected classes (i.e., for women in three "roles," and just one such for African-Americans, "Asians," and "Americans"). OFCCP's statistical methodology purports to identify these respective cuts, and the few respective classes of purported victims covered, out of the entire Redwood Shores establishment of over 7,000 employees.

11 Much of the authority OFCCP cites is irrelevant. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) and Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), both cited by OFCCP, are not germane to the issues at hand. Griggs established the viability of disparate impact law and cited some statistics relevant to the specific employment practice (a degree or episode test requirement), but does not address the statistical proof required to establish a pattern-or-practice disparate treatment case. Castaneda was a case in which the plaintiff challenged his conviction on equal protection grounds due to alleged
drivers with basic, common skills showed a “glaring absence of minority line drivers” approaching “the inexorable zero.” Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 342 n.23. And even then, the Government “bolstered” its overwhelming statistical evidence “with the testimony of individuals who recounted over 40 specific instances of discrimination.” Id. at 339. Thus, Teamsters was “not a case in which the Government relied on statistics alone” [because] “the individuals who testified about their personal experiences with the company brought the cold numbers convincingly to life.” Id. Likewise in Hazelwood School District v. United States, the Government did not rely solely on statistics, but also adduced evidence of (1) a history of alleged racially discriminatory practices, (2) statistical disparities in hiring, (3) the standardless and largely subjective hiring procedures, and (4) specific instances of alleged discrimination against 55 unsuccessful [African-American] applicants for teaching jobs.” 433 U.S. 299, 303 (1977).

Even in Segar v. Smith, on which the OFCCP heavily relies, the plaintiffs “introduced anecdotal testimony of discrimination” from several class members “[to buttress] the statistical proof” they offered, “including testimony of several agents about disparate treatment in disciplinary procedures and supervisory evaluations, and about black agents’ general perceptions that DEA was a discriminatory environment.” 738 F.2d 1249, 1263, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Segar thus underscores that something more than a bare statistical analysis is needed to sustain an inference of intentional systemic discrimination. To the extent that Segar can be read to have held (arguably in dicta) that bare statistics can sustain a pattern and practice disparate treatment claim (see id. at 1278), the OFCCP’s other authority makes clear that Segar is an outlier; the weight of federal authority recognizes “that statistical evidence supported by no, or very little, anecdotal evidence is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.” 3-55 Labor & Employment Law § 55.05 (Matthew Bender 2016) (citing cases).

When the statistical evidence is not overwhelming and unassailable—for example, when it “does not adequately account for the diverse and specialized qualifications necessary for” the position(s) in question—“strong evidence of individual instances of discrimination becomes vital to the plaintiff’s discrimination case. Hazelwood explicitly states that “the OFCCP, in addressing federal Drug Enforcement Agency practices that openly used race as a factor to assign African-American agents “disproportionately large amount of undercover work . . . on the assumption that black agents [would] be more readily able to infiltrate organizations consisting primarily of blacks,” which “injure[d] [their] promotion opportunities because [they were] unable to obtain the breadth of experience needed for promotions.” Id. at 1260. Plaintiffs used compensation statistics to demonstrate the effect of this and other allegedly discriminatory practices. Id. at 1261. And the Court emphasized that to be “legally sufficient,” those statistics needed to “show a disparity of treatment, eliminate the most common nondiscriminatory explanations of the disparity, and thus permit the inference that, absent other explanation, the disparity more likely than not resulted from illegal discrimination.” Id. at 1274 (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 368).
Re: Oracle/Redwood Shores
Submitted in Furtherance of Conciliation and Resolution
Subject to Federal Rules of Evidence 408 Related to Negotiation and Settlement

page 12 of 18
Re: Oracle/Redwood Shores
Submitted in Furtherance of Conciliation and Resolution
Subject to Federal Rules of Evidence 408 Related to Negotiation and Settlement

("When special qualifications are required to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general population (rather than to the smaller group of individuals who possess the necessary qualifications) may have little probative value."); *Cever*, 739 F.2d at 750 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (finding that "generalized statistical data may be less persuasive evidence of discrimination where an employer hires highly educated, specially qualified people on a decentralized basis").

OFCCP makes no effort in the NOV to compare the actual applicant pool to those hired into Oracle's technical PT1 positions during the relevant period—presumably because that comparison would not support OFCCP's desired conclusion. Although recourse to relevant labor pool statistics could conceivably be appropriate if there were independent evidence that the applicant pool itself had been skewed by a company's overt discriminatory preferences, OFCCP offers absolutely no facts to suggest any such conduct by Oracle. As such, there is no reason to think that the OFCCP's statistics present any meaningful comparison, and they cannot support a prima facie case of any recruiting/hiring violation. See, e.g., *Sears*, 839 F.2d at 324, 328 (rejecting statistical analysis that used overinclusive data pool and did not "account for differences in interests or qualifications among [actual] applicants," as the "EEOC did not analyze the hiring situations actually confronted by Sears managers"); *Ste Marie v. E. R.R. Ass'n*, 650 F.2d 395, 400 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding "plaintiff's statistical evidence and the EEOC reports on which it was based were totally wanting in probative value" because they failed to isolate pool of candidates with requisite skills and experience). We are confident that a judge would reject OFCCP's efforts to manufacture a violation by recourse to inappropriate labor pool statistics in this case. Accord *Lopez v. Laborers Int'l Union Local No. 18*, 987 F.2d 1210, 1214-15 (5th Cir. 1993) (no prima facie case established where plaintiffs "concocted numbers to create the requisite standard deviations").

5. **OFCCP Has Not Established a Prima Facie Case of Compensation Discrimination.**

The burden of showing that any affected pay class is comparable to a more favored class falls on the Government. No rush to judgment can short circuit its obligation. Absent evidence that the purported classes in the NOV are actually, in fact, similarly situated to relevant comparators, OFCCP's statistics and conclusions have no basis in fact or law.

As OFCCP's Directive 307 acknowledges, "[i]nvestigation of potential compensation discrimination presents complex and nuanced issues" and requires a "case-by-case approach." Id. at 7. OFCCP's directive dictates that compensation analysis must employ "statistical controls to ensure that workers are similarly situated," and counsels consideration of a host of different factors including "tasks performed, skills, effort, level of responsibility, working conditions, job difficulty, minimum

---

13. *Accord Hunter v. S. R.R. Co.*, 497 F.2d 1374, 1379 n.6 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that "comparison with general population statistics is of questionable value when we are considering positions for which ... the general population is not presumptively qualified," and that often "recourse [will] still have to be had to the statistics concerning the applicant pool and its racial composition before meaningful comparison with the percentage of blacks actually employed could be made"); *Mento v. Dep't of Transp.*, 629 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1980) (citation omitted) (holding that "statistical source [which] did not accurately reflect the percentage of females interested in the work force in question ... did not establish a prima facie case").
qualifications, and other objective factors” in determining who is “similarly situated.” Id. at 3; see also id. at 12-13 (“For purposes of evaluating compensation differences, employees are similarly situated where it is reasonable to expect they should be receiving equivalent compensation absent discrimination.”). OFCCP must look to “contractor’s wage and salary system”—not its own external, superficial judgment—to determine which individuals are “comparable” for purposes of a pay equity analysis. Id. at 7. Even then, because of the complex factors that can inform how companies compensate individuals, “[t]he mere fact that there are pay differences between comparators, without any other evidence of pretext or other indicia of possible discrimination, generally is not sufficient to find a violation of E.O. 11246.” Id. at 12.

OFCCP plainly failed to comply with its own directive in this case, as well as ignoring applicable Title VII principles. The NOV alleges four separate compensation violations (against females, African-Americans, Asians, and “Americans” (whatever that may mean) in varying combinations of IT, Product Development, and/or Support roles). All of these conclusions suffer from the same fatal flaw: the assumptions that all professionals at Oracle who may share a role are similarly situated, fungible employees, and that the primary factors affecting pay are time at Oracle and work experience. Again, OFCCP provides no facts suggesting or supporting the crucial assumptions at the foundation of its findings.

The case law makes clear that compensation statistics “must address the crucial question of whether one class is being treated differently from another class that is otherwise similarly situated.” Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 638 (7th Cir. 2001). “[S]tatistics that fail[] to account for obvious variables ... that would have affected the results of the analysis” are “insufficient to raise a question of intentional discrimination.” Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1283 (9th Cir. 2000). Uncritically assuming that everyone in the same job category (or role) is similarly situated—as OFCCP did here—does not suffice. This is because “[e]mployers are permitted to compensate employees differently based on skills that are not specifically required in a given job description so long as the employer considers those skills when making the compensation decision.” Warren v. Solo Cup Co., 516 F.3d 627, 630-31 (7th Cir. 2008) (rejecting Title VII compensation claim where plaintiff could not show she was similarly situated to more highly skilled co-worker); see also Caceres, 739 F.2d at 753 (in rejecting compensation discrimination claim by female non-tenured professors [NTPs], finding that “[t]he NTP rank itself merely establishes outside parameters for salary and does not reflect the tasks or responsibilities of a particular job except in a highly general fashion,” and thus data that failed to account for “crucial variables” within that broad job category (including differing duties) were “not probative of discrimination”).

16 Numerous other courts are in accord. See, e.g., Knight v. Brown, 797 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1127 (W.D. Wash. 2011), aff’d, 485 Fed. App’x 183 (9th Cir. 2012) (employee not “similarly situated” to other individuals with same job title (security sergeant) in same county agency (King County’s Facilities Management Division) due to differences in seniority/tenure in that job and shift worked); Ren v. Univ. of Cent. Florida Bd. of Trustees, 390 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1230-31 (M.D. Fla. 2005), aff’d sub nom., 179 F. App’x 690 (11th Cir. 2006) (rejecting Title VII discrimination claim of individual who did not “share[] the same supervisor or evaluators” and “hold[ed] a position[] in a different department[]” than proposed comparator, and thus was subject to different evaluation process impacting prospects of promotion); Nititha v. Daphne Util., No. 13-0605-WS-C, 2015 WL 4910983, at *6 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 17, 2015) (finding job duties of clerk handling accounts receivable “fundamentally different” than those of clerk handling accounts payable, as latter job “was more difficult, more complex, more time-consuming, and required more skill, effort and responsibility”); Sims-Fingers v. City of Indianapolis, 493
OPCCP has made no effort to show that all Oracle employees who work anywhere in “Information Technology” (or “Product Development,” or “Support”) have the same responsibilities, performance, or skills; or that the products or projects on which they work have the same importance to the company; or that the broader labor market has the same demand for their services elsewhere, such that Oracle faces the exact same competitive pressure to retain them all. To the contrary, it is implausible to treat all employees in a company like Oracle that requires specialized, trained professionals as fungible, or any compensation distinctions among them as per se suspect.

Once again, the OFCCP has set forth a conclusory finding unsupported by the requisite facts. As set forth here and in Section III, OFCCP’s assorted compensation statistics are simply not “legally sufficient,” as they do not make any effort to “eliminate the most common nondiscriminatory explanations of the disparity”—namely, genuine differences in the skills, performance, and other features of different Oracle employees—and thus do not “permit the inference that” Oracle discriminated. See, 738 F.2d at 1274 (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 368). Accordingly, the NOV fails to state even a prima facie case on these counts as well, and should be withdrawn.

III. OFCCP’S SUMMARY STATISTICAL ANALYSES IN ATTACHMENT A TO ITS NOV ARE LEGALLY IRRELEVANT AND FAIL TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE INFERENCE OR PROOF OF UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION

NOV violations #2-5 rely on OFCCP’s contention that it has identified “statistically significant pay disparities ... after controlling for legitimate explanatory factors.” NOV, Attachment A. Each of the regression models states simply that the model “involved the natural log of annual salary as a dependent variable and accounted for differences in employees’ gender (race, etc.), work experience at Oracle, work experience prior to Oracle, fulltime/part time status, exempt status, global career level, job specialty and job title.” Id.

OFCCP makes its conclusory findings of statistically significant disparities as to the specific classes based solely on the above factors. The NOV then offers one line of numbers for each such finding. Why or how OFCCP and its statisticians adopted, as the supposed legitimate explanatory factors,
only those included in its model is nowhere explained. However, none of the variables the OFCCP considered addresses the specific types of work performed by individual employees. The lack of any other factors, and lack of any further explanation from the Agency, comes as no surprise given that its position as to the model used simply cannot be defended.

Oracle is a high technology company in a highly competitive field. Most of its jobs, and certainly the jobs at issue, require people with specialized or unique skills. Many are in cutting edge new areas of technology. Required skills and expertise at Oracle are not basic for most roles, and jobs at Oracle are not fungible or homogeneous, in contrast to jobs in large retail or manufacturing operations or municipal services such as bus drivers or police officers. While the larger types of jobs require a range of significant and unique skills across jobs, the particular jobs within those categories each generally involve a similar set of skills. In such cases, the roles of drivers or line (beat) police officers may well be sufficiently similarly situated that all drivers or all line officers may be included in a given analysis.

But at Oracle, product developers working on cloud products, on fusion products, or on PeopleSoft products require different skills and skill levels, and can have very different roles and responsibilities. This is why grouping skills together based on the overbroad "job function" designation is not an appropriate or accurate way to analyze or understand pay at Oracle. Grouping employees by supervisor provides some insight into which employees may be working on similar products or projects in the same line of business. But even in the same job and line of business, employees may not only have different skill sets but different levels of expertise and responsibilities. As a result, even for employees working in the same department, for the same supervisor, and with the same job title, they may not be doing the same level or type of work. Oracle is organized into many small entrepreneurial groups and each group works on different products or may support different types of industries, business sectors and/or lines of business. Frequently, the product worked on, or the business sector for whom the work is being done, can itself be an important indicator of pay.

Performance at Oracle also matters. Not only does the employee's individual performance matter; the performance of the product (value and criticality to the company's business) also matters. These and numerous other legitimate factors described during the compliance evaluation have all been ignored by Mr. Doles and OFCCP's statisticians in an apparent effort to squeeze out some statistical model in order to engineer a disparity finding. But simply producing some model, however irrelevant, is not sufficient to shift OFCCP's legal burden.

Neither Mr. Doles in the NOV, nor the statisticians in their models, offer any facts to establish that their conclusions concern appropriate employee comparators. OFCCP has an obligation to use relevant facts and apply applicable legal standards in developing a statistical model. It has failed to meet its obligations in all respects. Simply stated, in many instances employees at Oracle are not, in fact, similarly situated. And, even where employees are comparators (i.e., similarly situated), pay

---

19 In response to follow-up questions to OFCCP seeking to understand the rationale for use of these factors and no others, Oracle was met with a series of legal objections from the Agency and was provided zero additional information.
differences can be, and are, based on legitimate non-discriminatory explanatory factors consistent with Oracle's pay system and applicable law.

Had OFCCP evaluated pay consistent with the relevant facts and applicable legal standards, it would have found valid explanations for the disparities it identified. Consider, for example, Ping (Shelley) Feng, a female who was working as a Software Developer Senior Manager making $131,000 as of January 1, 2014. Although there were 334 total employees in that same job title at HQCA at that time, only two others worked with Ms. Feng in her group under the same supervisor: Byung-Hyun Chung and Mandar Chintaman. And, although they worked for the same supervisor, each of them had different roles and responsibilities within the group. According to their supervisor (a female, Ayse Abu), both Mr. Chung and Mr. Chintaman had larger areas of responsibility and larger teams than Ms. Feng. Mr. Chung is the lead Development Manager for product and responsible for the entire engineering effort. He is also conversant in all technology areas used and manages a team of nine, including two Senior Managers. Mr. Chintaman also managed a larger team than Ms. Feng before his departure from Oracle (team of 8 with two managers reporting to him), and he was also a lead Development Manager for product. Mr. Chintaman was an expert in the newer technology areas. Both Mr. Chung and Mr. Chintaman held the discretionary title of Group Manager. Ms. Feng's area of responsibility was narrower. She managed a smaller team of just three individual contributors and was responsible for only some areas of product. Her technical expertise is also narrower and she is not as knowledgeable as Mr. Chung or Mr. Chintaman in newer technologies. Her discretionary title is Senior Manager. These facts—none of which were considered by OFCCP—explain why Mr. Chung and Mr. Chintaman had higher salaries ($147,000 and $146,000, respectively) than Ms. Feng in 2014.

The Software Developer 4 employees under Wilson Chan present another good example. In January 2014, the two Asian employees in the group (Xiaoli Qi and Norman Lee) had lower salaries than the two white employees (Yuri Sharonin and Tolga Yurek) because of their relative technical expertise and level of productivity. Mr. Sharonin (paid $157,000 in 2014) has a strong knowledge of Cluster and Parallel Storage technology, RAC, O.S. and file systems including CFS. He is also experienced in multi-threaded programming. Mr. Yurek (paid $140,000) is considered to have the strongest technical skills out of this group. This was reflected in his 2013 and 2014 performance review scores—both “4s”—which, combined, were better than both Mr. Qi (“3s” in both years) and Mr. Lee (“4” in 2014 and “3” in 2014). He understands the internal code of RAC, Parallel Storage, and Distributed Systems. Mr. Qi has more limited technical expertise (in High Availability and RAC only), and he has the lowest productivity in the group. Likewise, Mr. Lee's expertise in Distributed Systems, Parallel Storage and RAC is more limited than Mr. Yurek's and Mr. Sharonin's, and he also works at a slower pace.

Similar facts explain pay differences among the two white and two Asian Software Developer 5 employees under supervisor Andrew Wiatowski. The top earning employee, Allen Brumm (white), making $220,000, had the strongest technical skills on the team and worked on very high visibility projects. He designed and owned the architecture for Data Manipulation Language (DML). He also defined and designed XML tables for Hadoop. In addition, he was the most productive out of this group of three. Because of his high performance, he had the best performance review scores on the
team in 2013 ("4") and 2014 ("5"). Neither Asif Chaudhry (making $193,000) nor Srilmith Bellamkonda (earning $192,000) were as technically strong or productive as Brumm. This was reflected in their performance reviews: Mr. Chaudhry received "3s" in both 2013 and 2014, and Mr. Bellamkonda received a "4" in 2013 and a "3" in 2014. And, while one white developer had the highest salary on the team, the other white developer, Valery Soloviev, had the lowest salary of all four ($156,000).

Had OFCCP evaluated similarly situated employees and relevant factors that impact pay, it also would have seen instances where the purported disadvantaged employees were—for legitimate reasons—making the highest salaries on their teams.

Consider the four M5-level IT Senior Directors working under Renzo Zagni. Female Eve Halwani was the highest paid in 2014 ($185,000), and for good reason. Ms. Halwani was the most senior IT Director of the group. She has an MBA and led high visibility, critical project teams, including helping to build the team to provide operational support for Fusion Customer Relationship Management ("CRM"). Although Edwin Scully ($184,486) made more than the two other females in the group, Weiran Zhao ($181,900) and Joyce Chow ($172,260), the difference was also justified. Mr. Scully is considered the strongest leader out of this group and has 7 direct reports. His technical strengths include Business Intelligence and Value Chain Planning. He is rated as Top Talent and has received regular salary raises based on his high level of productivity.

Consider also Jia Shi (a female), who was the top paid Software Development Director in her group under supervisor Kothanda Umamageswaran; in fact, she was the highest paid out of all 258 total employees in that job title at HQCA as of January 1, 2014. Ms. Shi manages the state of the art availability feature and performance for Exadata (https://www.oracle.com/engineered-systems/exadata/index.html), which are key areas of focus for Oracle. According to those who know her work, she is not only strong technically with great educational background (a master’s degree from Stanford), but she is clever and brings innovative ideas to complex problems. She is flawless at executive projects. She drives all the software as well as hardware features. She is a great mentor for her team and is her supervisor’s go-to person and right hand. Indeed, she is considered to be her supervisor’s potential successor. Ms. Shi is highest paid because she manages the largest team of 14 employees and has the largest scope. She is respected as the go-to person and is her manager’s most dependable employee for technical skills as well as leadership abilities.

As these examples illustrate, OFCCP’s model is not in any way reflective of Oracle’s world or its pay system, and some of the most important legitimate factors used at Oracle are ignored. Accordingly, the NOV fails entirely to measure real demographic group differences in the rates paid to similarly situated Oracle employees. In sum, the Attachment A statistical models fail under both Title VII standards and OFCCP’s Directive 307 mandate to assess measurable pay differences between comparator groups under Oracle’s pay system, and thus do not support any finding adverse to Oracle.