



International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC)



International
Labour
Office

IPEC Evaluation

Prevention and Reintegration of Children Involved in Armed Conflict An Inter-Regional Programme

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**An independent final evaluation by a team of external
consultants**

Core Countries: Central Africa (Burundi, Congo, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Rwanda), Colombia, Philippines, Sri Lanka

Non-Core Countries: Côte d'Ivoire, Uganda, Liberia, Sierra Leone

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This document has not been professionally edited.

NOTE ON THE EVALUATION PROCESS AND REPORT

This independent evaluation was managed by ILO-IPEC's Design, Evaluation and Documentation Section (DED) following a consultative and participatory approach. DED has ensured that all major stakeholders were consulted and informed throughout the evaluation and that the evaluation was carried out to highest degree of credibility and independence and in line with established evaluation standards.

The evaluation was carried out a team of external consultants¹. The field mission took place in July 2007. The opinions and recommendations included in this report are those of the authors and as such serve as an important contribution to learning and planning without necessarily constituting the perspective of the ILO or any other organization involved in the project.

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Table of Contents

1. Executive Summary	1
2 – Description of the Programme	3
2.1 Background to the Programme	3
2.2 Programme Objectives	4
2.3 Programme Design	5
3 – Approach to the Final Programme Review	7
3.1 Background to the Final Programme Review	7
3.2 Final Program Review Scope and Purpose	8
3.3 Methodology	9
3.4 Considerations, Challenges and Limitations	10
4 – Discussion of Findings	12
4.1 Introduction	12
4.2 Design and Relevance	12
4.3 Implementation and the Constraints of Context	18
4.4 Achievement and Results	21
5 – Conclusions and Recommendations	33
5.1 Design and Relevance	33
5.2 Implementation	34
5.3 Creation of an Enabling Environment	34
5.4 Acquisition of Decent Work and Sustainable Income	36
5.5 Reduction of Recruitment into Armed Conflict	37
5.6 Other	38
6 – Lessons Learned	39
6.1 Integration into DDR Policies and Programmes	39
6.2 Links to DWCP Processes	39
6.3 Tailoring Action Programmes to Contexts	40
1 Annexes	41

Acronyms

AP	Action Programme
ARMM	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
BTMC	Bishop Thibault Media Center
CDL	Child Domestic Labour
CL	Child Labour
CNDRR	Commission Nationale chargée de la Démobilisation de la Réinsertion et de la Réintégration
CONADER	Commission Nationale de la Demobilization et Reinsertion (DRC)
CP	Country Programme
CPC	Country Programme Coordinators
CSEC	Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children
CTA	Chief Technical Adviser
CRISIS	ILO's Crisis Response and Reconstruction Programme
DB	Direct Beneficiary
DBMR	Direct Beneficiaries Monitoring and Reporting
DED	Design, Evaluation and Documentation Section
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DWCP	Decent Work Country Programme
FNL	National Liberation Forces in Burundi
GP	Good Practice
IA	Implementing Agency
IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards
IFP-CRISIS	In Focus Programme on Crises Response and Reconstruction
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPEC	International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, ILO
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NPA	National Programme Assistants
NPM	National Programme Managers
NSC	National Steering Committee
PDRR	Program of Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration
SCREAM	ILO-IPEC educational package "SCREAM Stop Child Labour" – Supporting Children's Rights through Education, the Arts and Media
SIMPOC	Statistical Information and Monitoring Programme on Child Labour
SNES	National Structure for Child Soldiers
SPIF	Strategic Program Impact Framework
TBP	Time-Bound Programme
TOR	Terms of Reference
TPR	Technical Progress Report
TU	Trade Union
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDOL	United States Department of Labour
WFCL	Worst Forms of Child Labour
YEN	Youth Employment Network

Definitions

Child Labour: refers to work that is unacceptable because: the child is either too young to enter work or employment, or because the work prevents a child from attending school regularly or impedes a child's ability to learn (see Convention No. 138); or the hazardous conditions under which the child works and the safety, health and environmental hazards to which the child is exposed as well as the duration of work (Articles 3 of Convention No. 138 and 3(d) of Convention No. 182; or the work falls under the "unconditional" worst forms of child labour specified in Articles 3(a) - (c) of Convention No. 182.

Children prevented: Refers to children that are either a) siblings of children engaged or previously engaged in child labour that are not yet working or b) those children not yet working but considered to be at high risk of engaging in child labour. In order to be considered "prevented," these children must have benefited directly from a project intervention.

Children withdrawn: Refers to children who were found to be working in child labour and no longer work in such unacceptable work as a result of educational services and/or training opportunities or other non-education related services provided by the project. In the case of the ILO-IPEC programme for the Prevention and Reintegration of Children in Armed Conflict, "withdrawn" refers specifically to children who have received training and subsequently have gained appropriate employment which, it is assumed, means they are withdrawn from, and will not return to, involvement in armed conflict.

DDR: Disarmament is the collection of weapons from combatants or civilians and includes responsible arms management programs; **Demobilization** is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants whether that be at the level of processing in temporary centres or camps or second stage "reinsertion;" **Reinsertion** is a form of transitional assistance for the short-term (up to 12 months) to cover basic needs; **Reintegration** is the process of acquiring civilian status and gaining sustainable income and employment which takes place in communities, supports the general development of the country and represents long term assistance. In the case of the ILO-IPEC programme for the Prevention and Reintegration of Children in Armed Conflict, the focus is *economic* reintegration.

Educational services and/or training opportunities: include at least one of the following services provided by the project; (a) non-formal or basic literacy education as demonstrated by enrolment in educational classes provided by the program. These classes may include transitional, leveling or literacy classes so that the child may either be mainstreamed into formal schooling and/or can participate in vocational training activities; (b) vocational, pre-vocational or skills training as demonstrated by enrolment in these training courses in order to develop a particular skill; (c) mainstreaming into one of four educational activities (1) formal education system, (2) non-formal education, (3) vocational, (4) pre-vocational or skills training after having received assistance from the project to enable them to enroll. The assistance provided by the project could include one or more of the following services: the provision of nutrition, uniforms, books, school materials, stipends, or other types of incentives that meet the specific needs of the targeted child and results in their enrolment of one of these four educational activities.

Other non-education related services: may include face-to-face psychosocial counselling, income generation and/or skills training for parents of children at risk, as well as other types of interventions that allow the child to be withdrawn or prevented.

United Nations Resolution 1612: the resolution proposes a mechanism to facilitate the collection and dissemination of relevant and reliable information with regard to the recruitment and use of child soldiers in direct violation of international law. Further, the mechanism reports to a working group established by the Security Council with the aim of reviewing progress with respect to the development and implementation of time-bound action plans endeavoring to stop the use of children in violation of international obligations as called for under Council resolution 1539. Essentially, this resolution affirms the Council's intention to implement explicit measures such as halting the supply of small arms and military equipment in order to protect children from exploitation.

1. Executive Summary

Regarding children involved in armed combat, ILO-IPEC's response, framed by Convention 182, was to develop and implement an inter-regional programme for the prevention and reintegration of children involved in armed conflict with focused activities in the core countries of Colombia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Central Africa (Burundi, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda).

The programme was developed after a preparatory phase begun in October 2001 by ILO-IPEC, in collaboration with the ILO-IN Focus Programme on Crises Response and Reconstruction (IFP-CRISIS). During this phase rapid assessments were conducted. Based on the information from the rapid assessments, a project was conceived with the Development Objective: "The programme intends to contribute to the reduction of the incidence of children serving in armies and/or in armed groups." In order to do so, three immediate objectives were articulated:

- IO.1. "By the end of the programme, there will be an enabling environment in each country, facilitating the prevention, withdrawal and subsequent reintegration into society of children involved in armed conflict."
- IO.2. "By the end of the programme, former child soldiers above the minimum working age will be assisted to acquire decent work and achieve a sustainable income."
- IO.3. "By the end of the programme, fewer children will be recruited in armed conflict in targeted countries."

Given the diversity of national contexts, the programme was developed to allow for flexibility and to foster learning through different experiences. In March 2006 a mid-term evaluation report was produced which highlighted common program elements and lessons being learned.

In summary, the programme illustrated the important role of economic reintegration as advocated and supported by ILO-IPEC. While the diversity of national (and local) contexts presented a challenge, this reality was also a defining characteristic of the initiative and the basis for much learning.

The programme confirmed that ILO-IPEC should continue to work in national contexts which support - at least to a minimum extent - the creation and enforcement of a legislative framework that is consistent with UN protocols on child labour. A holistic approach, grounded in multi-sectoral collaboration, is another important hallmark of the initiative.

An understanding of the context is crucial to programme design, implementation and sustainability. Sufficient attention needs to be paid to the vocational guidance component, taking into account local realities, children's interests, as well as the possibilities for ongoing supports and incentives. Within this framework, new technologies and private sector partnerships should be explored and fostered, in addition to supports for individual and collective entrepreneurial opportunities.

While the programme has taken into account the varying realities of girls and young women, increased attention to the needs of other vulnerable sub-groups (such as children with disabilities) should be considered in any future projects.

The participation of children and youth in mainstream education is a formidable ally to prevention of recruitment of children. Coupled with a community approach, supports for participation in mainstream education should not be under-estimated. The media can be a formidable ally in this endeavour.

Finally, ILO-IPEC can play a critical role in fostering initiatives that support the economic reintegration of children previously involve in armed conflict. ILO-IPEC has the mandate and expertise, as evidenced by this programme, to make an important and unique contribution. The learnings from this programme should be disseminated and used as the basis for developing and supporting future interventions that will benefit affected and vulnerable children in both conflict and post-conflict situations.

2 – Description of the Programme

2.1 Background to the Programme

The aim of ILO-IPEC is the progressive elimination of child labour, particularly in its worst forms. The Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, 1999 (Convention 182) categorizes: “all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict” as worst forms of child labour (Article 3a). Each country ratifying this Convention is committed, as a matter of priority, to implementing programmes to eliminate worst forms of child labour in consultation with the relevant government institutions and employers’ organizations, workers’ organizations (trade unions), as well as non-governmental organizations and other relevant parties.

The ILO-IPEC approach to child labour in general includes raising awareness on the negative consequences of child labour, promoting social mobilization against it, supporting increased national capacity to deal with the issue, and facilitating the implementation of direct action programmes that prevent child labour and remove children from hazardous work and provide them with appropriate alternatives.

ILO understands that children become involved in armed conflict for a variety of reasons; some join groups voluntarily, others are encouraged to do so, and some are forcibly abducted.² One reason for joining armed groups is that participation in the military is a way to ensure a livelihood. Therefore, children’s lack of access to education and employment - and thus their limited options in terms of securing a livelihood - is an important determinant of their participation in armed conflict.

In the case of children involved in armed combat, ILO-IPEC’s response, framed by Convention 182, was to develop and implement an inter-regional programme for the prevention and reintegration of children involved in armed conflict with focused activities in the core countries of Colombia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Central Africa (Burundi, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda). Non-core countries included were Côte d’Ivoire, Uganda, Liberia and Sierra Leone.³ It was intended that non-core countries would benefit from the project in terms of information sharing, networking and the exchange of good practices.

² This report does not include a discussion of the issues germane to children involved in armed conflict, as this information exists in other publications, including those of the ILO. Issues will be referenced when they are relevant to the context of a country which in turn affects project design and/or implementation.

³ All countries but Sierra Leone had ratified Convention 182.

The programme was not only important in these countries, but also timely, given the global context. In December 2006 the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) were launched in Geneva and New York simultaneously. The IDDRS draw on the experiences, lessons learned and good practices of the United Nations system. The ILO, through IPEC and other Departments such as CRISIS and YEN, supported the drafting of Module 5.20 on Youth and DDR. In February 2007 the International Conference “*Free children from war,*” was held in Paris. The conference sought to introduce the new *Paris Guidelines and Principles on the protection and reintegration of children associated with armed forces or armed groups.*⁴ The conference, hosted by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and UNICEF, brought together high level representatives of governments, NGOs and researchers who endorse the Paris Principles and Guidelines. ILO’s presence, along with the World Bank and UNDP, focused on the importance of a development approach with the reintegration of former child soldiers as an effective way of preventing re-recruitment and assuring enduring peace.

In addition, August 2006 marked the 10th anniversary of the UN report, *Impact of Armed Conflict on Children.*⁵ In her strategic plan for this year, the Special Representative of the Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict proposed a 10 year Strategic Review of this study. A Coordinating Committee, working with an international consultant on this review, identified five themes/sectors as key issues for the report, one of which is “community-based reintegration and youth opportunities.” ILO is participating on the working group dealing with this issue and the learnings from ILO’s project on the Presentation and Reintegration of Children Involved in Armed Conflict will help inform the conclusions and recommendations of the Strategic Review.

2.2 Programme Objectives

The programme was developed after a preparatory phase focused on certain countries⁶ that began in October 2001 by ILO-IPEC, in collaboration with the ILO-IN Focus Programme on Crises Response and Reconstruction (IFP-CRISIS). During this phase rapid assessments were conducted on the causes of using children in armed conflict situations, mechanisms for recruitment, children’s living conditions when in armed groups, circumstances surrounding their demobilization and the possibilities for their reintegration.⁷

Based on the information from the rapid assessments, a project was conceived with the Development Objective: “The programme intends to contribute to the reduction of the

⁴ These principles are a revised version of the *Cape Town Principles and Best Practices on the recruitment of children into the armed forces and the demobilization and social reintegration of child soldiers in Africa.*

⁵ This report is commonly known as the “Machel Study.”

⁶ This phase did not take place in Sri Lanka.

⁷ Five reports were prepared on the Central African region between December 2002 and March 2003.

incidence of children serving in armies and/or in armed groups.” In order to do so, three immediate objectives were articulated:

- IO.1. “By the end of the programme, there will be an enabling environment in each country, facilitating the prevention, withdrawal and subsequent reintegration into society of children involved in armed conflict.”
- IO.2. “By the end of the programme, former child soldiers above the minimum working age will be assisted to acquire decent work and achieve a sustainable income.”
- IO.3. “By the end of the programme, fewer children will be recruited in armed conflict in targeted countries.”

In the project document indicators were identified for each immediate objective, thus helping to operationalize the objectives.⁸

The project represents one of IPEC’s first comprehensive frameworks for action regarding children in armed conflict. Therefore, the project was to serve a strategic purpose of enhancing IPEC’s knowledge regarding effective approaches for dealing with this worst form of child labour.

2.3 Programme Design

Given the variety of national contexts, the programme was developed to allow for a great degree of flexibility. The programme utilized a “menu of model interventions” from which each country could choose those approaches most appropriate to their situation. In order to fashion the national strategy, a strategic planning exercise was conducted in each country, with the exception of Sri Lanka. The country-specific programmes were documented in the Country Annexes.

The inter-regional programme focused on economic reintegration of children above the minimum working age who had been associated with armed forces and groups. ILO’s mandate and expertise are in this specific area, so other organizations were viewed as more appropriate to deal with issues of demobilization and social reintegration. Therefore, ILO focused on ensuring that children formerly involved in armed conflict were able to acquire decent work and achieve a sustainable income.

The first Immediate Objective spoke for the need “to prepare the institutional national environment”⁹ in order to achieve the enabling situation in each country. It was intended that IPEC would assess the capacities of implementing partners in countries where IPEC was not yet present. In all cases, IPEC would play a role in supporting countries in

⁸ The Logical Framework (excerpted from the Project Document) and the Menu of Model Interventions are found in Appendix A.

⁹ Source: Project Document, p. 45.

developing and coordinating a strategic plan of intervention in addition to facilitating the adoption and implementation of domestic legislation coherent with international treaties.

The second Immediate Objective deals with the actual economic reintegration of children involved in armed conflict. Direct activities were sub-contracted to implementing agencies (IA), usually local NGOs, who were given the technical assistance and monetary resources to support a specific number of children in a given area. Each IA implements an Action Programme (AP) with a total of 25 APs being implemented in the seven participating countries.

The strategy begins with an intensive vocational orientation phase designed to match the job opportunities with the capacities and expectations of the children, followed by vocational skills training. To complement the skills training, management training to help participants learn how to market their skills was introduced. “Catch-up” education was provided simultaneously with vocational skills training where required. The project also provides services for the transition between skills training and economic activity, including formal employment, self-employment, the creation of cooperatives, low level income generating activities and support during the first phase of employment. As much as possible, the project tries to use strategies that benefit the whole community, such as opening training opportunities to other children and identifying community needs that could be addressed by the project (e.g., rehabilitation of schools).

The third Immediate Objective, which deals with prevention of recruitment of children, provides services for prevention on four levels, including sensitization of political leaders and relevant authorities in armed forces or groups towards the harmfulness of using children in situations of armed conflict and advocacy for the adoption of adequate national legislation (as previously mentioned). The other two levels of service relate to making a contribution to improving the quality of and access to basic education as a preventative tool and the inclusion of children at risk of being recruited (who are above working age) in vocational training and employment support activities.

Finally, the “experimental” nature of the project needs to be recognized. The flexibility in design allowed teams to tailor their activities to local needs and realities so that ILO-IPEC could learn “what works” under different circumstances to support the economic reintegration of children previously involved in armed conflict and what is effective in preventing future recruitment.

3 – Approach to the Final Programme Review

3.1 Background to the Final Programme Review

According to ILO procedures and as agreed with USDOL, an independent mid-term evaluation was conducted with the purposes of: a) accountability to the main stakeholders regarding what had been achieved as of 2005, and b) learning from the project experience in order to plan for the future and, where necessary, recommend the appropriate adjustments. The mid-term evaluation documented project accomplishments and highlighted project constraints. A synthesis of project strengths and weaknesses across the seven countries was conducted which highlighted a number of common elements. The common elements identified led to the following lessons:¹⁰

- ◆ “Complex projects covering 7 countries in three continents need to have a decentralized and flexible project management structure. A balance between accountability and effectiveness is needed. When accountability infringes upon the effectiveness of the project, it is time to review the procedures and grant greater flexibility.”
- ◆ “The project strategy and design are strong and support the country’s overall framework for child soldiers. However only in the non-African countries is there a wider operative national framework for the abolition of child labour, something which provides synergies to the project. This creates a substantial difference in the political environment in which the project operates.”
- ◆ “Despite tremendous constraints in virtually all countries (except Colombia), the project was able to actually carry out the implementation of the APs and other activities, in addition to its work at the institutional level. Two poles can be found among the 7 countries: the focus on the institutional framework in Colombia, in detriment to actual A.P. implementation, and at the other pole the focus of the African component on actual implementation, given the limited opportunity for focusing on the institutional framework at this point in time.”
- ◆ “The project has positively impacted on project beneficiaries in all countries (except Colombia). The increased confidence and self-esteem of the beneficiaries indicates that an essential and critical step towards reintegration has been achieved.”
- ◆ “There is no plan or indication for the sustainability of the process initiated by the project, except for Colombia. Sustainability has to be clearly defined: it is not the project that needs to be sustainable (e.g. that activities continue with funding other

¹⁰ Lessons from the mid-term evaluation are summarized, based on their presentation in the evaluation Terms of Reference.

than that of USDOL) but the process which has been initiated. This requires both ownership and buy-in from the different stakeholders and has to be part of the project approach since the beginning.”

- ◆ “Monitoring of project results is a key element to ensure that objectives will be met, and adequate means must be supplied, both in terms of human resources and funding.”
- ◆ “The project is supported and welcomed by all governments, showing its objectives clearly contribute to filling a delicate and acute need in all countries.”
- ◆ “A holistic approach to prevention and reintegration is necessary. Efforts to place beneficiaries in support structures are not enough. Focus should be placed on the sustainability of the beneficiaries’ capacity to earn a living as a result of the different project activities, looking at the overall impact.”

Given the mid-term evaluation and the ongoing consultations on the strategic lessons learned, it was determined that the final programme review/evaluation¹¹ would centre on the global workshop planned for the inter-regional programme. The workshop would include a process of highlighting and recording good practices as a separate (yet related) component of programme documentation, along with time for evaluation activities centred on assessing achievements. Both aspects of the global workshop, in their own ways, were to deal with the lessons learned from the programme.

3.2 Final Program Review Scope and Purpose

The scope of the final program review was global in that it was to include the seven core countries, plus the non-core countries.¹² As a final report, it is intended to address issues of project design, implementation, lessons learned, replicability and recommendations for future programmes.

The overall purposes of the final programme review, as outlined in the Terms of Reference, are:

- ◆ “To assess the degree of achievement of the project in accordance with immediate objectives, the general evaluation concerns such as relevance, effectiveness, impact and sustainability;
- ◆ To review and validate, to the extent possible, emerging experiences, lessons learned and models that could inform future work, including making suggestions for how to take these further;

¹¹ Because the “final evaluation” was limited in terms of scope and approach and does not represent what would be considered a typical programme evaluation, the process will be referred to as a final external “programme review.”

¹² Specified in the evaluation Terms of Reference.

- ◆ To assess, based on collected information and the views of stakeholders, the potential strategic and programming follow-up, including linkages between the project and other initiatives being developed in the targeted countries.”

As an inter-regional project and a major intervention of IPEC on the issue of children involved in armed conflict, the lessons learned that are applicable to future work are particularly important. National stakeholders, IPEC management and project staff will reference evaluation results when developing follow-up activities in each country, at the sub-regional level in Africa, and globally (as appropriate). Furthermore, it is anticipated that evaluation results will be used by partners in charge of implementing activities in the field and by stakeholders who are working towards national efforts against the use of children in armed conflict.

3.3 Methodology

The final programme review was designed to be independent of ILO-IPEC through the use of an external international evaluator. The international evaluator was to work with national consultants in the Philippines, Colombia and Sri Lanka who were charged with conducting project reviews in their respective countries.¹³

The review is built around a desk review of project documents and an evaluative process linked to the Global Workshop which occurred in Turin, May 7 - 11, 2007. The first three days represented a “good practices and lessons learned workshop” where the International Evaluator had the opportunity to participate as an observer and hear directly from workshop participants about their experiences and lessons learned.¹⁴ The final two days were devoted to what was termed the “evaluation workshop.”¹⁵

All core countries with the exception of Colombia were represented at the evaluation workshop. The workshop was conducted in French and English through the use of simultaneous interpretation. The inclusion of Colombia would have complicated the workshop with the addition of a third language (Spanish), coupled with the fact that the context, focus and experiences of the Colombian work were vastly different from any of the other countries.

The first day of the evaluation workshop had teams from each country answer questions specific to project design and project implementation. Representatives from the teams then shared their reflections and recommendations with the large group. Comments on

¹³ In addition to their Terms of Reference, the National Consultants were provided with guidance from the International Evaluator. See Annex B.

¹⁴ The International Evaluator believes it was particularly beneficial to have been an observer for the first three days of the workshop as it gave her a deeper understanding of the global and local contexts, as well as up-to-date information from the participating countries. Given her very recent involvement as the evaluator for this project, being able to learn more about the project in this manner was particularly beneficial and an efficient use of time.

¹⁵ See Annex C for a copy of the agenda.

project implementation often incorporated issues related to project monitoring. During the second day the large group addressed system level issues (facilitated by a representative from ILO-IPEC DED, Geneva), while the International Evaluator conducted semi-structured interviews with the teams from each country. The focus of these interviews was on key results, as issues relating to context and implementation had already been shared.

In addition, the International Evaluator met with the Technical Officer for the programme (ILO-IPEC Geneva) and the Chief Technical Adviser (ILO-IPEC Kinshasa/Gombe) who provided contextual and related information, as well as their insights into the programme prior to and following the Evaluation Workshop. The International Evaluator also met with the Programme Officer (Kinshasa), the Project Coordinator for Sri Lanka and the Senior Programme Officer for the Philippines who provided further information about the project and the countries in which they were working. As well, the Consultant/Technical Officer working on the good practices and identification of a strategic framework for future ILO interventions in the area of child soldiers provided her observations in an interview about the strengths, weaknesses and lessons to be learned from the programme.

3.4 Considerations, Challenges and Limitations

The time frame for the final programme review, including report writing, was constricted. Due to circumstances beyond the control of ILO-IPEC, the International Evaluator was confirmed less than a week prior to the Global Workshop. Furthermore, the report had to be completed by the end of May, leaving less than a month for the International Evaluator to undertake her work. Similarly the National Consultants were working under extremely tight timelines. The restricted timeframe for evaluation activities must be recognized as a limitation.

A related issue was the fact that the International Evaluator did not have the opportunity to visit any of the countries involved in the programme and, thus, had no prospect of being able to interview beneficiaries or to see the Action Programmes first-hand. While the National Consultants did have the opportunity to work in-country, the limited time and resources for the evaluation meant that their data collection was limited to interviews with people in the capital region, document review and, in some instances, telephone interviews with people in the identified communities.¹⁶

The International Evaluator had the choice of including senior programme staff and the donor in the evaluation workshop. While some might argue that their presence might negatively affect the willingness of workshop participants to share openly, participants had been forthcoming over the course of the first three days of the workshop. Although these days had focused on “good practice,” the discussion of “lessons learned” had also included project weaknesses and problems which arose, often as a result of the social,

¹⁶ See the National Consultants’ reports for more specific descriptions of the methodology used in each case.

political, and/or economic context in which the project was functioning. Therefore, given the focus on learning from project experiences, the International Evaluator determined that the senior programme staff and donor would benefit from hearing more about workshop participants experiences with the project and recommendations for the future.¹⁷ Additionally, this approach enhanced the transparency of the evaluation process and allowed for these additional voices to be part of an open dialogue.

A challenge for the International Evaluator was that she conducted some team interviews in English, some in French with the formal assistance of professional interpreters and some in French with informal assistance provided by a bilingual speaker.¹⁸ While she does not believe this situation has affected the quality or accuracy of the information, given her extensive experience working through interpretation and her basic knowledge of French, the possibility that some level of precision was lost must be acknowledged.

Another complicating factor and limitation of this report, relates to translation. The report from the National Consultant for Colombia was provided in Spanish; a language not spoken nor understood by the International Evaluator. Because of the tight timelines for reporting, the Colombian report was translated through the use of a translation web-site.¹⁹ While the general meaning can be understood, the quality of the translation is a hindrance. Consequently, the level of detail that can be gleaned confidently from the report and use in writing the final programme review (evaluation) is limited.

Finally, it must be acknowledged that this report does not go into great detail on the country context or history. These aspects are explained in depth in a number of supporting documents including (but not limited to) the various Technical Progress Reports, the Mid-Term Evaluation, the responses to USDOL inquiries, and the reports of the National Consultants from Colombia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka.

¹⁷ It should be noted that the presence of the senior programme staff and the donor did not influence the agenda or process for the evaluation workshop. In fact, the donor was able to extend the discussion on particular issues through specific questions he posed to the group.

¹⁸ The International Evaluator has a functional level of French and, therefore, could understand much of the discussion without the assistance of an interpreter, often needing assistance for clarification or to make herself more understandable to participants.

¹⁹ <http://babelfish.altavista.com/>

4 – Discussion of Findings

4.1 Introduction

A challenge – or perhaps a tension – exists for ILO-IPEC regarding the project which, in turn, has implications for discussing programme results. ILO-IPEC works to “withdraw” children from child labour. In this case, “withdrawing” children meant securing their permanent removal from involvement in armed conflict through engaging young people in some type of sustainable employment, the first step of which is involving them in vocational training. This situation means that when the number of children “withdrawn” is reported, this does not equate to the demobilization of children from armed conflict, as this had previously occurred through the intervention of other agencies or through children removing themselves.

4.2 Design and Relevance

Designed to be flexible, because of the “experimental nature” of the programme and the need to respond to divergent local contexts, the programme operated on the sub-regional, national and local levels. A focus common to all levels was the economic reintegration of children formerly involved in armed conflict, as well as prevention of future recruitment of children into armed forces or groups. However, ILO-IPEC recognized the wide variability of national contexts (e.g., conflict/post-conflict, infrastructure differences, the roles played by girls in armed groups). As previously noted, a “menu of model interventions” was provided to each country from which they could choose the strategies they believed best suited their own context.

The project design is, of course, found in the original project document (September 2003). This document, available only in English,²⁰ provided the detailed justification for the project along with design (project approach and strategy), logical framework, as well as the other necessary sections (e.g. timeline, budget).

The target groups for the project are important to note prior to a discussion of relevance. The target groups²¹ for reintegration were girls and boys associated with armed forces or groups of children who have demobilized or left their armed unit (either through formal demobilization or self- or auto-demobilization). The age range would usually be 15 (minimum working age) to 18; however, the age range was extended for up to 21 for boys and up to 22 for girls in Central Africa, particularly because of the situation in Rwanda

²⁰ Because the Project Document was only available in English the teams from some participating countries had not seen the Logical Framework prior to the Turin Workshop. The entire SL IPEC team had been given the project document during the mid-term evaluation.

²¹ As one of the most recent sources, this information is taken from the Technical Notes from the Turin Good Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop (May 2007).

and Congo where the armed conflict had ended some years previously. However, IPEC was not permitted to count youth who were above the age of 18 at the time of enrollment against the project's overall targets for withdrawn and prevented. Identification of girls in the Central African context particularly, was recognized as being problematic because after their negative experiences they wanted to distance themselves and not let their communities know, if possible, about their involvement.

The prevention target group were girls and boys in areas or belonging to social groups from which children under the age of 18 have been recruited. The most vulnerable children were defined as girls and boys who were heads of households, orphan boys and girls, the economic level of the family, and those belonging to a particularly disadvantaged group (e.g., disabled children, girls, ethnic minorities). As previously mentioned, girls in some contexts did not want to be identified as having been involved with armed groups so the potential for including them in services without identifying them as the first target group was problematic.

It should also be noted that in many areas in which the programme operated the number of children who are potential beneficiaries far exceeded the capacity of the programme. "Because of the generalized poverty in the post-conflict areas in which the project is active, all young people there need support in terms of economic reintegration or schooling."²²

4.2.1 Relevance to the Local Situation

In the **Central African** countries, the situation has been one of uncertainty and logistical difficulties²³ and the realities across countries – and even within countries – were variable. Currently, the intensity of conflicts continues to vary from country to country "with the risk of recruitment ranging from real (eastern DRC) to unlikely (Rwanda)."²⁴ Despite these – and the many logistical challenges – the project was viewed as being "extremely relevant" by the CTA and Programme Officer in Central Africa; "ILO is in the right place . . . the strategy for economic integration is on the right track."

As stated in the Mid-Term Evaluation, despite the amount of research and the logic and coherence of the Project Document, "it does not reflect the conditions and constraints of the different operating environments in each of the project countries, nor the difficult relationships between each of these countries" (p.17). The CTA, speaking at the Evaluation Workshop, echoed this sentiment saying that "the project design did not consider the logistical issues in Central Africa." He also argued that "some of the indicators were difficult to manage or were not applicable . . . [and] national commissions got moving once the programme got moving but no one took this into consideration when the PDRRs were set up."

²² Technical Note 2, Good Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop, Turin, May 2007.

²³ The challenges have been thoroughly explained in the Mid-Term Evaluation, so this report will not describe these in detail.

²⁴ Technical Note 8, Good Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop, Turin, May 2007.

In **Burundi**, the ILO-IPEC project was designed “to focus on economic and vocational reintegration. It will be part of the national reintegration policy. It will collaborate closely with the CNDRR and the SNES and will be complementary to the activities undertaken by the other partners, in particular the SNES, in the field of psychosocial and economic reintegration and prevention, by using the necessary experience and competency in vocational education and training, and implementation of income generating activities and other decent employment opportunities.”²⁵ As explained by the Burundi team that participated in the Turin Evaluation Workshop, “the project was adapted to the reality of the country in the strategic planning exercise” (SPIF), which had been preceded by ministerial round tables. At this time, some children had been demobilized (supported by UNICEF), while others were still active.²⁶ From the design standpoint, the Burundi team was able to adapt the design to some degree and believed the objectives were appropriate; however, they also noted that “some indicators did not correspond to our reality,” particularly those related to Immediate Objective 3. The current mediation process (as described in the latest TPR) is expected to lead to the liberation of more children. Meanwhile the government has started to reform the Penal Code which includes new articles that consider the use of children in armed conflict as a crime that may be punished with life imprisonment. The team at the Evaluation Workshop argued that their project helped to influence this national legislation. The CNDDR also continued its DDR programme that includes child soldiers, reporting that (as of February 2007) 3,041 had been demobilized and reintegrated into communities; a figure which does not include children who “auto-demobilized” or those still associated with the FNL.²⁷

In **Congo**, the ILO-IPEC project was “aimed at reintegrating economically 200 former child soldiers and at preventing the recruitment of 500 other children. Both the size of the target group and the budget are very limited compared to the real needs the country is facing. The project will therefore make a number of strategic choices which will enable it to play, in spite of its modest dimension, a significant role in the whole national programme of former child soldiers’ reintegration.”²⁸ When the project began in Congo, a strategic planning workshop was held including potential partners, where the project was adapted and additional partners identified. Recognizing that the conflict had ended several years before without formal demobilization, they focused on reintegration. In order to identify children the IAs set up a system of interviews with young people to determine whether they had taken part in conflict as well as to document their age.²⁹ The team at the Evaluation Workshop explained that the objectives of the project were appropriate as they focused on service to demobilized children³⁰ (“who had received nothing”) and children “at risk.” However, the prevention indicators were viewed as problematic, particularly

²⁵ Country Annex, Burundi.

²⁶ In fact, as reported in the September 2006 to February 2007 Technical Progress Report, the current negotiation process hopes to lead to the liberation of children still associated with the last rebel group, the number of which are unknown.

²⁷ Technical Progress Report – Child Soldiers, September 2006 to February 2007.

²⁸ Country Annex, Congo.

²⁹ In this case, as in others, young people would not have any documentation as to their actual age.

³⁰ DDR programs often centred on the collection of weapons, rather than the provision of services.

because the impact of community activities was seen as “difficult to quantify.” The increased age range for the target group was viewed as appropriate to their context. In the current situation, the DDR process includes a campaign launched in February 2007 for the identification of ex-combatants.³¹ The issue of child soldiers was viewed as being on the government agenda. However, because the future recruitment of children looks unlikely, the project was able to focus more heavily on economic reintegration. A national committee to fight WFCL now exists, which was viewed by the team at the Evaluation Workshop as a benefit of ILO-IPEC presence.

In **Democratic Republic of Congo** a strategic planning workshop, including a variety of stakeholders (e.g., government, NGOs, UN agencies), was held. Because of the extensive DDR programme in the country, IAs were able to involve a large number of partners and to obtain lists of former child soldiers from CONADER and other agencies already providing services to young people (Technical Note 2 from Good Practices Workshop). As other partners were providing services, such as psycho-social support, they focused on ILO’s area of expertise which was viewed as particularly relevant to their situation. Therefore, the IPEC programme in DRC “decided to focus on those options of the menu that are directly concerned with the *economic* (re)integration component and reduce, as far as possible, project elements that are already, at least partly, taken care of by others.”³² The team at the Evaluation Workshop noted that, despite the focus, they ran into difficulties with the prevention indicator as it was difficult to demonstrate how providing services would prevent recruitment. The current situation still speaks to the relevance of strategies to support the reintegration of children involved in armed conflict, as there is a continued concern about the presence of children among the “mixed” troops of the FARDC in North Kivu.³³

In **Rwanda**, the ILO-IPEC project was viewed as “part of a common and coherent national strategy and programming for the reintegration of the child ex-combatants in Rwanda.”³⁴ A strategic planning exercise was undertaken to adapt the project to this context. Given the recognition that the conflict had been over for some years and that some children had not benefited from reinsertion programmes, they made adjustments in their country annex. For example, under Immediate Objective 2 concerning the number of children in armed forces or groups, the team explained that “this was not one of our natural concerns . . . the risk of child recruitment was very low . . . we were not at war . . . so to include this indicator in our project agenda was not necessary.” They also mentioned that while the target of employment of 50% more than six months after training was maintained as an indicator, they “realized we would not be able to verify this during the project.” The current number of repatriated ex-child soldiers from Rwandese groups still active in DRC continues to be relatively low.³⁵

³¹ Technical Progress Report – Child Soldiers, September 2006 to February 2007.

³² Country Annex, DRC.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Country Annex, Rwanda, Budget and Activities.

³⁵ Ibid.

Concerning the **Philippines**, the team at the Evaluation Workshop reported that the project was “very timely” for them. In 2002 an ILO-IPEC study reported that “about 10-30% of children in any given community influenced either by the NPA [New People’s Army] or the MILF [Moro Islamic Liberation Front] are drafted as child soldiers. At least 2,000 to 6,000 children out of 10 MILF-influenced municipalities in Maguindanao are involved as soldiers.”³⁶ They used the SPIF to assess the national programme against child labour (under the Time-Bound Programme). They added the component of children in armed conflict. ILO-IPEC commissioned a study in 2004 where the mapping of the target areas was done and through this process the area for intervention was limited to one province. Interviews were done and the target number of 300 was established. The development objective and the three immediate objectives were viewed as relevant. One Action Programme addressed the first two objectives, while the second Action Programme addressed the third. Vocational skills training, counselling and educational support were made more sustainable through coordination with the Department of Labour and Employment and the involvement of local government agencies (Technical Education and Skills Development Authority, Department of Education and Department of Social Welfare and Development.) The project strategy continues to have relevance as conflict is ongoing,³⁷ so although the project closed in December 2006 the TBP continues as the “umbrella project.”

In **Sri Lanka**, despite the escalation of conflict and uncertainties³⁸ the relevance of “economic reintegration is more than ever of key importance.”³⁹ Subsequent to the cease fire agreement in 2002, an Action Plan for Children Affected by War (i.e., an agreement between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), facilitated by UNICEF, was signed. As part of the agreement was the release of former child combatants. The Action Plan aims to “improve the living conditions of children affected by war”⁴⁰ in the eight districts in the North and East. The Action Plan is led by UNICEF⁴¹ on behalf of the UN and endorsed by the government of Sri Lanka. One component of the AP addresses community-based vocational training for children under 18 which is addressed by the ILO-IPEC initiative. As reported by the Sri Lanka team at the Evaluation Workshop, the project addressed Immediate Objectives 2 and 3 (in relation to USDOL funding) as they had an array of other partners and funders focused more on the creation of the enabling environment. (Other ILO-IPEC projects in Sri Lanka also contributed to the creation of an enabling environment.) In terms of the menu of interventions, their project contributed to almost all elements but the USDOL funding focused on elements IV (“facilitating and supporting the economic reintegration of former

³⁶ Source: PowerPoint presentation from Good practices and Lessons Learned Workshop, Turin, May 2007. Original study: Cagoco-Guuiam, Ruffa (2002). *Child Soldiers in Central and Western Mindanao – A Rapid Assessment*, ILO-IPEC, Geneva.

³⁷ For a description of the current context, see the National Consultants’ Evaluation Report, p. 2.

³⁸ The National Consultant’s report details the escalation of violence and its implications.

³⁹ Source: September 2006 to February 2007 Technical Progress Report.

⁴⁰ Source: Country Annex, Sri Lanka.

⁴¹ UNICEF provides registration and psycho-social support; Save the Children identifies the needs; UNHCR provides shelter; UNDP supports income generation credit and savings; ILO supports vocational training through the IAs.

child soldiers”), V (“special initiatives to facilitate the reintegration of girls child soldiers and other categories facing particular difficulties”) and VI (“preventing the recruitment of child soldiers”). The USDOL funded project was complemented by other donor funded projects which have supported sustainability in Sri Lanka. For example, while the duration of the project was September 2003 to December 2006, the IPEC project has continued with additional donor funding, particularly through UNICEF.

In **Colombia**, “the relevance remains high because armed conflict has worsened and none of the groups has taken a public stand on the recruitment of children.”⁴² This is confirmed by the National Consultant’s evaluation report (May 2007): “the children continue being affected by the new outbreak of armed conflict and by the constant pressure of the different armed actors.” In Colombia, the creation of enabling conditions was a focus, particularly in working with the national government in the application of the policy to eradicate child labour.

Finally, in the **large group discussion** at the Evaluation Workshop, it was argued that the original project document “did not take into account the existing activities in the non-African countries,” although “we could extract what was relevant because of the sufficient scope and flexibility” of the project design.

In the discussion of system issues,⁴³ the recommendation from the large group was that, in future, key people from each country should be gathered together to provide input on project design. “Strategic directions must be realistic and in line with the national situation.” The need for an exit strategy integrated into project design and integrated in to project strategies was suggested in individual interviews as well as in the large group discussion.

Other design-related issues raised during **in-person interviews** highlighted the importance of having all the pieces needed for economic reintegration, in particular a partner that can provide access to micro-credit. Furthermore, it was argued that economic reintegration can be limited by training; that is, the use of new technologies or “even other ways of doing the same thing” need to be considered in project design. Design should also take into account differences in rural and urban costs. While there are distances to consider in the rural context, survival for children in an urban context may be more difficult as the competition in various trades or industries will be more pronounced.

⁴² Source: September 2006 to February 2007 Technical Progress Report.

⁴³ This discussion of the project on a global level was facilitated on Friday by the Senior Evaluation Officer (ILO-IPEC, DED, Geneva) and recorded as further information for the Final Evaluation Report.

4.3 Implementation and the Constraints of Context

Issues of implementation will be addressed in conjunction with the constraints of the context. Again, much documentation on context exists, so the discussion will primarily rely on the presentations made by the country teams upon reflection at the Evaluation Workshop.

4.3.1 Country Specific

In the **Central African** context, the CTA and Programme Officer noted the difficulty in finding agencies with an economic rather than a child protection focus; “often they had to learn what economic reintegration was all about.” The two pillars were described as vocational training and employment support services, as there had not been sufficient time in the project for employment follow-up. While more public partners working on implementation would have been desirable, the reality (particularly in the DRC) was that people had been surviving because of NGOs, not because of public services. Rwanda, on the other hand, had a national policy against child labour and a national action plan related to youth employment which IPEC was able to influence. The fact that there was no earlier IPEC presence in these countries, and therefore no existing infrastructure, contributed to the extended time needed for project start-up. Monetary issues and the problems associated with “standard costs” were mentioned. The data base of beneficiaries did not function and the categories within it did not reflect the actual project activity/focus. So as part of project implementation they had to develop their own data base and file system.

In **Burundi**, they encountered difficulties in starting work after the round tables and strategic planning sessions. While the project was intended to begin in May 2004, in reality it did not commence real operation until February 2005. The process of IAs submitting their proposals and having them approved took time. Other issues such as a lack of security and difficulties in communication, all contributed to delays, so that what should have been implemented in 12 to 15 months had to be done in eight months in some cases. Economic reintegration of children is costly. Given the budgetary constraints it was not possible to give a tool kit to each child, so children had to share the kits. However, access to micro-credit, through the participation of other partners (funders), was a support to economic reintegration.

In **Congo**, an array of partners and supporters assisted with implementation, including support from UNICEF as well as, at the local level, village committees and authorities. The assistance of IPEC staff was also noted as a positive influence. However, as in other countries in Central Africa, many factors could neither be anticipated nor controlled (e.g., difficulties in travel, changing exchange rates). Delays in implementation meant that some beneficiaries were still completing their training, so any follow-up after a few months of employment was not feasible within the scope of the project.

The geographic size of **DRC** was an added challenge to implementation. For example, one AP covers a geographic area described as the size of Belgium. Designed to have programmes in both the east and west of the country, when safety worsened and, at one point, the team from Gombe had to be called back to Kinshasa. The dearth of agencies with the capacity to implement Action Plans was also an issue, as were cost of materials, transfer of money and other budgetary constraints. Some communities had no telephone service. In some APs the drop-out rates were high because of the absence of services, food and health care. The team from DRC also identified ILO reporting procedures as a constraint.

In **Rwanda**, once they had adapted the project there was a second stage of identifying and selecting implementing agencies. Then agencies had to begin to develop the APs. Validation of these was reported as being a lengthy process as IAs were required to present to a technical follow-up committee for validation, prior to government approval. As the APs were started there was administrative reform in the country which divided the country into new geographic districts, so the area where an AP was to operate was passed from one district to another. Furthermore, some activities were identified later and not included so the necessary material was not available. The data base of beneficiaries took time and logistical problems (e.g. unreliable air travel, government bureaucracy) were encountered, so the entire process was lengthier than anticipated and this, in turn, had financial implications. However, the new administrative districts were also a support to implementation in that every district the mayor signed a document with the President of the Republic stating what would be accomplished. In districts where the project was operating, APs were included within these performance contracts. Resources were an issue as the budget did not take everything into account. IAs were frustrated because there were no administration fees built into the budget.

Many similar logistical issues were highlighted by the country teams from **Central Africa**. In addition, the CTA added the issue that sometimes “partners may be jealous . . . it takes time to find our own space and to prove our competence . . . after a period then partners come to us.”

In the **Philippines** the inclusion of many stakeholders was viewed as a positive that helped facilitate the development of detailed workplans, although there were delays in project start-up.⁴⁴ One major problem – which resulted in other problems – was a staffing issue where, as a result, the IPEC staff had to assume a more direct and time intensive role than had originally been anticipated. An additional responsibility was also placed on the finance person of the TBP. However, the project also had to address challenges in explaining to local stakeholders the purpose and nature of the project and in describing the supportive roles of ILO and the funder.⁴⁵ Once credibility was established and

⁴⁴ The National Consultant’s Evaluation Report references, for example, a delay in signing Memorandums of Agreement for BTMC’s AP, resulting in an eight month time frame being reduced to four months, p. 5-6.

⁴⁵ This issue was explained in the team interview conducted during the Evaluation Workshop.

Memoranda of Agreement signed, the selection of appropriate beneficiaries also took time. However, the use of Regional Implementing Teams was helpful in facilitating the project's implementation.

In addition to a pre-planning workshop in **Sri Lanka** to develop the vocational training strategy, very detailed Action Programmes were developed which listed all the activities and accompanying budget lines; thus supporting AP implementation and monitoring. While ILO was a “newcomer,” they were able to benefit from “piggy-backing” on UNICEF to create comprehensive reintegration strategy. However, the conflict situation, coupled with the fact they had no previous experience with partner agencies in these areas, were challenges. The tsunami also affected particular districts where the APs were being implemented. Supporting implementation were the coordination and linkages among all partners, both at the national and district levels. Despite no electricity, communication and transportation problems, regular meetings of the whole group were seen as helping to create a “tight knit family.” The National Steering Committee was mirrored in coordination at the local level, again strengthening linkages. Therefore, when problems arose, good communication among all the partners minimized delays. Also in Sri Lanka, some funds were allocated to the partners for staff travel and communication and a programme assistant, while IAs contributed their space and the time of their director. Finally another challenge, noted in some other countries as well, was that the \$50 for the tool kit was insufficient) additional fund-raising was required (e.g., tool kits relating to training through the Patrician Institute, such as sewing). Sustainability was viewed as coming with other donor funds, not USDOL funds.

4.3.2 Global

As the project was global in scope, as previously noted, systems issues were also addressed by the large group.⁴⁶ The need for a standard data base for beneficiaries was recommended as was the need to ensure timely mid-term assessments. Taking into account the cost of services in budget estimates was also advised, as was the continued need to formally involve major partners at all stages (i.e., Ministries of Labour, other government departments, workers' and employers organizations, NGOs).

A strong theme in the comments (which was echoed in individual and team interviews) was the need to promote exchanges among the different country projects. Workshop participants argued that gathering to share experiences and/or setting up electronic vehicles for sharing good practices, insights, interests and concerns would strengthen a global or inter-regional programme. A divergent point of view was also offered on this issue; that as an experimental programme such sharing might work against lessons being learned in particular contexts. If people were to share solutions or approaches then “home grown,” innovative strategies to solve problems might not emerge.

⁴⁶ This discussion of the project on a global level, facilitated on Friday by Craig Russon, looked at the whole program from a systems perspective.

Increased communication to broadcast good work and good practices represented the desire for a broader sharing of project learnings. Related to this concept was the need during and after implementation to work with the media to gain greater visibility; “provide space for beneficiaries to speak up and share what they derived from the project.”

Professional development at a variety of levels was also proposed by the group. For example, people should be made aware/trained on DDR and other related issues, including IPEC staff, staff from Implementing Agencies and social partners.

Three phases for such programmes were suggested by participants at the evaluation workshop: a preparatory phase with funding, a project phase, and a closure stage.⁴⁷ This idea was linked to the issue of sustainability which was raised on a number of occasions with the recommendation from the group being that more thought needed to be given to sustainability at the beginning of a project; “at the beginning, think about the end.”

4.4 Achievement and Results

In this section of the discussion, the most significant achievements and results will be discussed in relation to the three Immediate Objectives of the project. Questions related to achievements and results from the Terms of Reference will be integrated into each objective.

4.4.1 Immediate Objective 1: By the end of the programme there will be an enabling environment in each country, facilitating the prevention, withdrawal and subsequent reintegration into society of children involved in armed conflict

Legislative Frameworks

A variety of factors and conditions contribute to the creation of an “enabling environment,” including legislative frameworks. For this programme, the target was to achieve adequate legislative frameworks in all core countries, (i.e., the ratification of relevant international standards and the adoption of specific national legislation, including enforcement mechanisms). The legislative frameworks across the inter-regional programme were supportive of the prevention, withdrawal and reintegration of children to varying degrees.

In the Philippines acts such as R.A. No. 9231 (December 2003) providing for the elimination of child labour (including recruitment of children in armed conflict had been enacted. CRC had been previously signed and ratified, as had Convention 182 and in

⁴⁷ A three phased approach is already used by ILO-IPEC.

August 2003 the Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict had been ratified.

In Sri Lanka, a legislative framework was also in place with a Penal Code amendment in 2006 which increased the criminal liability for underage recruitment, forced or compulsory labour and slavery and recruiting a child for use in armed conflict. (2006 also saw the establishment of the LTTE Child Protection Authority.) While the amendments of the Penal Code do include WFCL, “the laws lack enforcement capacity.”⁴⁸

In Central Africa, ratification of various conventions had also occurred. For example, Convention 138 had been ratified in 2000 and Convention 182 in 2002. National legislation on child labour exists with reference to international norms.⁴⁹ A similar situation exists in Congo where Conventions 138 and 182 had been ratified, along with the African Convention on the Rights of the Child. While enforcement of the protocols and legislation remains a question, the basic legislative frameworks are in existence. In addition, other difficulties arose as in Burundi where the convention that the government signed did not include children who had auto-demobilized.

ILO-IPEC was able to provide technical expertise regarding the implementation in support of the implementation of Articles 4 and 6 Convention 182 in Colombia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, DRC and Burundi. In Colombia, DRC and Burundi, ILO-IPEC assisted in drafting proposal for legislative revision and reform, as appropriate. Also, in all core countries, ILO-IPEC participated in and contributed to national strategic planning processes and/or periodic reviews concerning activities relating to children involved in armed combat.⁵⁰

Partner Institutions

In all countries there were partnerships with institutions. However, in the Central African context the projects operated in countries “where most social and economic infrastructures have been destroyed.”⁵¹ As previously discussed, in some countries the strongest partners were NGOs, so the strategy was for the project to find its own niche and partner with others who could provide complementary services. In Congo, however, close cooperation with ONEMO in the framework of one of their APs increased the operational capacities of the government agency.⁵²

In the Philippines, structures within government had been set up to address children in armed conflict and the Department of Education was mandated “to include children in armed conflict as a priority sector for the implementation of education policies and

⁴⁸ National Consultant’s Evaluation Report, May 2007.

⁴⁹ Source: PowerPoint presentation at the Good Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop, Turin, May 2007.

⁵⁰ Source: September 2006 to February 2007 Technical Progress Report.

⁵¹ Responses to US Department of Labor inquiries, 2006.

⁵² Source: September 2006 to February 2007 Technical Progress Report.

programmes.”⁵³ This project represented the first action plan ever implemented by the Department of Labour.⁵⁴ To implement the project also meant meetings at the local level and the creation of a Regional Implementing Team. Technical assistance was also provided by other government departments, in coordination with the Department of Labour Regional Office.

In Sri Lanka the project included many partner organizations including NGOs and CBOs, UN agencies, employers’ organizations, workers’ organizations and cooperative societies, as well as multiple government partners. Through the implementation of the project, NGOs were supported and their capacity was built to deliver vocational training services to children affected by armed combat. Additionally, project staff reported that some of the partners have gone on to link with other donors, partner organizations, and government departments to support expansion of their vocational training programmes.⁵⁵

In Colombia the project operates as part of the Colombian Family Welfare Institute, a government agency responsible for the protection of children, adolescents and youth demobilized from armed groups. In Colombia the project contributed to the creation of models of prevention as well as the capacities of governmental and non-governmental employees.⁵⁶ Despite the diverse nature of the activities of the APs, with the support of the project diverse networks were established and alliances were formed that allowed for the maximization of existing resources.

In a discussion at the Good Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop regarding the contributions of workers’ organizations to the project, representatives signaled their appreciation to ILO-IPEC for adopting the approach of economic reintegration of children. They recommended “strengthening the synergy between IAs and social partners,” namely governments (as represented by Ministries of Labour), workers’ and employers’ associations.

A process of identifying organizations to carry out internal, independent monitoring of recruitment of children and supporting organizations in this endeavour is ongoing in DRC and in Sri Lanka through the Task Force on the 1612 Resolution; thus, helping to sustain a more positive environment.⁵⁷

⁵³ “Children in Armed Conflict: The Philippine Context,” PowerPoint presentation at the Good Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop, Turin, May 2007

⁵⁴ Government departments are not usually seen as acceptable Implementing Agencies; however, the argument was made in the case of the Philippines that they were the organization most likely to be successful within the existing national context.

⁵⁵ National Consultant’s Evaluation Report, May 2007.

⁵⁶ National Consultant’s Evaluation Report, May 2007.

⁵⁷ The use of a community approach is another way of helping sustain an enabling environment. The community approach is discussed on page ???

Public Opinion

Public opinion can be considered another factor that becomes part of an enabling environment. In the Philippines the project conducted orientation seminars on children involved in armed conflict in target communities, and among chairpersons of village councils and high school students in the Sala'am areas. Through the work of the Bishop Thibault Media Centre (BTMC) promotion of mass communication was targeted. They produced films on CDs using local dialects, along with an infomercial depicting children involved in armed conflict in ARMM. They established and maintained an interactive web-site accessible to other stakeholders involved with children in armed conflict in ARMM. In addition, the country team interviewed at the Evaluation Workshop explained that the Sala'am project is recognized in the communities as a benefit not only to children but to the community as a whole. Whereas officials were first hesitant to support the project, they are now asking for an extension.

In Colombia the media component included television commercials and radio materials, the latter of which were used at the local and national levels. In addition, posters were distributed to institutions in all the capital cities through certified mail and were also distributed more directly in the cities targeted for intervention. The FREE 2007 calendar was developed to provide information both to institutions and vulnerable populations.⁵⁸

Monitoring System and Data Base

While some attempts have been made to systematically monitor projects, the data base there is no evidence that the data base designed for beneficiaries was well used. This was confirmed by a number of those interviewed in-person by the International Evaluator. "The data base was the weakest part of the project. It never really worked . . . you can't really get reports from it, only age, gender and some numbers." While the data base was to be used for tracking beneficiaries, other systems were established in some countries to support local project monitoring. Frequent field visits and regular meetings were used, in Sri Lanka and in the Philippines for example, to monitor project implementation.

It should be noted that even where project monitoring exists, there is a lack of tracer studies⁵⁹ on former trainees. In some cases, this is a result of a lack of capacity for follow-up, while in other cases trainees were just finishing their vocational training. For example, in Colombia, due to the increase in conflict and the accompanying risks, the planned tracer study will not be conducted.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Source: September 2006 to February 2007 Technical Progress Report.

⁵⁹ Tracer Studies are follow-up studies of beneficiaries to determine their activity after some time has elapsed subsequent to completion of training. Tracer studies, while not required by the Prodoc, were something suggested by participants at the Good Practices and Lessons Learned and Evaluation Workshops.

⁶⁰ Source: September 2006 to February 2007 Technical Progress Report.

4.4.2 Immediate Objective 2: By the end of the programme former child soldiers above the minimum working age will be assisted to acquire decent work and achieve a sustainable income

The direct services offered to children and families in support of acquiring decent work and achieving a sustainable income included not only vocational or skills training, but also non-formal education, legal assistance, counselling services, and health services. Incentives might also include nutritional support, uniforms, and books or other school supplies. In places in Central Africa, adult members of families also benefited from direct services such as vocational or skills training, basic literacy training, income generating activities, and credit schemes. In Colombia as well there were adult family members who benefited from vocational or skills training, while a number also received medical check-ups.⁶¹

Vocational Training Strategy

The training strategy adopted by the project was fundamentally the same everywhere, despite the individual characteristics of the APs and the strengths of particular IAs.

“Catch-up” education was organized in places where children were illiterate and was coupled with other types of training. Many of the IAs in Central Africa included catch-up education as part of their vocational training activities. One issue that arose was that older learners who were illiterate were sometimes stigmatized by younger children which resulted in repeated absences and withdrawals.⁶²

The project also commissioned studies on the availability of training in a number of countries. In most cases, these studies were poorly conducted and came to late to assist in implementation.⁶³ To address this situation, some APs carried out rapid assessments focused on their specific area of activity.

In Sri Lanka, of the 1490 children targeted to receive vocational training a total of 1380 had completed training, for an achievement rate of 90%.⁶⁴ Vocational training programmes ran from two to six months and covered over 20 skill areas. Children were provided with tool kits provided by the project aimed at supporting them either in their own employment or in group ventures. In order to support their reintegration into society, project beneficiaries also received training in topics, such as leadership and problem solving, through the LifeSkills training programme that was provided to them.

In the Philippines, 277 youth successfully completed comprehensive vocational skills training, exceeding their original target of 180. They were able to exceed the target

⁶¹ Exact numbers of direct beneficiaries by type of service provided are found in the September 2006 to February 2007 Technical Progress Report.

⁶² Technical Note 4, Good Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop, Turin, May 2007.

⁶³ Ibid. It should be noted that the study conducted in Burundi and part of the study covering the east of the DRC were more helpful.

⁶⁴ National Consultant's Evaluation Report, May 2007.

because of partnership with a local sugar company who were looking for trained youth in the conflict area. They provided the technical expertise, tools and opportunity for employment.

In association with the National Apprenticeship Service in Colombia, an initial training module was developed to evaluate the skills of children and youth. The module was revised with the support of IOM, while ILO was responsible for pedagogical implementation.⁶⁵

In a number of countries it was not possible to link with national structures or services as they did not exist or were exceedingly bureaucratic. For example, in Congo the project was not able to establish cooperation with the Agence Nationale de l'Artisanat (ANA).⁶⁶ In the absence of professional vocational apprenticeship structures, other institutional support needs to be discovered and/or community support mobilized.

As part of the overall strategy, attempts were made to assist young people in choosing an occupation that would be economically viable in their area and that would, as much as possible, match the interests of the child. In some cases (such as tourism in Kigali) implementing agencies were able to take advantage of emerging opportunities.⁶⁷ In the DRC, however, where children vocational guidance was not well conducted and occupations were imposed on young people, children withdrew from the training.⁶⁸ Despite variability, the overall experience across countries suggested there was some reluctance to engage in agricultural occupations, reluctance to form associations/cooperatives, a preference for self-employment and a desire to participate in more urban and "modern" occupations.⁶⁹

Employment Status of Direct Beneficiaries

In Sri Lanka, the existing data suggests that the employment placement of trainees was approximately 75%.⁷⁰ (Final data are not available at this time.) Project staff estimates that approximately 60% of trainees will be engaged in occupations directly connected to their training, while 40% will go to unrelated occupations, a proportion that varies by district.

In the Philippines all the 115 trainees in sugar production technology graduated and were hired as technical assistants by sugar planters in the area. This partnership with a private company is intended to continue and will support the sustainability of the project.

⁶⁵ Colombia –Child Soldiers – Faces of Change Survey.

⁶⁶ Technical Note 8, Good Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop, Turin, May 2007.

⁶⁷ Technical Note 3, Good Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop, Turin, May 2007.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ National Consultant's Evaluation Report, May 2007.

In Colombia, support was provided for income-generating projects for 76 young people in four different cities, while 15 youth also benefited from health training under an agreement with the Red Cross of Colombia.⁷¹

In Burundi, 450 children were trained to specialize in bee keeping, with 350 learning particular occupations. Some learned carpentry to build the hives while others learned sewing in order to make the masks and gloves. However, the project ran into difficulties because they had to wait six months to collect the honey. At the end of the February reporting period, in Burundi 873 children were direct beneficiaries of reintegration, while 706 participated in prevention.⁷²

In Congo, the beneficiaries who benefited from formal vocational training were largely integrated into government financed construction projects.⁷³ The number of beneficiaries for reintegration was 179 and for prevention the number was 652. In the DRC 175 children who had benefited from the Action Programmes technical training began work in individual or collective micro-enterprises (most in the informal economy). A small minority were employed by master artisans or formal enterprises.

In Rwanda the focus was placed on support to new entrepreneurs, again in individual or collective micro-enterprises; 26 cooperatives were operational as of the end of February 2007.⁷⁴ Local authorities facilitated the delivery of official documents that were required for the creation of cooperatives, as well as providing technical support that encouraged provision of micro-finance to the cooperatives. (All beneficiaries had opened accounts in micro-finance institutions.) The strong support of local authorities, coupled with a strengthening economy, supported employment opportunities as well as follow-up of beneficiaries. As a result, the situation in Rwanda was more conducive to sustainable employment opportunities.

Status of Former Girls Involved in Armed Conflict

Girls experienced conflict in different ways.⁷⁵ In Sri Lanka and Rwanda for some girls who had joined voluntarily, it was status-enhancing. In other cases girls want to hide the fact they were involved because they had been exploited (often sexually), beaten, and forced into service. The tension in trying to include former girl soldiers was that some were hiding their past involvement, while the project sought to identify them. Therefore, girls might be included in the “vulnerable” group, rather than being clearly identified as formerly involved in armed combat. The percentages of girls who were reintegrated may be affected by this phenomenon.

⁷¹ Source: September 2006 to February 2007 Technical Progress Report.

⁷² Ibid.


⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Evidence for this section is drawn primarily from notes taken from during presentations in the Good Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop, Turin, May 2007.

In Sri Lanka, more girls than boys were involved, with girls representing 70%-80% of the total numbers of children placed for training as well as for completion of training. (See Graph 1.) Because of the “conservative social set-up” the choice of occupations for girls is limited and families see the advantages of girls receiving access to training opportunities.⁷⁶

Graph 1
Percentage of Girls Supported by APs



Some examples of the actions taken include those in Rwanda where the project paid for health care for husbands and children as well as the women. In the Philippines, where girls had been used as messengers, they were provided with access to education, vocational training, and psycho-social counselling, as needed. They were given an orientation on services provided by the project as well as individual consultations. Some organized themselves into working youth clubs that could be recognized by the Department of Labour. In Congo, one of the vocational instructors started a nursery so girls could bring their babies during the training period. In DRC (as in Rwanda), meetings were held with girls families to explain the programme. Timing of project activities was adjusted so girls could have time for their families and household chores. Girls were given management skills so they could work in cooperative groups. In Sri Lanka the programme was also adjusted to meet the needs of girls, including putting them in community-based situations where they were linked to women’s organizations.

In Burundi, they realized that many girls did not want to come forward and talk about their experiences, so they were flexible in listing them in the “vulnerable” category. They also made sure that in each association that was created girls were part of the management committee. In DRC, some needs of girls and young women (e.g. transport,

⁷⁶ National Consultant’s Evaluation Report, May 2007.

food) were not covered by the AP, so pocket money⁷⁷ was found to help address this situation and, wherever possible, transportation was found.

While the project has reintegrated some young people from minority indigenous groups (e.g., Congo), they received the same services as the majority population children. There were no other examples of activities targeting or being tailored for other minority or particularly vulnerable groups (e.g., children and youth with disabilities).

4.4.3. Immediate Objective 3: By the end of the programme fewer children will be recruited into armed conflict in the targeted countries.

Recruitment Numbers/Prevention of Children in Armed Conflict

To discourage recruitment and encourage prevention, the project adopted a strategy that included discouraging armed groups from recruiting children, raising the awareness of children at risk, their parents and communities, improving educational access, and establishing child protection networks.

In Central Africa, it was determined that other organizations had “the means and mandate to perform this task more effectively” and that it was “dangerous and unrealistic” to try to approach military commanders.⁷⁸ However, the project undertook prevention activities in all four Central African countries. While identifying the children most at risk was difficult, the project decided to support the schooling of children identified as vulnerable, while supporting the economic reintegration of children who had reached the minimum age for work.

The most effective way to prevent recruitment of children was seen as supporting economic activities of parents of children at risk of recruitment, while at the same time keeping their children in school.⁷⁹ For example, in Burundi, parents of 300 children were “economically empowered” so they were able to keep their children in school.⁸⁰

Prevention of recruitment is, once again, difficult to measure in actual terms. While reduction of recruitment seems to have occurred in most areas of the sub-region (except for certain zones such as the Eastern DRC), the actual effectiveness of prevention is unknown. However, it was recognized that direct support activities are only relevant where voluntary recruitment is concerned.

As stated in the National Consultant’s Evaluation Report for Sri Lanka: “Activities at the UN level and attention by international Human Rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch has, therefore, raised awareness on the issue among the general public in Sri Lanka. The challenge though remains in translating awareness into action by the

⁷⁷ Technical Note 6, Good Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop, Turin, May 2007.

⁷⁸ Technical Note 8, Good Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop, Turin, May 2007.

⁷⁹ Source: September 2006 to February 2007 Technical Progress Report.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

militant groups that are outside the realm of legislative accountability, especially in a situation of renewed conflict.” However, the risk of post-training re-recruitment was deemed as low. Quoting from an interview with UNICEF, “the Action Plan didn’t stop recruitment, but it has brought the topic squarely on the table.”

In Colombia the prevention strategy was designed and implemented in collaboration with other IPEC projects, particularly the IPEC CDL CSEC project in South America.⁸¹ While some numbers of children receiving assistance are countable, whether this translates into prevention is unknown. Given the situations in the various countries, the number of children still being recruited (voluntarily or forcibly) is difficult to determine.

Mainstreaming into Educational System

Successful participation in the education system is one means of preventing the recruitment of children. In the Central African countries, formal schooling support services were provided to 1316 children of whom 593 were girls and 723 were boys.⁸² Incentives such as uniforms, books and school supplies were also distributed. Also, in Burundi, the parents of 300 children (other than those in direct reintegration and prevention activities) had been economically empowered to keep their children in school.⁸³

In the Philippines 120 children were provided with formal education; 50 at the elementary level, 50 in high school and 20 in college. Of the 120 children and youth, 58 were girls and 62 were boys.⁸⁴ In Colombia, networks such as those in Bucaramanga and Bogotá were developed with parents of school age children and adolescents to provide support to parents which would prevent young people from dropping out of school.⁸⁵

Use of the Community Approach

While the project used a variety of strategies to benefit the individual child, it incorporated a community approach where the intention was to provide services that would also benefit the community through children’s economic reintegration and the prevention of recruitment (or re-recruitment) of children. The concept was to make the community willing to accept children formerly involved in armed conflict, in particular to avoid singling out girls and to avoid the impression that violence was being rewarded. While this involved opening up services to other children in the community, it also entailed the rehabilitation of community facilities (e.g. roads, bridges, schools).

Burundi provides an example of where children who had fought on opposite sides were brought together to develop an economic activity which also strengthened existing

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

services in the community. Also in Burundi, 150 families were provided with micro-credit (provided by funds other than USDOL)⁸⁶ including goats in a scheme where goats were raised and passed on to other vulnerable families.

Where former child soldiers took part in the rehabilitation work, this sometimes represented “symbolic reparation.”⁸⁷ However, the projects were often expensive and required the support of multiple partners. The link to the project’s objectives needed to be explicit and the commitment of the community obvious in order to justify the expense.

Results in Non-Core Countries

The programme saw very little activity in non-core countries. As explained in the Good Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop and confirmed by the Technical Officer (ILO-IPEC Geneva), the only activity was in Liberia. A Labour Market and Training Needs Assessment was conducted to map reintegration opportunities for children associated with armed conflict. The report was produced in March 2005, as a joint effort by ILO-IPEC and UNICEF (Liberia).

4.4.4 Overview of Beneficiaries⁸⁸

Table 1 provides an overview of the direct beneficiaries (children and youth) withdrawn and prevented over the course of the programme. The most recent data indicate that 4335 children were withdrawn, as compared to a target of 5260 (the actual withdrawn representing 82% of the target).

**Table 1:
Direct Beneficiaries Withdrawn or Prevented Through the Provision of
(Enrollment in) Educational Services or Training Opportunities⁸⁹**

CHILDREN BY COUNTRIES (DIRECT BENEFICIARIES)	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	TARGET FOR WITHDRAWN
African Countries: Withdrawn	2520	585	3105	3840
African Countries: Prevented	1535	1070	2605	
<i>African Countries Sub-Total</i>	<i>4055</i>	<i>1655</i>	<i>5710</i>	
The Philippines: Withdrawn	190	33	223	200
The Philippines: Prevented	101	73	174	
<i>The Philippine* Sub-Total</i>	<i>291</i>	<i>106</i>	<i>397</i>	
Sri Lanka: Withdrawn	52	166	218	660
Sri Lanka: Prevented	330	832	1162	

⁸⁶ After the September 2006 TPR, the decision was made to fund micro-credit activity using funds other than USDOL money.

⁸⁷ Technical Note7, Good practices and Lessons Learned Workshop, Turin, May 2007.

⁸⁸ Annex G to the September 2006 to February 2007 Technical Progress Report, provides data on direct services to children and families as well as the number of direct beneficiaries by country. The data on direct beneficiaries have been used to as the basis for this section of the report.

⁸⁹ The TPR also provides notes on considerations to be taken into account by country. Table 1 provides a gross overview.

<i>Sri Lanka Sub-Total</i>	382	998	1380	
Colombia: Withdrawn**	----	-----	789	560
Colombia: Prevented	289	384	673	
<i>Colombia Sub-Total</i>	----	-----	1462	
			TOTAL	8,949

* *Additional detail used for this table was found in the Philippines PowerPoint presentation at the Workshop in Turin, May 2007.*

** *Data not available for children withdrawn by gender in Colombia.*

4.4.5 Reflections on the Global Project

ILO-IPEC staff, when interviewed, believed that one of the main outcomes has been the “opportunity to give ILO a voice in this forum.” As previously described, ILO took a leadership role in international events, bringing forward the idea of economic reintegration of children who had been involved in armed conflict as a development approach. The recommendations being made through the study documenting good practices and lessons learned will fit within the information gathered for the Machel Review. In addition, ILO will be contributing the youth employment perspective to a paper being developed by an internal task force on employment in post-conflict countries.

“The programme has been important and unique with its focus on economic reintegration . . . in this case we went beyond vocational training and paid particular attention to the search for decent work for youth. . . . We have worked with other partners, such as UNICEF (who can provide the psycho-social services) and we have found our niche.”

The other benefit was in the creation of a model, not only applicable to children involved in armed conflict, but also to children between the ages of 15 and 18. “It is difficult for us [ILO] to talk about employment when we are against child labour, but now we are re-thinking our mental models.”

Finally, in the in-person interview following the workshop ILO-IPEC staff expressed relief that all workshops participants were aware of WFCL and of ILO-IPEC’s approach to child labour. The emphasis that had been placed in the beginning of the programme on understanding Conventions 138 and 182 had reaped the reward of people coming together with a common conceptual framework related to child labour issues.

5 – Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1 Design and Relevance

It can be **concluded** that:

1. The focus on economic reintegration of children was a strength of the programme as it allowed ILO-IPEC to find a niche that was appropriate to its mandate and expertise – the programme was viewed as relevant to the country situations and target populations.
2. The flexibility inherent in the project design was both a strength and a challenge. While the menu of options allowed country teams to choose what was most appropriate to their context, the indicators could not then be aggregated to determine programme impact in a systematic manner.
3. Having the project document (including the logical framework) only available in English did not provide equal access to understanding of project design.⁹⁰
4. The flexibility in design that allowed for extension of the age range of the target population was sensible and appropriate to certain country contexts.
5. People “on the ground” in the various countries were not significant players in the original project design; their involvement might have helped to make the original design more tailored to national realities.
6. Processes within countries (such as the strategic planning sessions and round tables) were helpful in tailoring or adapting the programme, thus making it more relevant to local contexts.
7. Project design might benefit from looking beyond what trades or businesses are known in the implementing regions to pointing out new technologies or industries that might be appropriate in certain contexts; thus creating the balance between local knowledge and innovation.
8. Although steps were taken during programme implementation, attention should be paid to an exit strategy at all stages of a project, beginning at the design stage.

Therefore, it is **recommended** that:

- ◆ ILO, building on what has been learned in this programme, continue to pursue projects that focus on economic reintegration of children affected by conflict;
- ◆ ILO continue to allow flexibility within global projects, but ensure a balance with common outcomes and key indicators;

⁹⁰ The International Evaluator recognizes that there were monetary constraints in translating a document of this magnitude. However, translation of the Logical Framework and other key elements could have been achieved. More importantly, this may speak to the need for more concise and focused project documents.

- ◆ ILO involve key stakeholders/teams/participants from implementing countries to have involvement in project design, along side experts who can bring outside perspectives and fresh ideas;
- ◆ Exit strategies be considered and explored at project inception, with reconsideration and adaptation throughout the life span of the project.

5.2 Implementation

It can be **concluded** that:

1. Implementation was slow in its inception, as the various country contexts and dynamics presented barriers to the realization of the project.
2. The challenging logistics within the countries (e.g., lack of infrastructure, continuing conflict, natural disasters) exacerbated delays in implementation.
3. The existence of multiple partners was a strength, but in some contexts required additional time and effort to ensure the commitment of the partners.
4. Attention to internal communication and scheduling regular meetings facilitated implementation.
5. The lack of communication across country projects and regions can be viewed as a detriment to implementation or a necessity in experimental projects. However, the country teams believed that enhanced sharing of project problems and solutions would have promoted implementation.
6. Given the complications and unexpected events that delayed actual implementation, a project start-up phase would have been helpful.

Therefore, it is **recommended** that:

- ◆ Vehicles for sharing project experiences and learnings be built into the ongoing implementation of inter-regional/global projects (at least to the degree that financial constraints will allow);
- ◆ A phased approach be considered that would include a “start-up” or development phase prior to expectations for actual project implementation.

5.3 Creation of an Enabling Environment

It can be **concluded** that:

1. While variation existed, the basic legislative frameworks were in place in all countries; however, the capacity to enforce legislation and protocols remains a question.
2. As a result of the programme, ILO-IPEC had a new or additional vehicle for providing governments with technical expertise that enhanced existing legislative frameworks, either through advice on implementation and/or assistance in legislative revision and/or reform.

3. Where strong governmental or institutional partners existed, the creation of an enabling environment appears more likely. Such partnerships were less likely in most instances in Central Africa, given the situation where social and economic infrastructures had been destroyed and government situations were in flux.
4. Regardless of challenging circumstances, ILO's holistic approach of creating multi-level partnerships involving the NGO sector, governments, workers' organizations and employers' associations offers multiple opportunities for positive impact on children and youth.
5. Where multiple partners and complementary funders were included in a well coordinated umbrella strategy, such as in Sri Lanka, project efficiency and impact was enhanced.
6. Initiatives designed to inform public opinion (use of the media) were used in certain countries and were a helpful adjunct to actual programming for children and families.
7. A monitoring system which was to support project implementation and, as such an enabling environment, was particularly difficult to establish in Central Africa due to the local conditions. Monitoring in Sri Lanka and the Philippines appears to have been more effective because of the close working relationships between project management and the implementing agencies.
8. The data base was problematic and did not reflect the realities of project activity.
9. Overall, the programme made a contribution to enhancing and sustaining enabling environments, albeit to different degrees in the various countries.

Therefore, it is **recommended** that:

- ◆ ILO-IPEC continue to work in countries where the basic legislative framework is in place, as this – at minimum – speaks to some desire for national governments to support the principles of ILO;
- ◆ Within such contexts, ILO-IPEC advocate for legislative enhancements (where necessary), while continuing to provide technical advice and assistance;
- ◆ ILO-IPEC continue to pursue multi-faceted partnerships and support enhancement partners' capacity both to prevent children from engaging in armed conflict and to support their economic reintegration into communities.
- ◆ ILO-IPEC projects maximize the opportunities provided by multiple and complementary funders;
- ◆ Strategies to engage the media as partners in support of the reduction of children in armed combat should be part of a comprehensive national strategy;
- ◆ More attention be paid to setting up data bases and monitoring systems that are appropriate to the local context and to the realities of the project.

5.4 Acquisition of Decent Work and Sustainable Income

It can be **concluded** that:

1. Many studies commissioned to support project implementation were reported as not being particularly helpful, often because they were not well done and/or were not timely.
2. The project was successful in providing vocational training that gave many children and young people occupational skills. However, it should be noted that there was still variability in the applicability of these skills to the local economy.
3. While attempts were made to assist young people in choosing a useable and contextually relevant skill/occupation, vocational guidance was not always successful. Incentives and supports (including follow-up) for young people to form cooperatives were beneficial.
4. In most cases, employment was in “traditional” occupations.
5. Young people were able to gain employment in all of the participating countries, although follow-up to ascertain the sustainability of this employment has not been possible in most cases.
6. When a clear understanding of what was realistic and viable, was coupled with private sector partnerships (as in the Philippines), training was more likely to lead to employment.
7. Attention was paid to the unique needs of girls. The project was flexible enough to address the very different circumstances of females involved in armed conflict situations.
8. Beyond the issues related to females, the project did little to address other groups with special reintegration issues. While some mention was made of minority populations in Congo, there was no apparent attention paid to groups such as children/youth with disabilities.
9. True to the experimental nature of the programme, ILO-IPEC found various means of providing training and decent work for youth previously involved as children in armed conflict situations, while recognizing that the total numbers were somewhat below the projected targets.

Therefore, it is **recommended** that:

- ◆ The necessary time and resources be spent to understand clearly the local economy and employment context, without limiting the options to only “traditional” occupations. Part of knowing the local context is also assessing opportunities for private sector partnerships that would help to guarantee employment;
- ◆ New technologies and private sector partnerships be explored;

- ◆ Sufficient time and attention be paid to the vocational guidance component, taking into account local realities, children's interests, as well as the possibilities for ongoing supports and incentives;
- ◆ ILO-IPEC continue to address the specific – and contextually variable – needs of girls;
- ◆ More attention be paid to identifying and programming for other vulnerable groups, particularly children with disabilities as this must be a group whose experience in armed conflict situations has affected their future employability.

5.5 Reduction of Recruitment into Armed Conflict

It can be **concluded** that:

1. Prevention and reduction of recruitment is difficult to measure – and indeed difficult to ascertain.
2. Support activities are only relevant where voluntary recruitment is concerned.
3. Successful participation in the mainstream education system is one means of preventing recruitment of children and needs to be considered in any national or inter-regional strategy.
4. Participation of children in mainstream education often requires provision of other supports/incentives.
5. A holistic community approach that involves families and/or networks of families, other vulnerable children, the rehabilitation of community facilities, and the strengthening of existing services, has great potential to prevent and reduce the recruitment of children into armed groups. Such an approach also contributes to an enabling environment at the local level.
6. Non-core countries, with one exception, were not influenced by the programme.
7. Overall, support for mainstream education and the use of a community approach appear to be logical and viable prevention strategies; however, accurately quantifying their impact remains problematic.

Therefore, it is **recommended** that:

- ◆ The participation of children and youth in mainstream education be supported in whatever ways are appropriate to the local context, including the provision of incentives to children and families;
- ◆ A community approach be used in efforts to prevent and reduce recruitment of children, thus helping to create an enabling environment.

5.6 Other

It can be **concluded** that:

1. Through the inter-regional programme, ILO was able to gain knowledge and expertise which could be brought to bear in the global discussion of how to best serve children who had been involved in armed conflict situations.
2. Through supporting the development of the module on youth and DDR (IDDRS), through participation in the 2007 International Conference “*Free children from war,*” and through membership in a working group for the Machel Study, ILO-IPEC has used its mandate and expertise to make an important contribution as to the role economic reintegration can play in the reintegration of children and youth who were previously involved in armed conflict.
3. The project was able to encourage economic reintegration without *placing* young people into situations that would be considered WFCL.

Therefore, it is **recommended** that:

- ◆ ILO-IPEC continue to support initiatives that use economic reintegration as a key strategy in supporting the prevention and withdrawal of children and youth from situations of armed conflict;
- ◆ ILO-IPEC continue to advocate for decent work for children within the context of economic reintegration so as to avoid placing children in hazardous employment or any WFCL;
- ◆ Tracer studies be considered to ensure that young people continue to be in decent work situations and not in WFCL.

6 – Lessons Learned

The conclusions and recommendations, as previously discussed, speak to many of the lessons learned. Furthermore, ILO-IPEC has commissioned a study to document Good Practices and Lessons Learned. Therefore, this chapter will not repeat the concepts included in the previous chapter on conclusions and recommendations nor will it attempt to replicate the complementary Lessons Learned report, but rather it will focus on the questions regarding emerging experiences, strategies and results as outlined in the Terms of Reference.

6.1 Integration into DDR Policies and Programmes

Integration of ILO-IPEC programmes into Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration policies and programmes at the national level is crucial. ILO-IPEC must be viewed as a partner and a support to national initiatives. ILO-IPEC has the technical knowledge and expertise to assist governments in enhancing their legislative frameworks and national initiatives dealing with both children involved in armed conflict and worst forms of child labour. ILO-IPEC's involvement in global initiatives regarding children involved in armed combat allows them to bring the latest information to the national governments with whom they are working, while providing ILO-IPEC with practical experiences to help inform the global work.

ILO-IPEC's role in promoting *economic* reintegration of children and youth is an innovative and important adjunct to existing and emerging national DDR strategies as it provides a practical means for the long term reintegration of children by giving children and youth vocational skills. ILO-IPEC partners with existing agencies that provide the training. While these implementing partners could, theoretically, provide vocational training without the involvement of ILO-IPEC, the presence of ILO-IPEC creates a network among these partners in which there is the potential for them to learn from each other. ILO-IPEC's upstream work with national governments provides a link between national policy and legislation and the activity "on the ground;" thus, informing both the national and local work and contributing to the creation of an enabling environment.

6.2 Links to DWCP Processes

ILO-IPEC has the challenge of providing vocational training and facilitating economic opportunities for young people in difficult circumstances without provoking a move to hazardous - or otherwise unacceptable forms - of economic activity. In the case of this programme, ILO-IPEC was successful in training young people and placing them into decent work situations.⁹¹ Clearly, all partners were well aware of the conventions and principles which ILO promotes which speak to the consistent message that ILO-IPEC staff conveyed in all countries within the inter-regional programme.

⁹¹ Again, longer term follow-up would have to be undertaken to ensure that youth have remained in decent work situations and not transferred into WFCL or been re-involved in conflict situations.

ILO-IPEC's supervision of the Action Programmes allowed them to educate implementing agencies about child labour issues. The value-added is that the agencies now have a greater awareness of the issues and will be less likely to inadvertently place youth in situations that could be construed as WFCL. Again, the linkages among local, national and global initiatives are mutually supportive.

6.3 Tailoring Action Programmes to Contexts

Context cannot be underestimated. At all stages, from programme design to sustainability considerations, contextual understanding is crucial. While the logistical challenges of country contexts can appear overwhelming, the strengths of the context must also be taken into account. Without downplaying the challenges, an initial assessment of the contextual assets is crucial. Who are the potential partners with the greatest capacity? What does government have to offer? Where are the economic opportunities?

In order to answer these questions, the consideration of a start-up or development phase needs to be seriously considered. As previously argued, comprehensive projects that include action programmes and mini-programmes, must first consider an exploratory or start-up phase, followed by time for implementation and finally, a structured and well-considered follow-up plan wherein sustainability has been directly addressed from the outset and continues to be a focus throughout the stages of project implementation.

1 Annexes

Annex A – Logical Framework

DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVE	To contribute to the reduction of the incidence of children serving in armies and/or in armed groups.		
IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE	INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	COMMENTS
I/O 1. “By the end of the programme, there will be an enabling environment in each country, facilitating the prevention, withdrawal and subsequent reintegration into society of children involved in armed conflict.”	Quality of legislative framework in each country (expected target: improvement in each country as appropriate and possible)	Qualitative analysis of national law compendia / official or media reports of laws being adopted (including formal notification of legislation to ILO)	The analysis of the legislation will focus particularly in the introduction of a ban on recruitment into the armed forces or any other branches of the security forces that is consistent with the State’s commitments under international law, as well as on the inclusion of enforcement mechanism in the text of a law (where this does not exist). If the process of approval of legislation exceeds the timeframe of the project, the status of the process will be analysed.
	Number and type of institutions participating in coordinated action in each country	Reports from meetings and information from relevant institutions	Includes governmental, non governmental and international institutions. The indicator will analyse actual commitments and not just participation in meetings
	Personnel appointed (or budget established to allow this) for internal monitoring of army/security force recruitment	Reports from meetings with relevant institutions	Same as above
I/O 2. “By the end of the programme, former child soldiers above the minimum working age will be assisted to acquire decent work and achieve a sustainable income.”	Number of organizations setting up reintegration projects for child soldiers that refer to good practice handbook for advice on what to do	Feed-back from organizations setting up reintegration projects	Likely to be available only towards the end of the programme
	Number of children who receive vocational training	Records of organisation setting-up vocational training services	This is a process indicator. The expected outcomes of the vocational training activities will be measured by the following indicator
	Employment status of programme direct beneficiaries (target: 50% or more of former child soldiers have got decent work six months after they stop receiving support from the programme, and are earning a sustainable income that gives them enough to live on)	Follow-up monitoring (as provided for by Activity 2.2.6)	“50%” is an arbitrary target; it may be possible to identify a meaningful proportion during the programme implementation

Annex A – Logical Framework

	Proportion of former girl soldiers involved in reintegration programmes (target: more than 10 per cent of the total number of former child soldiers on such programmes)	Monitoring the number of girls benefiting from action programmes under Activities 2.2.4, 2.2.6 and 2.3.3, and comparison with both the number of girls revealed at the beginning of the mainstream programme (2.2.3), with information about the proportion of girls acquired in the course of Activities 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, and with the proportion of girls reported by former child soldiers to be involved in their armed group	This indicator will also include a qualitative component analysing whether efforts to secure access to them and develop ways of supporting their reintegration have been successful. If the indicator goes above 10 per cent, it will represent a worthwhile marked improvement on recent results reported in most of Central Africa.
I/O 3. "By the end of the programme, fewer children will be recruited in armed conflict in the targeted countries."	Number of cases of child recruitment in security forces reported previously to have recruited children (target: reduction of at least 50%)	Reports from independent monitors.	Requires either cooperation of armed forces/security forces (i.e. access to sources of information that they may regard as secret) or confidence in accuracy of independent monitors
	Number of children mainstreamed into the educational system by the project	Reports from implementing agencies based on school and other educational services registers	This indicator will reflect the success of the project in reintegrating children into the educational system, being formal or non formal, as a means of rehabilitation
	Current and potential future political leaders who have been targets for advocacy efforts or provided with information about harmful effects of child recruitment advocate an end to the practice (or, in the case of potential future leaders, pledge not to use children in future armed conflicts); i.e. are reported to be doing more than just making statements for propaganda purposes or to impress observers	Media reports. Other reports on policy discussions within individual armed groups	This qualitative indicator shows whether leaders, including those of armed opposition groups, have been swayed (but not if recruitment has been stopped or if child soldiers have been demobilized)
	Issue of stopping the use of child soldiers is included in the political agenda of one or more political parties	Media reports. Governing party policy statements provided to ILO	Same point as above

Annex A – Logical Framework

	Percentage of communities supporting an armed group that are hostile to child recruitment / with a positive attitude to the ending the use of children in armed conflict reported to increase	Survey of views of those concerned. Alternatively, their views may be noted in media interviews, in statements to other organizations, or in publications produced by the armed group concerned	Not clear whether views of any such communities can be surveyed safely (for communities concerned, or for survey team)
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3.4.2 Outputs and activities

The following table lists the various outputs associated with each Immediate Objective and the respective Activities, which will be implemented in order to produce them. It is important to note that this matrix has been developed as a flexible tool to accommodate the different strategies that might be developed in each of the countries included in this project. Therefore, most of the outputs and activities are linked to the different “elements” of the menu of interventions explained in 3.2.3 and in Annex 2. A narrative explanation of the rationale for the selection of the outputs is presented in Annex 3.

DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVE	To contribute to the reduction of the incidence of children serving in armies and/or in armed groups.	
IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE	OUTPUTS	MAIN ACTIVITIES
I/O 1 “By the end of the programme, there will be an enabling environment in each country, facilitating the prevention, withdrawal and subsequent reintegration into society of children involved in armed conflict.”	1.1 Capacity for enforcement of legislation in Ministries and other relevant institutions enhanced <i>(Element I.2)</i>	1.1.1 Capacity of both Ministry of Labour and other departments of ministerial-rank playing a role in preparation and enforcement of child soldier legislation assessed and short-fall in expertise or capacity identified, and remedial action proposed and supported (e.g. appointment of a relevant specialist for specified time, or training of ministry staff)
		1.1.2 ILO provides technical expertise concerning implementation of Articles 4 and 6 of Convention No. 182 (supporting Ministry of Labour in convening tripartite process to identify “hazardous” forms of child labour)
		1.1.3 Identifying organizations to influence and train the armed forces/security forces and armed groups on their internal procedures to prevent child recruitment and support respect for child rights, and providing support for them to do so
		1.1.4 Identifying organizations to carry out independent monitoring of recruitment and providing support for them to do so
	1.2 National strategic plans on the issue developed, involving coordinated action by government departments, inter-governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations <i>(Element II)</i>	1.2.1 National SPIF exercise carried out by ILO-IPEC in every country
		1.2.2 National strategic plan for principle child soldier activities prepared and up-dated periodically (some countries may require specific plans for individual regions or conflicts). ILO-IPEC representative participates in and contributes to strategic planning process and periodic reviews. The particular reintegration strategy(ies) to be supported by ILO-IPEC are agreed with others.
		1.2.3 Capacity and expertise of organizations (NGOs or social partners) already experienced in prevention or reintegration, or interested in carrying out such activities, observed and assessed by ILO-IPEC, in particular potential as partners to work on sub-contracts
		1.2.4 Mid-programme self-evaluation and re-planning (“mini-SPIF” exercise)
		1.2.5 End of programme self-evaluation and planning for follow-up

Annex A – Logical Framework

	1.3 Proposals for improving the legislative / normative systems developed and discussed (Element I.1)	1.3.1 Assessment and identification of what further laws, regulations and enforcement mechanism are necessary in each of the eight countries
		1.3.2 Need for new legislation raised with government partners and other agencies already lobbying on child soldier issues
		1.3.3 Drafting of proposals for legislation revision and reform as appropriate
		1.3.4 Advocacy with governmental institutions and independent agencies to ensure proposals on the (legal) bans on recruitment are considered (if possible adopted)
	1.4 The knowledge base on the scope and scale of the problem of child soldier recruitment and what the most appropriate solutions are likely to be, both in terms of prevention and DDR, improved (Element II.5)	1.4.1 Assess whether other stakeholders would benefit from access to 1 st phase national consultant’s report by ILO-IPEC (on four Central African countries), edit existing report if necessary, and disseminate to relevant other agencies
		1.4.2 Needs for further research to complete the knowledge base for policy formulation and to carry out ILO-IPEC activities identified and priorities established. Terms of reference for further research prepared and potential researchers identified. Research carried out (linked to extra research concerning girls associated with armed units, see 2.3.1)
	1.4.3 Comments about the experience of each country concerning reintegration initiatives prepared and contributed to a global review of good practice	
I/O 2 (Reintegration) “By the end of the programme, former child soldiers will be assisted by the governments, workers’ and employers’ organisations, NGOs and other partners above the minimum working age to acquire decent work and achieve a sustainable income.”	2.1 The knowledge base, facilities and opportunities required to undertake the economic reintegration of former child soldiers have been acquired.	2.1.1 Research into employment opportunities for demobilized child soldiers (Element III.1) carried out, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • assessment of whether appropriate information is already available, needs completing or updating, or is largely unavailable; • terms of reference of research prepared and suitable researcher(s) identified and commissioned; • research carried out and conclusions presented in form that gives clear indication of numbers of young people (15-20 year olds) that could be absorbed into particular activities in different towns and areas.
		2.1.2. Assessment of the educational and training needs of former child soldiers in general in order to secure the employment (Element III.2)

Annex A – Logical Framework

		<p>2.1.3 Identification of the physical infrastructure and human resources required in order to provide catch-up education and vocational training to allow reintegration of former child soldiers (<i>Element III.3</i>), involving:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • agreeing with other agencies the nature and extent of facilities that are needed; • supporting the development of a strategy on youth training facilities; • existing information about facilities assessed to decide what form of investigation is required to identify physical facilities and personnel needed; • terms of reference of investigation prepared, investigators commissioned; • investigations carried out, conclusions highlighting differences between what is available and what is needed, and making proposal for remedial action, accompanied by budget.
		<p>2.1.4 Material assistance to meet updating needs identified in 2.1.3 (types of assistance specified in menu <i>Element III.4</i>) prioritised (in consultation with others) and provided accordingly</p>
		<p>2.1.5 Assessment of the needs of communities to which former child soldiers are being returned, if they are to facilitate their integration into jobs or income generating activities (<i>Element III.5</i>), including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • identifying areas or communities where the programme will support reintegration; • NGOs/CBOs identified and commissioned to identify the types of support to the community that will assist in the economic reintegration of former child soldiers and other war affected children.
	<p>2.2. At least 5000 former child soldiers identified and participating in the programme’s activities according to their needs</p>	<p>2.2.1 Initial review with other agencies of number of former child soldiers and war affected children to benefit from reintegration activities in the country concerned</p>
		<p>2.2.2 (<i>Element IV.1</i>) In exceptional cases where reintegration activities that are essential prior to economic integration are not being organized by other agencies, these are undertaken with regard to former child soldiers <u>not</u> benefiting from programmes of other agencies, NGO or another organization sub-contracted to provide or organize: the main activities are listed in <i>Element IV.1</i>, from the provision of food and shelter to family reunification and the establishment of former child soldiers who cannot return home in shared accommodation of their own.</p>
		<p>2.2.3 (<i>Element IV.2</i>) Identification of the needs and abilities of individual former child soldiers. Current abilities and future educational and training needs of individual young people identified and recorded. Individuals provided with information about their options, and initial choices made on training.</p>
		<p>2.2.4 (<i>Element IV.3</i>) Provision of life skills training, catch-up education, and vocational training. Advice provided about income generating opportunities following training,</p>

Annex A – Logical Framework

		2.2.5 (<i>Element IV.3</i>) Potential employers identified for apprenticeships linked to vocational training (and possibility of follow-up employment negotiated)	
		2.2.6 (<i>Element IV.4</i>) Former child soldiers remaining in urban centres given stipends or other appropriate support to set themselves up in sustainable income-generating activities, involving: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • assessment of amount per individual required and benefits of encouraging pooling of grants; • <u>Stipends</u> administration set up in towns where they are to be paid and <u>stipends</u> paid in instalments, supported by micro-business advice. 	
		2.2.7 (<i>Element IV.5</i>) Material support provided to communities where former child soldiers are being reintegrated (needs identified in 2.1.5) via CBO/NGO, e.g. for <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • transport infrastructure; • health care provision; <p>or to individual families for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • agricultural activities, such as providing seeds and tools; • implementing small livestock programmes, such as rabbits, chickens of guinea pigs; • or conducting other ‘micro-projects’ aimed at vocational skill building and income generation. 	
		2.2.8 (<i>Element IV.6</i>) Organization supervising reintegration support monitors progress for six months after former child soldiers start work, providing further advice on request, and again monitors progress 12 months later	
		2.2.9 (<i>Element IV.7</i>) In cases of need (assessed by CBO/NGO organizing support for reintegration in the community), training in non-violent resolution of conflicts for some children	
		2.2.10 (<i>Element IV.8</i>) Self evaluations of each Reintegration project	
		2.2.11 Independent evaluation in each country during the third year of all reintegration initiatives; ready to feed into international workshop, intended to reach conclusions on good practice – see Output 2.4)	
		2.3 Appropriate initiatives to facilitate access to former girl child soldiers and other categories of child soldiers facing particular difficulties, developed	2.3.1 (<i>Element V.1</i>) Consult other agencies on their experience in securing access and providing support for former girl soldiers. Commission consultant to investigate appropriate ways of securing access to former girl child soldiers, in order to assess their reintegration needs, and test these.
			2.3.2 (<i>Element V.2</i>) One or more appropriate forms of training or support for former girl soldiers designed.

Annex A – Logical Framework

		2.3.3 (<i>Element V.3</i>) Pilot projects to provide life skills training, catch-up education or vocational training, or similar support, to former girl soldiers.
		2.3.4 (<i>Element V.4</i>) Assessment of whether any other categories of child soldier are experiencing difficulty in getting access to reintegration programmes; designing and providing support for reintegration if necessary
	2.4 Conclusions have been reached about which reintegration strategies are most appropriate, and observations on good practice have been shared at international level.	2.4.1 Existing ILO tools relating to employment generation for youth or demobilized soldiers assessed by CTA and other ILO units for relevance to reintegration of child soldiers, and translated or adapted if necessary (e.g. IYB for possible use supporting Activity 2.2.6).
		2.4.2 Central Africa sub-regional meeting of either governments, or social partners and others about child soldiers
		2.4.3 International workshop for up to 22 participants held to consider good practice in economic reintegration of child soldiers, comparing activities in all eight countries on the basis of the summary of evaluations produced by each (Output of Activity 2.2.11), and comparing them too to similar reintegration initiatives by other agencies.
		2.4.4 Conclusions on good practice (from Activity 2.4.3) and examples of model reintegration programmes prepared in 80-page report for distribution to ILO-IPEC partners and other agencies (and translated into two other languages)
<p><i>I/O 3 (Prevention)</i> By the end of the programme, fewer children will be recruited in armed conflict in the targeted countries.</p>	3.1 Political leaders and relevant authorities in charge of armed forces or armed groups in each country sensitised on the recruitment of child soldiers as one of the worst forms of child soldiers.	3.1.1(<i>Element VI.1</i>) Support for approaches (either by government ministries or other organizations) to commanders of government security forces to take practical steps to obtain the commitment; if appropriate (and not provided by others) this can be follow up with training on child rights,
		3.1.2 (<i>Also Element VI.1</i>) Support for approaches to leaders or commanders of armed groups to <u>obtain the commitment</u> ; if appropriate (and not provided by others) this can be followed up by training on child rights
	3.2 Potential child recruits, their parents and the wider communities in which recruitment and deployment of child soldiers has occurred have been provided with information to convince them that employment of child soldiers is harmful and undesirable.	3.2.1 Assessment of whether particular communities should be targeted with information to reduce recruitment and, on the basis of the evaluation of previous initiatives, of how best to influence them
		3.2.2 Elements of harm suffered by child soldiers documented, along with the wider damaging repercussions on the communities of recruits or society as a whole.
		3.2.3 Dissuasive information prepared in an appropriate medium or media (e.g. radio broadcast, television, video) and tested
		3.2.4 Dissuasive information provided to potential child recruits, their parents and the wider community, either directly or indirectly, and feedback monitored
	(<i>Element VI.2</i>)	
3.3 The quality and access to basic education (in selected areas) have been	3.3.1 Consult other agencies and CBOs/NGOs active at local level to identify areas considered to be “at risk” of further recruitment or re-recruitment where provision of basic education might be an effective way of preventing further recruitment	

Annex A – Logical Framework

	<p>improved (with special attention to children at risk of recruitment into armed conflict).</p> <p><i>(Element VI.3)</i></p>	<p>3.3.2 Provision of schooling supported in one or more communities in each core country, by one or more of the following ways:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • needs assessment; • refurbishment of school buildings, equipment or teaching materials; • financial support for redesign of appropriate curriculum; • recruitment of teachers or other staff needed and payment of salaries for an initial period; • development of teacher training and related materials with teachers' organizations; • provision of non-formal education to war-affected children; • support for direct and indirect costs of schooling (e.g. fees, uniforms, school meals or textbooks) for a fixed period.
	<p>3.4 Locally based networks established to protect children against recruitment and other abuses of their rights</p> <p><i>(Element VI.4)</i></p>	<p>3.4.1 Consultation with CBOs or NGOs in areas where recruitment continues or is considered a possibility and where “Child protection networks” might be effective</p> <p>3.4.2 Training by Save the Children or another agency for ILO-IPEC and CBO/NGO likely to be involved in how to set up a “Child protection network”</p> <p>3.4.3 Support for a CBO/NGO in establishing one or more “Child protection network” on a pilot basis</p> <p>3.4.4 Evaluation of any “Child protection networks” that have been established</p>

Annex B – Directions to National Consultants

Directions to National Consultants May 2007

Terms of Reference: Please address points 6 to 12 under “main aspects to be addressed by the evaluation.” Any significant changes in context or activities since the Mid Term evaluation are important to highlight, as the Terms of Reference indicate.

There are a few specifics it would be helpful if you could address directly. They focus on the results. Please try to give me the evidence of results. If it is someone’s opinion of project impact/results, then be clear that it is an opinion of a certain type of stakeholder. I do have access to the Technical Progress Reports which provide me with much of the context and many numbers (numbers of direct beneficiaries etc.)

As you know, results are on a number of levels:

- Legislative framework and contribution to DDR policies and programmes (what was already in place to support the project and then what, if any, changes did the project contribute to?)
- Political support for the project (have there been any changes due to advocacy efforts of the project to increase the commitment of current and potential political leaders to end the practice of using children in armed conflict situations; for example, inclusion in the political agenda of national parties? Impact at the local political level?)
- Education and training – what was impact of vocational training on children? Were children mainstreamed into the educational system?
- Employment status of direct beneficiaries – what was achieved? There was a target of 50% former child soldiers in decent work. The numbers should be in the TPR but can you find out if this was a meaningful/realistic target – why or why not?

I believe these are consistent with your Terms of Reference. I just thought I would just provide some specific examples. You will also wish to reflect the results in relation to the Immediate Objectives of the project (point 10 in your Terms of Reference).

Specific to Colombia: I had the opportunity to talk to teams at the workshop about project monitoring. For Colombia, I also need some information on the kind of monitoring system and data base that were used. How did they (or did they not) contribute to the attainment of project objectives?

Linda E. Lee
International Evaluator



**GLOBAL WORKSHOP ON PREVENTION AND REINTEGRATION OF CHILDREN INVOLVED IN ARMED CONFLICT
- Evaluation Workshop-**

Code: A900929

Room: P3

Language: English and French

From: 10/05/2007 to: 11/05/2007

Time	Thursday 10 Stakeholders' evaluation workshop	Time	Friday 11 Stakeholders' evaluation workshop and interviews
8:30-9:00	Introduction to the Evaluation Workshop	8:30-8:45	Review of Previous Day and Agenda for Friday
9:00-10:15	<p style="text-align: center;">Design Analysis</p> <p>Participants will analyze the Logical Framework to determine how the project design took into account the country context.</p> <p><i>a) Did any analysis (e.g., situation analysis, problem analysis, stakeholder analysis, etc) serve as the basis for the project? If so, did the analyses appear to be valid and reliable?</i></p> <p><i>b) Was the project formulated correctly? Was there good alignment among the developmental goals, immediate objectives, and indicators?</i></p>	8:45-10:15	<p style="text-align: center;">8:45-9:30 Introduction to Systems Analysis</p> <p style="text-align: center;">9:30-10:15 Large Group Discussion on Systems Analysis</p> <p style="text-align: center;">10:15 - 10: 45 Country Team Interview (Linda Lee)</p>
10:15-10:30	Break	10:15-10:30	Break
10:30-11:30	Presentations of Design Analysis (10 min each group)	10:30-10:45	Plenary on Systems Analysis (Craig Russon)
11:30-12:30	<p style="text-align: center;">Implementation Analysis</p> <p>Participants will discuss planning for implementation as well as the implementation process itself.</p> <p><i>a) How did you plan for implementation? Who was involved?</i></p> <p><i>b) Was implementation planning adequate? Was the work broken down correctly? Scheduling realistic? Responsibility adequately delegated? Sufficient resources allocated?</i></p>	10:45-12:30	<p style="text-align: center;">10:45-11:15 Looking to the Future – Long Term Issues</p> <p style="text-align: center;">11:15-12:30 Working Groups Long Term Issues</p> <p style="text-align: center;">11:15-12:15 Country Team Interview (Linda Lee)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">12:15-12:45 Country Team Interview(Linda Lee)</p>
12:30-14:00	Lunch Break	12:30-14:00	Lunch Break 1:15-1:45 Country Team Interview (Linda Lee)
14:00-15:00	Presentations of Implementation Analysis (10 min each group)	14:00-15:00	14:00-15:00 Presentation on Long Term Issues (10 min each group)
15:00-16:00*	Presentations of Implementation Analysis (continued)	15:00-15:30	14:00-14:30 Country Team Interview(Linda Lee) 14:30-15:00- Country Team Interview (Linda Lee)
16:00-17:00	<p style="text-align: center;">Project Monitoring*</p> <p>Participants will clarify and analyze project monitoring.</p> <p><i>a) What was the process for project monitoring? Who was involved?</i></p> <p><i>b) What were the strengths and weaknesses of the project monitoring process?</i></p>		Closing and Evaluation

* Discussion of Project Monitoring was embedded in the extended discussion on implementation and followed-up in the team interviews.

Annex D – Documents Consulted

Documents Consulted

“Children in Armed Conflict: The Philippine Context,” PowerPoint presentation at the Good Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop, Turin, May 2007.

Colombia –Child Soldiers – Faces of Change Survey.

Country Annex, Burundi.

Country Annex, Congo.

Country Annex, DRC.

Country Annex, Rwanda, Budget and Activities.

Country Annex, Sri Lanka.

National Consultant’s Evaluation Report, May 2007.

PowerPoint presentation from Good Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop, Turin, May 2007. Original study: Cagoco-Guiam, Ruffa (2002). *Child Soldiers in Central and Western Mindanao – A Rapid Assessment*, ILO-IPEC, Geneva.

September 2006 to February 2007 Technical Progress Report.

Technical Progress Report – Child Soldiers, September 2006 to February 2007.

Technical Note 2, Good Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop, Turin, May 2007.

Technical Note 8, Good Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop, Turin, May 2007

Technical Note 4, Good Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop, Turin, May 2007.

Technical Note7, Good Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop, Turin, May 2007.

Technical Note 8, Good Practices and Lessons Learned Workshop, Turin, May 2007.

US Department of Labor, response to inquiries, 2006.

Annex E – Action Programme Table

DRC ACTION PROGRAMME TABLE

Action Programme	Achievements as per I/A report or statements made by I/A	Achievements as per project management (Comments, additions)	Corresponding Project Area of Work/Element
	Target Groups		
<p>1 Socio-economic Reintegration of former child soldiers and prevention of other children affected by armed conflict - BICE</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 210 withdrawn • 150 prevented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vocational counselling, catch-up education, vocational training, including traditional apprenticeship, training on the workplace, financial and technical support for (self)employment and micro-enterprise development in agriculture and urban crafts, management training, follow up of the micro-enterprises that have been created, support to reintegration communities and prevention of recruitment of other war affected children. 	<p>Facilitating and supporting the economic reintegration of former child soldiers.</p> <p>Preventing the reintegration of child soldiers.</p>
<p>2 Socio-economic reintegration of 500 former child soldiers in the district of South-Oubangui, Province of Equateur - AASD</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 500 withdrawn • 0 prevented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vocational counselling, catch-up education, vocational training, including traditional apprenticeship, training on the workplace, financial and technical support for (self)employment and micro-enterprise development in agriculture and urban crafts, management training, follow up of the micro-enterprises that have been created and support to reintegration communities. 	<p>Facilitating and supporting the economic reintegration of former child soldiers.</p>
<p>3 Socio-economic reintegration of 450 former child soldiers in the district of North-Oubangui, Province of Equateur - APEE</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 450 withdrawn • 0 prevented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vocational counselling, catch-up education, vocational training, including traditional apprenticeship, training on the workplace, financial and technical support for (self)employment and micro-enterprise development in agriculture and urban crafts, management training, follow up of the micro-enterprises that have been created and support to reintegration communities. 	<p>Facilitating and supporting the economic reintegration of former child soldiers.</p>

<p style="text-align: center;">4</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Vocational counselling and training of former child soldiers and prevention of recruitment of other children in Bukavu - FSH</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 200 withdrawn • 150 prevented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Set up of an institutional framework with “G1” to coordinate vocational training and business support services, vocational counselling, catch-up education if required, and vocational training, including traditional apprenticeship, training on the workplace. • Activities are coordinated with the AP of Groupe One. 	<p>Facilitating and supporting the economic reintegration of former child soldiers.</p> <p>Preventing the reintegration of child soldiers.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">5</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Employment support for former child soldiers in Bukavu - Groupe One</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 200 withdrawn 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identification of suitable crafts and products, training in the management of micro-enterprises, identification of individual business projects, financial and technical support to (self)employment and development of micro-enterprises and/or cooperatives in urban crafts, financial, technical and advocacy support for job placement in formal sector enterprises, technical follow up on established micro-enterprises by AP personnel, access to existing micro-credit facilities, documentation of AP experience through case studies/good practices. • Activities are coordinated with the AP of FSH. 	<p>Facilitating and supporting the economic reintegration of former child soldiers.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">6</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Socio-economic reintegration of 450 former child soldiers in the territory of Kabare, South Kivu and reintegration of 550 children affected by war into the educational system in DRC - GAV</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 450 withdrawn • 597 prevented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic reintegration of 450 ex-child soldiers: rapid assessment on provision of vocational training/apprenticeship training services, vocational orientation, catch-up education, vocational training (from 1 to 8 months), management training, technical and financial support for micro-enterprise development. Prevention of the recruitment of 600 children through the rehabilitation of a primary school and through the initiation of income generating activities in the community to which they belong. 	<p>Facilitating and supporting the economic reintegration of former child soldiers.</p> <p>Preventing the reintegration of child soldiers.</p>

CONGO ACTION PROGRAMME TABLE

Action Programme	Achievements as per I/A report or statements made by I/A	Achievements as per project management (Comments, additions)	Corresponding Project Area of Work/Element
	Target Groups		
<p style="text-align: center;">1</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Socio-economic reintegration of former child soldiers and prevention of the recruitment of vulnerable children in the Departments of the Niari, Lekoumou and Bouenza - DMI</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 100 withdrawn • 616 prevented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vocational counselling, catch-up education when required, vocational training/apprenticeship, management training for small and micro-enterprises in agriculture, animal breeding, technical and financial support for micro-enterprise development, creation of a cooperative in the agriculture and transformation of agricultural products, technical follow up of created micro-enterprises and cooperative. 	<p>Facilitating and supporting the economic reintegration of former child soldiers.</p> <p>Preventing the reintegration of child soldiers.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">2</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Socio-economic reintegration of 115 former child soldiers in the Departments of Brazzaville, Cuvette and the Plateaux, Republic of Congo - ONEMO</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 101 withdrawn • 0 prevented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vocational counselling, catch-up education, vocational training, including traditional apprenticeship (3 types: short-term training for 1-3 months, medium-term 3-6 months, and long-term training, 6-9 months), technical, pedagogical and management training of master-craftsmen, training on the workplace, financial and technical support for (self)employment and micro-enterprise development in agriculture, animal breeding and urban crafts, training in micro-enterprise and cooperative management, follow up of the micro-enterprises that have been created, support to reintegration communities and prevention of recruitment of other war affected children through the rehabilitation of at least one Primary school in the territory and economic support to the selected communities with at least 550 children to be re-sent to or kept at school. 	<p>Facilitating and supporting the economic reintegration of former child soldiers.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">3</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Prevention of the recruitment of 100 children at risk into armed</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 0 withdrawn • 36 prevented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic reintegration of a 100 children at risk of being recruited in the agricultural sector. Sensitization at community level. Capacity building of community leaders 	<p>Preventing the reintegration of child soldiers.</p>

groups - <i>NIOSI</i>		to actively prevent recruitment.	
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RWANDA ACTION PROGRAMME TABLE

Action Programme	Achievements as per I/A report or statements made by I/A	Achievements as per project management (Comments, additions)	Corresponding Project Area of Work/Element
	Target Groups		
<p>1</p> <p>Socio-economic reintegration of 100 former child soldiers and prevention of the recruitment of 300 particularly vulnerable children in the city of Kigali and the Provinces of Byumba et Umutara, Rwanda - <i>ASOFERWA</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 100 withdrawn • 300 prevented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identification of labour opportunities, vocational counselling, catch-up education, vocational training, including traditional apprenticeship, training on the workplace, financial and technical support to (self)employment and development of micro-enterprises and/or cooperatives, financial, technical and advocacy support for job placement in formal sector enterprises, technical follow up on established micro-enterprises by AP personnel, financial and material support to 300 households to encourage school enrolment of their children, sensitization for prevention, documentation of AP experience through case studies/good practices. 	<p>Facilitating and supporting the economic reintegration of former child soldiers.</p> <p>Preventing the reintegration of child soldiers.</p>
<p>2</p> <p>Socio-economic reintegration of 56 former child soldiers and of 300 other vulnerable children in the region of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, Rwanda - <i>ADEPE</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 56 withdrawn • 304 prevented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic reintegration of 56 former child soldiers: labour market assessment, vocational orientation, apprenticeship, provision of tools, catch-up education, management training – advocacy for employment of 10 children by master craftsmen and salary subsidy - technical and financial support for the development of individual micro-enterprises and setting up of cooperatives. Prevention of the recruitment of 300 children at risk: sensitization of local authorities, support to vulnerable families to set up income generating activities. 	<p>Facilitating and supporting the economic reintegration of former child soldiers.</p> <p>Preventing the reintegration of child soldiers.</p>
<p>3</p> <p>Vocational training and support to the socio-economic reintegration of 40 former child soldiers in the restaurant trade/catering business in Rwanda -</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 40 withdrawn • 0 prevented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vocational training of 40 former child-soldiers in the restaurant trade/catering business, includes: training on hygiene, reproductive health, entrepreneurship - vocational training through placement in hotels and restaurants for an internship, provision of uniforms and transportation during the training period – advocacy for hotels and restaurants to hire part of the children - technical and financial support 	<p>Facilitating and supporting the economic reintegration of former child soldiers.</p>

<i>APROPOL</i>		for setting up a cooperative (about 20 children) and for the development of individual micro-enterprises.	
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BURUNDI ACTION PROGRAMME TABLE

Action Programme	Achievements as per I/A report or statements made by I/A	Achievements as per project management (Comments, additions)	Corresponding Project Area of Work/Element
	Target Groups		
<p>1</p> <p>Socio-economic reintegration of 300 former child soldiers and prevention of the recruitment of other children affected by war (50 street children + children coming from vulnerable families) in Makamba Province and Bujumbura Central - <i>TPO/CFR</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 598 withdrawn • 202 prevented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vocational counselling, catch-up education when required, vocational training/apprenticeship, management training, technical and financial support for micro-enterprise development, technical follow up of created micro-enterprises, material and technical support to 900 households in developing breeding activities, linkage to microfinance institutions. 	<p>Facilitating and supporting the economic reintegration of former child soldiers.</p> <p>Preventing the reintegration of child soldiers.</p>
<p>2</p> <p>Economic reintegration of 300 ex-child soldiers and 250 vulnerable children in the Provinces of Rural Bujumbura and Muramvya - <i>CONSEDI</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 300 withdrawn • 250 prevented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic reintegration of 550 children : vocational training, organisation of children in association, catch-up education for some, short term vocational training (1 month), management training, provision of tools/kit, assistance to obtain micro-credit from local micro-finance institutions. Capacity building of communities to actively prevent recruitment and setting up of a child protection network. 	<p>Facilitating and supporting the economic reintegration of former child soldiers.</p> <p>Preventing the reintegration of child soldiers.</p>

COLOMBIA ACTION PROGRAMME TABLE

Action Programme	Achievements as per I/A report or statements made by I/A	Achievements as per project management (Comments, additions)	Corresponding Project Area of Work/Element
	Target Groups		
<p>1</p> <p>Action programme to strengthen social insertion of 560 boys, girls and adolescents withdrawn from the armed conflict - CEDAVIDA</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 560 withdrawn 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The AP focuses on building the capacity of the ICBF and other public institutions in dealing with former child soldiers. The aim is to guarantee a sustainable withdrawal by improving the quality of services provided by the public institutions to the former child soldiers, including education, health, psycho-social treatment, vocational training and job placement and others. 	<p>Developing the knowledge base, facilities and opportunities for the economic reintegration of former child soldiers.</p> <p>Facilitating and supporting the economic reintegration of former child soldiers.</p>
<p>2</p> <p>Strengthening of the organisations of employers in Colombia to contribute to the prevention and eradication of child labour, particularly in its worst forms – ANDI</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Awareness-raising with businessmen affiliated to the ANDI on the importance of eliminating the WFCL, utilising the venues that pertain to the institution such as national and regional assemblies, annual meetings, Committee of Entrepreneurial Social Responsibility • Negotiate the inclusion and implementation of the commitments of employers in the municipal operational plan and the National Plan of Action • Support the negotiations with the National Vocational Training Institute (Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje –SENA-), the ICBF and others to undertake and strengthen institutional actions for the training and job placement of young people who are particularly vulnerable. 	<p>Planning and coordinating activities on child soldiers at national level, ensuring adequate ministerial capacity, and completing the knowledge base.</p>
<p>3</p> <p>Prevention and eradication of child labour in the locality of Ciudad Bolívar, Bogotá and the Municipality of Facatativa, Cundinamarca –</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevention of children from being engaged in soldiering and other WFCL by promoting enrolment in the school and vocational training courses. It also includes IGAs for parents along with awareness raising activities targeted at their communities. 	<p>Developing the knowledge base, facilities and opportunities for the economic reintegration of former child soldiers.</p> <p>Preventing the reintegration of child soldiers.</p>

<p>CGT</p>			
<p>4 Strengthening the local policy for prevention of the involvement of children in the WFCL, particularly CSEC, CDL and child soldiers – Antonio Restrepo Barco Foundation</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity building of 5 local governments so that they can elaborate and implement a policy to prevent the WFCL, including soldiering. 	<p>Ensuring legislation is in place in line with the State’s international treaty obligations concerning child soldiers, and that appropriate procedures and monitoring mechanisms are in place to enforce the (legal) bans on recruitment, with the capacity and expertise of government institutions to do so developed if necessary.</p>
<p>5 Prevention of the WFCL, particularly CDL, CSEC and children engaged in armed conflict – Youth Christian Association</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A preventive program targeting 500 children who are at risk of being recruited. AP’s components include education, vocational training, familiar and personal development, job-placement, health and others. 	<p>Preventing the reintegration of child soldiers.</p>

SRI LANKA ACTION PROGRAMME TABLE

Action Programme	Achievements as per I/A report or statements made by I/A	Achievements as per project management (Comments, additions)	Corresponding Project Area of Work/Element
	Target Groups		
<p>1 Community based training for livelihood activities and micro enterprise development in the batticaloa and trincomalee districts – Center for Women’s Development and Rehabilitation</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 64 withdrawn • 392 prevented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ongoing preventive and withdrawing programme for 600 children (since revised to 450 children). There is ongoing training for girls including released under aged recruits. 	<p>Special Initiatives to facilitate the reintegration of girl child soldiers and other categories of child soldiers facing particular difficulties.</p>
<p>2 Capacity building of Patrician Institute to provide relevant skills training opportunities to prevent children affected by war from entering worst forms of child labour and to rehabilitate released underage ex-combatants – Patrician Institutes, Jaffna</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 withdrawn • 207 prevented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A preventive and withdrawing programme, building on the 1st AP with the same partner to provide vocational training for vulnerable children, including released underage recruits. The capacity of the IA will also be enhanced with the provision of equipment to support their national accreditation. 	<p>Preventing the reintegration of child soldiers.</p>
<p>3 Capacity building of St John’s VTC to provide relevant skills training opportunities to prevent children affected by war from entering worst forms of child labour and to rehabilitate released underage ex-combatants –</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 73 withdrawn • 73 prevented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A preventive and withdrawing programme, building on the 1st AP with the same partner to provide vocational training for vulnerable children, including released underage recruits. The capacity of the IA will also be enhanced with the provision of equipment to support their national accreditation in 2 new programmes. 	<p>Preventing the reintegration of child soldiers.</p>

St Johns VTC, Batticaloa			
<p style="text-align: center;">4</p> <p>Providing vocational training options to prevent children affected by war from entering worst forms of child labour and to rehabilitate released underage ex-combatants – Patipalai Area Development and Rehabilitation Organization Batticaloa District</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 15 withdrawn • 52 prevented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A preventive and withdrawing programme. Targeting vulnerable children including released underage recruits to be provided with vocational training and follow up. Support to be placed in employment or self employment. 	<p>Preventing the reintegration of child soldiers.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">5</p> <p>Capacity building of INSGD to provide relevant community based skills training opportunities to prevent children affected by war from entering worst forms of child labour and to rehabilitate released underage ex-combatants in Jaffna District – Institute of Nursery Studies and Gender Development, Jaffna district</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 11 withdrawn • 163 prevented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A preventive and withdrawing programme. Targeting vulnerable children including released underage recruits to be provided with vocational training and follow up. Support to be placed in employment or self employment. 	<p>Preventing the reintegration of child soldiers.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">6</p> <p>Capacity Building of Eastern Self-Reliant Community Organization to deliver training and decent work opportunities in farming and related areas – Eastern Self-Reliant</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 withdrawn • 92 prevented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A preventive and withdrawing programme. Targeting vulnerable children including released underage recruits to be provided with vocational training and follow up. Support to be placed in employment or self employment. 	<p>Preventing the reintegration of child soldiers.</p>

<p>Community Awakening Organization</p>			
<p>7 Capacity building of Porativupattu Pradesa Development Rehabilitation Organization to deliver training and decent work opportunities in farming and related areas – Porativupattu Pradesa Development Rehabilitation Organization</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 44 withdrawn • 105 prevented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A preventive and withdrawing programme. Targeting vulnerable children including released underage recruits to be provided with vocational training and follow up. Support to be placed in employment or self employment. 	<p>Preventing the reintegration of child soldiers.</p>

THE PHILIPPINES ACTION PROGRAMME TABLE

Action Programme	Achievements as per I/A report or statements made by I/A	Achievements as per project management (Comments, additions)	Corresponding Project Area of Work/Element
	Target Groups		
<p style="text-align: center;">1</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Action Programme on the Prevention and Reintegration of Children/Youth Affected by Armed Conflict – Department of Labor and Employment - DOLE</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 300 withdrawn 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provision of Literacy and Counselling Services and Development of Vocational Skills to 300 former child soldiers. Among these, 120 have been enrolled for formal education with support for books and allowance and 45 youth are undergoing skills training for future self-employment. 	<p>Facilitating and supporting the economic reintegration of former child soldiers.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">2</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Prevention and Reintegration of Children In Armed Conflict (CIAC) in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Through Media Advocacy and Awareness Raising – BTMC</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This AP intends to increase the level of public awareness and access to Children Involved in Armed Conflict (CIAC) information and its multi-dimensional concerns and challenges and to enhance the capabilities of advocates for the elimination of the Children Involved in Armed Conflict (CIAC) problem in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). 	<p>Developing the knowledge base, facilities and opportunities for the economic reintegration of former child soldiers.</p>



**International Programme on the Elimination of Child
Labour
ILO-IPEC**

*Final
30 April 2007
- basis for contract*

**Terms of Reference
For
Prevention and Reintegration of Children Involved in Armed
Conflict:
An Inter-Regional Programme
TC Code: INT/03/P52/USA**

End of Project and Lessons Learned Workshop

ILO Project Code	INT/03/P52/USA
ILO Project Number	2 P340 03 900 052
ILO Iris Code	10833
Country	Global
Duration	39 months
Starting Date	September 2003
Ending Date	May 2007
Project Locations	Philippines, Côte d'ivoire, Asian Regional, African Regional, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Colombia, Sri Lanka
Project Language	English/French
Executing Agency	ILO-IPEC
Financing Agency	US DOL
Donor contribution	USDOL: US \$ 7,000,000

Background

Background to the Project and Status

1. The aim of ILO-IPEC is the progressive elimination of child labour, especially in its worst forms. The political will and commitment of individual governments to address child labour—in cooperation with employers’ organizations, trade unions, non-governmental organizations and other relevant parties in society—is the basis for ILO-IPEC action. ILO-IPEC’s strategy includes raising awareness on the negative consequences of child labour, promoting social mobilization against it, strengthening national capacities to deal with this issue and implementing demonstrative direct action programmes (AP) to prevent children from child labour and remove child labourers from hazardous work and provide them with appropriate alternatives.
2. According to the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, “Children become “child soldiers” for many reasons. While thousands are forcibly recruited, the majority enlist “voluntarily” for lack of any alternative. War itself is a major motive, but children’s lack of access to education or employment is a key determinant. Frustrated by poverty and inequality, children (and adults) also take up arms to fight for social change. Girls may see enlistment as a way out of marriage and other forms of exploitation. In other words, children often see the military route as the most effective available livelihood strategy. If these underlying issues are not addressed, children will remain at risk of recruitment or use in future armed conflict as well as other forms of armed activity. What then needs to be done?”
3. The response of ILO-IPEC to the issue of child soldiers is framed by the Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, 1999 (N. 182). The Convention categorizes “all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict” as worst forms of child labour (Article 3a). Each country ratifying this Convention is committed to implementing programmes of action to eliminate the worst forms of child labour as a matter of priority, in consultation with relevant government institutions and employers and workers organizations, and taking into consideration the views of other concerned groups.
4. Within the framework of Convention 182, the inter-regional programme for the prevention and reintegration of children involved in armed conflicts is a global intervention with focused activities in Colombia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Africa (Burundi, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda—core countries—, and Cote d’Ivoire, Uganda, Liberia and Sierra Leone—non core countries). All these countries except Sierra Leone have ratified Convention 182.
5. This programme was conceived after a preparatory phase launched in October 2001 by ILO-IPEC in collaboration with the ILO-In focus Programme on Crises Response

and Reconstruction (IFP-CRISIS). This phase served the purpose of obtaining information (through rapid assessments) on the causes of the use of child soldiers, the mechanisms for recruitment, the living conditions while in the armed groups and the circumstances surrounding their demobilisation and the perspective for their reintegration.⁹²

6. Based on the information that was obtained during the rapid assessments, a project was developed three basic objectives:
 - I/O 1: “By the end of the programme, there will be an enabling environment in each country, facilitating the prevention, withdrawal and subsequent reintegration into society of children involved in armed conflict.”
 - I/O 2: “By the end of the programme, former child soldiers above the minimum working age will be assisted to acquire decent work and achieve a sustainable income.”
 - I/O 3: “By the end of the programme, fewer children will be recruited in armed conflict in targeted countries.”
7. In order to accomplish the objectives, an innovative model was put in place. The services that the project provides start with an intensive vocational orientation phase designed to match existing job opportunities with capacities and expectations of the children. Afterwards, vocational skills are imparted by agencies that specialize in a particular field of training. Traditional apprenticeship is the most common form of skills training in the countries of the sub-region, especially in rural areas.
8. Training that complements the vocational training is also received by the participants. Management training is provided to help the participants learn how to market their new found vocational skills. Also most vocational training courses are accompanied by catch-up education for those in need. Catch-up education is generally provided simultaneously with vocational skills training, on a periodic basis, for instance in the afternoon after skills training. The project also facilitates the provision of food during training.
9. In all cases, the project provides services for the transition between skills training and the start of the corresponding economic activity, covering the whole range from formal employment, self-employment, creation of cooperatives, to low level income generating activities, and support during the first phase of employment, ideally until the stabilization of that activity.

⁹² A total of five reports were prepared: *Rapport national sur la situation des enfants engagés dans les conflits armés au Burundi*, Suzane Nsabimana, December 2002; *Rapport sur l’Evaluation rapide de la situation des enfants engagés dans les conflits armés en République du Congo*, Michael Bitemo and Frédéric Nkeoua, December 2002; *Rapport national sur la situation des enfants engagés dans les conflits armés en République Démocratique du Congo*, Modeste Mangola Dukti and Jean-Marie Vianney Mupende Katembo, Kinshasa, October 2002; *Rapport national sur la situation des enfants engagés dans les conflits armés en République Démocratique du Congo (Goma, Est-RDC)*, François-Xavier Baganda N’Simba, Goma, December 2002; *Résultats de l’enquête d’évaluation rapide au Rwanda sur la situations des enfants engagés dans les conflits armés*, Prosper Mutijima Nkaka, March 2003.

10. In order to facilitate community acceptance, the project tries, as far as possible, to provide the individual services described above in a context that is profitable for the whole community: vocational training opportunities are open to other children, too, communities in some cases are asked to identify collective basic needs that have been satisfied by the project (construction of wells, rehabilitation of roads, schools), and community members are employed and receive food for the implementation of such works.
11. Lastly, the project provides services for prevention on four different levels: (i) vocational training and employment support for children above working age, at risk of being recruited, (ii) promotion of education for younger children at risk, (iii) advocacy for the adoption of adequate national legislation, and (iv) sensitization.
12. The project is one of the first comprehensive frameworks for action on children in armed conflict that IPEC has implemented and therefore also served strategic purposes on enhancing the further knowledge of IPEC and determining the particular value of IPEC on action against child labour. Inter-regional activities and experience sharing is therefore included in the project.

Mid-Term Evaluation

13. According to ILO regular procedures and as agreed with USDOL, an independent mid-term evaluation was conducted in the second half of 2005⁹³. This evaluation served two basic purposes: a) accountability to the main stakeholders, including government agencies and social partners in the targeted countries, partner organizations and the donor, on what has been done and achieved so far; and b) learning from the experience to analyze how the project is progressing towards achieving its objectives, plan for the future and, where necessary, to recommend appropriate re-designing.
14. According to the mid-term evaluation, the project achieved a number of important results. In most cases results are mixed with some positive accomplishments but also a large number of difficulties and constraints. These are presented in the table format below for easy reading. Each common element is divided into two columns, to present common elements in a balanced manner: the strengths appear on the left hand column, and the weaknesses on the right hand column. The line underneath indicates in which countries it applies.

<i>project results</i>	<i>strengths</i>	<i>weaknesses</i>
issue	1. Level of project implementation despite constraints (all countries have established functioning APs)	1. Delays in preparation and implementation both for administrative and financial reasons
countries	all	all
issue	2. Fill a need and have valid objectives	2. Excessively centralised management structure

⁹³ Reports from Colombia, The Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Africa

<i>project results</i>	<i>strengths</i>	<i>weaknesses</i>
countries	all except the Philippines	all
issue	3. Sound strategy integrated into the country's overall framework	3. Time-frame too short to reach all stated results
countries	all	all
issue	4. Rich and positive learning process	4. Lack of proper monitoring and evaluation of the project at field level
countries	all	all
issue	5. Positive change created among beneficiaries and their families (confidence and self-esteem)	5. No plan existing for sustainability
countries	all except Colombia	all except Colombia
issue	6. Reduced perception of ex child soldiers being a threat to society	6. Design does not incorporate the constraints of the context
countries	all except The Philippines	all except Colombia
issue	7. Appreciation and support from the country's governments	7. Lack of both programmatic and financial flexibility
countries	all	all
issue	8. child soldier project part of a wider national framework on elimination of forced labour	8. child soldier project not part of a wider national framework on elimination of forced labour (institutional connections/linkages)
countries	Colombia, The Philippines, Sri Lanka	RoC, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC

15. Despite the constraints associated with inter-regional evaluation, the summary of strengths and weaknesses in the table presented above does show a number of common elements, from which the following lessons can be drawn:

- Complex projects covering 7 countries in three continents need to have a decentralized and flexible project management structure. A balance between accountability and effectiveness is needed. When accountability infringes upon the effectiveness of the project, it is time to review the procedures and grant greater flexibility
- The project strategy and design are strong and support the country's overall framework for child soldiers. However only in the non-African countries is there a wider operative national framework for the abolition of child labour, something which provides synergies to the project. This creates a substantial difference in the political environment in which the project operates
- Despite tremendous constraints in virtually all countries (except Colombia), the project was able to actually carry out the implementation of the A.P.s and other activities, in addition to its work at the institutional level. Two poles can be found among the 7 countries: the focus on the institutional framework in Colombia, in detriment to actual A.P. implementation, and at the other pole the focus of the African component on actual implementation, given the limited opportunity for focusing on the institutional framework at this point in time.
- The project has positively impacted on project beneficiaries in all countries (except Colombia). The increased confidence and self-esteem of the beneficiaries indicates that an essential and critical step towards reintegration has been achieved.
- There is no plan or indication for the sustainability of the process initiated by the project, except for Colombia. Sustainability has to be clearly defined: it is not the

project that needs to be sustainable (e.g. that activities continue with funding other than that of USDOL) but the process which has been initiated. This requires both ownership and buy-in from the different stakeholders and has to be part of the project approach since the beginning

- Monitoring of project results is a key element to ensure that objectives will be met, and adequate means must be supplied, both in terms of human resources and funding
- The project is supported and welcomed by all governments, showing its objectives clearly contribute to filling a delicate and acute need in all countries.
- A holistic approach to prevention and reintegration is necessary. Efforts to place beneficiaries in support structures are not enough. Focus should be placed on the sustainability of the beneficiaries' capacity to earn a living as a result of the different project activities, looking at the overall impact.

Current Status

16. Reviews of the TPRs that have been prepared since the midterm evaluation was conducted (March 2006 and Sept 2006) give an indication as to the current status of the work in the countries that make up the project. **Burundi** is the one country where the project will stay behind largely its targets. Given the limited time-frame and the reallocation of the resources, it is not planned to initiate further APs in Burundi. The combined number of beneficiaries of the three APs is 950 for reintegration and 400 for prevention, against an initial target of 1440 for reintegration and 1000 for prevention.
17. In the **Republic of Congo**, identification of ex-child soldiers is a particularly difficult because the conflict ended several years ago without a formal demobilization. All 100 former child soldiers of the DMI AP in the localities of Sibiti, Nkayi and Dolisie were identified by December 2005. At the end of the reporting period, those children just finished remedial education after having gone through the phase of vocational counselling and orientation.
18. In the **DRC**, the political tension in DRC during the reporting period because of the presidential and legislative elections led to reduced efficiency, culminating in the total standstill of all project activities in Kinshasa during the 3 days of heavy fighting that broke out in Kinshasa after the publication of the provisional results of the presidential election on 20th of August.
19. Despite the successful start of the APs in **Rwanda**, the general context for the child soldiers' project remains problematic. The incessant changes inherent in the administrative reforms that have been going on for several years now, undermine the stability of activities and programs in favour of children, and not only ex-child soldiers. Furthermore, the fact that demobilization of child soldiers from the APR took place some 8 to 9 years ago induces the Government to consider this group like any other vulnerable group.

20. In **Sri Lanka**, the main focus of most direct actions remains support to the provision of vocational training opportunities for children as both a prevention and withdrawal strategy. Despite security issues, the eight vocational training organizations have had their training capacities greatly enhanced due to project interventions. But by the end of the project a total of 1004 children between the ages of 14-18 would have received appropriate vocational skills training to support future decent work opportunities.
21. In **Colombia**, US\$487,566 (85 percent of the total budget allocated to the country) has been spent by the submission of the Sept 2006 TPR. The project concluded the following December. By joining forces with the other two IPEC projects in Colombia (Strengthening of National Policy and Weaving Networks), the project's actions have achieved greater coverage and impact on the target population.
22. In **The Philippines**, the delivery and conduct of activities such as provision of vocational skills trainings, counselling and educational support fund was made more sustainable by the coordination established with by the Department of Labour and Employment with the local offices of the relevant government agencies such as the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), Department of Education (DepEd) and the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).

Background to Final Evaluation

23. Given the comprehensive nature of the mid-term evaluation, and based on on-going consultations on how the experience and broader strategic lessons learned could be documented and evaluation, the final evaluation will be centred on the Global Meeting of the Inter-regional project. This meeting has as one of the focus discussions on how to carry actions further and in those process evaluative questions can be asked. The independent final evaluation will consist of a facilitated part of the workshop focusing on assessing achievements, detailed discusses with the present stakeholders and updating of –mid-term reports from Philippines, Colombia and the most appropriate

Purpose and Scope of the Final Evaluation

24. The scope of the present evaluation is the project as a whole, including all countries and non-core countries. It should as such address issues of project design, implementation, lessons learned, replicability and recommendations for future programmes.
25. The overall purposes of the evaluation are:
 - To assess the degree of achievement of the project in accordance with immediate objectives, the general evaluation concerns such as relevance, effectiveness, impact and sustainability.

- To review and validate to the extent possible emerging experiences, lesson learned and models that could inform future work, including making suggestions for how to take these further
 - To assess based on collected information and views of stakeholders, the potential strategic and programming follow-up, including the linkages between the project and other initiatives being developed in the targeted countries.
26. National stakeholders, IPEC management and the project staff will use the evaluation results to develop follow-up activities in each country, at the sub-regional level in Africa and globally as appropriate. Therefore, the evaluation should provide credible and reliable information on achievements and further, ensuring the sustainability of the benefits that have been or will be generated. The intention is particular that the evaluation results will also be used by partners in charge of implementing activities in the field or that support the national efforts against the use of children in armed conflicts in the region.
27. As an interregional project and one of the major interventions of IPEC on child soldiers, the project can provide important experiences and lessons learned beyond the project as part of IPEC's further development of knowledge on interventions in this area.

Suggested Aspect to be Addressed

28. The evaluation should address the overall ILO evaluation concerns such as relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability as defined in the ILO Guidelines for the Preparation of Independent Evaluations of ILO Programmes and Projects and for gender concerns see: ILO Guidelines for the Integration of Gender Issues into the Design, Monitoring and Evaluation of ILO Programmes and Projects, January 1995. The evaluation processes and products should conform to the United Nations Evaluation Group's Norms and Standards.
29. The following are the broad suggested aspects that can be identified at this point for the evaluation to address. Other aspects can be added as identified by the evaluation team in accordance with the given purpose and in consultation with DED. The evaluation instrument prepared by the evaluation team will indicate further selected specific aspects to be addressed.
30. These should be addressed within a results-based framework as used by ILO-IPEC line with the ILO's commitment to results-based management that focuses both on results as identified explicitly in the project document (Immediate Objectives) as well as strategic results related to policy and legislative development, knowledge building and sharing, social mobilisation, and institutional building. Contributions to national efforts and to ILO broader work are key concerns. Answers to the key questions will be interpreted in light of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability—core values of ILO-IPEC.

31. Design and Relevance

- Evaluate the relevance of the project (design) in relation to the needs of the countries involved.
 - Was the program relevant to the local situation concerning child labour and the use of child soldiers? Please, consider specifically the needs of the target groups, the local capacities to address these issue and the national policies and programs in place.
 - How well has the program coordinated and collaborated with other child-focused interventions supported by IPEC or other organizations in the country? Did the program's design fill an existing gap in services that other ongoing interventions were not addressing?
 - Was the program design logical and coherent? Were relevant indicators of achievement and means of verification properly designed? How useful were program indicators for monitoring and measuring impact of interventions?
 - How realistic were the critical assumptions and to what extent did other factors outside the control of program management affected program implementation and attainment of objectives/goal?
- Analyse major constraints:
 - in relation to the political, military and security situation in the four countries
 - in relation to the economic, administrative and logistical context of the four countries involved

32. Achievements and Results

- What was the quality of the legislative framework that was put in place in each country to facilitate the prevention, withdrawal and subsequent reintegration into society of children involved in armed conflict?
- What institutions partnered with the project to carryout coordinated action in each country and what were their respective roles?
- What kind of monitoring system and data-base were put into place and how did they contribute to attainment of project objectives?
- What kind of, if any, reintegration projects were conducted for child soldiers? How was the good practice handbook used in these projects?
- What kind of vocational training did children receive? How many children received training? What were the results?
- What is the employment status of programme direct beneficiaries? Was the target of 50 percent of former child soldiers in decent work achieved? Was the target meaningful proportion? Why or why not?
- How have former girl soldiers been involved in reintegration programmes? Was the target of more than 10 percent involvement met?
- By what percent did the number of cases of child recruitment decrease? What were the reasons?
- How were former child soldiers mainstreamed into the educational system by the project? How many were mainstreamed? Please interpret the results in light of ILO-IPEC's core value of effectiveness.

- How have current and potential political leaders who were the targets for the project's advocacy efforts used their influence to end the practice of child soldiering?
 - How has the issue of stopping the use of child soldiers been included in the political agenda of national political parties?
 - What do stakeholders think is the public's current opinion on the issue of child soldiers? What activities contributed most to the movement of public opinion?
 - What results have been achieved in the non-core countries?
33. Emerging experiences, strategies and results
- What lessons were learned from integrating the project into national DDR policies and programs? How can these lessons be best put to use?
 - What lessons were learned with regard to linking the project to the DWCP process? How can these lessons be best put to use?
 - What lessons were learned about tailoring action programmes and mini-programmes to the social, historical, economic, cultural contexts? How can these lessons be best put to use?

Methodology and Time Frame

34. The following is the proposed evaluation methodology. While the evaluation team can propose changes in the methodology, any such changes should be discussed with and approved by DED provided that the research and analysis suggest changes and provided that the indicated range of questions is addressed, the purpose maintained and the expected outputs produced at the required quality.
35. The evaluation consultant will be asked to use the standard evaluation instruments that ILO-IPEC has developed for documenting and analyzing achievements of the projects and contributions of the Action Programme to the project.
36. The evaluation will be centred around the a project review and evaluative process linked to the Global Workshop that will take place at our Turin Centre (Italy) from 7-11 May, 2007. Based on desk review, briefing with key IPEC officials and participation in the workshop, the evaluation will on one of those days, conduct an activity to collect data from stakeholders from Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, and Congo.
37. An extra day would also be arranged for individual interviews with the participants from the Africa. In addition, the evaluator would also work with national consultants in the Philippines, Colombia and Sri Lanka to help them implement project reviews of activities in their respective countries. (No travel involved.) This would be based on a standard framework developed by the international consultant who will act as the team leader Lastly, a report would be written that integrates the results from the desk review, the Global Workshop, those of the national consultants and the evaluator's own analysis.

International Evaluator	
Responsibility	Profile
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Design and facilitate the project review at the Global Workshop • Conduct supplementary interviews with DRC participants • Work with national consultants in the Philippines, Colombia and Sri Lanka to help them implement project reviews of activities in their respective countries • Prepare evaluation report that integrates the results from Global Workshop and those of the national consultants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Extensive experience in evaluation of development projects, in particular with local development projects ▪ Relevant regional experience in the region ▪ Familiarity with and knowledge of specific thematic areas ▪ Experience working with local organisations/local partners agencies ▪ Experience in UN system or similar international development experience ▪ Previous experience in statistical analysis of raw data and/or developing questionnaires ▪ Experience evaluating gender issues.
National Consultant	
Responsibility	Profile
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Carry out in-country project review with guidance from the international evaluator and under the supervision of DED 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extensive knowledge of development context of country • Documented experience in evaluation to international standards • Experience with work at policy level and in multi-sectoral and multi-partner environment, including networking • Prior knowledge of ILO-IPEC an advantage

Table 1 provides a detailed time frame and process

Expected Output

38. The evaluation report in draft form and in English should be presented to IPEC DED one week after the finalization of the field mission. The report should conform to UN evaluation standards and norms. The report will be circulated by DED to all relevant stakeholders for their comments. The evaluation consultant should consider the comments for the preparation of the final draft of the report.
39. The length of the report should not exceed 30 pages (excluding annexes). It is suggested to structure the report as follows:
- Executive Summary with key findings, conclusions and recommendations
 - Description of the project
 - Clearly identified findings
 - Clearly identified conclusions and recommendations
 - Lessons learned
 - Potential good practices and effective models of intervention.
 - Appropriate annexes including TOR
 - Standard evaluation instrument matrix
40. The report should include specific and detailed recommendations solidly based on the evaluator's analysis and, if appropriate, addressed specifically to the

organization/institution responsible for implementing it. The report should also include a specific section on lessons learned from this project that could be replicated or should be avoided in the future, in the same or in other IPEC projects.

41. Ownership of data from the evaluation rests jointly with ILO-IPEC and the consultants. The copyright of the evaluation report will rest exclusively with the ILO. Use of the data for publication and other presentations can only be made with the written agreement of ILO-IPEC. Key stakeholders can make appropriate use of the evaluation report in line with the original purpose and with appropriate acknowledgement.

Resources and Management

Resources

42. The following are the resources needed for this evaluation:

- Fees for one international consultant during 22 working days
- Fees for three national consultants during 5 working days
- Travel expenses and daily subsistence allowances for consultant

A detailed budget is available separately.

Management

43. The DED responsible official in IPEC HQ will manage the evaluation process. In country management and logistics support will be provided by the CTA of the projects and the IPEC team as a whole.

Annex F – Terms of Reference

Evaluation Tasks and Timeline

<i>Phases</i>	<i>Tasks</i>	<i>Responsible</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Outputs</i>
Phase One: Preparatory	Briefing with IPEC DED and preparatory desk review	International consultant With DED support	5-6 May, 2007 (2 days)	Evaluation plan
	Design of the Global Workshop facilitation			Facilitation Design
	Develop a framework for national consultants to use			Evaluation framework for national consultants
Phase Two: Data collection	Facilitate the project review at the Global Workshop	International consultant with DED support	7-11 May, 2007 (5 days)	
	Conduct supplementary interviews with African participants		12 May, 2007 (1 day)	
	Work with national consultants in the Philippines, Colombia and Sri Lanka to help them implement project reviews of activities in their respective countries	International consultant with DED support National Consultants	(5 days)	
	Prepare Update			National Project Review Reports Update Report
Phase Three: Report writing	Prepare first draft of evaluation report that integrates the results from Global Workshop and those of the national consultants	International consultant With DED support	21-25 May, 2007 (5days)	Draft version evaluation report
	Review and comments by key stakeholders and consolidated comments by DED	Key stakeholders Consolidated comments	2 days	
	Final draft of evaluation report based on consolidated comments		28-31 May (4 days)	Final version evaluation report due 31 May, 2007