Interim Performance Evaluation
Better Work Haiti

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Office of Trade and Labor Affairs
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Interim Performance Evaluation of Better Work Haiti
Final Evaluation Report

AUTHORS

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report describes in detail the findings of the interim evaluation of the Better Work Haiti project. IMPAQ International, LLC (IMPAQ) conducted fieldwork for this independent evaluation from August 12 to August 23, 2019 in collaboration with the project team and stakeholders and prepared the evaluation report according to the terms specified in its contract with the United States Department of Labor. IMPAQ expresses sincere thanks to all the parties involved for their support and valuable contributions.

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACTRAV</td>
<td>ILO Bureau for Workers’ Activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADIH</td>
<td><em>Association des Industries d’Haïti</em> (Haitian Industry Association)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMST</td>
<td><em>Bureau de la Médiatrice Spéciale du Travail</em> (Office of the Labor Ombudsperson)</td>
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<td>BW</td>
<td>Better Work</td>
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<td>BWG</td>
<td>Better Work Global</td>
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<td>BWH</td>
<td>Better Work Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAOSS</td>
<td><em>Conseil d’Administration des Organes de Sécurité Sociale</em> (Administration Board of Social Security Bodies)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Confederation of Workers of the Americas</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td><em>Conseil Supérieur des Salaires</em> (High Council of Wages)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTA</td>
<td>Chief technical advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>Enterprise advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus group discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>FoA</td>
<td>Freedom of association</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoH</td>
<td>Government of Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>HELP</td>
<td>Haiti Economic Lift Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOPE</td>
<td>Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFC</td>
<td>International Finance Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILAB</td>
<td>Bureau of International Labor Affairs</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>ITUC</td>
<td>International Trade Union Confederation</td>
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<tr>
<td>KII</td>
<td>Key informant interview</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAST</td>
<td><em>Ministère des Affaires Sociales et du Travail</em> (Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFATMA</td>
<td><em>Office d’Assurance de Travail, de Maladie et de Maternité</em> (Office for Work, Health, and Maternity Insurance)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONA</td>
<td><em>Office Nationale d’Assurance Vieillesse</em> (National Office for Old-Age Insurance)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSH</td>
<td>Occupational safety and health</td>
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<td>OTLA</td>
<td>Office of Trade and Labor Affairs</td>
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<td>PAC</td>
<td>Program advisory committee</td>
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<td>PICC</td>
<td>Performance improvement consultative committee</td>
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<td>PMP</td>
<td>Performance monitoring plan</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>American Center for International Labor Solidarity</td>
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<td>SONAPI</td>
<td><em>Société Nationale des Parcs Industriels</em> (National Company for Industrial Parks)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAICNAR</td>
<td>Technical Assistance Improvement and Compliance Needs Assessment and Remediation Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>ToT</td>
<td>Training of trainers</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPR</td>
<td>Technical progress report</td>
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<td>USDOL</td>
<td>United States Department of Labor</td>
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<td>USTR</td>
<td>United States Trade Representative</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Better Work Haiti (BWH) is part of the Better Work Global (BWG) partnership program between the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The program aims to improve compliance with labor standards as well as the competitiveness of enterprises within global garment manufacturing supply chains. The Better Work (BW) strategy is based on the premise that by enhancing compliance with international labor standards and national labor laws, enterprises will be in a better position to meet the social compliance requirements of buyers, improve conditions for workers, and increase productivity and product quality. BW was launched in Haiti in June 2009 after the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2008 (HOPE II) provided preferential treatment for US imports of apparel, textiles, and certain other goods from Haiti. Since then, the United States Department of Labor (USDOL) Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) has provided BWH with a total of $13.3 million, which will support program activities through 2019. The United States extended Haiti’s preferential tariff treatment until September 30, 2025 and, to date, has committed funding for BWH through December 2020. To comply with HOPE II legislation, ILAB will need to allocate additional funding for the 2021–2025 period.

The USDOL ILAB Office of Trade and Labor Affairs (OTLA) selected IMPAQ International to conduct an interim performance evaluation of the BWH program. This report presents the evaluation team’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations. The overall purpose of the evaluation was to assess the performance and achievements of the BWH program from March 2016 to August 2019 and to identify promising practices and lessons learned.

The evaluation team addressed the evaluation questions using multiple sources of evidence, combining primary qualitative data with secondary quantitative and qualitative data. Evaluation team members conducted fieldwork in Port-au-Prince and Caracol from August 12 to August 23, 2019, including 37 key informant interviews (KIIs) with program stakeholders, such as international buyers and factory managers, and 16 focus group discussions (FGDs) with workers and worker supervisors, factory-level bipartite committees, labor inspectors, and trade union members.

Summative Findings

Relevance

Garment sector tripartite stakeholders are generally satisfied with the role played by BWH. Based on KIIIs and FGDDs, stakeholder satisfaction with BWH core services was overall high, with a few exceptions related to the scope and efficiency of service delivery. Stakeholders generally valued BWH services but wanted more frequent advisory services and training, as well as faster feedback on factory assessments and assessment progress reports.

Stakeholder feedback shows that BWH’s current strategy has some important limitations affecting its ability to address several broader concerns of garment industry stakeholders. For example, BWH’s strategy is not effectively addressing workers’ low wages relative to the rising cost of living (e.g., the minimum wage adjustment process, the absence of effective enterprise level or sectoral collective bargaining), nor is it effectively addressing challenges with the overall capacity of the labor inspectorate and adequacy of government social security programs. Program limitations are largely attributable to issues outside its core mandate as well as to factors largely beyond its control (the fundamental limitations of weak state institutions in Haiti).
Overall, BWH support for industry development and job creation is highly relevant to high-priority concerns of the Government of Haiti (GoH) and social partners, as well as everyday Haitians. Evaluation findings show that BWH’s efforts to help Haiti comply with the terms of HOPE II legislation have contributed to increasing foreign investment and creating jobs in Haiti, high-priority concerns of all national stakeholders. Despite natural disasters and political instability, there has been steady job growth in the sector and informed stakeholders predict that this will continue as long as the United States offers HOPE II trade advantages.

BWH’s intervention strategy is working to improve labor standards in the Haitian garment sector. Evaluation findings show general agreement among workers, government, and employers that BWH assessments are offering an effective incentive to factory management to comply with core labor standards and national labor laws, albeit with some limits. Based on feedback from all three stakeholder groups, a key factor in the effectiveness of BWH assessments has been its transparent reporting of non-compliance on the BW transparency portal, suggesting that the program is effectively leveraging buyer pressure. Despite workers’ and employers’ mixed feedback on the specific findings of BWH compliance assessments, both groups recognized that BWH has contributed to progress toward improving working conditions and labor standards within most factories.

Efficiency and Effectiveness

BWH has largely been effective and efficient in delivering core services to factories, although additional efforts are required to increase stakeholders’ satisfaction. Evaluation findings show that BWH is largely on track relative to planned activities and most of its performance targets related to core services delivery. Feedback from factory-level stakeholders as well as international buyers suggests that there is room to improve the effectiveness of core services in areas such as depth of advisory services and enterprise advisors’ (EAs) efficiency finalizing assessment reports and validating progress reports, as well as their responsiveness when stakeholders request support. Findings also highlight that the program has made important efforts to improve the effectiveness and relevance of training by improving the selection of training participants and systematically collecting their feedback. BWH, likewise, has leveraged partnerships and mass communication tools effectively to educate greater numbers of workers without significantly increasing costs.

Although BWH has been effective in facilitating the creation of bipartite committees in most factories, the effectiveness of the committees in promoting workplace cooperation and worker/management dialogue has been mixed. Evaluation findings suggest that more needs to be done at the factory level to strengthen the bipartite committees’ role in promoting effective bipartite dialogue and workplace cooperation. Analysis of worker concerns voiced during FGDs suggests that at least some issues affecting factory productivity and worker welfare could be resolved through more constructive dialogue.

While recognizing the importance of its trade union and GoH capacity-building activities, results produced to date by BWH have been somewhat limited, especially for trade unions. The nature and volume of planned capacity-building activities for trade union and GoH stakeholders, as well as recent changes in staffing patterns (with more staff dedicated to capacity building efforts), show that BWH program managers are keenly aware of the key role played by these stakeholders. However, many planned activities either were not implemented or were only partially completed, suggesting that the program underestimated the extent to which external constraints, such as trade union divisions and Haiti’s weak governance, would limit its effectiveness.
Of the main stakeholder groups, working relationships with trade unions have the greatest room for improvement, especially regarding finding an acceptable solution to trade union representation on BWH's tripartite governance committee. Significant divisions among trade unions have contributed to constrained relations with BWH and delayed some planned capacity-building activities. Although working relations with the government are effective and inspector capacity-building programs have been successful at building inspector knowledge, less progress has been made in improving the enabling environment for inspector effectiveness.

The program has faced significant external constraints that have negatively affected BWH performance and ability to meet some of its objectives. Constraints largely beyond BWH’s control have hindered the effectiveness of BWH efforts to improve respect for international labor standards as well as working conditions. Notable examples include instability within the GoH and its negative repercussions on the ability of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (Ministère des Affaires Sociales et du Travail or MAST) to carry out its mandated functions, as well as sourcing practices common to the global garment supply chain that increase pressure on factories to speed up production and lower costs, pressures that are often passed on to the workers through higher production quotas and low wages.

Based on stakeholder feedback and progress to date toward planned objectives, BWH management has been largely effective. Overall, BWH has maintained effective communication and positive relationships with all the main stakeholder groups in Haiti’s garment sector. This and its overall good progress in meeting objectives suggest that the program has been effectively managed, even in the face of significant external challenges.

**Impact**

Evidence from evaluation findings show that BWH has been committed to addressing gender-specific concerns and that its interventions have been effective at producing positive changes that have improved workers’ welfare. Reported heightened awareness of sexual harassment and greater enforcement of prohibitions against the practice, as well as improvements in maternity protection in most factories, are examples of positive program impact.

Although HOPE II legislation continues to draw investors to Haiti’s garment sector, buyers’ perceptions of the export competitiveness of the sector have been damaged by recent unrest. Government instability and lack of follow-up on providing investment incentives to foreign investors appears to have constrained growth in the sector. Based on feedback from a small sample of buyers, perceptions of Haitian suppliers’ compliance are generally improving, with some exceptions.

**Sustainability**

Progress to date strengthening GoH capacity to monitor and promote good labor practices in Haiti’s garment sector and existing levels of trust in the neutrality of government institutions suggest that BWH services are likely to be needed for many years to come. BWH has fostered coordination among MAST, social security providers, and the special ombudsperson, but progress has not yet been institutionalized through formal agreements/procedures and a consistent change in practices. BWH has likewise contributed to strengthening the capacity of a core group of labor inspectors and promoting training programs for other inspectors. Although the core group of inspectors have improved their professional capacity, progress in the institutional enabling environment has been limited.
Recommendations

Recommendations for BWH

1. Intensify workplace cooperation training and activities in factories. Give the performance improvement consultative committees (PICCs) a clearer mandate regarding fostering workplace cooperation. Consider funding for small workplace improvement projects. In industry seminars, share good practices in workplace cooperation from other countries or from “model” factories in Haiti.

2. Hire more EAs and take other measures to reinforce BWH presence in factories, especially in the north, where the number of workers is growing. Gather feedback from buyers and factory-level stakeholders on how BWH can be more responsive to their needs.

3. Strengthen the capacity-building program for trade union members, at both the national level and factory level. Capacity building should not be limited to training trainers but should include more comprehensive interventions to build capacity of trade union leaders to develop and deliver their own training programs and make progress on other indicators of trade union organizational development such as recruiting new members, managing membership lists, and collecting dues.

4. Continue/strengthen efforts to raise buyers’ awareness of practices that are not supportive of good working conditions in factories. BWH and BWG should continue to conduct regular dialogues with buyers, including dialogue on areas in which research shows that buyers’ practices may hinder improved working conditions (for example, pricing that does not consider increases in minimum wage).

5. Ensure that foreign supervisors and middle management participate in supervisor training and workplace cooperation training. Consider new training on cultural sensitivity.

6. Continue building the capacity of labor inspectors, particularly of the garment sector task force, and providing support for logistics to increase frequency and responsiveness of inspections. Develop more comprehensive indicators and targets to measure progress against capacity-building objectives.

Recommendations for ILO

7. ACTRAV should assist BWH in resolving the issue of trade union representation, which is an important factor preventing formal tripartite discussions and hindering BWH engagement with trade unions.

8. ILO industrial relations specialists should provide technical assistance to stakeholders in the sector to negotiate renewed collective bargaining agreements. The ILO should consider the feasibility of renewing past efforts to support the negotiation of a sector-wide collective bargaining agreement or multi-enterprise collective bargaining agreements. It may also explore the feasibility of enlisting buyer support for collective bargaining.¹

¹ See https://actonlivingwages.com for information on one buyer-supported collective bargaining initiative.
9. The ILO should consider the feasibility of ILO wage specialists providing technical support to
the Superior Council on Wages for strengthening minimum wage setting mechanisms in Haiti.
Technical assistance should promote tripartite social dialogue on wages using an evidence-
based approach.

**Recommendations for ILAB**

10. Reinforce advocacy with GoH to address structural issues affecting government inspection of
garment factories by MAST.
1. PROGRAM CONTEXT AND DESCRIPTION

The United States Department of Labor (USDOL) Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) Office of Trade and Labor Affairs (OTLA) selected IMPAQ International to conduct an interim performance evaluation of the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Better Work Haiti (BWH) program. This report presents the evaluation team’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

1.1 Background

The garment sector is a rare source of employment in Haiti’s formal private sector. At its peak in 1980, the industrial manufacturing sector, which was dominated by garment factories, employed more than 150,000 people in about 200 foreign companies. The sector declined in the 1980s because of competition from Asia as well as Haiti’s political instability and natural disasters. Trade preferences enacted by the US Congress in 2008 enabled the Haitian textile and garment industry to benefit from customs exemptions, created interest from American buyers to source from Haiti, and has helped to revive the sector.²

Haiti’s textiles and apparel sector has grown significantly in the past decade in terms of employment and exports. Between 2009 and 2019, the number of jobs in the sector more than doubled, from 24,000 to an estimated 52,000.³ The majority of workers are women. The sector contributes 80–90 percent of the country’s export earnings, with nearly all sector exports destined to the United States. Despite repeated periods of political and economic unrest in the country, the apparel sector has seen a steady rise in the value of garment exports. In 2018, Haiti exported $926 million worth of garments to the United States, up 10.1 percent from $850 million in 2016.⁴

Haiti’s garment sector benefits from US trade preferences, which are contingent on labor standards monitoring provided by BWH. The Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2008 (HOPE II) provides preferential treatment for US imports of apparel, textiles, and certain other goods from Haiti. HOPE II allows Haiti to export garments to the United States without paying tariffs; these exports include garments that are assembled in Haiti from parts or materials that are made in other countries.

To be eligible for preferential treatment under HOPE II, the Government of Haiti (GoH) is required to (1) implement the Technical Assistance Improvement and Compliance Needs Assessment and Remediation (TAICNAR) program; (2) establish a Labor Ombudsperson’s Office; (3) mandate that apparel and textile producers exporting to the United States participate in the TAICNAR program; and (4) develop a system to ensure participation by these producers, including the establishment of a producer registry. Furthermore, to remain eligible for preferential treatment, Haiti must be making continual progress toward protecting internationally recognized worker rights.⁵ To benefit from HOPE II trade incentives, individual Haitian producers on the GoH’s registry are likewise required to remediate non-compliance with core labor standards or Haitian

² Better Work program description: https://betterwork.org/home/bwh-our-programme/
⁵ HOPE II defines the core labor standards as follows: freedom of association, the effective recognition of the right to bargain collectively, the elimination of all forms of compulsory or forced labor, the effective abolition of child labor and a prohibition on the worst forms of child labor, and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 19 U.S.C. § 2703a(a)(3).
labor law. The United States has committed to maintaining Haiti’s preferential tariff treatment and the associated TAICNAR program until September 30, 2025.⁶

As part of the provisions for HOPE II legislation implementation, the US government is supporting BWH to monitor participating factories’ compliance with international and national labor norms and standards and to help remediate issues of non-compliance. Between 2009 and 2019, ILAB provided BWH with a total of US$13.3 million. ILAB also provided $1 million to the American Center for International Labor Solidarity, also known as the Solidarity Center (SC), over two years (12/2012–12/2014) to strengthen worker organizations in Haiti,⁷ and $2.4 million over four years (11/2013–12/2017) for a separate ILO project providing technical assistance to the GoH that focused on improving labor inspection and other aspects of labor law enforcement.⁸ Since December 2017, BWH has taken over some activities initiated by this second project implemented by the ILO and plans to further strengthen institutional capacity in the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (Ministère des Affaires Sociales et du Travail or MAST). At the time of the evaluation, ILAB had allocated an additional $1.1 million to cover BWH activities through 2020.

### 1.2 Program Description

BWH is part of the Better Work Global (BWG) partnership program between the ILO and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). In all the countries where it operates, the Better Work (BW) program aims to improve compliance with labor standards as well as the competitiveness of enterprises within global garment manufacturing supply chains.

The overall goal (also called development impact) of BWH is “Better Work Haiti will have improved workers’ lives and the competitiveness of the garment sector.” This goal is intended to be achieved through 12 program outputs contributing to three outcomes:

- **Outcome 1.** Compliance with national labor law and international labor standards in the Haitian garment industry is monitored and compliance levels increased.
  - **Output 1.1.** BWH assessment services are maintained and adjusted to changing circumstances in the industry in Haiti and based on BW’s experience across countries.
  - **Output 1.2.** BWH advisory services contribute to increased compliance and improved social dialogue at the factory level.
  - **Output 1.3.** BWH training services are diversified and strengthened and knowledge levels of factories on specific compliance issues increased.

- **Outcome 2.** The garment industry in Haiti is strengthened and capable to improve labor related issues and industrial relations on a sectoral level.
  - **Output 2.1.** Factories have obtained technical support to increase their productivity.
  - **Output 2.2.** The Haitian garment industry is promoted to attract new buyers.
  - **Output 2.3.** Lessons learned and knowledge of governance gaps are brought into public and private sector policy debates.
  - **Output 2.4.** Social dialogue and sound industrial relations are promoted at the sectoral level.

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⁷ Strengthening Worker Organizations, [https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/strengthening-worker-organizations](https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/strengthening-worker-organizations)
Output 2.5 Support is provided to industry stakeholders to elaborate strategies to improve worker wellbeing in the sector, in particular for women.

**Outcome 3.** The long-term institutional and financial viability of BWH activities is strengthened through increased capacity of its constituents and increased revenues.
- **Output 3.1.** BWH’s efforts to increase cost recovery are intensified.
- **Output 3.2.** The capacity of different institutions of the Government of Haiti to provide services to their respective constituents is increased.
- **Output 3.3.** The capacity of the unions of Haiti’s garment sector to contribute to compliant working conditions at the factory and sectorial level and hence promoting mature industrial relations is increased.
- **Output 3.4.** The capacity of the employers of Haiti’s garment sector to ensure compliant working conditions at the factory and sectorial level and hence promoting mature industrial relations is increased.

The BWH theory of change links improved respect for workers’ rights with higher productivity and improved competitiveness. It is based on the premise that by enhancing compliance with international labor standards and national labor laws, enterprises will be in a better position to meet the social compliance requirements of international buyers, improve conditions for workers, and increase productivity and product quality. With a good social compliance record and increased productivity and product quality, complemented by other factors such as trade preferences and proximity to the North American market, Haiti will be a competitive producer country in global garment production supply chains. An overview of the program’s outcomes and main interventions is presented in Exhibit 1.

**Exhibit 1. Program Outcomes and Main Interventions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Main Interventions</th>
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| **Outcome 1** | • Provide practical assistance to factories to help workers and employers in the workplace engage and cooperate effectively, and self-diagnose and remedy problems themselves.  
• Conduct annual assessments of participating garment-producing factories using a regularly updated assessment tool that measures factory compliance with international core labor standards as well as the Haitian labor code.  
• Produce regular assessment and biannual synthesis reports that are published on BW’s transparency portal; reports are shared with brands and retailers doing business in Haiti and who subscribe to BWH services.  
• Assist factories in developing compliance improvement plans, monitor progress eliminating non-compliance issues, and validate factory progress reports on the transparency portal.  
• Offer trainings and industry seminars on a regular basis in line with non-compliance issues identified during assessment.  
• Offer productivity improvement assistance to factories and document good practices and lessons learned. |
| **Outcome 2** | • Facilitate coordination, information sharing, and social dialogue among sector-level tripartite representatives, including the labor ombudsperson for the garment sector, through regular meetings of the program advisory committee (PAC) and other capacity-building activities. |
| **Outcome 3** | • Collaborate with and build the capacity of MAST (the labor inspectorate and social security providers) to strengthen labor law enforcement and government social services in the garment sector.  
• Develop and implement a cost-recovery strategy. |
2. EVALUATION OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

2.1 Evaluation Objectives

The overall objective of this evaluation was to assess the performance and achievements of the BWH program from March 2016\(^9\) to August 2019 and to identify promising practices and lessons learned. Specifically, the purpose of the performance evaluation of the BWH program was to:

- **Assess the relevance of the program’s activities** to their beneficiaries, in the current economic and political context in the country and consider progress already made and challenges that remain in ensuring that the textile and apparel sector complies with labor laws and standards.
- **Assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the program’s implementation**, determine whether the program is on track and on schedule to meet its objectives and fulfill TAICNAR’s requirements, and identify and analyze challenges and opportunities encountered.
- **Assess the impact of the program’s strategies and the program’s strengths and weaknesses** in promoting labor compliance in the textile and apparel sector through the two sets of TAICNAR requirements articulated in HOPE II.
- **Assess the program’s plans for sustainability**, identifying steps being taken to ensure that producers can and will independently achieve labor compliance and Haitian labor authorities can and will effectively enforce Haitian labor laws.
- **Provide conclusions, lessons learned, and recommendations.**

2.2 Methodology

The evaluation team addressed the evaluation questions using multiple sources of evidence, combining primary qualitative data with secondary quantitative and qualitative data. Qualitative data were obtained from key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), and document review. Quantitative data were obtained from tables in the quarterly technical progress reports (TPRs) submitted by BWH to ILAB. Data collection methods and stakeholder perspectives were triangulated to bolster the credibility and validity of the results.

This report addresses the main research questions and sub-questions presented in Exhibit 2. The evaluation team developed these questions in collaboration with ILAB and BWH, based on their needs and the types and scope of data available.

\(^9\) The last USDOL commissioned evaluation was in March 2016. In addition to evaluating BWH, this evaluation also covered the ILO MAST program and the SC program highlighted in the introduction to this report.
### Exhibit 2. Evaluation Questions and Data Sources

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<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>To what extent are the outcomes and outputs of the various BWH activities consistent with improving producers’ compliance with core labor standards, the capacity of the GoH to identify and address non-compliance, and the export-competitiveness in the Haitian textile and apparel sector?</td>
<td>Document Review; KIIs; FGDs</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>To what extent have BWH activities responded to the specific needs of the targeted beneficiaries? In particular, how satisfied are the following stakeholders with BWH’s assistance, training, support, and other services: a) Worker organizations, workers (by gender), and PICCs; b) Factory management, producers, and brands; c) MAST, in particular, labor inspectors; d) HOPE Commission members; e) Judicial officers and other relevant government labor law enforcement personnel; and f) The Labor Ombudsperson.</td>
<td>Document Review; KIIs; FGDs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency and Effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>What are the key strengths and weaknesses of BWH’s staffing and management arrangements, particularly in respect to EAs?</td>
<td>KIIs; FGDs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>To what extent are the working arrangements of BWH efficient and effective with respect to each of the stakeholders enumerated in question 2 above? What are the strengths and weaknesses?</td>
<td>KIIs; FGDs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Has BWH ensured that program activities for workers and their organizations efficiently and effectively reach the target number of beneficiary workers?</td>
<td>KIIs; Secondary data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Since December 2017, has BWH ensured that the program’s activities for government representatives charged with enforcing labor laws, including labor inspectors and judicial officers, efficiently and effectively reach the targeted number of beneficiary government representatives?</td>
<td>KIIs; Secondary data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>What are the main internal and external factors influencing the efficiency and effectiveness of the program, including the achievement of its objectives and fulfillment of the two sets of TAICNAR requirements?</td>
<td>Document Review; KIIs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>To what extent have BWH’s producer compliance assessments, remediation assistance and monitoring, and the publication of biannual producer compliance public reports on producer compliance occurred efficiently and effectively?</td>
<td>Document Review; KIIs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>What have been the gender-specific impacts of BWH’s activities to assess and facilitate textile and apparel producers’ compliance with worker rights requirements, particularly concerning sexual harassment, pregnancy testing and other pregnancy-based discrimination, and other forms of sex-based discrimination in employment and the workplace?</td>
<td>KIIs; FGDs; Secondary data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>What, if any, changes do U.S. garment and textile buyers and importers perceive (either positive or negative) in the export-competitiveness of the Haitian garment and textile industry since 2016? To what extent do they attribute changes to BWH activities?</td>
<td>Document Review; KIIs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>To what extent are the necessary agreements, procedures, and mechanisms in place to ensure continued coordination, consultation, and cooperation among relevant government representatives, employers, workers and their organizations, and U.S. brands and importers to improve compliance with core labor standards in Haiti’s textile and apparel sector and to increase the export-competitiveness of the sector?</td>
<td>Document Review; KIIs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>To what extent do the relevant Haitian government officials, in particular labor inspectors and judicial officials, have the technical capacity, resources, and political will to enforce effectively Haitian labor laws?</td>
<td>Document Review; KIIs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.2.1 Evaluation Schedule

The evaluation team completed a project document review in July 2019 and conducted fieldwork in Haiti from August 12 to August 23, 2019, collecting information from semi-structured KIIs and FGDs. Prior to the visit, the evaluation team developed KII and FGD guides. During the site visit and in pre- and post-fieldwork Skype KIIs, the evaluation team consulted with various stakeholder groups, including workers and workers’ organizations, factory managers and the primary employers’ association representing the garment sector (Association des Industries d’Haiti or ADIH), relevant government officials (including labor inspectors), BWH and BWG program personnel, buyers and brands, and ILAB representatives. Following the fieldwork, the evaluation team held a workshop with stakeholders and then a debriefing with ILAB to discuss key findings and recommendations. Most of the data analysis and report writing was conducted in August and September 2019.

2.2.2 Data Collection

Key Informant Interviews. The evaluation team consulted with 38 stakeholder representatives (16 women, 22 men) via semi-structured KIIs by phone or in person to obtain participants’ perspectives on the project’s implementation and progress. Exhibit 3 shows the number of KII participants by stakeholder group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Informant Interviews</th>
<th>No. Participants</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ILAB and US embassy representatives</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO regional office, IFC, and BW personnel</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government stakeholders</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADIH representatives</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buyers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory managers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Focus Group Discussions. The evaluation team conducted a total of 16 FGDs with 117 participants in BWH activities. Each FGD type addressed different types of questions. Exhibit 4 shows the number of FGD participants by stakeholder group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus Group Discussions</th>
<th>No. Participants</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labor inspectors</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National-level trade union representatives</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory-level bipartite committee members</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory-level trade union representatives</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory workers</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory supervisors</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>117</strong></td>
<td><strong>57</strong></td>
<td><strong>60</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the factory-level, the team organized 12 FGDs with workers and worker supervisors; bipartite committees, including the performance improvement consultative committees (PICCS) and
occupational safety and health (OSH) committees; and trade union members in garment factories located in Port-au-Prince and Caracol. For worker FGDs, the evaluation team selected 8 to 10 participants in a random manner. All FGDs were held in a private space, away from any employer and BWH representatives. The evaluation team selected factories using the following criteria: (1) program exposure (i.e., including factories that have been in the program since inception and factories that joined the BWH program since 2016); (2) labor compliance (i.e., including factories with greater and lesser numbers of compliance issues based on BWH assessments); (3) location (i.e., including factories in different geographic areas); and (4) size (i.e., number of workers employed), with the objective of having a small sample representing a diverse set of characteristics and experiences with BWH services.

The evaluation team organized two FGDs with labor inspectors participating in the MAST task force for the garment industry, one in Port-au-Prince and another in Fort Liberté in the north. In addition, the team organized two FGDs with national trade union members in Port-au-Prince.

**Document Review.** The evaluation team reviewed BWH documents to understand the project design and implementation, extract findings relevant to the evaluation questions, and inform data collection protocol development so that instruments would appropriately supplement the information collected from background documents. These include the following:

- BWH quarterly TPRs to ILAB (April 2016–July 2019)
- BWH annual work plans
- BWH monitoring and evaluation (M&E) plan
- BWH bi-annual compliance synthesis reports
- US Trade Representative (USTR) annual reports on TAICNAR implementation
- Other relevant statistical and background information produced by the GoH, ILO, and other relevant research organizations

### 2.2.3 Data Analysis

Evaluation team members took detailed notes during KIs and FGDs throughout the fieldwork. The evaluation team employed the following data analysis methods to identify key findings from the collected data, as well as to draw conclusions and make recommendations for BWH follow-up:

- **Content analysis.** The evaluation team reviewed and coded KII and FGD data to identify and highlight notable examples of BWH successes (or lack of successes) that contributed to (or inhibited) achievement of its objectives.
- **Trend analysis.** The evaluation team examined BWH M&E data on their indicators over time to identify trends in performance relative to targets.
- **Gap analysis.** The evaluation team analyzed where BWH fell short of anticipated performance targets, and the likely factors contributing to these gaps.
- **Comparative analysis.** The evaluation team compared different stakeholder groups’ perspectives to assess either convergence or divergence.
2.2.4 Limitations

The evaluation team was aware of several bias risks in data collection and analysis and developed mitigation strategies to overcome these, as follows:

- **Response bias.** Response bias is the risk that key informants may have been motivated to provide responses that would be considered socially desirable or influential in obtaining personal benefits, or to discredit other BWH stakeholders. In the factory context, workers’ responses may also have been shaped by fear that their answers would be shared with factory management. Likewise, honest discussion of topics such as sexual harassment may have been constrained by social sensitivities.

  To mitigate response bias, the team formulated its findings based on multiple sources of information. Within stakeholder categories, the team interviewed several individuals and held multiple FGDs. The team also administered a clear consent script that explained the purpose of the evaluation and clarified the differences between the evaluation and a BWH factory compliance assessment. The team also highlighted the value of honest answers to help orient future interventions, underlined the evaluation team’s commitment to confidentiality, and asked participants to likewise not share the specific contents of the discussion with others outside the group. In addition, worker FGDs were held in a private space, without the presence of project personnel or factory management.

- **Selection bias.** Selection bias is an inherent risk when project or factory personnel help to facilitate contact with participants. To mitigate the risk of selection bias, the evaluation team selected from among many possible factories where BWH was active based on its own selection criteria. Within factories, the team identified workers to be interviewed randomly using lists provided by the factory or by going directly on to the factory floor to select workers. In other key stakeholder categories, the evaluation team established a list of proposed candidates for KIIs and requested BWH’s assistance to schedule them.
3. FINDINGS

This section presents the evaluation findings based on the data collected from KIIs and FGDs conducted with program stakeholders, secondary data analysis, and a review of program documents. The key findings are presented for each evaluation criterion: relevance, efficiency and effectiveness, impact, and sustainability.

3.1 Relevance

In this section, the evaluation team presents the major concerns and needs perceived by the main stakeholders involved in or affected by BWH activities based on KIIs, FGDs, and relevant documentation. The team then examines the extent of stakeholder satisfaction with BWH relative to their needs and concerns, as well as their suggestions for what BWH could do to increase their satisfaction. Finally, the team assesses the extent to which BWH activities are consistent with the program’s objectives, namely with improving export garment factories’ compliance with core labor standards, improving the capacity of the GoH to identify and address non-compliance, and enhancing the export competitiveness of the Haitian textile and apparel sector.

3.1.1 To what extent has the program responded to stakeholder concerns?

KIIs and FGDs highlighted common trends in key stakeholder groups’ concerns. Through document review and KIIs with BWH, the team also identified how some of BWH’s main strategies and activities responded to these concerns/perceptions. An overview is provided in Exhibit 5.

**Exhibit 5. Main Stakeholder Concerns and BWH Response Strategies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder Group</th>
<th>Main Concerns/Perceptions</th>
<th>BWH Response Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Workers                         | • Low wages, declining production bonuses  
• High-pressure working environment  
• Social security deductions in exchange for poor quality or absent social services  
• Poor quality transportation (north)  
• Lack of respect from supervisors and management  
• Unfair treatment of female workers | • Compliance assessments cover legal minimum wage and overtime payment, proper declaration and payment of social security dues, maternity protection  
• Facilitates coordination among ONA, OFATMA, and labor inspectors to reduce under-reporting of workers  
• Follows up with OFATMA on cases of nonpayment of maternity leave  
• Provides supervisor training, sexual harassment prevention training  
• Facilitates formation of bipartite OSH committees and PICCs |
| Trade union members and leadership | • Weak bargaining position vis-à-vis factory management  
• Anti-union practices by some employers  
• Absent or corrupt labor inspection  
• Pro-employer bias by ombudsperson | • Includes trade union representatives on PAC  
• Encourages trade union participation on PICCs  
• Assesses factory compliance with freedom of association (FoA)  
• Offers training for trade union members |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder Group</th>
<th>Main Concerns/Perceptions</th>
<th>BWH Response Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Factory management        | • Country instability and work disruptions  
• Lack of predictability of minimum wage increases  
• Low productivity  
• Potential loss of business due to country conditions, “exaggerated” reports of non-compliance  
• Weak or absent labor inspection  
• Ambiguities in Labor Code  
• Poor services in government-managed industrial parks  
• Pressure from buyer to keep prices low                                                                                                               | • Promotes factory-level social dialogue through bipartite committees (PICCs)  
• Supported IFC pilot productivity enhancement program  
• Supports update of Haitian Labor Code  
• Organizes buyer forums  
• BWG research on the effect buyer practices on working conditions                                                                                   |
| Employers’ Association (ADIH) | • Limited government investment in the sector  
• Country instability  
• Poor quality of government provided social services for workers  
• Continuation of US trade preferences for Haiti                                                                                                          | • Fulfilling HOPE II requirements on labor standards monitoring and supporting factory remediation efforts                                                                                                                                |
| Labor inspectors          | • Low status  
• Poor working conditions  
• Lack of initial and on-the-job training                                                                                                                 | • Training senior labor inspectors  
• Supporting training programs  
• Providing access to transportation                                                                                                                                                                                  |

Workers were concerned about the rising cost of living, low wages, and absent or poor-quality social services, issues BWH was able to only partially address because of external constraints and limitations in its program mandate. Workers who participated in FGDs highlighted low wages, decreasing bonus earnings, and rising prices at the top of their list of concerns. Although they had once been able to save some of their wages, they no longer could because of the rising cost of food, transportation, and other essentials. One factory manager likewise indicated that factory management was also concerned about the rising cost of living and had distributed food aid to support workers in 2019. Some workers in all four sampled factories also indicated that they are under significant pressure to reach production quotas, while pay incentives (bonuses) have decreased since they first started working in the factory.

In all worker FGDs, participants highlighted their dissatisfaction with limited medical services available in the factories and the quality or absence of state-provided accident, maternity, and medical insurance program (Office d’Assurance Accidents du Travail, Maladie et Maternité or OFATMA). Many workers objected to having money withheld from their salary for OFATMA contributions (3 percent), considering the poor services offered.

BWH management indicated that although the program works to ensure that workers are paid the legal minimum wage and applicable overtime, facilitating the minimum wage adjustment process is outside its core mandate. One BWH program manager highlighted that minimum wage levels have been a significant issue since the program started and suggested that the ILO should consider assisting the High Council on Wages to improve the wage-setting process.

“We face a situation where people are not motivated to work. They are not earning enough. I think the company should make an adjustment.”

– Union representative
On the issue of the quality of government-provided social security benefits, BWH and relevant government stakeholders reported collaboration to reinforce and improve the efficiency of the state old-age pension provider (Office National d’Assurance-Vieillesse or ONA) and OFATMA to ensure that employers declare their entire workforce and pay legally mandated contributions. This collaboration also helps ensure that accident, health, maternity, and retirement benefits are provided to workers. For example, on the issue of paid maternity leave, BWH personnel attested that the program, in collaboration with the garment sector ombudsperson and OFATMA, has made progress ensuring that workers receive the pay due to them. Other issues, such as improving access by workers to medical services that accept OFATMA insurance, are largely beyond the program’s scope and are affected by weakness in government institutions (for example, the ability of OFATMA to reimburse medical service providers).

BWH strategies and activities systematically addressed other worker concerns, such as verbal abuse, sexual harassment, access to clean water, and sanitary facilities. In addition to the high-priority “bread and butter” issues highlighted earlier, workers in all four sampled factories also expressed a variety of other concerns, including disrespectful treatment by supervisors, human resource managers, and general managers. Many workers singled out what they considered to be disrespectful or abusive behavior by foreign supervisors and managers. Examples of disrespectful behavior or practices cited by workers included a variety of issues such as verbal abuse, sexual harassment, management “always” taking the side of supervisors in disputes, being turned away from the factory for arriving late, and “arbitrary” limitations on their right to take personal and sick leave. Workers also frequently complained about limited access to clean and cool water (they indicated that even in cases where potable water was available, it was often left in the hot sun and served warm or even hot) and clean toilets.

According to BWH personnel, some worker concerns are addressed through the compliance assessment process, whereas others are addressed through strategies to increase bipartite

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10 Three of four factories were foreign owned. Factories employ Haitian supervisors and compliance managers, but some also employ foreign managers including nationals from Korea, Central America, and India.

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**Background on the Cost of Living and Minimum Wage in Haiti:** In recent years, Haiti has experienced double-digit annual inflation and rising cost of living fueled by the depreciation of national currency (the gourde) and the country's dependence on imports for essential commodities. According to the National Bank of Haiti, the cost of food in Haiti increased 22.60 percent in June 2019 over the same month in the previous year.

The Haitian government, in consideration of the recommendation of the Superior Council on Wages, adjusts the minimum wage annually. Between 2015 and 2019, the garment sector minimum wage rose from 225 gourdes per day (about $5) to its current level of 420 gourdes ($4.50 in August 2019), an increase of 86 percent in local currency. Wages have been a significant source of labor unrest in the sector. For example, there were major strikes by garment sector workers over wages in both 2017 and 2018.

In a study released in April 2019, the Solidarity Center (SC) estimates that the cost of living is more than four times higher than the garment sector minimum wage and increased by 74 percent since its last assessment in 2014. Based on the standard 48-hour work week, the SC study estimates that workers must earn at least 1,750 gourdes (about $21.21) per day to adequately provide for themselves and their families.

**Source:** The High Cost of Low Wages in Haiti, Solidarity Center, 2019
dialogue. Examples of worker concerns addressed through compliance assessments include access to potable water, the ratio of sanitary facilities to the number of workers, working hours, correct payment of wages, and OSH. To address issues not covered by labor standards and laws, BWH facilitated the formation of bipartite committees to foster social dialogue and workplace improvements, including issues not covered by the labor code. BWH reports that these committees are active in 29 of 35 factories. The program also offers training to supervisors and HR managers on issues including communication to improve management practices and reduce the use of verbal abuse.

**National trade union leaders and factory-level representatives are concerned by unfair labor practices, trade union capacity to educate and organize garment workers, their bargaining position vis-à-vis employers, and weak government oversight.** Based on feedback from trade union leaders at both the factory and national levels, anti-union behavior by factory management remains a concern among union members. Trade union representative opinions at the factory level diverged about the extent of anti-union practices from one factory to another. In one factory, union representatives had no concerns about unfair treatment from factory management, whereas in two others, union members reported active efforts by management to suppress union activity and marginalize existing members. In a fourth factory, the evaluation team was unable to meet with union representatives, who, according to factory management, no longer openly identified themselves to management. Examples of anti-union activities reported by factory-level leaders included blacklisting union members and disproportionate reductions in unionized workers. National trade union leaders likewise reported similar examples, in addition to reporting mass firings of union members for what national trade union leaders considered legal strike activity.

**Union representatives’ opinions were mixed regarding the extent to which BWH is adequately addressing these concerns.** Overall, trade union representatives were appreciative of BWH training for their leaders and members. In one factory in Port-au-Prince, trade union representatives highlighted improving relations with management and attributed this outcome in part to BWH training. Some factory-level union representatives also affirmed having received useful training from BWH but wished that BWH representatives would visit the factory more frequently, stating that one every three months was not enough.

National-level trade union representatives expressed the need for additional support from BWH to carry out their mission of educating workers on their labor rights and mobilizing new members. They cited useful training on collective bargaining but were disappointed that it had not been more extensive and that BWH was not supporting the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements, especially in factories that had expired agreements. Representatives of one union reported satisfaction with BWH support for training of trainers (ToT) activities but expressed disappointment that trade union requests for BWH financial support for follow-on training were only occasionally accorded.

National-level trade union representatives expressed strong dissatisfaction with BWH’s strategy to form PICCs at the factory level. They perceived that the practice had weakened the unions’ bargaining position within the factory by creating a parallel body to represent worker concerns. At the factory level, trade union leader opinions on the PICCs diverged. In one factory, union leaders’
opinions aligned with their national-level leadership, whereas in two others, union leaders indicated that some union members participated on the bipartite committee and, in addition, held separate meetings with factory management facilitated by BWH.

National trade union leaders likewise expressed dissatisfaction with labor inspection and work of the special mediator for the garment sector (the labor ombudsperson). They perceive the following:

- Labor inspectors are corrupt or unable to exercise legal authority over employers.
- The ombudsperson has been helpful in mediating trade union concerns in the past, but her effectiveness had waned in recent years because she is increasingly taking a “preserve jobs at all cost” approach.

National-level union leaders expressed satisfaction with BWH efforts to train labor inspectors. They indicated that, although the program had been effective in creating a core group of professional inspectors, these efforts had not been enough to strengthen labor inspection effectiveness overall. For example, union leaders indicated that factories chose their own employer-friendly inspectors and were successful in sidelining the BWH-trained taskforce. Trade union leaders also noted that, despite recurrent reports of non-compliance by some factories, GoH authorities have never removed a factory from the list of factories eligible for duty-free exports to the United States.

**Factory managers and ADIH are concerned by country instability, frequent strikes and work stoppages and their effect on productivity, lack of predictability of minimum wage increases, and potential loss of business to competitors in other countries.** Factory management expressed concerns about instability in the country and its effect on worker productivity. Two factory managers expressed fear of potential loss of business because of late deliveries. All indicated that they had been negatively affected by unrest in Haiti during the evaluation period (2016–2019), noting the negative consequences of the two-week shutdown of the country in February 2019 when people protested corruption associated with the Petro-Caribe program. One factory manager recounted that a large order was given to a factory outside Haiti as a result of the crisis.

Factory managers were also concerned by the role played by the GoH in promoting the development of the sector. For example, factory managers cited absent or weak labor inspection, poor quality services in the industrial parks, and the lack of predictability of minimum wage increases. Managers reported difficulty getting labor inspectors to come to their factories for required verification—for example, in cases in which a worker is fired—using certain chapters in the labor code. On industrial park services, factory management cited issues with worker transportation (applicable only to Caracol), maintenance of facilities, and delayed construction of planned new facilities. ADIH representatives likewise expressed concern with limited government investment in the sector, especially in providing appropriate infrastructure and buildings, and overall levels of instability and lack of government leadership in Haiti.

On the issue of minimum wage, most employer representatives interviewed by the evaluation team indicated that the unpredictability of annual minimum wage increases, in addition to absolute
wage levels, was a concern of employers who set their prices six or more months before production based on estimated costs. Based on press reports, eight Korean manufacturers predicted a drop in foreign investment and job losses following the Haitian lower house vote in March 2019 in favor of increasing the minimum wage by 75 percent (the bill has not taken effect). One factory manager indicated that buyers did not allow the factory to pass wage increases on to them and another said that recently some buyers were pressuring suppliers in Haiti for price breaks based on the devaluation of the gourde, which resulted in factory labor cost savings in dollar terms. A recent ILO survey on the effect of buyer business practices on working conditions in the garment global supply chain likewise found that that only 25 percent of buyers are willing to adjust their prices to incorporate statutory increases in the minimum wages of suppliers’ countries.

Overall factory management expressed satisfaction with BWH core services but indicated areas for improvement. Factory managers indicated they valued BWH services. Managers believed that BWH had been helpful in explaining relevant laws and regulations, helping them to improve compliance, and were a useful “guarantee” of social compliance vis-à-vis their clients. Based on BWH personnel and employer feedback, employers’ perceptions of BWH have improved since the program started, which was attributed largely to improved awareness and understanding of the program’s role and mandate.

All factory management representatives expressed concerns about BWH reports on non-compliance and the potential impact of unaddressed compliance issues on their business. For example, one factory manager highlighted being cited for non-compliance on correct payment of OFATMA contributions, a serious issue for buyers, whereas workers were strongly against having contributions deducted from their salary and were willing to strike over the issue. Factory managers also cited the example of outdated or ambiguous regulations for which they were found in non-compliance, such as the number of nurses required by national law. Some factory managers expressed the opinion that BWH was biased in favor of workers. For example, one factory manager believes that BWH took the side of trade unions in the case of what he perceived as an illegal strike.

Factory management suggestions for improvements included the following:

- Increasing the numbers of enterprise advisors (EAs) to facilitate greater diversity among auditors (for example, one factory manager indicated that the same EA should not audit multiple factories under the same management)
- Extending the time EAs spend in factories so that they can close compliance issues that have been addressed by management more quickly
- Increasing the number of advisory sessions
- Increasing training services; repeat some training topics more frequently

“I think that BW has contributed to improvements….This industry needed to be recalibrated to give the workers a voice, but the scale tipped so much on the other side, we need to rebalance. They pushed the envelope too far to the detriment of the industry and job creation.”
– Factory manager

“It is very important for Haiti to have BW. Without BW being there to provide proper guidance, it would be very hard for there to be respect and compliance.”
– Factory manager

• Providing more training to train union representatives so that they understand their role and stay within the limits of the law

**Labor inspectors are concerned about their poor working conditions.** In FGDs with labor inspectors, participants expressed significant frustration with their working conditions. They highlighted issues such as low salary, late payment of salary, limited opportunities for advancement, the absence of basic tools needed to do their jobs, such as computers, transportation, and decent office space, as well as limited support for their work within the MAST hierarchy. Labor inspectors indicated that their status was too low for them to be effective at enforcing labor law.

Other stakeholders corroborated inspector claims. A BWH program manager indicated, “The status of the inspectorate needs to be enhanced. There are competent inspectors who receive less than 200 USD/month.” A trade union representative indicated that after visiting the labor inspectors’ offices and seeing their working conditions, he lost confidence in the inspectors’ capacity to carry out their mandate.

In addition to poor working conditions, MAST inspectors highlighted other challenges that affect their performance, such as ambiguities in the labor code, low penalties for labor code infractions, and weak enforcement of laws by labor tribunals. They also highlighted that the qualifications of inspectors varied significantly, that many inspectors had not officially been sworn into the civil service, and that both initial and in-service training for inspectors was largely inadequate.

**Overall, labor inspectors were satisfied with BWH interventions to build their capacity but found that these had limited impact on improving their status and working conditions.** According to members of the MAST labor inspector task force for the garment sector, BWH assistance to them included training, the provision of tablets loaded with digital versions of the inspection form, assistance with their system for organizing and archiving inspection reports, and support for transportation. For the last item, in Port-au-Prince, BWH has made an ILO vehicle available to labor inspectors for factory visits and, in the north, the program provided labor inspectors with motorcycles.

Labor inspectors expressed strong appreciation for training provided by BWH. One inspector remarked, “The training helped us to master our jobs better. We found the training on OSH especially useful because it applied to garment sector.” Feedback on the usefulness of other assistance was mixed. Inspectors in the north indicated that the absence of a budget for fuel limited the usefulness of BWH-provided motorcycles and that the tablets were welcome but that their capacity was too low and they needed to pay for internet access themselves to use the digital application provided by BWH. Overall, labor inspectors, especially those based in the north, expressed disappointment that BWH had not been more successful at raising their status and improving their working conditions.
3.1.3 To what extent are the program’s outputs consistent with achieving its planned outcomes and development impact?

Stakeholders broadly affirmed that BWH programs have contributed positively to improving the social compliance of factories in the Haitian garment sector but disagreed on the extent to which BWH evaluations and associated follow-up were enough to significantly improve working conditions overall. In evaluation consultations, the GoH and social partners all hoped for the continuation of US trade incentives, which they associated with growth in sector and job creation. They likewise recognized the important role played by BWH as a guarantor of the sectors’ efforts to comply with international labor standards and national labor laws.

Opinions diverged among stakeholders, especially between workers and employers, on just how well BWH assessments and associated advisory services worked to improve compliance. Some employers reported that BWH exaggerates compliance problems, contributing to a potential loss of business. On the workers’ side, several worker FGD participants shared the view that evaluations don’t adequately reflect conditions (actual conditions are worse) and progress has been limited.

- Workers indicated that employers were very concerned with putting on their best “face” at the time of EA visits but regressed when BWH representatives were not around. In one FGD, some workers indicated that some of the emergency exits were locked, but were unlocked when BWH EAs came.13 Nevertheless, in two of four factories, workers reported examples of improved working conditions and improved relations with management.
- Representatives of national trade unions highlighted that little progress had been made since 2016 in some compliance areas such as OSH (corroborated by BWH compliance synthesis reports) despite the issue being raised in multiple assessment reports. Both national- and factory-level trade union representatives also indicated that respect for FoA remained a significant problem. Despite their perceptions of the program’s limits, one national-level trade union remarked to the general agreement of others in the group, “If BW was not there, the situation would be worse.”
- Factory management reported making progress resolving non-compliance issues highlighted in BWH evaluation reports, such as the way supervisors communicate with workers or the availability of cool and clean drinking water.

Findings from Tufts University’s 2016 impact assessment suggest that BWH core services are useful to improve working conditions in some areas but have been limited in others. The assessment analyzed the impact of BW on social compliance and working conditions in several countries where the program is active.14 Regarding Haiti, the impact assessment reported the following:

13 The workers indicated that they had raised the issue with factory management, who indicated that doors were temporarily locked because of ongoing construction.
14 In Haiti, Indonesia, and Vietnam, there is similar evidence suggesting a significant effect can be attributed to Better Work in reducing the prevalence of verbal abuse. This effect increases as factories participate in the program longer. (Source: Progress and potential: How Better Work is improving garment workers’ lives and boosting factory production)
• A reduction in the gender pay gap
• Expanded access to pregnancy-related healthcare
• A reduction in concerns about shouting and verbal abuse
• An increase in productivity associated with training female supervisors"}

Of note, the baseline study of the BW impact assessment indicated that when workers were initially asked to share any concerns regarding their immediate health and safety, nearly one in three workers in factories in Haiti stated that working with dangerous equipment was a concern among their colleagues. However, in this evaluation’s worker FGDs, few participants raised serious OSH concerns, suggesting that workers’ perceptions of the extent of factory health and safety risks had diminished since the impact assessment.

The impact assessment reported little change in some indicators of worker welfare, possibly corroborating worker concerns about low wage levels relative to the cost of providing for themselves and their families. For example, the impact assessment found hunger to be a significant problem among Haitian garment workers, for which there was “no consistent pattern of improvement driven by Better Work.” In addition, BWH did not appear to have a statistically significant effect in increasing opportunities for girls’ schooling, a change linked in other countries to increases in worker household income.16

3.2 Efficiency and Effectiveness

In this section, the evaluation team examines the extent that BWH is achieving planned results related to core services delivery and stakeholder capacity building. It also identifies and analyzes key external and internal constraints affecting BWH progress. Finally, this section examines the extent to which BWH management and staffing arrangements are effectively and efficiently contributing to overall program performance.

3.2.1 To what extent is the program efficiently and effectively reaching the target number of beneficiary workers and factories?

A review of BWH progress against its work plan and output targets for services to workers and factories (“core services”) indicates that the program remained largely on track relative to planned activities and most of its performance targets related to core services delivery. Core services include producer compliance assessments, remediation assistance and monitoring, and the publication of public reports on producer compliance.

Based on 2016–2019 Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) data provided by BWH (see Exhibit 6), the program is meeting or exceeding its targets for the numbers of factories enrolled and numbers of workers covered by the program. These results show that despite repeated periods of unrest in the country, the Haitian garment industry is growing at the steady rate anticipated by BWH.
### Exhibit 6. July 2019 Performance Monitoring Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of factories impacted</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Target 27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual 28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>33</td>
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<td>Number of workers impacted</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>Target 40,000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual 38,000</td>
<td>45,856</td>
<td>43,300</td>
<td>53,662</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>Number of women workers impacted</td>
<td>23,400</td>
<td>Target 26,000</td>
<td>32500</td>
<td></td>
<td>35,750</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual –</td>
<td>29,806</td>
<td>28,145</td>
<td>34,880</td>
<td>35,100</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of compliance assessment reports completed in the reporting period</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Target 27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual 12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>Number of advisory visits in the reporting period</td>
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<td>Target 180</td>
<td>180</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual 90</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of training sessions</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>Target 75</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual 35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Average non-compliance rate on publicly reported issues</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Target –</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Actual 7.70</td>
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<td>6.60</td>
<td>2.82</td>
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<td>Number of buyers affiliated with the country program</td>
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<td>Target 20</td>
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<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual 15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of targeted partners that implement inspections or deliver other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Target 2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>important government services using BW tools or resources</td>
<td></td>
<td>Actual –</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>Program revenue in the reporting period</td>
<td>US$136,035</td>
<td>Target 160,000</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td>165,000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual 154,463</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>139,638</td>
<td>–</td>
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</table>

P: period; -: data not available.
BWH is largely meeting its targets on factory compliance assessments and advisory services. BWH synthesis reports provide the most comprehensive picture of compliance of export garment factories in Haiti, with data from factories’ annual assessments. During the evaluation period, BWH has produced and published compliance synthesis reports twice yearly, according to TAICNAR requirements. The 18th synthesis report was published in April 2019.

PMP data also show that BWH met or was only slightly under its 2017–2018 annual targets for the number of compliance assessments carried out. However, the program fell short in the timely production of assessment reports. According to BWH program managers, although there is room for improvement, the need for validation in ILO headquarters of some reports containing sensitive issues such as violations of FoA partially accounted for the delays. BWH management likewise indicated that periods of unrest delayed some factory assessments.

EAs, factory managers, and buyers highlighted challenges and areas for core service delivery improvements. BWH also regularly updated the Compliance Assessment Tool (CAT), taking into consideration new or revised legal requirements agreed on by GoH. Regarding assessment criteria, EAs highlighted that gaps in the labor code pose a challenge, either in areas where no guidance is provided by Haitian law or where laws are outdated and not adapted to the modern factory setting. For example, EAs highlighted that Haitian law offers no guidance to regulate heat and noise levels in factories, so they rely on standards established by the ILO. Another frequently cited national legal framework gap is the number of nurses required per worker, which does not consider the large number of workers employed on a factory floor. To address these issues and others, BWH has been supporting a tripartite process to update the labor code but progress has been slow, mainly because of frequent turnover in the government. EAs also highlighted cases in which factory non-compliance is caused by factors outside the factories’ control, such as when they need MAST authorization—for example, to fire a worker—and this is not provided in the time period required by law.

Though not reflected in its program monitoring matrix, as part of BW’s service model, two progress reports on factory compliance improvement plans are due over the course of a one-year cycle, one written by the factory shortly after the assessment and the second one written by BWH EAs at the end of the cycle. One buyer and some factory management representatives highlighted BWH slowness in finalizing their progress reports as well as in validating and updating online performance improvement plans on the BW Transparency Portal. On the issue of updating performance improvement plans, both factory management and buyers emphasized the importance of showing progress on non-compliance issues and noted that delayed validation of resolved issues by BWH damaged the suppliers’ image, potentially resulting in lost orders.

BWH met its targets for advisory visits in 2017 and 2018 but did not provide data on this indicator for 2019. Based on feedback from factory management and a buyer, some factories are not receiving the planned number of advisory visits and one indicated some of the visits were too short. In two factories, managers expressed concerns about the quality of advisory services, indicating they were occasionally blindsided by non-compliance reports on issues that had not been raised during initial advisory services. One factory manager likewise indicated that EAs

17 Advisory services are delivered by EA. The EA must visit the factory at least once every two months. Based on the last assessment report, they advise on how to resolve non-compliance issues.
needed to be more effective updating factory management on changes in the labor regulations. EAs highlighted that their movements had been restricted during periods of unrest, especially regarding factories in insecure zones, and indicated that they have tried as much as possible to limit the potential negative effects by using remote communication technologies.

**BWH is meeting its targets on training and industry seminars and has been implementing strategies aimed to increase training relevance and impact.** BWH largely met or exceeded its targets for the number of stakeholders (workers, management representatives, labor inspectors, and other government representatives) participating in its training programs in 2017–2019. According to a BWH program manager, each factory should receive 1–2 training days or 25 participant days per year. Training is provided by BWH staff, sometimes in partnership with other organizations, such as the Solidarity Center,\(^{18}\) SHARE HOPE,\(^{19}\) and Electra Sewing.

In addition to training, BWH also organized industry seminars that brought together representatives of all factories on topics of common interest. For example, in 2018, BWH organized an industry seminar in collaboration with the Secretary of State on the rights of persons with disabilities on legislation setting hiring quotas for disabled people. During the evaluation period, BWH organized a seminar on boiler safety and maintenance.

BWH has developed audio materials in Creole on 19 topics such as sexual harassment prevention, FoA, payroll, Haitian social security programs (ONA and OFATMA), and rights and responsibilities of workers and management as an additional means to share knowledge with workers. The materials were recently finalized and shared online and with factories; some workers reported that their factory broadcast the capsules during lunch breaks. However, one factory manager indicated that he was reluctant to share the capsules with workers until the MAST “officially validated” the content, guaranteeing that the messages aligned with national laws.

The BWH core service training catalogue includes a variety of topics. A BWH program manager reported that the most popular training topics for workers include supervisor training, worker rights, and sexual harassment training. Popular topics for management include OSH and human resource management. Both trade unions and managers have appreciated training on negotiation and communication skills. BWH program management reported that it hopes to expand its training offerings to include more “customized” training.

Productivity-related training is one topic area in which BWH indicated it would like to expand. IFC recently completed the “Productivity Accelerator” program with two BWH factories. According to IFC and BWH managers, an opportunity exists to integrate parts of this more comprehensive program into the BWH core training catalogue based on lessons learned. According to an IFC program manager, relevant topics for integration include a short worker training on improving production quality and standardization and management training on setting production targets. Various key informants (BWH, ILAB, ADIH) reported demand for productivity training from factory managers. Based on stakeholder accounts, in the past, factory management had voiced disappointment that BWH support was not more relevant to improving production, although the issue was not raised by factory managers during evaluation consultations.

\(^{18}\) Solidarity Center partnered with BWH in 2018 to provide training to national committee trade union members. According to BWH, additional training for factory-level trade union members is planned in the future.

\(^{19}\) SHARE HOPE is a national NGO with a mission to improve worker welfare in the garment sector. Although not directly funded by BWH, the BWH program regularly collaborated with SHARE HOPE. Last year, the organization sponsored a two-week event on gender-based violence for workers in the SONAPI industrial part. SHARE HOPE also runs a training program for factory nurses and another personal development program for prospective workers known as PACE.
BWH management highlighted that since 2016, the program has made efforts to improve the effectiveness of training through better profiling of participants, especially GoH participants. BWH defines a profile for the people who will receive training so that participants are qualified and have the appropriate mandate to follow up and apply what they learn. The program also regularly collects participant feedback on training programs using a tablet-based survey.

**Stakeholder feedback on training was positive overall, with only a small number of comments indicating areas for improvement.** One member of a factory OSH committee reported positive outcomes from OSH training on topics such as noise levels and gas emissions. One line supervisor, who participated in BWH supervisor training, affirmed having changed their communication style. In another factory, recipients of supervisor training reported wanting to use the positive reinforcement techniques promoted by BWH but that sometimes their supervisors pressured them use more aggressive techniques. Another factory management representative reported skepticism about the effectiveness of training and indicated more follow-up was needed.

Based on feedback from factory-level stakeholders, there is strong demand for BWH training. In factories (and with national tripartite stakeholders), to increase the reach of its training programs, BWH frequently uses a ToT approach. In FGDs with bipartite committees, committee members reported participating in BWH training activities more frequently than workers, suggesting committee members had relatively privileged access to training. The limited number of workers who reported participating in training also suggests that there have been limitations in the ToT approach in terms of trainers following through and training their peers.

Even though BWH is meeting its targets on the formation of bipartite committees, direct observation and key informant feedback suggest that more needs to be done to strengthen the committees’ role in promoting bipartite dialogue and workplace cooperation. Based on BWH reporting, 29 of 32 factories have active PICCs. BWH also reported that participating factories also have active bipartite OSH committees. Based on the evaluation team’s observation and feedback from members, there is significant variation in the extent to which PICCs meet regularly and serve their purpose of fostering dialogue and cooperation between workers and management. In one factory, the FGD transformed into a dynamic exchange between workers and management on issues of mutual concern, whereas in other factories, discussion was largely dominated by management. In another factory, workers reported, “We have zero relationship with the administration.” In all factories visited by the evaluation team, workers complained about being disrespected by foreign managers. Many concerns raised by workers were on issues that might be resolved through dialogue—for example, the temperature of potable water, congestion getting into the factory at starting time, and whether music could be played on the factory floor.

Based on worker FGDs, worker perceptions of the bipartite committees varied. In one factory, members were viewed as potential mediators, whereas in others, worker members were viewed as “management favorites” and/or as having limited utility to make worker concerns heard by management. Committee members reported that committee recommendations are not always
acted on by higher-level “foreign” management, limiting their capacity to improve working conditions and address worker concerns. The extent of reported management buy-in for bipartite committees varied among sampled factories.

Factory-level trade union perceptions of the bipartite committees varied. BWH encourages union participation in the PICCs. Some national trade union leaders have discouraged their members from participating in bipartite committees based on the belief that they undermine unions in representing worker concerns. In two of four factories, trade union members were part of the bipartite committee but, in addition, the unions met with factory management separately on issues concerning their membership. Neither union nor non-union bipartite committee members appeared to have been democratically elected by workers in the factories visited by the evaluation team.

The evaluation team met with only one OSH committee, although factory-level stakeholders reported that they existed in the other factories visited by the team. OSH committee members and workers reported that the OSH committees were engaged in awareness raising on safety issues. Workers also reported receiving visits from the fire department and that they were aware of emergency evacuation procedures. OSH committee members and factory management reported that worker resistance to using personal protective equipment presented a challenge and in one factory, a worker indicated that equipment like face masks was not always made available to workers.

BWH recognizes that more support is needed to strengthen the role of the bipartite committees to promote workplace cooperation and ensure good OSH practices among factory workers and management. According to EAs, one challenge they have experienced in building the capacity of bipartite committees is the factory management’s production orientation. EAs indicated that some factories, especially the smaller ones, are reluctant to allocate time for committee members to discuss factory issues because of production pressures. The same issue is also a challenge for the organization of BWH and BWH-trained factory trainers’ workshops and activities. High turnover among committee members was another issue highlighted by the EAs as diminishing committee effectiveness.

3.2.2 To what extent is the program efficiently and effectively reaching the targeted number of beneficiary government representatives?

Many planned BWH capacity-building interventions for trade unions have been significantly delayed. Based on the BWH workplan, many planned efforts to strengthen the capacity of trade unions during the evaluation period (2016–2019) have yet to be implemented due mainly to unsettled divisions among trade union partners (discussed in greater detail below). Although trade unions reported receiving training from BWH on topics including sexual harassment, OSH, worker rights, the Haitian Labor Code, and collective bargaining, many more comprehensive forms of support planned by BWH were not carried out. Examples of planned interventions for the period 2016–2019 that have not yet been implemented by BWH include the following:

- Organizing joint tripartite training sessions in the areas of conflict prevention, reconciliation, and grievance management
- Designing and implementing a comprehensive training program for current and future union leaders on trade union organizational development (including topics such as appropriate tracking of membership and collection of dues)
• Supporting the practical needs of unions for their activities—for example, through provision of computer access and support on specific activities
• Assisting garment sector unions to set up an inter-union coordination mechanism to allow for a constructive exchange
• Supporting the process of establishing collective bargaining agreements at the enterprise level and possibly the sector level

Trade union capacity was a concern of many stakeholders. Representatives from all stakeholder groups indicated that training of trade union representatives was a high priority and an area in which BWH was not doing enough. ADIH and factory managers considered training necessary to help trade union representatives understand the law, their role, and how to negotiate more productively.

Based on discussions with ADIH and factory management, capacity building for trade unions was needed to rein in trade union “bad behaviors.” One employer representative remarked, “Some of the factory owners believe that BWH leans towards the unions. BWH needs to pay attention to the issue of putting some order in unions.” One ILO official indicated that they believed that BWH assistance needed to be more balanced and that support to trade unions should be strengthened. They remarked, “The trade unions don’t see the benefits of the program for them.”

Many key informants inside and outside the unions highlighted the significant challenges the unions face in carrying out their mandate. One person with extensive experience working with trade unions remarked, “We say there is the presence of trade unions—recognized by the government and by BWH—but the presence lacks power.” They went on to explain that although establishing a trade union is easy (the law requires only that 10 workers belong to a union to be recognized), it is very difficult to mobilize workers to join.

As discussed in Section 3.1, union and non-union workers reported efforts by management to weaken the trade unions. Factory-level trade union members in one factory indicated that workers sometimes try to use trade union membership for protection when they think they may be fired rather than understanding the trade union’s role to work within the law. National trade union leaders highlighted the need to provide more training to the cells at the factory level while noting challenges to making training effective, such as high turnover among their membership.

Divisions among Haitian trade unions hindered BWH effectiveness in strengthening their organizations and promoting social dialogue. Based on feedback from BWH program management, strong divisions among Haitian trade unions have hindered the program’s effectiveness at building trade union capacity. Based on a report of an industrial relations specialist that carried out collective bargaining training in 2016, there are two rival groups of trade unions in Haiti. One group is formed by trade unions that are affiliates of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC); the other one is formed by “independent” or non-affiliated trade unions. According to the specialist’s report and corroborated by BWH personnel and other relevant national stakeholders, the two groups are strongly divided, owing to one or more factors:

“There needs to be more involvement from BWH—more visits, more follow-up, and more interaction with the trade unions. They [BWH] are the one party that the unions listen to. They should train and guide the unions.”

– Factory manager

“We used to have trade unions but they [management] shut them up. The “union” now is close to the management. The union should have been independent—if it was independent, it would do a better job defending our rights.”

– Factory worker
differences related to their strategy or values, cases of infighting and secession among union leaders, or some unions appearing to have been compromised by factory managers.\textsuperscript{20}

Based on BWH management reports, this situation has been an obstacle to the implementation of some planned BWH efforts to promote social dialogue in the sector. For example, it has impeded regular meetings of the program’s tripartite PAC as well as tripartite consultations on labor law reform because unions do not agree on who should represent them. Based on ILO regional personnel, to resolve the issue, the ILO proposed to expand the number of trade union representatives on the committee to allow more diverse representation. However, BWH management indicated it is still waiting for the trade unions to designate representatives, suggesting the issue is still not resolved. According to BWH personnel, while the issue of trade union representation is being resolved within the unions, BWH has addressed the situation by consulting the two trade union groups separately and keeping them both informed of program activities.

Added to this external constraint is an internal one: according to BWH management, the ILO Bureau for Workers’ Activities (ACTRAV) has not been clear about which unions the program may actively support and partner with. Although ACTRAV organized a joint mission of the ITUC and the Confederation of Workers of the Americas (CSA) to Haiti in September 2018 with a view to discussing various points concerning the trade union situation in the garment sector, based on BWH management reports, there has been limited follow-up to date. Moreover, the delegation met only with ITUC-affiliated unions, a decision that negatively affected BWH credibility with the unions that were not included in the consultations, according to BWH management accounts.

**BWH has been engaged in capacity-building efforts for GoH stakeholders, with some positive outcomes.** In 2018, BWH assumed responsibility for capacity-building activities for government representatives charged with enforcing labor laws, including labor inspectors and judicial officers from the ILO MAST project.\textsuperscript{21} To ensure adequate human resources to manage this mandate, BWH hired one of the former ILO MAST program managers; in addition, BWH recently hired a senior program manager to lead BWH capacity building activities for national-level stakeholders.

Based on feedback from various GoH participants in BWH capacity-building activities as well as BWH program management reports, the program has made progress on many planned interventions, including the following:

- Organizing training for inspectors on topics such as sexual harassment, OSH, core labor standards, and use of technology for inspection and report writing
- Supporting labor inspector training using GoH resource persons trained by ILO MAST
- Assisting labor inspectors with access to transportation and a web-based application hosted on tablets to facilitate inspection reporting, as well as improving filing systems for inspection reports
- Facilitating collaboration between the labor inspectorate and the national social security providers (ONA, OFATMA) responsible for collecting contributions and providing social services to workers


\textsuperscript{21} The Building the Capacity of the MAST to Ensure Labor Law Compliance in the Haitian Apparel Sector project, which, like BWH, was funded by USDOL, ended its activities in 2017. It was designed to strengthen the capacity of the labor inspectorate as well as other relevant GoH stakeholders.
Facilitating development of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) defining the roles of responsibilities of the Office of the Labor Ombudsperson versus those of the inspectorate as well as developing a complementary procedure manual.

These activities have produced some positive outcomes, based on participant accounts. BWH and labor inspectors reported that, since 2017, MAST has been developing an inspection plan. Although the number of labor inspections carried out by MAST remains relatively low, it increased in 2017 and 2018, based on USTR reports. Likewise, BWH efforts to foster cooperation between MAST, ONA, and OFATMA inspectors resulted in stronger communication and coordination between the entities and, in turn, has improved factory compliance regarding the declaration and payment of required social security contributions, according to ONA and OFATMA inspectors.

Unlike for its core services, BWH has not clearly established indicators and targets for its capacity-building activities. According to BWH program managers, BWH intends to address this in an upcoming exercise to review its M&E systems.

Despite its efforts, significant external factors limit the overall effectiveness of BWH capacity building for GoH stakeholders. Many key informants highlighted challenges in collaborating with the GoH. One ILO official recounted that with frequent turnover, follow-through from the government is rare, citing a tripartite meeting that BWH organized in Costa Rica in 2016 during which participants agreed on an action plan that the government later rejected.

Despite some progress, limited responsiveness from high-level government officials, exacerbated by frequent turnover among key decision makers in MAST, contributed to delaying numerous MAST capacity-building activities, especially those requiring government follow-up or official validation. Some examples highlighted by BWH management include the following:

- Validation of the MOU and procedural guidelines delimiting the roles and responsibilities of MAST and the labor ombudsperson
- Approval for proposed updates to the Labor Code
- Swearing in new labor inspectors

3.2.3 What were the main factors that affected results achievement?

**External Factors.** Several external factors have negatively affected the extent that garment factories in Haiti use good labor practices and that the industry fully capitalizes on HOPE II benefits. In addition to the external challenges affecting BWH capacity building for trade unions and GoH stakeholders described earlier (divisions among Haitian trade unions; frequent turnover and limited responsiveness on the part of MAST), other external factors have also hindered BWH’s effectiveness and efficiency, as follows:

- Some prevailing purchasing practices of lead buyers may not incentivize compliance. For example, Haitian producers indicated that high levels of price competition and the ease that production can be moved from one country to another were important concerns. Based on research on the global garment sector supply chain labor practices, competition among low-wage countries and fear of losing business may influence the extent to which producers in those countries are willing to accept changes such as paying higher wages, allocating resources for needed factory improvements to ensure workers’ health and safety, easing production quotas, and/or changing other
management behaviors associated with production and price pressures, such as the use of abusive language by supervisors. For example, BWH EAs indicated that many of the outstanding BWH factories’ OSH-related non-compliance issues require significant investment to address: air conditioning, toilets, and cleaning systems. They indicated that although the investment is possible, the factories “will not do it because they focus on the service they offer to the customers and investments at this level are not their priority.”

- **Periods of instability and insecurity caused by large-scale demonstrations, strikes, and civil unrest have hindered program implementation.** In July 2018, the government’s announcement that it would eliminate subsidies to fuel prices led to widespread protests and the worst civil unrest the country has seen in years. Again, in February 2019, two weeks of protests shut down the country following reports from a court that high-level officials of the GoH (including President Moise) had misused loans from Venezuela’s Petrocaribe. Since President Moise took office in 2017, he has appointed four different prime ministers. Opposition members in parliament have prevented the confirmation of the last two prime ministers, effectively preventing formation of a new government from March 2019 to the time of the evaluation fieldwork (August 2019).

In parallel, a resurgence of gang violence has led to increased insecurity in parts of the capital. According to BWH EAs, insecurity limited their ability to conduct in-person visits to some factories. Nearly all stakeholders highlighted Haiti’s instability and insecurity as constraining BWH’s effectiveness enhancing competitiveness and promoting investment in the garment sector. One national-level stakeholder highlighted a recent case of a Caracol-based factory that lost a big order to another factory in Nicaragua and concluded, “Better Work would have been more effective if the political environment was better. The political instability of the country has hurt their efforts.” Because of unrest, planned annual buyers’ forums to facilitate networking between buyers and national industry stakeholders were canceled two years in a row.

**Internal Factors.** Some internal factors have likewise hindered BWH efficiency and effectiveness carrying out its mandate:

- **High turnover among BWH enterprise advisors and other key staff in 2016.** According to BWH personnel, turnover among EAs was relatively high in 2016, a period during which at least three advisors left the program. BWH attributed the loss of experienced personnel at least in part to the limitations of United Nations national staff salary scales and practices in Haiti such as payment of salaries in the local currency (which has significantly depreciated in value). BWH has addressed the issue to the extent possible by regularly reevaluating cost of living increases and providing other, non-wage incentives to its employees, such as access to training. Staffing has been relatively stable since 2017.

- **Limited cooperation between BWH and other ILO departments and offices.** ILO personnel highlighted challenges creating synergies between BWH and other ILO programs. For example, while highlighting that BWG provides effective oversight and assistance to BWH, BWH program management indicated it faced challenges accessing

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support from other ILO specialists in areas like international labor standards and norms, wages, and so on, from both ILO regional offices and ILO headquarters.

In recent years, the ILO has had a strategy to decentralize some of its technical assistance activities to regional and subregional offices. In the case of Haiti, BWH is supported by the ILO’s regional office for Central America, based in Costa Rica. According to ILO personnel in Haiti and Costa Rica, regional specialists have provided relatively limited technical support to BWH. BWH personnel cited language as a factor, whereas the regional office highlighted that it had limited resources and that regional specialists already spent significant time and effort responding to requests for support from constituents in Haiti.

- **Pressure to support broader ILO programming in Haiti with program resources.** The previous ILAB-supported evaluation of BWH in 2016 highlighted that, as the largest ILO program in Haiti, BWH was sometimes asked to allocate a disproportionate level of program resources to cover ILO office operational costs and to spend program management time on activities outside the scope of the program. According to BWH personnel, this issue has largely, but not entirely, been addressed by the country and regional offices. For example, during the period under evaluation, the ILO moved offices. BWH now has its own floor, a change that contributed to a clearer cost-sharing.

### 3.2.4 What are the key strengths and weaknesses of the program’s staffing and management arrangements?

Overall, BWH management structure and resource allocation are adapted to its service delivery mission. Analysis of the BWH financial reports show that a large proportion—more than 50 percent—of the program budget is allocated to personnel costs. According to program managers, given the nature of its activities, which are highly focused on providing services to factories and national stakeholders (technical advice, assessment, training, and monitoring remediation activities), BWH is, by its nature, a labor-intensive program.

In August 2019, BWH employed eight management personnel and seven support staff. Program delivery is overseen by the program director (known as the chief technical advisor [CTA] within the ILO) and two team leaders, one primarily responsible for core service delivery and the other for national stakeholder relations and capacity building. Core services are delivered primarily by three EAs and one training manager. The team leader for national stakeholder relations and capacity building is supported by another full-time employee who formally worked in the ILO MAST program, which ended in 2017. On the support staff side, the program employs a finance and administration manager, a finance assistant, a receptionist, a logistics manager and three drivers.

The current BWH CTA assumed leadership of the program in 2016 and is of Haitian descent, a factor described as largely positive in terms of her understanding of the local context. According to one BWH program manager, BWH restructured the team starting in 2016 to rebalance responsibilities, improving overall effectiveness.

**Key Strengths.** Participants in evaluation KIIs and FGDs highlighted several program practices that were contributing to effective management and good working relationships with program stakeholders. Stakeholder feedback on BWH management was overall positive and highlighted many strengths of BWH management and working relations, as follows:
• **Overall good working arrangements with all main stakeholder groups.** Based on KIIs with both national- and factory-level stakeholders, BWH has established and maintained overall strong relations with all key stakeholder groups. Several national-level stakeholders indicated that communication with BWH management had improved since 2016, noting that the current program director has been effective in keeping them informed. One employers’ representative remarked, “BW got off to a bad start, but the current CTA has improved the situation.” Feedback on program communication from donor representatives likewise indicated that communication has improved under the current BWH leadership, even if concerns with BWG communication protocols persist. Donor representatives also expressed satisfaction with BWH efforts to coordinate with high-level government stakeholders despite high turnover.

• **Good human resource practices.** Based on KIIs with BWH personnel, several of whom referenced their personal performance plans and objectives, a program management strength is the use of good human resource management practices to promote program personnel performance. These include providing clear job descriptions, performance plans, in-service training, internal advancement potential, and participation in knowledge-sharing activities such as in-person and online learning. For example, BWH EAs reported participating in a capacity-building event in Thailand last year that gathered EAs from other country programs to share good practices. As an example of professional advancement opportunities offered by BW, one BWH team leader recently participated and won an international competition for an international position within the ILO.

• **Team members’ duties overlap to cover program needs and increase efficiency.** To increase efficiency, several program personnel indicated that they support activities that are not part of their core job description to ensure efficient delivery of BWH services. For example, one BWH manager indicated that although EAs were hired to be factory focused, they also work with unions and the government. Similarly, the team leaders and the training managers indicated that they sometimes carry out factory-level assessments to backstop the enterprise advisors. This flexibility allows members of the relatively small BWH team to efficiently adapt their activities to the needs of the program.

• **Effective use of information and communication strategies and tools to extend BWH reach and increase efficiency.** Review of communication tools used by BWH shows that the program is using a wide variety of communication tools to complement the person-to-person activities implemented by the program team. Examples include a regularly updated website,

  23 [https://betterwork.org/where-we-work/haiti/](https://betterwork.org/where-we-work/haiti/)

  newsletter (12 issues published to date), audio recordings in Creole covering labor relations issues,

  24 [https://betterwork.org/blog/portfolio/audio-resources-for-better-work-haiti/](https://betterwork.org/blog/portfolio/audio-resources-for-better-work-haiti/)

  and a guide on Haitian labor laws published in 4 languages.


  Feedback from stakeholders about these tools was largely positive, although one factory manager expressed the need for more frequent updates on changes in the labor law.

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“**One thing I have appreciated about BW is we place a lot of emphasis on strengthening the national teams. Our emphasis helps build the resources in the country.**”

- BWG program manager

“I think the EAs have been well trained and do a professional job.”

– Factory management rep.
BWH also uses the BW management information system STAR, which contains a database on factory assessments that allows buyers to track follow-up on remediation plans. Several factories reported using their interface to enter information about progress on their improvement plans. According to BWH management, STAR has improved over time but can still be further improved. Also, based on BWH reporting, BWG plans to launch online training for factory-level stakeholders on “root causes analysis”26 by the end of 2019.

**Key Weaknesses.** The evaluation also highlighted management areas in which the program has experienced challenges since 2016. Several evaluation informants also highlighted management and partnership issues that negatively affected BWH performance.

- **Mixed feedback on the adequacy of staffing levels including current ratio of EA to factory.** BWH enterprise advisors indicated that their current workload of approximately 10–12 factories is manageable. However, factory-level stakeholders in all sampled factories wished for more frequent visits from the BWH team. One buyer representative expressed strong dissatisfaction with BWH responsiveness, attributing this to inadequate human resources: “I think BW Haiti is either underfunded and understaffed or is not using its resources as best as possible.” In contrast, another buyer representative remarked, “The support we have with BW is really good. One of the main reasons for me that our suppliers’ compliance has improved is the relation that we have with BW and the contractors.”

- **Limited BWH presence in garment factories located in the north of Haiti.** BWH management reports that the concentration of factories and number of workers in the north of Haiti is growing rapidly. For example, a large garment factory based in the Caracol industrial park manages seven modules (essentially seven separate factory floors) employing more than 11,000 workers. Another factory on the border with the Dominican Republic is similarly large and growing. Although BWH has an office in Caracol, it currently has no full-time program staff based outside Port-au-Prince. Based on feedback from various factory-level stakeholders consulted in Caracol, they would appreciate a more significant BWH presence in the north.

### 3.3 Impact

This section is specifically focused on gender-specific outcomes associated with BWH’s core services, as well as how BWH’s activities have been perceived by buyers.

#### 3.3.1 What have been the gender-specific impacts of the program’s activities?

**Gender considerations have gained new prominence within BWH interventions since 2016.** Based on BWH management, national- and factory-level stakeholders’ feedback, and other documentation, BWH has paid growing attention to the gender dimensions of its mission since the program was last evaluated by ILAB in 2016. According to the BWH management, gender is

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26 Root cause analysis provides factory management with tools to identify what are the root causes of some compliance violations. For example, the root cause of some OSH violations may be lack of knowledge and could be fixed by training.
now an important cross-cutting component of the program and is being guided by a specific BWH action plan on gender developed in 2019. The following are the main objectives of the new gender strategy:

1. Garment factories free of discrimination, including of violence and harassment
2. Improved health awareness and stronger agency for women workers
3. Stronger women’s voice and representation in social dialogue mechanisms at factory, sector, and national levels
4. Women in leadership positions in factories and among tripartite constituents

Even prior to developing a specific strategy on gender, BWH implemented a variety of initiatives to promote gender equality and address issues of special concern to women workers. Examples reported in program documentation and by stakeholders interviewed by the evaluation team include the following:

- Implementation of a factory-level training program on sexual harassment for workers, middle and upper management, and its national-level tripartite partners
- Integration of maternity protection in the BWH compliance assessment tool and awareness raising activities
- Requiring gender-balanced participation in BWH training activities and membership in bipartite committees
- Partnering with civil society organizations such as SHARE HOPE to improve factory-level medical services for pregnant women, organizing medical caravans, and, in 2018, organizing a program in the Port-au-Prince industrial park (SONAPI) on gender-based violence in partnership with a variety of NGO and government representatives

Based on feedback from BWH program management and progress reports, BWH is in the discussion/development stages with other United Nations organizations (UNFPA, UNICEF) to develop joint interventions to improve worker well-being, including on gender-specific issues. For example, ILO and UNICEF have included interventions to improve maternal health among factory workers as part of UNICEF’s planned Mothers at Work project.

Stakeholders reported heightened awareness of sexual harassment and greater enforcement of prohibitions against the practice as well as improvements in maternity protection in most factories. Factory-level stakeholders affirmed that there have been significant efforts by BWH to address issues that disproportionately affect women workers, such as sexual harassment, maternity leave, and women’s health issues. In FGDs, both men and women workers reported increased awareness of the issue of sexual harassment. In all but one factory, factory-level stakeholders reported that awareness raising and compliance assessments, as well as existing corporate policies, had led to stricter enforcement of internal regulations prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace.

According to a representative of BWG, relative to other countries where BW operates, Haiti has been effective proving non-compliance with sexual harassment policies when cases are raised. Workers cited several cases in which offenders had been fired by management. However, there
were also reports by union representatives of cases in which offenders were transferred rather than discharged from their position, contrary to the BWH Zero Tolerance Protocol. BWH compliance synthesis reports also document such cases, as well as BWH follow-up efforts to ensure that the protocol is applied.

In all but one factory, workers reported that employers respected provisions in the national law that accord pregnant women special treatment such as reduced working hours and less strenuous working conditions. Workers also reported that they were provided with legally mandated maternity leave. Evaluation FGDs did not reveal any claims of employment discrimination based on pregnancy, although one worker indicated that women who were already pregnant when they were hired would not benefit from maternity leave based on company regulations.

**BWH launched initiative to integrate disability issues into core program activities.** In addition to its attention on gender issues, in 2018, BWH partnered with the government body charged with promoting the human rights of Haitians with disabilities. A representative of the partner government agency highlighted positive collaboration with BWH on the employment of persons with disabilities. A BWH industrial seminar on disability highlighted the existence of a national law establishing quotas on the employment of persons with disabilities. As a result of this collaboration, BWH management reported updating its compliance assessment tool so that compliance with required quotas are assessed by enterprise advisors. No data are available to assess the impact of the change on BWH factory employment practices.

### 3.3.2 What changes do buyers perceive in the export competitiveness of the Haitian garment and textile industry?

**HOPE II legislation continues to draw foreign investment in Haiti’s export garment sector.** Based on document review as well as factory management and industry leader feedback, duty-free export to the United States continues to attract the attention of foreign investors, especially garment makers from Asia. Haiti currently hosts a variety of Korean, Taiwanese, Dominican, American, and Haitian owned factories. Various stakeholders—including buyers, factory managers, and the ADIH—reported that despite recent unrest in the country, interest from potential investors remains high and garment sector employment is expected to continue to expand, largely because of HOPE II trade incentives. Buyer feedback indicated that duty-free access to the US market was the main factor drawing foreign investors to Haiti. One factory manager likewise remarked, “We are only getting orders because of HOPE II. Haiti is less efficient than other countries. If we don’t have the HOPE agreement, we will never get orders.”

**Buyers are concerned with their suppliers’ records of social compliance, and generally perceive that compliance is improving in Haiti with BWH monitoring and support.** The document review shows that a mix of factors, including social compliance, are increasingly driving purchasing and sourcing decisions among US apparel companies. Supplier capacity, product quality, workforce competency, production efficiency, and labor

“I am satisfied with our collaboration …. Sometimes the challenges are so great in Haiti, there is a tendency to put disability issues on the sideline. In the future we recommend that the issue of disability be integrated into their core program.”

— Government representative

“In the beginning, it was very tough to work in Haiti. Now the suppliers are engaged and aware. They understand the problems they can have if they are not in compliance. A lot of issues have been dealt with.”

— Buyer representative
compliance are all key determinants of buyer sourcing decisions. Feedback from buyers sourcing in Haiti corroborated these findings and shows that buyers perceive Haitian producers’ record on social compliance to be generally improving. However, one buyer perceived its suppliers to be reluctant BWH participants and that they are doing “the bare minimum” to comply with brand requirements. The same buyer cited factory/union relations as a specific source of concern.

Recent instability in Haiti, as well as low levels of government investment in the sector, are negatively affecting buyer confidence and may be slowing sector growth. One factory manager suggested that although buyer concerns about compliance issues in Haiti had diminished, their anxiety about the potential negative effects of instability in the country had increased in the past two years. Factory managers, as well as BWH program managers, suggested that the cancellation of buyer forums because of security concerns during the past two years had detrimental effects on buyer confidence because it prevented face-to-face communication and networking with buyers. BWH management reported organizing regular calls with buyers to update them on their partners’ progress and general issues affecting the industry.

Two factory managers also indicated that expansion in Haiti and growth in the size of orders has been impeded by weak government management of industrial zones. A representative of ADIH likewise indicated that the lack of infrastructure has been among the biggest challenges limiting garment sector expansion.

3.4 Sustainability

BWH efforts to strengthen national stakeholders’ role in monitoring factory compliance as well as solving industrial disputes have produced limited results to date. HOPE II called for Haiti to establish the Office of the Labor Ombudsperson within the national government to: (1) develop and maintain a registry of producers whose articles are eligible for the preferential tariff treatment; (2) oversee the implementation of the TAICNAR program; (3) receive and investigate comments regarding compliance with core labor standards and relevant Haitian labor laws; and (4) assist producers in meeting the requirements of HOPE II. Based on national stakeholder feedback and USTR reports, the GoH has largely complied with these requirements, but not without challenges. For example, the government stopped paying the labor ombudsperson’s salary for several months in 2016, although she continued to carry out her duties. The office is reportedly significantly underfunded and understaffed. Based on discussion

with national trade union leaders, they are skeptical about the neutrality of the labor ombudsperson’s office in mediating industrial relations.

**Garment sector stakeholders’ trust in national institutions’ capacity to monitor working conditions in garment factories is likewise limited.** Although several stakeholders indicated that BWH capacity building has contributed to improvements in the knowledge levels of some labor inspectors, overall most stakeholders expressed a relatively high degree of mistrust in the labor inspectorate. Interestingly, both workers and employers expressed suspicions about labor inspector bias, with employers indicating that labor inspectors favored the workers and workers perceiving that many labor inspectors had been compromised by employers. Labor inspectors, for their part, also expressed doubt regarding fellow inspectors’ honesty as well as in the likelihood that high-level decision makers within MAST would support inspector effectiveness.

Similarly, although BWH has contributed to improved compliance with national laws requiring employer and employee social security insurance contributions, workers and employer and trade union representatives all highlighted poor-quality or absent social services, especially workers’ difficulty accessing medical service providers that accept the state medical insurance card. Based on employer and worker feedback, in the absence of improved social services, stakeholder resistance to legally mandated social security contributions is likely to persist.

**Limited informal and formal social dialogue constrains the capacity of the garment industry to improve working conditions and productivity.** Based on document review and stakeholder feedback, despite BWH efforts, workers’ and employers’ organizations show limited capacity to promote national tripartite social dialogue and resolve industrial disputes. To date, although national tripartite stakeholders reported that they meet regularly with BWH personnel, they rarely engage in structured social dialogue. Representatives of tripartite stakeholders as well as BWH program management highlighted that a more structured coordination mechanism among national stakeholders would be useful. BWH intended that the PAC should have this function, but the committee has been dormant during the past two years because of issues about trade union representation.

Trade union divisions and limited sector-level cooperation among employers have limited BWH effectiveness in promoting more harmonious industrial relations at the sector level, according to one BWH program manager and an ILO industrial relations expert’s report. For example, the 2016 BWH initiative to strengthen workers’ and employers’ organizations’ capacity to conduct collective bargaining and to explore the feasibility of a sector-level agreement had limited results. In the absence of collective bargaining, high-priority issues, such as wage determination, have fallen back on the minimum wage adjustment mechanisms established by the state, which are viewed by both workers’ and employers’ representatives as overly political and/or have been settled through strikes.

“I have never felt confident in a MAST inspection.”

– Buyer representative

“The employer has to spend money to bring the inspector to the factory. Do you think the inspector is going to be a neutral guy if the company pays for his time?”

– Trade union representative
4. LESSONS LEARNED AND PROMISING PRACTICES

This section highlights a several BWH lessons learned and promising practices based on evaluation findings.

4.1 Lessons Learned

1. The limited capacity of the BWH core service model to address several broader issues affecting working conditions in Haiti’s garment sector, as well as challenges experienced by BWH personnel accessing appropriate technical support from ILO headquarters and regional offices, suggest the need for BWH to find ways to create more synergies with other departments within the ILO.

2. Factory concerns with avoiding problems with their clients because of BWH non-compliance reporting suggests that BWH should continue its efforts to strengthen and leverage buyer commitment to ensuring good working conditions among its suppliers in Haiti.

3. The many worker concerns not linked to international labor standards and the national labor code suggest the importance of promoting workplace cooperation to increase worker satisfaction and promote more productive workplaces. Many issues might be resolved through better communication between managers and workers.

4.2 Promising Practices

1. BWH staffing patterns, which include both dedicated personnel and the inclusion of stakeholder capacity-building responsibilities in other staff members’ job descriptions, are effective practices to ensure that BWH factory-level work is appropriately balanced with constituents’ capacity building.

2. BWG and BWH emphasis on strengthening the national BWH teams is an effective practice to build country-level resources. Since 2016, BWH replaced one international position with national personnel. This practice, which includes providing training for national personnel, is a way to create expertise on garment-sector compliance issues among Haitian nationals who presumably will remain in-country when BWH ends.

3. BWH commitment to addressing gender and non-discrimination concerns and integrating interventions to address these concerns in its assessment, capacity building, and partnership strategies are an effective practice to contribute to greater gender equity and less discrimination. BWH’s development of a gender action plan, its efforts to raise awareness of a large variety of stakeholders on the issue of sexual harassment, and inclusion of respect for maternity protection and non-discrimination in wages and hiring are examples of positive initiatives.

28 These concerns include, for example, the use of disrespectful language by supervisors, leaving drinking water in the hot sun, ending the practice of broadcasting music on the factory floor, congestion at the factory gate at punching-in time, and short time allowed for lunch break.
4. BWG’s and BWH’s use of mass communication tools in the local language (audio capsules) is an effective way to educate the large numbers of workers working in Haiti’s garment sector at relatively little cost. Relatively few workers reported receiving training on their rights. In factories with many thousands of workers, it is unlikely that ToT programs will reach a critical mass of workers. Among other factors, management resistance to allocating time during working hours for training activities is a factor limiting traditional, face-to-face training. In factories where the capsules have been broadcast, workers reported being exposed to the messages during their breaks. However, in one factory, management had not yet allowed the capsules to be broadcast, suggesting the need for follow-up to ensure that issues preventing the capsules’ diffusion are overcome.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In this section, the evaluation team presents its main conclusions on the program’s overall implementation and its progress for each evaluation criterion. The team also makes recommendations based on the evaluation findings presented in Section 3.

5.1 Conclusions

5.1.1 Relevance

Garment sector tripartite stakeholders are generally satisfied with the role played by BWH. Based on KIIs and FGDs, overall stakeholder satisfaction with BWH core services was high with a few exceptions related to the scope and efficiency of service delivery. Stakeholders generally valued BWH services but wanted more frequent advisory services and training as well as faster feedback on factory assessments and assessment progress reports.

Stakeholder feedback shows that BWH current strategy has some important limitations affecting its ability to address several broader concerns of garment industry stakeholders. For example, BWH’s strategy is not effectively addressing workers’ low wages relative to the rising cost of living (e.g., the minimum wage adjustment process, the absence of effective enterprise-level or sectoral collective bargaining) as well as the overall effectiveness of the labor inspectorate and adequacy of government social security programs. Program limitations are largely attributable to issues outside its core mandate, as well as to factors largely beyond its control (the fundamental limitations of weak state institutions in Haiti).

Overall, BWH support for industry development and job creation is highly relevant to high-priority concerns of the government and social partners as well as everyday Haitians. Evaluation findings show BWH efforts to help Haiti comply with the terms of HOPE II legislation has contributed to increasing foreign investment and creating jobs in Haiti, high-priority concerns of all national stakeholders. Despite natural disasters and political instability, there has been steady job growth in the sector and informed stakeholders predict that this will continue as long as the United States offers HOPE II trade advantages.

BWH’s intervention strategy is working to improve labor standards in the Haitian garment sector. Evaluation findings show general agreement among workers, government, and employers that BWH assessments are offering an effective incentive to factory management to comply with core labor standards and national labor laws, albeit with some limits. Based on feedback from all tripartite stakeholders, a key factor in the effectiveness of BWH assessments has been its transparent reporting of non-compliance on the BW transparency portal, suggesting the program is effectively leveraging buyer pressure. Despite workers’ and employers’ mixed feedback on the specific findings of BWH compliance assessments, both stakeholder groups recognized that BWH has contributed to progress in improving working conditions and labor standards within most factories.

5.1.2 Efficiency and Effectiveness

BWH has largely been effective and efficient at delivering core services to factories, although additional efforts are required to increase stakeholders’ satisfaction. Evaluation findings show that BWH is largely on track relative to planned activities and most of its performance targets related to core services delivery. Feedback from factory-level stakeholders as well as international buyers suggests that there is room to improve the effectiveness of core
services. Areas for improvement include providing more comprehensive advisory services (i.e., covering all compliance areas) and improving EAs’ efficiency in finalizing assessment reports and validating progress reports, as well as their responsiveness when stakeholders request support. Findings also highlight that the program has made important efforts to improve the effectiveness and relevance of training by improving the selection of training participants and systematically collecting their feedback. BWH likewise has leveraged partnerships and mass communication tools effectively to educate greater numbers of workers without significantly increasing costs.

Although BWH has been effective at facilitating the creation of bipartite committees in most factories, the effectiveness of the committees in promoting workplace cooperation and worker/management dialogue has been mixed. Evaluation findings suggest that more needs to be done at the factory-level to strengthen the bipartite committees’ role in promoting effective bipartite dialogue and workplace cooperation. Analysis of worker concerns voiced during FGDs suggests that at least some issues affecting factory productivity and worker welfare could be resolved through more constructive dialogue.

While recognizing the importance of its trade union and GoH capacity-building activities, results produced to date by BWH have been somewhat limited, especially for trade unions. The nature and volume of planned capacity-building activities for trade union and GoH stakeholders as well as recent changes in staffing patterns (with more staff dedicated to capacity building efforts) shows that BWH program managers are keenly aware of the key role played by these stakeholders. However, many planned activities were either not implemented or only partially completed, suggesting that the program underestimated the extent that external constraints, such as trade union divisions and Haiti’s governance challenges, would limit its effectiveness.

Of the main stakeholder groups, working relationships with trade unions have the greatest room for improvement, especially regarding finding an acceptable solution to trade union representation on BWH’s tripartite governance committee. Although working relations with the government are effective and inspector capacity-building programs have been successful in building inspector knowledge, less progress has been made in improving the enabling environment for inspector effectiveness, largely owing to external constraints.

The program has faced significant external constraints that have negatively affected BWH performance and ability to meet some of its objectives. Constraints largely beyond BWH’s control have hindered the effectiveness of BWH efforts to improve respect for international labor standards as well as working conditions. Notable examples include instability within the GoH and its negative repercussions on MAST’s ability to carry out its mandated functions, as well as sourcing practices common to the global garment supply chain that increase pressure on factories to speed up production and lower costs, pressures that are often passed on to the workers through higher production quotas and low wages.

Based on stakeholder feedback and progress to date toward planned objectives, BWH management has been largely effective. Overall, BWH has maintained effective communication and positive relationships with all the main stakeholder groups in Haiti’s garment sector. This and its overall good progress meeting objectives suggest that the program has been effectively managed, even in the face of significant external challenges.

5.1.3 Impact

Evidence from evaluation findings show that BWH has been committed to addressing gender-specific concerns and that its interventions have been effective producing positive
changes that have improved workers’ welfare. Reported heightened awareness of sexual harassment and greater enforcement of prohibitions against the practice as well as improvements in maternity protection in most factories are examples of positive program impact.

While HOPE II legislation continues to draw investors to Haiti’s garment sector, buyers’ perceptions of the export competitiveness of the sector have been damaged by recent unrest. Government instability and lack of follow-up on providing investment incentives to foreign investors likewise appears to have constrained growth in the sector. Although based on feedback from a small sample of buyers, perceptions of Haitian suppliers’ compliance are generally improving, with some exceptions.

5.1.4 Sustainability

Progress to date in strengthening GoH capacity to monitor and promote good labor practices in Haiti’s garment sector and existing levels of trust in the neutrality of government institutions suggest that BWH services are likely to be needed for many years to come. BWH has fostered coordination among MAST, social security providers, and the special ombudsperson, but progress has not yet been institutionalized through formal agreements/procedures and a consistent change in practices. BWH has likewise contributed to strengthening the capacity of a core group of labor inspectors and promoting training programs for other inspectors. Although the core group of inspectors have improved their professional capacity, progress in the institutional enabling environment has been limited.

5.2 Recommendations

In this section, the evaluation team presents recommendations based on its findings. Recommendations are provided for consideration for each of BWH, the ILO, and ILAB.

Recommendations for BWH

1. Intensify workplace cooperation training and activities in factories. Give the PICCs a clearer mandate regarding fostering workplace cooperation. Consider funding for small workplace improvement projects. In industry seminars, share good practices in workplace cooperation from other countries or from “model” factories in Haiti.

2. Hire more EAs and take other measures to reinforce BWH presence in factories, especially in the north, where the number of workers is growing. Gather feedback from buyers and factory-level stakeholders on how BWH can be more responsive to their needs.

3. Strengthen capacity-building programs for trade union members, both at the national level and the factory level. Capacity building should not be limited to training trainers but should include more comprehensive interventions to build the capacity of trade union leaders to develop and deliver their own training programs and make progress on other indicators of trade union organizational development such as recruiting new members, managing membership lists, and collecting dues.

4. Continue/strengthen efforts to raise buyers’ awareness of practices that are not supportive of good working conditions in factories. BWH and BWG should continue to regularly dialogue with buyers, including dialogue on areas where research shows buyers’ practices may hinder improved working conditions (e.g., pricing that does not consider increases in minimum wage).
5. Ensure that foreign supervisors and middle management participate in supervisor training and workplace cooperation training. Consider new training on cultural sensitivity.

6. Continue building the capacity of labor inspectors, particularly of the garment sector task force, and providing support for logistics to increase frequency and responsiveness of inspections. Develop more comprehensive indicators and targets to measure progress against capacity-building objectives.

Recommendations for ILO

7. ACTRAV should assist BWH to resolve the issue of trade union representation, which is an important factor preventing formal tripartite discussions and hindering BWH engagement with trade unions.

8. ILO industrial relations specialists should provide technical assistance to stakeholders in the sector to negotiate renewed collective bargaining agreements. The ILO should consider the feasibility of renewing past efforts to support the negotiation of a sector-wide collective bargaining agreement or multi-enterprise collective bargaining agreements. It may also explore the feasibility of enlisting buyer support for collective bargaining.29

9. The ILO should consider the feasibility of ILO wage specialists providing technical support to the Superior Council on Wages for strengthening minimum wage setting mechanisms in Haiti. Technical assistance should promote tripartite social dialogue on wages using an evidence-based approach.

Recommendations for ILAB

10. Reinforce advocacy with GoH to address structural issues affecting government inspection of garment factories by MAST.

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29 See https://actonlivingwages.com for information on one buyer-supported collective bargaining initiative.