Independent Final Evaluation of the *Educar* Project: Combating Child Labor in Brazil

Partners of the Americas
Cooperative Agreement Number: E-9-K-3-0064

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Appendix 1: Teacher, School and Registration Data for Municipal Public Education in Target Municipalities of the Educar Program Source: IBGE 2005

Appendix 2: Lists of Institutions Consulted, Persons Interviewed, and Participants in Focus Groups During the Evaluation
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td><em>Agricultura Ilícita</em> (Illicit Agriculture)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA</td>
<td><em>Estado da Bahia</em> (State of Bahia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONANDA</td>
<td><em>Conselho Nacional dos Direitos da Criança e do Adolescente</em> (National Council on Children’s and Adolescents’ Rights)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTAG</td>
<td><em>Confederação de Trabalhadores da Agricultura</em> (National Confederation of Workers in Agriculture)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPD</td>
<td><em>Centro de Prevenção das Dependências</em> (Center for Addiction Prevention)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td><em>Comissão Pastoral da Terra</em> (Pastoral Land Committee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRAS</td>
<td><em>Centros de Referencia de Assistência Social</em> (Social Assistance Referral Centers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREAS</td>
<td><em>Centros de Referência Especializados de Assistência Social</em> (Specialized Social Assistance Referral Centers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRT-PE</td>
<td><em>Delegacia Regional do Trabalho de Pernambuco</em> (Pernambuco Regional Labor Office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educar</td>
<td>Eradication and Prevention of Child Labor through Education in Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EI</td>
<td>Child Labor Education Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EII</td>
<td><em>Modelo de Educação Integral e Inclusiva</em> (Integrated and Inclusive Educational Model)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESCCA</td>
<td><em>Exploração Sexual Comercial de Crianças e Adolescentes</em> (Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children and Adolescents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNPETI</td>
<td><em>Fórum Nacional de Prevenção e Erradicação do trabalho Infantil</em> (National Forum for the Prevention and Elimination of Child Labor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUNDEF</td>
<td>(Also, FUNDEB) <em>Fundo para Manutenção e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental e Valorização do Magistério</em> (Fund for Maintenance and Development of Primary Education and Teacher Development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIDEH</td>
<td><em>Gestão, Informação e Desenvolvimento Humano Ltda</em> (Management, Information and Human Development, Ltd.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBGE</td>
<td><em>Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística</em> (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICA</td>
<td><em>Instituto Companheiros das Américas</em> (Partners of the Americas Institute)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPEA</td>
<td><em>Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas Aplicadas</em> (Institute of Applied Economic Research)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEC</td>
<td><em>Ministério de Educação</em> (Ministry of Education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPT</td>
<td><em>Ministério Público do Trabalho</em> (Federal Labor Prosecutor’s Office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIT</td>
<td>Organização Internacional do Trabalho (International Labor Organization, or ILO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Estado da Paraíba (State of Paraíba)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAIR</td>
<td>Programa de Ações Integradas e Referenciais de Enfrentamento à Violência Sexual Infanto juvenil no Território Brasileiro (Program of Integrated and Referential Actions to Confront Child and Adolescent Sexual Violence in Brazilian Territory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PE</td>
<td>Estado de Pernambuco (State of Pernambuco)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEADS</td>
<td>Proposta Educacional de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Sustentável (Educational Proposal for the Support of Sustainable Development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PESTRAF</td>
<td>Pesquisa Nacional de Tráfico de Seres Humanos para Fins de Exploração Sexual Comercial (National Study on Trafficking in Human Beings for Commercial Sexual Exploitation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETI</td>
<td>Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil (Program on the Eradication of Child Labor)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFTI</td>
<td>Piores Formas de Trabalho Infantil (Worst Forms of Child Labor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PME</td>
<td>Plano Municipal de Educação (Municipal Education Plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNE</td>
<td>Plano Nacional de Educação (National Education Plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Projeto Político Pedagógico (Teaching Policy Project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRTP</td>
<td>Procuradoria Regional do Trabalho de Pernambuco (Office of the Pernambuco Regional Labor Attorney)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECREIA</td>
<td>Rede de Informação Nacional Sobre Violência Sexual com Crianças e Adolescentes (National Information Network on Sexual Violence Against Children and Adolescents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDSP</td>
<td>Secretaria de Desenvolvimento Social de Pernambuco (Pernambuco Secretary of Social Development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEDH</td>
<td>Secretaria Especial dos Direitos Humanos (Special Secretariat for Human Rights)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERTA</td>
<td>Serviço de Tecnologias Alternativas (Alternative Technology Service)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPIA</td>
<td>Sistema de Informação sobre a Infância e Adolescência (System of Information on Children and Adolescents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUAS</td>
<td>Sistema Único de Assistência Social (Unified Social Assistance System)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TI</td>
<td>Trabalho Infantil (Child Labor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFPE</td>
<td>Federal University of Pernambuco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDIME</td>
<td>União Nacional dos Dirigentes Municipais de Educação (National Union of Municipal Education Directors)</td>
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<tr>
<td>USDOL</td>
<td>United States Department of Labor</td>
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English Acronyms

GNP        Gross National Product
ILAB       International Labor Affairs Bureau
ILO        International Labour Organization
NGO        Nongovernmental Organization
OCFT       Office of Child Labor, Forced Labor and Human Trafficking
RPA        Rapid Participatory Assessment
UNICEF     United Nations Children’s Fund
USAID      U.S. Agency for International Development
WFCL       Worst Forms of Child Labor

Definitions

Axé         A sacred object of the African divinity in Afro-Brazilian religions
Educar      To educate
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2003, the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) and Partners of the Americas established an international cooperative agreement to implement a Child Labor Education Initiative (EI) Program in Brazil: the Eradication and Prevention of Child Labor through Education in Brazil (Educar) Program. The goal of the Educar Program was to help reduce incidence of the worst forms of child labor on two fronts: illicit agriculture and commercial sexual exploitation of children and adolescents (ESCCA). These incidences occur in 35 municipalities in northern and northeastern Brazil.

The Educar Program completed the implementation cycle proposed in its original document. The Program then went through a final evaluation process as part of commitments made by Partners of the Americas with USDOL and the Office of Child Labor, Forced Labor and Human Trafficking (OCFT) of the International Labor Affairs Bureau (ILAB). This document contains the results of this evaluation process.

Macro International Inc. (Macro) completed the evaluation in May 2007. It sought mainly to identify the lessons learned, establish good practices, and make recommendations to guide new cooperative projects and programs in the area of the EI.

In the same spirit as EI projects, the Educar Program proposed to improve the quality of education in the public schools and in complementary projects, such as the after-school project run by the Program on the Eradication of Child Labor (PETI) and others, through development and dissemination of innovative educational models. The Program was to develop this type of model based on the experiences of its partners, the Alternative Technology Service (SERTA) and the Axé Project. The central feature of such models would be their focus on eradicating child labor on illicit crops. The Program would also develop strategies to combat the commercial sexual exploitation of minors, using methods for eradicating this practice.

During the implementation process, the Project Design underwent three primary changes. First, it became clear that it would be impossible to serve all of the municipalities in the original plan, since the Program’s operating capacity was limited by its financial, human, and technical resources. The target count had to be lowered several times, yet the project’s actual operating capacity still fell short of the resources needed to serve the municipalities in the Program. The project formed institutional networks in 23 municipalities, 19 in the rural area of the state of Pernambuco (PE), three in the state of Bahia (BA), and one in the state of Paraíba (PA). Of these, only 14 implemented the educational models and conducted the Education Census, 12 put ESCCA methods into practice, and 15 performed monitoring processes. The result was an incomplete pattern of project activities. The inordinate number of targets caused serious problems for the implementation process: demands that exceeded the project operating capacity, teams that were too small to serve all of the targets efficiently and effectively, conflicts between teams (including the early departure of one team), and a loss of homogeneity and depth in disseminating the models presented to the schools.
Second, one of the strategies for strengthening institutions and public policies was not performed as planned. The strategy consisted of disseminating public policy coordination methods to municipalities by giving them tools to diagnose and understand socioeconomic realities. The strategy, in a move that was not in the Project Design, was transformed into the far-reaching goal of conducting 14 Municipal Censuses, which would then serve as the basis for carrying out the Municipal Education Plans (PMEs). Once again, the project’s operating structure was overwhelmed by the demands arising from this new objective. Processing data from the Municipal Censuses in time to meet Program goals created technical and financial difficulties that generated many more requirements, which in turn multiplied the Program’s inadequacies and operating shortfalls. Making matters worse, difficulties in the technical processes of the Census negated the political legitimacy of its results for most local administrators, greatly diminishing its potential to create a lasting impression on municipal public education policy.

Third, development of educational models was hindered by deep-seated differences of opinion on child labor among the institutions that originally formed the Educar Program partnership. The model actually implemented in schools in 14 municipalities was the Educational Proposal for the Support of Sustainable Development (PEADS). This proposal is the result of more than a decade of research and experience in rural education by SERTA, one of the Program’s partner institutions. During the implementation process, PEADS demonstrated enormous potential for improving teaching and learning processes, especially at rural schools. Major changes were seen at schools that went through the training process and subsequent implementation of this methodology. All of these changes were positive and had the potential for sustainability. However, it was clear that they were incapable of approaching the schools with exercises and lectures on the need to eradicate rural child labor, specifically in illicit agriculture.

Meanwhile, methodologies for helping those in ESCCA situations were finally implemented by the Center for Addiction Prevention (CPD), an institution that took the place of the Axé Project when the latter withdrew because of conflicts and operating problems. The states in northern Brazil were not included in this process. Actions were implemented in eight municipalities in Pernambuco, one in Paraíba, and three in Bahia. Only the municipalities in Pernambuco and Paulo Afonso in Bahia completed the entire process.

The methodology developed by CPD proved to be highly relevant for handling ESCCA situations. Strategies that fostered identification of children and building relationships with them (thus avoiding the traditional practices of legal complaints, punishment, and compulsory actions) created trained teams of social educators with ties to institutional structures in the municipalities. Once these procedures and concepts are systematized, this tool can be promoted as a public policy of national interest.

This experience gave Brazil significant examples of how to improve the teaching-learning process in rural schools, as well as working tools for combating one of the worst forms of child labor: ESCCA. However, there is still a need to develop methodologies that will allow institutions to penetrate the closed world of child labor in illicit agriculture and family farming.
I GOALS OF THE EVALUATION

The evaluation process proposed to—

- Verify that project goals were met.
- Determine the impact of project actions and their sustainability.
- Make recommendations on changes of course needed to reach project objectives.
- Describe the good practices and lessons learned from project actions.

The project elements observed were—

- **Project design and implementation**: Logic of the Project Design, its implications, and consistency of implementation.
- **Institutional relationships and coordination**: Relationships between the project and the inter-institutional network.
- **Management**: Relationships between project staff and management, especially with regard to administrative and communication problems resulting from distance, resource flow, and logistical capacities of teams in each state and municipality.
II EVALUATION STRATEGIES AND TOOLS: METHODOLOGY

The relationship between the evaluation strategies and the tools used to produce the information needed for this evaluation are shown below:

**Strategy:** Document review

**Tools:**

1. Read and analyze project text.
2. Read and analyze progress reports.
3. Read and review pertinent literature on the topic.
4. Review other pertinent documents issued by the donor, partners, or other entities.

**Strategy:** Approach various direct, consequential, or authorized actors (who have a knowledge of the topic)

**Tools:**

1. Conduct interviews (informal and open) with key actors in—
   - Institutions executing the project: Partners of the Americas Institute (ICA), Alternative Technology Service (SERTA), and Center for Addiction Prevention (CPD).
   - Partner and nonpartner institutions (at national, regional, and municipal levels): National Forum for the Prevention and Elimination of Child Labor (FNPETI), National Confederation of Workers in Agriculture (CONTAG), Federal Labor Prosecutor’s Office (MPT), City Halls.
   - Institutions authorized to take action on the topic (at national, regional, or municipal levels): International Labour Organization (ILO), State Forum, and others.
2. Have project subjects (at the local level) take part in Focus Groups.

**Strategy:** Direct field observation

**Tools:**

1. Visit locations where project is being implemented (at the local level): Salgueiro, Orocó, Cabrobó, Lagoa Grande, Petrolina, Juazeiro, Belém do São Francisco, Tacaratú and Paulo Afonso.
2. Observe activities implemented by the project (local level). Visit schools and Programs on the Eradication of Child Labor (PETIs).

**Strategies:** Systematize information

**Tools:**

1. Make return field visits.
2. Final report on evaluation process.
III PROJECT SUMMARY

The Eradication and Prevention of Child Labor through Education in Brazil (Educar) Program is one of the projects funded by the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) through its Office of Child Labor, Forced Labor and Human Trafficking (OCFT). This particular set of projects is called the Child Labor Education Initiative (EI), which hopes to improve access to and quality of basic education for children who are victims of or at risk of some of the worst forms of child labor (WFCL).

These projects aim to integrate children into educational environments under conditions that ensure that they will stay in school because of the improved educational process. The hope is to give these children alternatives for the future to keep them from returning to situations of exploitation. The fundamental objectives of the EIs are (1) Raise awareness of the importance of education for all children and mobilize social organizations to improve and expand educational structures; (2) Strengthen the formal and supplementary educational systems that provide a safe harbor for children who are working or at risk of working; (3) Strengthen national institutions and policies on education and eradication of child labor; and (4) Ensure the long-term sustainability of these efforts.

In this spirit, USDOL and ICA reached an international cooperative agreement in 2003 to implement an EI project in Brazil. The objective of the Educar Program was to help reduce the incidence of the WFCL on two fronts: illicit agriculture and the commercial sexual exploitation of children and adolescents (ESCCA). The Program would work in rural areas and the outskirts of cities in six states in northern and northeastern Brazil.

Specifically, 10,708 children would be withdrawn from or prevented from entering the WFCL by becoming students in public schools. To guarantee the success of this operation, the Program proposed to improve the quality of education in public schools and supplementary programs, such as the after-school program run by PETI, and other programs.

This involved the development and dissemination of an innovative educational model. The Program was to develop this model based on the experiences of its partners, SERTA and the Axé Project. These two nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) had relevant work histories: SERTA in rural education, and the Axé Project in education and the inclusion of urban youth at social risk. The basic focus of this model was to improve the educational process, creating a cycle of merit that would make schools places that could prevent children from entering the work force or could remove them from jobs by enriching the teaching and learning process. The model would be disseminated through ongoing training for educators and social workers, who would have access to materials, concepts, and methodologies promoting inclusion, accessibility, nondiscrimination, and interaction with the environment and the community. The project would cover 464 schools.

According to the project, these educational efforts would be complemented by the strengthening of local institutions and public policies. This would improve the local ability to implement educational policies and socioeconomic development programs for children, adolescents, and their families. It would thus be necessary to strengthen institutional networks linked to
educational services and protection of children’s rights, and to conduct campaigns to mobilize communities to support new values on the issue of WFCL.

The text of the Educar Program set some criteria for selection of target municipalities. These were (1) existence of illicit crops in a given area; (2) relevance, meaning the presence of children linked to such illicit activities; and (3) prevalence, meaning how many children and adolescents were linked to the WFCL in those areas. Based on these criteria, the project established a presence in the states of Pernambuco, Paraíba, and Bahia in the northeast, and Acre, Roraima and Amazonas in the north. The table below lists the number of target municipalities for each state and type of labor, either illicit agriculture or ESCCA.

### Table 1: Target Municipalities by States and Type of Labor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Illicit Agriculture</th>
<th>Sexual Exploitation</th>
<th>Other Types of WFCL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pernambuco</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraíba</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazonas</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roraima</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n/a = not applicable

### Table 2: Target Municipalities and Illicit Agriculture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>ESCCA Municipalities</th>
<th>Illicit Agriculture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paraíba</td>
<td>Campina Grande, Santa Rita &amp; Cabedelo</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahia</td>
<td>Feira de Santana &amp; Juazeiro</td>
<td>5: on the border with PE, along the São Francisco River (Abaré, Rodelas, Curaçá, Gloria and Chorochó); however, these municipalities did not meet conditions for policy adherence and council structure (Guardianship Council and Children’s Rights Council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazonas</td>
<td>Manaus</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>Rio Branco</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roraima</td>
<td>Pacaraima</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pernambuco</td>
<td>Salgueiro &amp; Floresta</td>
<td>20: municipalities in the so-called Marijuana Polygon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Target Municipalities</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n/a = not applicable
The table below lists the Program’s quantitative and geographic goals for its beneficiaries. Most goals are actually in the 25 municipalities within the “Marijuana Polygon,” and specifically relate to illicit crops, with 96.6 percent of the projected beneficiaries, while the remaining 3.3 percent of beneficiaries are in municipalities in the north.¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States of Project Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Beneficiaries Involved with Illicit Crops</th>
<th>Beneficiaries Involved in ESCCA</th>
<th>Beneficiaries Involved in ESCCA or Other WFCL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pernambuco &amp; Bahia</td>
<td>9,858</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahia, Paraíba, Amazonas, Acre &amp; Roraima</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n/a = not applicable

### 3.1 STRATEGIC ACTIVITIES FOR REACHING OBJECTIVES

**Objective 1: Establish an Innovative Educational Model**

1. Help municipalities incorporate the educational model offered by the *Educar* Program, using the schools’ Teaching Policy Projects (PPPs).

2. Enable direct participation of the children and adolescents served by the Program, empowering youth to effectively participate in their families, schools and communities.


4. Explore potential for development in rural areas.

5. Foster sustainable community development.

**Objective 2: Strengthen Institutions and Public Policies**

1. Encourage integration and promotion of public policies fostering children’s rights.

2. Promote mechanisms for civil society, including forums, citizens’ rights councils, citizens’ protection councils, and nongovernmental organizations, all of which form the institutional networks involved in children’s rights.

3. Promote synergy across a wide range of public and private institutions involved in Program goals at local, state, and national levels.

¹ The Program’s decision to leave the North considered the relationship previously mentioned, its small size, and the difficulty of establishing more ongoing and meaningful action there.
4. Disseminate methods for coordinating public policy, including research and diagnostic studies, to give municipalities the tools to make sound, rational decisions: geoprocessing, the Education Census, etc.

Objective 3: Raise Community Consciousness of the Issue

1. Influence public opinion and local values.
2. Build consensus among public administrators on the issue of child labor.
3. Sensitize and mobilize the community against child labor and for quality education.

Objective 4: Combat ESCCA on the Outskirts of Cities

1. Identify the communities where it is occurring.
2. Establish an institutional network to confront actors at local, state, and national levels.
3. Integrate the Program and interventions into the Sentinel Program.
4. Provide training and technical assistance to social service actors in the municipalities.
5. Create a school environment receptive to children in ESCCA situations.
6. Psychosocial development of victims and legal assistance.
7. Improve the quality of school education and afterschool programs.

Objective 5: Combat Child Labor in Illicit Agriculture

1. Work within the institutional network: GT SERTÃO.
2. Increase geographical concentration in municipalities in the meio São Francisco area.
3. Focus on rural schools as strong, meaningful places for children and their families.
4. Make schools relevant to improving family productivity and economic alternatives.
5. Impact the socioeconomic and environmental status of communities through the schools by applying the inclusive, integrated educational method of the Educar Program. Specifically, this method entails the training in and incorporation of the Educational Proposal for the Support of Sustainable Development (PEADS) model.
6. Understand and promote schools as vehicles of social mobility.
3.2 BUILDING THE BASELINE: IDENTIFYING AND MONITORING PROJECT BENEFICIARIES

The Program proposed to identify children working in illicit agriculture or ESCCA, put them in school and other complementary educational programs, and then monitor both how long they remain in those institutions and the quality of activities offered at the institutions. The Program would also monitor children’s relationships with their families and their membership and participation in other groups. The project plan described the strategies it would follow to find these children, send them to schools or institutions in the protective network, and monitor their participation in the institutions, thereby maintaining agreements made with USDOL. In other words, creating the baseline should make the Program’s goals viable.

The project states in its “Budgetlink to Logical Framework” section that it will use a variety of unconventional methods to collect and follow up on information, for purposes of identification, monitoring, and evaluation. These methods will be supplemented by other official sources of information, such as the Ministry of Education (MEC) Census, the registry of the Ministry of Social Development (centralized in what is known as the Single Registry), and PETI data.

According to the project, the baseline would give it elements for ongoing Program evaluation and monitoring. Demographic data on work and education would therefore be needed for the age group that the Program would focus on in the target municipalities. Two different strategies would be involved: one for ESCCA cases in areas on city outskirts, and another for illicit agriculture cases in rural areas.

For ESCCA, the Mapping and Counting Methodology developed by the Axé Project and IBASE (an NGO in Rio de Janeiro) would be applied. This method promised to identify sexually exploited children and make them visible, facilitating their entry into social programs. This information would need to be supplemented with data from institutions, such as the Sentinel Program, the Guardianship and Rights Councils, and national systems in the human rights network.

To identify children working in farming—specifically in illicit agriculture—the text states that the project will apply a methodology it has developed to identify and reach children and adolescents who are working in illicit agriculture or are victims of commercial sexual exploitation. This methodology, called Rapid Participatory Appraisal (RPA), will be applied by Gestão, Informação e Desenvolvimento Humano Ltda (GIDEH; also known as Management, Information and Human Development, Ltd.), a Brazilian consulting firm specializing in the strategic use of information for managing social policy, community projects, and institutional development. It develops and implements methods and technology for participative diagnosis, social policy focus, intersectoral management, performance monitoring, and quantitative and qualitative impact assessment. This methodology was to be used because of the high risk of gathering selection and follow-up data on Program beneficiaries working in illicit agriculture. The hope was that the method would reduce public exposure of beneficiaries and informants, and would lower the natural resistance of communities on these issues.

The Program also considered performing an Education Census. Because the GIDEH/RPA method would not identify individuals or targets by name, address, etc., information needed to meet the USDOL monitoring (“tracking”) requirements. Professionals would conduct the Census
in each location, with technical and financial support from Educar. The Census would identify all children and adolescents in every municipality. It would furnish objective, quantitative data on school attendance, family finances, demographic data, and the like. To provide a clearer picture of Program targets, this data would be supplemented by observational exercises, interviewing guidelines, inventories, checklists, etc. The goal was to enable the identification of children and adolescents who were being exploited as child laborers or were at risk for exploitation, while also strengthening the creation of local public policy that would focus on the quality of teaching, reinforcement of protections for children and adolescents, and the eradication of child labor.

The Census data, added to the Single Registry, PETI data and the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE)/PNAD statistical data, would be used as the basis for safely identifying, logging, and tracking Program beneficiaries in rural areas associated with illicit agriculture. Data from the System of Information on Children and Adolescents (SIPIA), the National Information Network on Sexual Violence Against Children and Adolescents (RECRIA), and the National Information Network for Integrated Management of Human Rights would provide ongoing supplementation of the ESCCA data collected using Educar’s own strategies. The invisibility of these children became increasingly evident as the Program approached the locations where it would be implemented. Even public data such as the Single Registry did not meet the municipalities’ identification needs (since the names of children in the registry were not available to them). The PETI data was constantly changing, and during the migration to the Bolsa Família (Family Stipend) system, even more difficulties emerged. These data, however, provide information on program beneficiaries, not children who work.

The invisibility of children engaged in illicit agriculture and ESCCA is one of the most widely recognized characteristics among the institutions and studies that address the issue. Therefore, the design and implementation of any strategy seeking to actually reach these children should be based on this characteristic. It is known that these children do not appear in any existing secondary data source, nor in the IBGE, the Single Registry, or PETI. Therefore, a variety of different, ongoing strategies not based on quantitative models needed to be implemented. All of these characteristics are inherent properties of any census.

### 3.3 Structure of Program Partnerships

Partners of the Americas presents the Educar Program as a partnership containing both internal and external partnerships. Some of the internal partnerships were established with organizations that would perform specific planning and implementation functions, due to their experience and expertise. There were three institutions: two NGOs and one consulting firm. The NGOs were SERTA, the Axé Project, and GIDEH. Potential ties were to be forged with the Program of Integrated and Referential Actions to Confront Child and Adolescent Sexual Violence in Brazilian Territory (PAIR),\(^2\) which is implemented through the Special Secretariat for Human Rights (SEDH), an office linked to the Office of the President of Brazil, in partnership with Partners of the Americas in Brasilia.

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\(^2\) PAIR is a series of local interventions that could potentially be networked with project actions. Although PAIR has focused on identifying responsible parties (legal complaints), the focus of Educar has been on helping individuals rather than filing complaints.
SERTA, with its experience in rural education (having even served as a national reference on the subject), has developed a methodology called the Educational Proposal for the Support of Sustainable Development (PEADS). This model proposes a paradigm shift in conventional education. It is based on putting the student and his or her community at the center of the teaching-learning process. It transforms educators into mediators of a process performed by students: gaining knowledge by using their own communities as the main research site. Given SERTA’s experience in rural education, its main function in the project was to improve education, especially in areas where illicit agriculture had been detected.

The Axé Project, with its experience in social education and social programs aimed at children and adolescents on the outskirts of urban areas, has developed methodologies for inclusion based on art and education, for use in public schools and on the streets. Within the Educar Program, the Axé Project was to focus on working with children and adolescents in ESCCA situations. A bridge between the Axé Project and PAIR was to be established, with the aim of creating a new methodology. This bridge with PAIR was characterized by local networking with local support and intersectoral strategies in each municipality. PAIR’s networking would thus be with Educar as a whole, not restricted to one partner. The Program, whose focus was on boosting investment and increasing visibility of the ESCCA problem among various entities, felt that PAIR played a strategic political role, since it counted ministries and international organizations among its participants. The central goal of the Axé Project was to work with its companions to develop intervention strategies.

GIDEH, a consulting firm with expertise in applying georeferencing information systems to social programs, would bring monitoring and evaluation tools to Educar, as well as its geoprocessing models for locating beneficiaries.

Connections with Partners of the Americas in Brasilia to execute Educar strategies based on the PAIR Program for combating ESCCA in the north, in Campina Grande and Feira de Santana, would be made with the technical team within PAIR that had been working with the Federal Government. At the same time, this connection would focus on actions at the municipal level, within the context of PAIR.

For its outside partnerships, Educar proposed working with a broad network of national institutions: among them the MEC, the Ministry of Social Development, the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Health, the Secretariat for Human Rights within the Ministry of Justice, IBGE, and FNPETI. Among the international organizations were ILO, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). At the state level were the Regional Labor Headquarters, the MPT, and the remaining institutions making up the Pernambuco State Forum for the Eradication of Child Labor. At the municipal level were all of the municipal city halls and their Secretariats of Education and Social Action, the Councils on Rights, the Guardianship Councils, etc. Finally, the project proposed to mobilize NGOs, research groups, universities, and specialists with connections to the subject. It is important to point out that the aforementioned institutions either participated or were directly or indirectly involved in developing the Educar Program proposal and design.

According to the project, the entire partnership structure sought to achieve institutional synergy on the project objectives.
3.4 PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY STRATEGY

The *Educar* Program sustainability strategy was based on the assimilation, acceptance, and execution of methodological models introduced to the educational systems in target municipalities. The sustainability strategy went beyond the educational system and included social assistance provided through social programs networked with the schools. This was presented as an essential dimension of the Project Design and execution. Incorporation of this inclusive, integral educational model into local educational systems would be the criterion for success, as long as it also removed children from the WFCL.

Other elements that were to indicate sustainability would be institutional strengthening, local participation, public policy creation, an actual reduction in the number of working children, children’s ongoing school attendance and scholastic success, and a shift in public opinion.
IV VIABILITY ANALYSIS: PROJECT VS. CONTEXT

The main targets of the Educar Program were children and adolescents engaged in the WFCL, specifically illicit agriculture and commercial sexual exploitation. The Project Design proposed implementation in six states: three in the North and three in the Northeast. The structure of the program being evaluated and its potential for success will be largely determined by the characteristics of these two phenomena and the two regions. Following is an analysis of the spatial, economic, sociopolitical, and educational dynamics of the context in which the project expected to function. The objective of this analysis is to find viable elements in the proposed project actions. This begins with the following question: Are the actions proposed by the Educar Program viable, given the spatial, economic, sociopolitical, and educational dynamics of child labor in illicit agriculture and in the sexual exploitation of children and adolescents in the proposed states?

In this analysis, we will use elements found in the original project text and in other bibliographic sources. We will conclude by describing the implications that each of these aspects had for project implementation.

4.1 SPATIAL DYNAMICS OF THE PROBLEM VS. PROPOSED SCOPE OF PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION: VIABILITY OF SPATIAL IMPLEMENTATION

The Northern Region has an area of 3,659,637.9 km² (1,412,994.1 square miles), and 15,023,331 inhabitants (IBGE, 2005), and makes up 42.27 percent of Brazilian territory. In surface area, it is the largest region in Brazil, and it is almost completely covered by forests. The region’s population is mainly concentrated in the state capitals. The cities with the largest populations are Manaus, with 1.7 million residents, and Belem, with 1.5 million (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Regions of Brazil. Source: IBGE

Notes: Norte = North; Nordeste = Northeast; Centro-Oeste = Central-West; Sudeste = Southeast; Sul = South

Most of the Northeast Region, with 1,558,196 km² (601,622.8 square miles) and 51,609,027 inhabitants (IBGE, 2006), is a vast, ancient plateau flattened by erosion. The region is divided into subregions, based on different physical characteristics: the mid-north, the forest zone, the agreste, and the sertão.

According to the coverage area established in the the Educar Program plan, the states of Pernambuco, Paraíba, Bahia, Acre, Amazonas, and Roraima (the first three in the Northeast and the others in the North) would be targeted for Program activities, given the existence, relevance, and prevalence of children and adolescents in two of the WFCL: illicit agriculture and the ESCCA. In the North, the Program would address only ESCCA.

In 2002, of 5.5 million child laborers, 13 percent were working in family farming, and half of all working children were living in the North or Northeast of the country. In fact, there is a history of child labor in that vast region of Brazil. There are no established data on children and adolescents working on illicit crops. “It is known that indigenous adolescents plant coca-epadu in the North, in the Amazon. Mainly in the North and the Northeast, there have been media reports about children and adolescents involved in planting Cannabis sativa. In the case of south central São Francisco, a region called the Marijuana Polygon, the MPT (5th Region) estimated that in 2003, there were ten thousand children and teenagers working on that crop” (Iulianelli, 2005, p. 145).
However, illicit crops have been grown for over a decade in various areas of the Central-West and Southern states: the Submédio São Francisco Region is the largest producer of cannabis in Brazil. This area borders the states of Bahia, Sergipe, Alagoas and Pernambuco. The history of marijuana crops in that area go back to colonial times. Gilberto Freyre has described marijuana use by slaves in the sugarcane mills during the first half of the 19th century. Donald Pierson, a U.S. researcher, also describes marijuana use by peasants in the São Francisco River Valley since 1940 (Iulianelli, 2004).

Since the 1970s, however, with increased marijuana use in the country’s capital cities and in large international centers, this traditional crop has taken on its current characteristics and dimensions. The traffic pattern, a polygon, is traced by an imaginary line linking more than 20 cities in the sertão subregion of Pernambuco. It covers an area of 40,000 km² (15,444 square miles)—nearly half the state of Pernambuco. It has been estimated that between Pernambuco and Bahia, the area occupied by illicit crops may be about 118,000 hectares (291,584 acres) of land (see Figure 2-B on the next page).

**Figure 2-A: Regions of Development and the Marijuana Polygon, Municipalities of Pernambuco State, Brazil**

Notes: Araripe = Araripe; São Francisco = São Francisco; Sertão Pajeú/Moxotó = Pajeú/Moxotó Sertão; Sertão Itaparica = Itaparica Sertão; Agreste Meridional = Southern Agreste; Agreste Central = Central Agreste; Agreste Setentrional = Northern Agreste; Mata Norte = Northern Forest; Mata Sul = Southern Forest; Região Metropolitana = Metropolitan Region.
We should mention that marijuana farming is a perfect match for the geographical characteristics of the region. The Marijuana Polygon is located in the region called the sertão, which represents 70 percent of the territory of Pernambuco. Its climate is semi-arid and tropical, with scant, irregular rainfall. The soil is sparsely covered by vegetation called caatinga, made up mostly of cacti: mandacaru (cereus jamaicaru), jurema, xique-xique (pilosocereus gounellei), facheiro, and friar’s cap (melocactus and discocactus). This region is part of what is known as the Polygon of Drought, which makes up a large part of the northeastern states. The region suffers from lack of water and cycles of famine. Due to these characteristics, the sertão is sparsely populated in its rural areas, which makes it easier to isolate farms and hide illicit crops.

Sexual exploitation of children and adolescents, another of the WFCL addressed by the Educar Program, also occurs over a broad area. This phenomenon takes on different forms in different parts of Brazil. However, it occurs at a significant rate in the Northeastern and Northern regions of the country. Specifically, it is linked to domestic and international migration, trafficking in women, and sex tourism. In 2002, the National Study on Trafficking in Human Beings for Commercial Sexual Exploitation (PESTRAF) described many of the trafficking routes and named six capitals in the North and Northeast as critical centers of sexual exploitation.

We should point out that this phenomenon is not limited to the capital cities. It is more or less evident in practically all of the smaller municipalities in the interior of these states. It is
particularly obvious in the states of Pernambuco and Bahia in the target municipalities of the Educar Program.

Any spatial proposal places demands on a project, in terms of technical, human, financial, logistical, and political resources. In the final analysis, the capacity to respond to these demands is what determines project viability. In any case, we cannot determine project viability simply by considering established factors: the existence, relevance, and prevalence of the targeted phenomena. These factors are present in a broad range of regions in the country, with specific characteristics in each region, depending on regional structure. Following these criteria, the project could be implemented on a national level.

4.2 Analysis of Economic and Sociopolitical Characteristics of the Problem vs. Potential for Project Proposal to Address Problem: Viability of Strategies

4.2.1 Economic Dynamics

The Project Design is based on widespread poverty in Brazil. According to 2001 IPEA data, 34 percent of the population was then living below the poverty line. The North and Northeastern regions are poorest and have slower rates of poverty decline. Consequently, 48 percent of the nation’s wealth is in the hands of only 10 percent of the population, especially in the southern states. Likewise, the group most affected by this is children: males in rural areas and females in urban areas.

Currently, lumber is the principal product of the Northern Region, with production concentrated in the states of Pará, Amazonas, and Rondônia. Rubber is no longer the region’s economic base as it was in the 20th century, although it is still produced in Amazônas, Acre, and Rondônia. Encroaching farms and livestock areas have greatly reduced the size of rubber tree stands.

Animal, plant, and mineral products predominate in the economy of this region. Some areas of the region stand out: the Petrobras Petrochemical Plant and the Manaus Free Zone.

The Northeast is the poorest region of the country: 50.12 percent of its residents have a family income of half the minimum wage. According to UNICEF research, the 150 cities with the highest rates of malnutrition in the country are in the Northeast. In these cities, 33.66 percent of children under age five are malnourished (more than one-third).

Until the 1930s and ‘40s, Pernambuco in particular maintained the social, economic, and political profile it had inherited mostly from colonial times. Long periods of drought have made the Gross National Product (GNP) of the area drop time and again. Agriculture in the area focuses on sugarcane farming, with Alagoas responsible for half of the Northeast’s production. Nevertheless, farming and raising livestock (strong points in the regional economy) experienced reversals in the ‘90s. A few years ago, development began on fields to grow fruit for export in the area of the São Francisco Valley, and now wine grapes are even being grown there.
In the forest zone subregion and on the coast, traditional sorghum farming and mercantile activities predominate; in the agreste and the sertão, which are more vulnerable to drought, there is still subsistence farming and animal husbandry.

Sugarcane fields are beginning to give way to plots of roses, gladiolas, and chrysanthemums. In addition to flowers, the numbers of coffee farms and fields of Pará rubber trees have been on the rise. Irrigated fruit farming is producing fruit, such as grapes, mangoes, watermelons, and bananas. The main fruit farming area is Petrolina, in the São Francisco River Valley. Horse and cattle husbandry is on the increase.

Although farming and animal husbandry are lucrative, sugarcane farming still plays an important role in the state’s economy. However, this increase does not negate the fact that Pernambuco is changing its economic profile and moving away from farming: In the last few years, this sector has seen growth below the national average.

In addition to official agriculture, there is also clandestine marijuana farming. According to the Federal Government, profits from illegal marijuana production can be 100 times greater than profits from traditional crops.

In rural areas, family farming has traditionally been part of the region’s economy. In Northeastern Brazil alone, it is estimated that there are 2.1 million small rural properties, most of them dedicated to family farming. Two conditions are inherent in this production model. First, it tends to be economically inefficient. Second, its functioning is based on the necessity for children, especially boys, to be involved in all of the family’s production processes.

Unfortunately, there is a direct relationship between family farming and illicit crops: to keep cannabis fields hidden, they are disguised as small family-owned properties. It is known that most of the land where marijuana is grown is made up mainly of small properties (Iulianelli, 2004).

A vicious cycle takes hold because of the depressed economy, poverty, and child labor. The economic model perpetuates poverty, putting millions of children to work. As a consequence, they are forced to drop out of school. This leaves them no choice but to perpetuate the poverty cycle that their parents never managed to escape. There is a direct correlation between low education levels and high poverty rates that is always seen in child labor, both domestically and internationally. The less education a person has, the lower his or her chances of being financially aware and entering the job market.

This issue shows even graver economic effects in the target states of the Educar Program. In those states, the lack of economic alternatives has led to an increase in economic activities linked to illegal practices, such as marijuana farming and commercial sexual exploitation.

With the failure of family farming as a source of income and the strengthening of illicit crops over the past 40 years, more and more farming families are finding themselves forced to drop financially unprofitable traditional crops and enter the world of drug-cropping.3 One

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3 The region of Submédio São Francisco is considered one of the most important producers of cannabis in Latin America, and the top producer of marijuana in Brazil.
consequence of this new connection is that children and adolescents in traditional farm families have no choice but to become part of the cycle, in most cases as laborers.

It is important to point out that the financial dynamic of illicit crops is not an isolated phenomenon in a backward, peripheral economy. In every case, it is closely connected with international trafficking networks and linked to large-scale demand for this type of product in First World countries. Thus, although drug-cropping is linked to small rural properties, it is becoming a form of agro-industry. In fact, growth in production has occurred only since the ‘70s, when increased consumption led to the establishment of international distribution networks.

Now, on the outskirts of urban areas in capital cities and small towns, unemployment and a lack of financial alternatives for many adults has led many children into employment in a wide range of sectors. One of the worst manifestations of this phenomenon is the sexual exploitation of children and adolescents, especially girls age nine and up. Practices such as sex tourism, trafficking of children for sexual exploitation, child pornography, and prostitution affect thousands of children.

As a financial alternative, prostitution comes in a variety of forms. It ranges from the exchange of favors to spontaneous supply and demand, and can go so far as open, arbitrary exploitation that can result in the loss of personal freedom in cases of trafficking. It could thus be said that prostitution has a long production chain, involving a wide array of players: taxi drivers, truck drivers, tourist agencies, hotels, domestic and international traffickers of human beings, bar owners, brothel owners, newspapers, and of course, children, mostly female, and adult men and women.

There is an element common to both illicit agriculture in rural areas and the exploitation of children and adolescents in urban areas: Because both types of work are illegal, they are done relatively invisibly. However, it is important to acknowledge and highlight that adult prostitution in Brazil is not considered a crime. When children and adolescents become involved in activities of prostitution, however, they are considered exploited, and are treated as victims if identified. Their exploiters are charged under Article 244 of the Statute on Children and Adolescents, and an adult exploiting a child or adolescent, or the owner of an establishment where exploitation took place, can be sentenced to 4 to 10 years in prison or fined. At the same time, marijuana farming is considered a non-bondable crime. Farmers, who are usually poor, normally do not plant only marijuana, but also other crops for family consumption or sale. There are no extenuating circumstances. When prisoners cannot be released, they wait for trial in prison, sometimes for years. Children and adolescents involved in such farming are also charged with a crime: They are considered to have violated the law. Thus, although both activities are unconventional, illicit, and illegal, there is a huge difference between their punishments. The invisibility of ESCCA, however, has much more to do with moral factors and even with hiding the identities of sex service users (despite existing law, exploiters are commonly not taken to court; during the Educar Program, although the Program’s main strategy was not to file legal complaints and it did not provide services for such cases, it did follow cases in which the exploiters managed to go free without even being charged). The pact of silence in drug farming means that anyone who provides information will be killed.
4.2.2 Sociopolitical and Cultural Dynamics

The cultural roots of the North and Northeast are unique in their richness. With a strong presence of highly diverse cultural backgrounds, the history of the two regions has been marked by class contradictions, racial strife, political conflicts, religious expressiveness, patriarchal practices, machismo, and an abundance of artistic and folkloric expression.

These are populations and territories marked by political, economic, and symbolic violence. In both regions, fights over land ownership are historic and frequent. According to the Pastoral Land Committee (CPT), Pernambuco in particular is the state with the greatest number of conflicts in the countryside: 228 of the 1,100 confirmed in Brazil in 1998. This is crucial for understanding many of the region’s social problems. In the Northeast especially, the cultural, political, and social mix is tied to family farming. The transition from family farming to illicit crops can only be understood as a consequence of the cultural, social, and political complexity of the region. The presence of children in all cultural processes, including economic activity, has historically been part of the picture.

The problem must be addressed on two clearly defined levels. One is child labor on family farms. The other is child labor on illicit crops. To do this, it is important to consider the cultural factors involved in the issue.

The fact is that family farming, apart from being an economic activity, is also a form of perpetuating the culture. It is thus an element of basic socialization for children and adolescents in the families and communities of this culture. This means that in many cases, to those within these symbolic systems, farming activities performed by children are not considered harmful or injurious. Farm work is viewed as children helping their parents, and in any case, it is not treated as work. Other types of farm work classified as WFCL are the use of agricultural poisons and “helping” carry heavy objects, both of which also cause physical injuries. Since children’s status as participants in the family economy is unquestioned, it can be openly discussed—practically all of the adults also had to work as children, and are proud of it.

The problem arises when family farming becomes permeated with illicit crops. Everyone knows that this activity is illegal for both adults and children. This is why there is an overall tendency to hide the problem. It is not discussed openly. Children working on illicit crops are invisible because of the collective silence and the invisibility of illicit agriculture itself. They are everywhere, but are so well disguised by their environment that they are imperceptible. This will be a decisive factor in the process of identifying, routing, and monitoring the children who become project beneficiaries.

4 There are cases in which parents prefer alternatives to child labor, but they feel that there are no alternatives, and that school could never provide a way out of the situation. Also, the fact (stated in the paragraph above) that the parents also had to work as children has been used to make them aware of their lost childhood, reconsider prospects for their children, and educate them (in the case of educators). Among the examples we can cite is an event that occurred on June 12, 2006—World Day Against Child Labor—at which more than 500 parents at a demonstration against child labor in the town of Carnaubeira da Penha demonstrated against having their children work, saying that they wanted them to study. That town, the poorest among those that Educar targeted, provided a powerful example by listening to the parents and their real interests and views (most came from indigenous communities).
Considering only the data provided by the Public Ministry for the municipalities of Belém do São Francisco, Cabrobó, Caraíbeiras, Carnaubeira da Penha, Floresta, Itacuruba, Lagoa Grande, Orocó, Petrolândia, Santa Maria da Boa Vista, Tacaratu, and others in Pernambuco, there are approximately 40,000 people working in marijuana farming, and 10,000 of them are adolescents and children. The largest of these cities has a population below 40,000.

“Cannabis farming takes place within the network of connections of small family farms, at least in Submédio São Francisco. The work of children and adolescents is an ever-present element in family farming. In Cannabis farming, children and adolescents go with their parents to plant and harvest the crop. Most are boys over the age of 8. There are no records on girls” (Iulianelli, 2005, p. 145).

In the flow between family farming and illicit crops, these children and adolescents become invisible. On one hand, there is a peaceful, accepted coexistence with family farming that has been legitimized by tradition; on the other, there is a collective, silent, and profitable coexistence with illicit agriculture.

“There is, however, another element associated with this traditional aspect of the work: the urge to consume. In general, youths do farm work to earn money to buy ‘name-brand’ sneakers and clothing, so that they can go out with women and buy motorcycles. These ambitions are also the result of media exposure and an environment similar to that of urban youth” (Iulianelli, 2005, p. 145).

Adolescents usually become involved in illicit agriculture on their own or are brought into it by friends, relatives, acquaintances, or family members. Parents, aunts and uncles, and cousins are often part of the recruitment strategy. They may be involved in planting, harvesting, and pressing activities, or in security. Youths involved in security learn to use weapons, and often become a threat to the residents of the region.

In the case of cannabis, the territorial dispute between families who farm the region of Submédio São Francisco poses a risk to the lives of workers, children, and adolescents who work with the crop. Although hundreds of murders of children and adolescents are directly or indirectly related to marijuana farming and repression of it in that area (Iulianelli, 2005), many cases are related to what is known as a “culture of violence,” largely fueled by issues of honor, machismo, and patriarchy.

The drug business contains a strong element of military security. There is undoubtedly a causal relationship between drug production and consumption and the increased death rate. For example, in 1997 the municipality of Floresta in Pernambuco had the second-highest murder rate in Brazil of youths age 15 to 24. In the past few years, this phenomenon has been concentrated in Petrolândia, another municipality within the target area of the Educar Program.

With regard to ESCCA, there is a wide range of cultural factors. This means that social and economic inequality is not the only cause of the problem. It is a matter of cultural elements that dictate that children, especially females, are at a symbolic disadvantage compared to adults and males. This results in various types of harmful activities. Some cases of sexual exploitation are preceded by sexual abuse by parents, grandparents, and relatives. Some parents prostitute their daughters, which is a decision made by adults, even the girls’ own mothers. In the Program’s
target areas, this practice was more apparent in only one municipality; in the great majority, teenage girls came from rural areas and skipped school to perform this activity, without their parents’ knowledge. In addition, among the children and adolescents the Program worked with, a direct connection between abuse and commercial sexual exploitation was not confirmed.

However, in this culture sexual activity usually begins at a very young age. Many teenage girls aged 12 to 14 are already mothers. Relationships between adolescent girls and older men are very common (in a culture in which a child’s father is often absent or not married to the mother). There is also a certain fascination with things from abroad and foreigners. The dream of living abroad, typical of the middle and upper classes, is lived out by the poorest class in relationships with foreign tourists that can occasionally provide a stable married life, which in fact often happens. Alternatively, in the worst-case scenario, they dream of working as prostitutes abroad and returning with enough money to become established and change their lives, which happens in many cases and is even reported admiringly in the press. Meanwhile, often a boyfriend, an exchange of favors, or a distant relationship ends up subjecting girls to slavery, human trafficking, or violent sexual exploitation. Girls who lack proper judgment are enticed into networks run by individuals who understand the phenomenon and know how to exploit them by making extraordinary offers.

Over the last few years in Brazil, many different public and private social organizations have cooperated in efforts to curtail these activities. In the public sphere, the Sentinel Program, in partnership with the Rights Councils and Guardianship Councils, is working on this issue at the municipal level. Administered by the Ministry of Social Development, it is anchored by the Municipal Secretariats of Social Development or Social Action. However, this action model has established a paradigm based on repression and intervention, with compulsory effects. It is a program that acts based on official complaints, with follow-up actions determined by law. Over the years, this modus operandi has negatively affected treatment of the problem, and its effectiveness has been harshly challenged.

4.2.3 Educational Dynamics

Since the ’90s, the Brazilian Government has adopted the policy of inclusion in basic education as its main strategy for combating child labor. Inclusion has thus been incorporated on a nationwide level into the Bolsa Escola (School Stipend) Program, and later into the Bolsa Família (Family Stipend) Program. Both offer students and/or their families stipends ranging from 20 to 40 reals, to be used to withdraw children from jobs and keep them in school. At the same time, PETI was created to reinforce children’s school ties by putting them into after-school programs with complementary activities to keep them from returning to work. Programs called Segundo Tempo (Second Period) and Jornada Ampliada (Extended Day) care for these children. Despite its efforts, Brazil is still facing challenges, especially the issue of improving child education, with greater emphasis in rural areas, where child labor rates are highest.

It is known that the lack of attention to education in rural areas is much more severe than in the country’s urban centers. There are not enough schools to serve the rural population. For many children, the schools available are so far away that it is very difficult to get a basic education. For most of these children, school transportation is either nonexistent or inadequate. When it does exist, it is uncomfortable and often dangerous. Many children have to use what are known as
“paus de arara”: trucks adapted to transport children. These are unsafe for them, however, and are slow and tiring to ride.

Besides logistical issues such as lack of transportation and insufficient and inadequate classroom space, the educational system has more severe problems: It has trouble keeping children in school and getting them to succeed in their studies. There is no effort to give children incentives to stay in school. There is a basic disconnect in the system, between the schools and their communities and between the curriculum and reality. This makes going to school something that is not seen as relevant for the daily lives of children and their families. Most teachers lack specialized training, and are often unmotivated, low-paid, and given no teaching assistance. All of this makes school uninteresting and unappealing to students and their families, reinforcing the idea that school is not a path to economic and social mobility. Poor families tend to undervalue education.

For children coming out of child labor, schools lack the strategies or abilities to properly integrate them. This becomes even worse when the children have been involved in some of the WFCL. In these cases, their needs and demands are more complex, as is the case for girls who have been sexually exploited. Such children are commonly stigmatized and excluded.

4.2.4 Implications

In the North and Northeast, WFCL have highly complex characteristics, due to geographic, economic, social, cultural, political, and educational conditions. It is a problem with multiple causes, which makes it difficult to summarize. Its solution will require vigorous intervention, in terms of time, financial and human resources, and technical ability.

We should therefore ask, “What implications will these contextual, spatial, economic, cultural, social, political, and educational conditions have for project implementation?”

4.2.4.1 Spatial Implications

Specifically, the project hoped to establish a concrete presence on several fronts. First, in the capitals of the Northern Region, in the states of Acre, Amazônia, and Roraima (in one border city—Pacaraima); next, in the municipalities making up the so-called Marijuana Polygon, specifically at the border between Pernambuco and Bahia; then, in several municipalities viewed specifically as ESCCA centers in the interior of Bahia, such as Feira de Santana, and in the interior of Paraíba, such as Campinha Grande; and finally, in two municipalities in the Metropolitan Region of João Pessoa in the state of Paraíba. All of this was to be coordinated from Recife. Before implementing the Program, a detailed study was done on the routes of sexual exploitation in the semi-arid region. The researchers observed, for example, that Campinha Grande (in Paraíba) had ties to Feira Santana (in Bahia), and realized that movement between the two cities passed through the interior of Pernambuco. They also saw that there was major traffic between Feira de Santana and Juazeiro (both in Bahia), and Paulo Afonso (in Bahia), a town quite close to the region where the Program was working on illicit agriculture. They looked for territorial synergy, which allowed them to better understand the spatial dimension and dynamics of the problem. Thus, when the decision was made not to implement the Program in the Northern Region, they opted to create a region where there was a high
incidence of sexual exploitation. Joint actions were often conducted in more than one municipality: Araripina, Trindade and Ouricuri, Serra Talhada and Salgueiro, among others.

In fact, there were elements of WFCL in all of these locations. These were sexual exploitation, illicit agriculture, or both, with children and adolescents found working in all of them. In all of these, the work is arduous and highly risky for children. Above all, however, these factors indicate the need for intervention, whether through public institutions or civic and social organizations. ESCCA is more widespread, while drug farming has geographically delimited regions.

There is another factor that should be mentioned here, which is that on the issue of illicit crops, the project proposed to reach most, if not all of the schools in the target municipalities, and all locations where children were working on illicit crops. This added significant spatial complexity to the project as a whole, since it necessitated dealing with a phenomenon found throughout the municipal educational network, including rural communities with students who attended school in the countryside or in cities. This meant that in addition to covering its spatial area, the project had to understand the importance of providing in-depth coverage; that is, penetrate into the microspaces in each chosen target. Considering this factor, although the Program focused on only 23 municipalities in the Marijuana Polygon, because of the deep penetration it desired in each municipality, this had already become quite a challenging space, due to the number of schools and the inherent difficulty of locating illicit crops. Given the invisible nature of illicit agriculture, the project had to reach the children working in rural areas of the municipalities; otherwise, it could take no action to remove them or prevent them from entering these jobs. When the project proposed working with the schools and after-school programs in the rural areas outside municipalities where it was known that marijuana crops coexisted with other legal crops, it chose to use both withdrawal and preventive actions.

What is the spatial nature of the project, in terms of its design? It is clear that project areas were not chosen in accordance with a geographical analysis of the problems. Only the presence and rate of incidence of the phenomenon in each location were recorded; thus, no spatial relationships were established. The cities in the North are shown as isolated points within a broad expanse of territory. Cities such as Feira de Santana, Campina Grande, and the Metropolitan Region of João Pessoa do not even make up a region. The preexistence of complementary programs (such as PAIR\textsuperscript{5} in the three municipalities in the North and in Campina Grande and Feira de Santana, or the ILO project in the João Pessoa metropolitan area) was a spatial selection criterion.

With regard to ESCCA, however, all of the preliminary studies revealed that there was indeed a spatial logic to the phenomenon. In principle, ESCCA is an economic activity. The fact that it operates outside the law does not mean that it lacks logic—quite the contrary. It functions within a logical system that allows it to outwit authorities and even penetrate their operations.

Only the Marijuana Polygon has the characteristics of a territorial entity—geographically, politically, and culturally. By this, we mean a phenomenon that operates homogenously throughout a spatial area for a single purpose: geographical concentration of children and adolescents working on illicit crops. In this area, the project hoped to penetrate every microspace. The project was thus characterized by its lack of spatial logic or uniformity.

\textsuperscript{5} Implemented by Partners of the Americas.
In conclusion, the *Educar* Program had serious design flaws in its spatial component. The consequences of this design would become clear throughout its implementation, and would in fact compromise its viability.6

Because this was a phenomenon that occurred over a broad expanse, with complex causes, treating it would require equally large demands on time and financial resources to allow prolonged, extensive, and in-depth intervention. Prolonged, in the sense that strategies would have to be properly implemented and monitored long enough so that positive results could be strengthened and negative results mitigated. Extensive, in the sense that the Project Design proposed a very broad-ranging geographical presence. Deep, in the sense that the project hoped to penetrate microspaces. In this sense, the four years granted for project execution may not have been sufficient, considering its spatial scope, in both expanse and depth.

4.2.4.2 Implications of Problem Complexity

The greatest challenge was posed by the very nature of the type of child labor chosen as the project’s object of work. The invisibility and inaccessibility of children in illicit agriculture, and, although to a lesser degree, sexually exploited children, would test the technical capabilities of the fieldwork teams and the consistency of the working models used to identify, guide, and monitor these children. This factor, plus the fact that child labor on the whole is culturally ingrained in these regions, would make the project’s proposed quantitative goals even more difficult to achieve.

Models for addressing these issues would play a dominant role. One would demonstrate the ability to actually approach the closed world of child laborers, and the other would demonstrate the ability to operate an educational program for an enormous group of teachers over a dispersed area. These teachers were located in the most concentrated region (the *sertão* [Marijuana] Polygon) of the project’s focus on illicit agriculture; its aim was to reach the municipal education networks in this region only. In the remaining municipalities, it proposed to work with one school in each location. Especially because the project linked problem resolution and achievement of its goals to changing the educational model used in schools in the target region. The models to be implemented would therefore need to demonstrate that they were consistent and coherent enough to take on the problem. In addition, implementation of the new model would need to be well incorporated at each school to reduce the harmful effects of the many uncertainties created by spatial factors and the complexity of the problem. The project’s chosen educational model did not aim to complete its changes by the end of the project, and did not initiate a process of profound change that would foster new changes in the same direction. Furthermore, the main goal of such a change would redefine the meaning of school by linking it with social programs of an educational nature. The intent of the research process was to understand in order to change.

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6 The spatial component is always a challenge, especially for projects with the characteristics of *Educar*. The challenge arises from the quantitative and qualitative complexity that the spatial component adds to the problems presented in the project. The challenge is to make the project’s limited conditions and possibilities approach the actual complexity of the phenomenon it will face. In this case, the conflict between scope and depth, as explained by the project director, allows one to understand the nature of the challenge.
In any case, we must consider that the greater the number of schools to be reached, the greater the need for consistency in incorporating the new model. This means that the implementation strategy had to maintain a certain level of homogeneity when presenting the proposal at each location within the territory. That is, the model had to be so solid and so well presented to each target that any miscommunications that could interfere with understanding of the proposal or its proper implementation would be minimized.

4.2.4.3 **Implications for Management**

This combination of factors was obviously going to burden the project’s human resources, which were of necessity limited. It would multiply the pressure on financial resources, given the high costs of transportation and the logistics of the implementation itself. It would mean that there had to be enough technical resources available for each target. It would reduce the time available for serving each target.

The higher number of targets would mean more effort put into articulating policy for each target. A greater presence of national and state institutions would be needed for resource sharing (i.e., an ongoing effort for policy articulation at three levels: local, state, and national). This would be a crucial factor for guaranteeing project sustainability, and would experience all types of unexpected events during the four years of the project: from changes in government teams because of elections, to administrators’ cultural resistance on the issue of child labor.

It was clear that the projected goals in the original Project Design would be affected by its overly broad geographical scope as well as the complexity of the problem. As we observed in the project summary, this was a case of far-reaching goals, both qualitative and quantitative. It was not only about withdrawing 10,708 children from jobs or preventing them from working, but also guaranteeing enough classroom space and cohesive, active institutional networks, as well as about symbolic contexts that were aware of the need and importance of establishing a different relationship with children and their place in society as a whole. The project would face constant challenges in reaching its quantitative goals due to obstacles to accessibility. It would also have trouble reaching its qualitative goals due to the complexity of its context. Because of the need to achieve project objectives, there would be an ongoing need to define criteria for monitoring and counting goals, as well as redefining the objectives themselves.

Taken as a whole, these factors meant that the project partners would need to work as a highly cohesive unit. Spaces for negotiating interests and views that would guarantee legitimacy and expression for each partner institution were needed during the implementation process. Finally, transparency and flexibility within each of these institutions to ensure the cohesiveness and consistency needed for offering a solid, convincing proposal to such a wide range of organizations.

All of this added up to a huge management challenge for the Educar Program team. The project managers would have to deal with the fact that the original Project Design involved a series of factors that put the viability of the entire project at risk.
V ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Table 5 was presented at the beginning of the project. It provided a general timeline for project activities during the four-year period. This chart was developed in conjunction with the *Educar* Program management team. Table 4, below, lists the actions taken by each municipality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MUNICIPALITY</th>
<th>COMPLIANCE &amp; NETWORKING</th>
<th>ESCCA</th>
<th>TRAINING</th>
<th>CENSUS</th>
<th>MONITORING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salgueiro</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Paulo Afonso</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serra Talhada</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trindade</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Araripina</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ouricuri</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Petrolina</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feira De Santana</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Campina Grande</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Floresta*</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ibimirim*</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jatobá*</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Parnamirim**</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Juazeiro**</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Municipalities that performed the activities, but formally left the project in 2006.
** Municipalities that did not formally leave the project, but did not complete it.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Networking</strong></td>
<td>Ministries, State Secretariats, Agencies &amp; NGOs Regional, territorial and topic-oriented</td>
<td>Municipalities, local administrators, coordinators of education secretariats, education technicians, organizations such as unions, guardianship councils, &amp; rights councils (Program creating citizenship-SERTA). Maintaining contact at federal and state levels: PE, BA &amp; PB. Presenting and adhering to the Program, and continuing education.</td>
<td>Focused on municipalities: administrators, education, social assistance, health, &amp; mayors. Established unofficial local committees. Renegotiated with new municipal political powers after elections.</td>
<td>Municipal and regional. Networked &amp; institutionalized local councils. Find territory: Find program managers.</td>
<td>Project closing &amp; sustainability negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Continuing Education</strong></td>
<td>Discuss education proposal (ICA/SERTA/Axé) Decision to set up a unique model for child labor and ESCCA.</td>
<td>Training begins: For secretaries &amp; coordinators at regional level: theme-driven. Internal discussion cycles. Prepare first training model for educators. Training of PETI educators.</td>
<td>Training of educators begins: Semester modules and teacher supervision. Training of coordinators. ESCCA training</td>
<td>Training of educators. Training of coordinators. ESCCA training Research on/in schools; results of PEADS</td>
<td>Good practices workshops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spatial Dynamics, Municipal Dynamics</strong></td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>20 municipalities in PE</td>
<td>21 municipalities in PE</td>
<td>23 municipalities in PE</td>
<td>19 municipalities in PE-BA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2007</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Territorial</strong>&lt;br&gt;Dynamics</td>
<td>PE, BA &amp; PB.</td>
<td>Meeting in Floresta and Triunfo (illicit agriculture); Salvador ESCCA. Meeting of 16 municipal administrators</td>
<td>4 municipalities in Araripe RESAB-meeting. Division of territories: 3 (each with 6-7 municipalities): Itaparica (PE/BA) Paulo Afonso.</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State</strong>&lt;br&gt;Dynamics</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>8 municipalities in BA 4 municipalities in PB 1 in Acre</td>
<td>Campina Grande-Axé exchange in Bahia</td>
<td>Central Sertão (PE/PB) Campina. São Francisco (PE/BA) Juazeiro-Feira</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National</strong>&lt;br&gt;Dynamics</td>
<td>Ministries, PETI Forum, ILO &amp; UNICEF.</td>
<td>Program launch; Brasilia workshop, FNPETI.</td>
<td>UNICEF throughout semi-arid region: Defines: 23 municipalities in 3 states.</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.1 **SPATIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF PROJECT**

The project intent was to combat two types of problems: child labor in illicit agriculture and ESCCA. The project was designed to be implemented against illicit agriculture in the municipalities in the Marijuana Polygon in Submédio São Francisco, and in the states of Pernambuco and Bahia. To combat ESCCA, it would establish a presence in the capitals of Acre and Amazonas and at the border of Roraima with Venezuela (in the municipality of Pacaraima), as well as in the interior of Bahia in Feira de Santana and the interior of Paraíba in Campina Grande.

The project involved three quite dissimilar spatial structures. Because of their shared characteristics, the municipalities in the *sertão* made up a territory that was geographically, culturally, and economically homogeneous. In principle, this suggested the possibility of establishing institutional networks and political connections that would strengthen the Program, given the proximity and contiguity of the municipalities. Although it might seem to be a focused, easily accessed territory, it nevertheless presented great difficulty because of Program implementation demands. Within this area, the Program expected to serve nearly 470 schools, focusing on rural areas. This meant that in addition to the need for cohesiveness between municipalities, the Program would deeply penetrate each municipality.

Ideally, the Program was to start out in each municipality by conducting a Municipal Census, followed by training teams of teachers in the Integral and Inclusive Educational Model (EII), ensuring that it was implemented in all schools or at least in the chosen ones and in PETIs. The Program would then allow each school to create its own PPP, using the ingredients provided in the EII. In addition, it would monitor the entire development of this process for changes in quality of education at each school, and removal of children from jobs on family farms and illicit crops. Not to mention strengthening institutional structures, formulating public policy, and changing views on child farm labor. All of this was to be done in every municipality in the region.

At the same time, the Program would be attending to all ESCCA-related issues in two regions: two state capitals and one municipality in the North, and several municipalities in Bahia, Pernambuco, and Paraíba—in other words, in five PAIR cities and other cities as well. PAIR was establishing itself and planned to work in distant and frontier cities and borders that had no connections between them. “We were identifying people who were living with the issue. Specialists who had performed diagnostic [studies]. We spent some time studying the routes: PESTRAF. We studied the routes in the Northeast and North. We wanted to go to Piauí, Ceará and Maranhão. When the crops moved, the trafficking routes for the girls and ESCCA also moved. Organized crime was leaving the big cities and going into the smaller and medium sized ones, which put children on the front lines. This situation certainly had a big influence on the spatial design of the *Educar* Program.” This was reported by *Educar* team members.

However, project managers had identified centers of ESCCA in Pernambuco with characteristics similar to those of the PAIR cities. The initial idea was to look at the contrast: see what happened in PAIR locations and in non-PAIR locations. This contrast between PAIR cities and other ESCCA cities was not a reason to focus on municipalities outside PAIR’s reach, since this was only one potential benefit of the project. Initially, they were to be Campina and Feira de Santana, then cities in the Northern Region. Then the team realized that ESCCA was prominent in municipalities of the Marijuana Polygon. That way, the project would not have to go to those
municipalities to combat child labor in illicit agriculture without also attending to ESCCA-related needs.

This meant that the inherent complexity of child labor on illicit crops was then added to the complexity of working with ESCCA. During the first few months after implementation, the project management team began to sense its limited operating capacity and the negative effects of the excess demands idealized during Project Design. Still, the project expected to cover territories that had not even been considered in the design, and there was the expectation that, through the dynamics of the phenomena, more municipalities and states would become involved, as can be deduced from the following statement of Educar team members: “There was crop movement from Pernambuco to Maranhão. We were already discussing the importance of working in that area. An action that would have an impact on the drug market in the cities. And a phenomenon linking the rural to the urban. The local with the national. Organized crime began to have direct contact with the region: that was the reason for the growth in ESCCA and trafficking of girls.”

According to the project team, at the beginning there were to be 50 municipalities. However, there was hope of taking the Program into the Northern Region. “When we began the process, we saw that because of the nature of the Northern municipalities, Pacaraima, Rio Branco e Manaus, it would be impossible to get the right kind of technical assistance. It was expensive. And our methodological tools weren’t structured enough. We had to have a very strong physical presence, so we decided to concentrate our resources on the sertão. Until we decided that it wouldn’t work out to go into the North. It would be impossible to keep up with the demands in the North because of the costs and possibilities involved. The needs of the municipalities in the sertão were so great that it would be dangerous unless large-scale investments were made. “The municipalities in the sertão needed a great deal of work,” said Claudia Lira of the Educar team.

Contacts were made in the capital of Acre to start the Program. An agreement was signed with the governor, but it was impossible to even make a second visit. Educar added itself to a more inclusive document of intent that did not list the commitments of the two sides. No second visit was made. Likewise, cities such as Feira de Santana and Campinas showed such unique dynamics that each one would demand much more continuous and coherent institutional efforts. The geography of the problem was the following: Girls were moving from Campina Grande on one end to Feira de Santana on the other, depending on events, truck traffic, etc. The Program did not do well in either of these locations.

The municipalities of the sertão absorbed all of the Program’s energy, technical abilities, and finances. It was clear from the outset that it would be impossible to serve all of the municipalities in the region. The Program’s technical capacity and logistical demands took their own toll. Thus, during 2004 and 2005, the Educar Program became aware of its true limits.

In fact, even the clearly delimited region of the Marijuana Polygon was already overtaxing the Program’s capabilities. During 2004 and 2005, the Program still made efforts to maintain a presence in the largest possible number of municipalities (as seen in the Networking column in Table 4). It could be said that the Program map expanded and then contracted. The total number

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7 The idea of working in 50 municipalities came up only during the proposal phase. It was never part of the initial design.
of municipalities was reduced on two occasions of design review (which was communicated to USDOL and received its approval). Finally, the design was finalized for 23 municipalities in three territories: the municipalities of Pernambuco and Bahia (Paulo Afonso) in the Territory of Itaparica, the municipalities of Pernambuco and Paraíba (Campina) in the Territory of the Central Sertão, and the municipalities of Pernambuco and Bahia (Juazeiro and Feira de Santana) in the Territory of São Francisco. Each of these territories contained some municipalities in close proximity, which made managing Program implementation processes easier; others were arbitrarily added, as was the case for Campina and Feira de Santana (see Figure 3 and Table 6).

With the territories, the intent was to achieve groupings of municipalities that met the spatial and technical criteria. It was also a goal-oriented Program management mechanism that required no replanning or changes to the anticipated structure.

### Table 6: Municipalities of the Educar Program by Territory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Itaparica Territory (Yellow)</th>
<th>Sertão São Francisco Territory (Green)</th>
<th>Central Territory (Red)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paulo Afonso – BA</td>
<td>Cabrobó – PE</td>
<td>Campina – PB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floresta – PE</td>
<td>Oróco – PE</td>
<td>Salgueiro – PE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Petrolândia – PE</td>
<td>Santa Ma. Da Boa Vista – PE</td>
<td>Serra Talhada – PE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tacaratu – PE</td>
<td>Lagoa Grande – PE</td>
<td>Parnamirim – PE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Itacuruba – PE</td>
<td>Petrolina – PE</td>
<td>Araripina – PE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belém do Sã Francisco – PE</td>
<td>Juazeiro – BA</td>
<td>Ouricuri – PE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carnaubeira da Penha – PE</td>
<td>Feira de Santana – BA</td>
<td>Trindade – PE</td>
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<td>Ibimirim – PE</td>
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<td>Jatobá – PE</td>
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### Figure 3: Territories of the Educar Program

Note: A) Regions of development; B) Marijuana Polygon. Map provided by the Department of Cartography, Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE). Municipal divisions are current for 1991 (167 municipalities). Approximate scale 1:4,600,000.

*Polígono da Maconha* = Marijuana Polygon; *Fora do Polígono* = Outside Polygon; *Região Metropolitana* = Metropolitan Region
Even so, the Program did not have a uniform presence in the three territories. Unique processes were required each time the project arrived in a new municipality—different rhythms. Thus, we can see that calling a group of municipalities a territory ended up being only a way to group them for naming purposes, not for any functional reason. This meant that within each territory there was no level of coordination that allowed it to be viewed as a geographical unit of function, coordination, or even networking. There were some weak attempts to do this. The territories were meant to serve “to streamline allocation of project resources (institutional, technical, and financial) and focus some actions on more than one municipality, as reported to USDOL in technical reports in 2006. At the same time, as mechanisms for exchange and interchange among municipalities in each territory.” In interviews with education authorities in those municipalities, however, it was never confirmed whether that had been accomplished.

Because of this, a homogeneous presentation of the tool (PEADS) was desirable (i.e., the same, consistent, complete presentation at every school, covering the entire network). The principle of respecting differences and diversity obviously fit the applications of every school. Because of this, compliance at each school was not compared to the model it received, but to the themes and aspects to which it applied the model. This is where the heterogeneity arose, which was in fact desirable, and, in practice, inevitable. For example, while Belém de São Francisco—the last municipality to enter the illicit agriculture program—got very interesting results on islands where there was a significant incidence of drug farming, the municipality of Petrolândia, which considered leaving the Program in 2006 because of changes in its local administration, returned in full force, focusing on the issue of health. This issue affects children and youths because of the heavy use of agricultural poisons.

What could and should have been avoided were inconsistencies in presenting the PEADS model caused by the lack of continuity, delays, and “operating difficulties” that became obvious with the large number of targets that had to be reached by a small team of professionals. This allowed room for stronger resistance from many teachers, misunderstandings of content, questions left unanswered, and the like.

What was most important for homogeneity was penetration into microspaces, which was desirable whenever the characteristics of a municipality led the Program to believe that most of its schools were in rural areas, where the greatest number of children were involved in child labor, especially illicit crops.

Because the Program as a whole had no specific information on illicit agriculture in each municipality, which would have allowed it to select individual areas according to the distance between the school and crops, its strategy was to reach every school. In practice, this was impossible.

Thus, the Program’s spatial presence turned into a broken web; that is, PEADS was not implemented in all rural schools in every municipality. In some, it was; in others, it was not. This

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8 In this evaluation, the term “uniformity” refers to the need for that single tool to be present in every microspace at the same degree of depth and deployment, to reduce incidence of any difficulties that final users might have in applying the concepts and procedures. Diversity or heterogeneity is not methodological, but thematic. The application of PEADS to different topics at each school led to a wide variety of results.
situation was more pronounced in urban schools. This situation weakened the Program’s ability to penetrate communities where child labor on family farms and illicit crops was a given.

Even so, it is important to note that the Program showed the potential to penetrate microspaces in every municipality. Schools in the most remote areas of each municipality received training and applied the model that was provided. Schools in the middle of the caatinga, on the islands and banks of the São Francisco River, in Quilombolas communities [Brazilian hinterland settlements of escaped slaves] and rural communities received the Program and applied it, to the benefit of their students. Thus, the problem was spatial management, not lack of potential for penetration.

It can be concluded that there was a need to set spatial delimitation criteria for project implementation. These limits should have been arbitrarily imposed whenever the incidence of WFCL in a territory unavoidably exceeded the ability of any project to intervene. Therein lay the danger of taking action compelled by the desire to tackle the entire problem.

5.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF INSTITUTIONAL NETWORKS

One of the project’s strengths was its creation of a very extensive network of institutions that supported its activities and provided elements of sustainability. These were internal and external partnerships that had specific roles in the Program’s overall implementation process.

5.2.1 Implementation of Internal Institutional Networking

Program execution was planned based on an internal partnership of several institutions: Partners of the Americas, SERTA, the Axé Project, and GIDEH. All of these employed highly qualified professionals in the various fields needed to implement Program activities.

Solid relationships among these institutions would be needed for good activity development. In the final analysis, these institutions would have to speak for the Educar Program, not for themselves.

However, this was not a typical supplier relationship, in which an organization with funding hires another organization to perform a specific task. It was a partnership among institutions with pursuits relevant to the Program’s field of action. It was hoped that each institution, drawing on its history, abilities, and identity, would enter into a constructive dialogue with the others and take part in building a unified, uniform, and solid intervention model. To accomplish this, some minimal game rules would need to be established: create a common terminology, share in decision making and planning processes, divide execution responsibilities fairly, and distribute institutional gains equally.

Although Partners of the Americas had sought to work in a horizontally integrated fashion, in reality the relationship had to be contractual, in accordance with USDOL rules. All of the partners had to work toward the Program objectives and expected results; however, the exclusive USDOL contractor was Partners of the Americas, which bore responsibility for Program goals and results. USDOL does not allow a different relationship (called “sub-grantees”) unless the organizations also sign the USDOL Cooperative Agreement, which was not the case. Thus, it
was necessary to fit these organizations within the project parameters and centralize decisionmaking in Partners of the Americas, which caused friction and tensions.

In actuality, the relationships between these partners were so tense that the partnership ended before the Program had been fully executed. The Axé Project, which was to do the ESCCA work, left the Program during its second year of implementation. The internal conflicts were so severe that they led to the entire team leaving. There was controversy within the Axé Project about its departure, but its president made this decision and asked the Axé team to support it and sign the resignation letter. In addition, the president of Axé, showing extreme self-centeredness, went so far as to discredit SERTA’s knowledge and its teaching proposal. There was always a need to share, and this sharing took place in different environments (forming a team for inter-institutional teaching coordination, joint training sessions for educators and technical specialists, discussion groups to debate key and/or controversial topics, etc.). Undeniably, the institutions in the Program did have different interests, and it was the Partners’ role to preserve the interests of its USDOL contract—both its goals and topics of work.

Something similar occurred with the PAIR cities. Misunderstandings arose from different ways of interpreting the Educar Program proposal, and created difficulties. There were no points of agreement. Nevertheless, Educar did work in PAIR municipalities, both Campina and Feira.

During the first two years, the SERTA team came close to leaving the project on several occasions.

One point of friction was definitely the difficulty of establishing common terminology between the institutions and the Educar team. In their previous pursuits, both Axé and SERTA had constructed theoretical and spoken points of reference for the problems they worked on. The Educar team’s demands that they redefine their theories and conceptual stances did more to erect barriers than build bridges between the institutions. These were the demands of the project, its funders, and the issues; they could not be reduced to the outlook of a single team, not even that of a single institution. Because the project actions were so novel, these conceptual barriers had to be faced. Despite their differences (something natural for institutions with their own missions and work histories), they held lively discussions and strategy-building sessions.

However, the hierarchy among the institutions seemed unclear. Neither SERTA nor Axé viewed themselves as subordinates. They both saw themselves as equals in a process in which they were supposed to participate in both planning and execution. Both institutions felt they were being treated as subordinates, and resisted taking on roles that had not been adequately negotiated. They both felt that they were losing their institutional identities by having to follow parameters of action that fell outside of their conceived prerogatives. This was especially true for SERTA. Although SERTA stayed until the end of 2006, it felt that it was assuming too many responsibilities during the execution process and was not being sufficiently compensated. The division of work became unequal, which generated internal tensions.

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9 This factor will be discussed in the “Logical Implementations” section.
The *Axé* Project was replaced by the CPD. CPD had less than two years to integrate itself into the work and reach the desired objectives.\(^{10}\) Although the new partnership was formed positively and did approach Program goals, the change in the institutional partnership had negative effects on the overall implementation process.

After identifying the limits of the *Axé* proposal on ESCCA in the project municipalities (a situation very different from that in Salvador, where *Axé* had been working), the Partners of the Americas team brought in CPD to add knowledge and integrate itself into the *Axé* team and its actions. After months of internal work to set up minimal conditions for joining forces, *Axé* rejected this proposal. Partners of the Americas had to expand its team to take on some of the tasks that *Axé* had been assigned, since *Axé’s* role went beyond intervention in ESCCA areas and also included ongoing training in social education that was networked with education in the schools.

This negatively affected the use of financial resources, implementation time, and formulation and application of a consistent model for ESCCA cases. It reduced the overall efficiency of the implementation process. CPD’s results would definitely have been more solid and far-reaching had it been present for the entire term of the Program.

### 5.2.2 Implementation of External Networking

Implementation also meant forming a broad network of institutions at national, state, and local levels. At the national and state levels, the *Educar* Program contained a network of institutions that were involved in FNPETI, as well as institutions that attended the State Forum on the Elimination of Child Labor. At the local level, it had all of the City Halls, Secretariats of Education, Health and Social Action, Guardianship Councils and Councils on Rights, the NGOs, and the other actors in the educational arena.

In the beginning the Program had trouble at the local level: “The idea was to start in the region and then expand into the other states. Later we saw that it was impossible, given our resources and the size of the task. Municipal adherence to the Program was a criterion for inclusion. During the first year the municipalities followed the Program. Longer than that was inconvenient and expensive,” said an *Educar* team member.

Although it had been foreseeable, another outside factor\(^{11}\) that made the venture even more difficult were local elections (2004–2005) and the resulting change of command in many municipalities. Every new mayor had to be approached and the project explained once more to confirm the compliance of the previous mayor. The networking process could not stop at the mayor’s office. The project also had to get cooperation at all of the relevant levels within each municipality. This greatly complicated the process, given the number of municipalities in which the project was working at the same time. The institutional framework in each municipality was

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\(^{10}\) Its performance will be discussed in the “Logical Implementations” section.

\(^{11}\) Studies of Brazilian local politics show the tradition of changing parties at the local level. This had to be considered in every process involved in project implementation. It might be best for international agencies’ investment schedules to take election schedules (national and municipal) into account whenever such cycles are established and regular. This would greatly reduce resources wasted on the change process, in which one party often cancels the processes initiated by the previous party.
extremely fragile; social programs did not operate within a system. The Unified Social Assistance System (SUAS) had no history. Networking between social programs was sorely lacking. PETI, the Sentinel Program, and ABB Community were there, but were not reaching the children engaged in child labor and ESCCA.

All of this made the minimal networking needed to actually begin program implementation much slower, and much more expensive and inconvenient than expected.

The initial lack of spatial delimitations for the Program negatively affected this process. Reality finally imposed limits on management’s desires when they realized that the initial proposals were exorbitant: “How are we going to account for the number of municipalities?” In addition to the number of municipalities, other factors hindered the process. It was known that drug traffickers influenced elections in the region, and the expectation was that as soon as the Program confronted this issue, some municipalities would withdraw or show resistance. One of these was Ibimirim, which chose not to participate or deal with the issues with not only Educar, but other programs as well.

In fact, the result of all of this effort was a certain degree of irregularity in the makeup of the local institutional network. Of the 21 municipalities in the three territories, one could say that the Educar Program had a relatively complete presence in only 60 percent. In the rest of the municipalities, the quantity and quality of Program actions were gradually reduced. For instance, in some, such as Campina Grande (PB), Feira de Santana (BA), Petrolina and Juazeiro (BA), project actions had practically no effect in some areas because of the weak connections with local institutions.

This 60 percent showed an unequaled vitality, however, since Educar was located in the poorest and worst-off region of the country, according to data from the Status of Children and Adolescents in the Semi-Arid Region of Brazil, a 2003 UNICEF report that served as the basis for Pact: A World for Children and Adolescents in the Semi-Arid Region of Brazil.

In fact, the Program tried different strategies for networking among the municipalities, which was critical for reinforcing its processes through sharing of experiences. However, in the municipalities, there was no clear feeling of belonging to a territory. In most cases, mayors interviewed on the subject were not sure exactly what the function of the territory was. They understood that the municipality was participating in Educar, but they did not relate that with the need for networking between municipalities. In one municipality, for example, the Secretaries of Education did not know what was going on in other schools in municipalities within the same territory. Of course, there may have been isolated cases where this was not true, but that was not established.

However, we should mention that the effort the project put into forging these ties at the municipal level reaped many rewards wherever project teams had a solid, permanent, and homogeneous presence. This should be the same as the number of municipalities in which it was possible to conduct the Education Census; that is, only 14.

In fact, to complete such a task, local institutional efforts had to be strong. Without commitment from various sectors of the public administration in each municipality, it would have been
impossible to complete all of the tasks in the Census. Unfortunately, one can see that even these 14 municipalities and their Education Censuses proved to be too much for the Educar teams. Many of the good relationships established for purposes of the Census were later damaged by poor handling and processing of the enormous amount of data. The delay in Census returns made the Program lose credibility in some of these municipalities.

The excessive number of commitments in each location negatively affected the Program in another way: It inevitably caused neglect of its relationships with state and national institutions. “It’s hard to join things that have traditionally been separate,” said one team member, explaining the difficulty of dealing with institutions on these two levels.

Although there may have been a clear recognition that state institutions would be created by the Educar Program, it was not clear how actively such institutions would participate in the process, participation being the hope. At the national level, the Program’s remoteness and failure to cultivate contacts resulted in a situation in which even FNPETI and interested institutions, such as MPT, had only remote knowledge of it. MPT, as well as the State Ministry of Labor were both active participants. Actually, only the Education Census got attention from the MEC and CONTAG. Once it had been completed, they too lost track of its subsequent actions. Even CONTAG received the Census results late, in May 2007.

In conclusion, there is one important piece of information that belongs here. One way to measure the Program’s success in building local institutional networks would be to check whether these municipalities are now able to maintain or form networks with other municipalities to partially or fully sustain the educational model implemented by the Program. This is, in fact, happening. One group of municipalities has been meeting regarding a new project that is seeking funding to maintain SERTA actions in rural education in three municipalities (not all of these municipalities are participating in the Program). Although SERTA may have had relationships and access prior to implementation of the Educar Program in the region, it acknowledges that this new outlook for institutional integration could not have occurred without the municipal ties the Program established over the past four years.

The suggestion that SERTA continue to advise municipalities where Educar worked was made in conjunction with Partners of the Americas. The Partners also made this suggestion to the municipalities in the Program. Since the municipalities can use the Fund for Maintenance and Development of Primary Education and Teacher Development (FUNDEF, now FUNDEB) as an advisory resource, the Program suggested that they do this and draw up contracts with CPD. The Partners of the Americas has formed state networks to guarantee that Program actions will continue in the region.

5.3  LOGICAL IMPLEMENTATIONS

The Educar Program proposed to implement three major types of actions: (1) conduct an Education Census to identify children working in family farming and illicit agriculture; (2) train teachers and social educators on its integral, inclusive educational model and its effective application in schools and PETIs; (3) form and train teams of social educators on innovative methodologies and their effective application in ESCCA cases.
5.3.1 Creating the Baseline

First of all, the baseline should have reported how many children are working and their locations, especially for WFCL, illicit agriculture, and ESCCA. This was the reason for the entire Program. Thus, the baseline was to serve as the point of departure for the entire implementation process, especially in providing means for selecting targets and systematically monitoring the process of withdrawal, prevention, and retention of such children in improved educational systems.

Creating a baseline would first require considering the complexity of child labor in illicit agriculture and ESCCA, spread over an excessively broad territory. The initial challenge would thus be methodological. They would have to see if the set of activities, techniques, and tools established in the Project Design could obtain the expected results (quantify and locate children working on illicit crops or in ESCCA), within the proposed timeframe (the first half of the first year of implementation).

However, from the standpoint of an evaluation, it is impossible to establish a set of coordinated actions that would result in a set of data approximating the project’s management of its direct beneficiaries, as described in the Project Design.

Even institutions that took part in the process using georeferencing tools and methodologies, such as GIDEH and IBASE, did not do this. As expected, the secondary data from IBGE and other institutions was inadequate and did not focus on the Program’s target population.

While the political networking process increased the number of spatial frameworks for Program implementation, the project time allotted for obtaining the baseline was taken up by its many demands as well as the urgent need to start other parts of the implementation process. Thus, the baseline, which should have been completed during the first half of the first year of implementation at the latest, lost its basic characteristics, its methodological definition, and, most of all, its purpose within the overall Program.

In reality, what happened was that all of the methodological devices the Project Design had meant to apply to set the baseline were absorbed or replaced by the Education Census.

Methodologically, the attempt to use the Census data as a baseline was worse yet. Especially because, due to its quantitative structure, the Census did not reveal specific data about children in WFCL, nor did it mention illicit crops or ESCCA.\footnote{As seen in the following analysis}

This comment by the Educar team reveals how the baseline and the Census became concurrent actions: “We were doing the work by approximation. The children are either at risk or they are working. The crops run parallel: You plant onions and marijuana, for example. On the islands the crop is already prominent. The question was put this way: How many children are working in farming? Statements made at feedback meetings show that agriculture and illicit crops complement each other. To farmers, it makes no difference whether they plant marijuana or another crop.” It was possible to create a log, running parallel to the Census, of children who, according to census criteria, were working, locating them house by house. The Education Census
data were useful to the Program because they provided names, addresses, and other information that was not available from the IBGE Census.

The baseline was thus an initial phase, not an objective. A census is not a diagnostic study. It is a tool for structuring and systematizing data, which, along with other tools and interpretations, is used to make diagnoses. In fact, the Program created no alternative ways to collect data on illicit agriculture. Since that activity was absorbed by the Census, it became an objective in and of itself. The long delay in receiving census results had harmful effects on the phases that followed. One of the main consequences of the Census’ complexity was that it took a long time to complete. Something that could have been done, for instance, would have been to set a baseline for one municipality, which could have shown which geographical sectors in the municipality had a higher incidence of the phenomenon. Since the baseline was not completed, there was no criterion showing where the model should have priority application within each municipality. The same was true for all of the municipalities. Once the baseline had been set for a broad set of municipalities, those with a higher incidence of child labor could have been chosen. Then, within that group, the model could have been applied on a prioritized and systematic basis to all schools, which, due to their proximity to illicit agriculture and ESCCA, best fit the project objectives. A logical framework would have been placed on the mode of implementation, something that was actually contemplated in the Project Design and in the exercises planned for the implementation timeline.

It is worth mentioning that the local teams’ use of these tools stirred up quite a controversy about child labor. Initially, administrators denied the existence of working children in their discussions with coordinators. Statements by school principals and educators, specifically about how the children and adolescents that had been identified were not working, were gradually disproved. Because of this, the logical framework of the project became quite fragile. In order to reconcile these two realities, the project should have begun by (quickly) setting a baseline, which should have allowed it to identify children who were working, whether they were in school or not. The second phase would have presented and implemented the educational model that would allow these children to find reasons at school to stop working and discover other ways of life. The third phase would have monitored the process to correct distortions, improve processes and confirm results. Since the first phase did not occur, the third phase, the most rigorous, was impossible to perform in a methodologically consistent manner.

The Program thus ended up in a situation in which it was impossible to follow the criteria set in the Project Design and in negotiations with USDOL on children removed from and/or prevented from entering WFCL in illicit agriculture and ESCCA. It was impossible to establish a quantitatively controlled corpus that could be systematically monitored. The direct beneficiaries of the Program became unreachable.

The quantitative corpus of beneficiaries needed to reach the Program’s expected objectives was never properly established.
5.3.1.1 Setting up the Education Census

To comply with Act 10,172 of January 9, 2001, which established the National Education Plan (PNE), every municipality was required to set up a PME. Conducting an Education Census was recommended by the MEC, the National Union of Municipal Education Directors (UNIDIME), and several state secretariats of education, but they provided no technical or financial resources. There was motivation and support for the municipalities to comply with the education census. The PME is still a work in progress in most municipalities in Brazil.

The Education Census was actually conducted in 14 of the 23 municipalities within the territories of the Educar Program. Belém do São Francisco, Carnaubeira da Penha, Cabrobó, Floresta, Ibimirim, Itacuruba, Jatobá, Lagoa Grande, Orocó, Parnamirim, Petrolândia, Salgueiro, Santa Maria da Boa Vista and Tacaratú (see Figure 4).

From September 2004 to December 2005, the project took Education Census questionnaires to 87,224 homes, 50.45 percent of them in rural areas, and 49.54 percent in rural areas [sic]. During 2006, the data was processed, analyzed, and published. More than 600 people took part as researchers and 54 as supervisors. The partnership with the municipalities meant an investment on their part to furnish logistical and human resources support, while the Educar Program provided technical, financial, and specialized human resources.

The questionnaire generally followed the line of questioning used in the national censuses. However, it included new questions about child labor. The Census described the income, work, education, and basic health of the population in general. In particular, it allowed quantitative assessment of children’s status, in terms of their school attendance and participation in the working world, their contribution to family income, and their work vs. school relationship.

| Table 7: Total Children and Their School vs. Work Status in School Census Municipalities |
|---------------------------------|----------|-----------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Age Group          | Total Children Age 7-17 in Municipality | Total Children Age 7-17 Attending School | %         | Not Attending School | %         | Working | %         | Studying and Working | %         | Working and Not Attending School | %         |
| 07–09            | 20,076                               | 19,221                         | 95.7     | 841                | 4.1       | 443     | 2.2       | 389                | 2.02      | 54                   | 12.1      |
| 10–14            | 32,026                               | 30,719                         | 95.9     | 1273               | 3.9       | 2737    | 8.5       | 2498               | 8.1       | 235                 | 8.5       |
| 15–17            | 20,289                               | 16,235                         | 80.0     | 4041               | 19.2      | 5400    | 26.6      | 3901               | 24.2      | 1494                | 27.6      |
| Total            | 72,391                               | 66,175                         | 91.4     | 6155               | 8.5       | 8580    | 11.8      | 6788               | 10.25     | 1783                | 20.9      |

The data in Table 7 show that of a total of 72,391 children in the municipalities surveyed, 66,175 of those between the ages of 7 and 17 (91.4 percent) were in school, and 6,155 (8.5 percent) were not in school. There were 8,580 children (11.8 percent) working. It was also relevant that of the total number of children, 6,788 were combining school with work, forming a group making up

13 The Census was planned only for the municipalities that were following the Program, focusing on illicit agriculture; however it was conducted in only 14 of the total 15.
10.2 percent of the total number of students. In addition, 1,783 (20.9 percent) of the children who were working were not in school. The data also showed that the most affected age range was 15–17. Nevertheless, we note that most children and adolescents who worked did so only to help out or be cooperative; that is, neither they nor the adults considered it a real job.

The Census was negotiated with each municipality, and it was clearly explained that it would include questions about child labor. However, these negotiations were done based on a very *a priori* assumption that the municipalities were technically and financially unable to contribute, without doing even a minimal estimate of the impact the Census would have on all of the other implementation processes. What led the *Educar* management to conduct the Census was their idea that the cost-benefit ratio would be highly positive for the municipalities, which could use it as a tool to set education policies. For the Program, it would provide data on the child labor situation.

From the Project Design viewpoint, the Education Census would be a political strategy to steer the PMEs toward focusing on the child labor issue.

However, as a political strategy, the Census had little effect. Possibly some municipalities would focus their Education Plans on eliminating child labor. Certainly, most of them would not take it into account. In the municipalities that the evaluation team visited, where the Census had been performed, it was impossible to discern whether the mayors had any intentions on child labor policies. Unfortunately, the quantitative census data on child labor were not officially endorsed by all of the municipalities where it was conducted. However, some of the data on school attendance were endorsed.

In any case, the Census, its legitimacy, and its usefulness for municipalities in need of information on which to base public policy was always a difficult subject in interviews with municipal administrators. The mayors preferred not to directly address the topic, and the Secretaries of Education hid behind their lack of freedom compared to the mayors. That is, there was no consensus among municipal administrators on the results, even after extensive discussions in the municipalities. The census results faced resistance precisely because they affronted a culture that exploits children and adolescents and harbors other types of social exclusion. Meanwhile, the data were compared with IBGE indexes, and only a narrow margin of difference was found between the two.

It was definitely not taken into account that a census was not merely a technical and quantitative exercise. It was also a political exercise.\(^{14}\) This meant that the census results in general did not address only methodological issues, but also unquantifiable ones. Because of this, the legitimacy of the Census did not lie only in its efficiency and technical effectiveness.

What this evaluation brought to light was that some municipalities created the sentiment that the Census, which was led by the *Educar* Program, not municipal administrators, did not precisely

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\(^{14}\) The comments in this evaluation do not refer to the political network for performing the Census, but to the political control of its methodology and interpretation of its results, all of which remained in the Partners’ hands. Controlling information, as is known, is a form of political control. It is possible that *Educar* did not intend to establish this type of control; however, in practice, that is what happened. This caused municipalities to distance themselves from the results and created negative sentiment against the Census.
address their expectations and priorities, but those of the Program. This is why some called it the “Educar Census” and refused to view it as a municipal census. In actuality, Educar had offered to do a highly complex piece of municipal homework with no financial compensation from the municipalities. It was easy to be a partner in this venture and be responsible only for cooperating with census teams and logistical factors. In the end, however, it turned out to be unsettling not to control the brains of the process, which remained entirely in the hands of the Program, and even more unsettling not to have the prerogative to manipulate and interpret the data. Therein lay the difficulty of endorsing information received after the fact.

Figure 4: Municipalities in the Education Census and PEADS

Meanwhile, this situation, which could only be understood by reading between the lines, was blanketed in a number of explicit complaints about the long wait between the time the questionnaires were filled out until the totaled information was received. Some administrators took the long processing time to mean that the Census’ technical capabilities were deficient, and said it was impossible to believe the results because of the long wait. In other words, they found a way not to endorse the Census in the final analysis. “Since processing the data turned out to be a huge undertaking and the census results hadn’t come, the time predicted wasn’t long enough, the administrators started feeling suspicious because a lot of things could influence the municipality’s decisions, depending on the results.”

Even the Educar team acknowledged that “we underestimated how long it would take to do the Census. When the Census was ready, all of the possibilities for error appeared.” They also underestimated the huge number of unexpected events that would occur during the Census: the insistence on going to areas where no one went,

15 Statement of SERTA team members.
to some regions that were very difficult to reach, operating difficulties such as how to go into areas where there were social conflicts, and the like. Difficult questions included the following: Do you help support your family?

This indicates that the Education Census did not address the Program’s need to obtain information for setting a baseline. At the same time, it did not address what the municipalities needed in an Education Census.

It did not address the project’s needs because methodologically, as was seen, conducting a census opened up a corpus of information that was too complex for the project to handle, requiring advanced technical capabilities and increased funding. This was for one census, not to mention 14. Without these elements, what occurs is what was seen in this case: the time and money spent on the entire procedure greatly exceeded the informational needs of the Program, which in principle had limited time and resources. By its very nature, a baseline must define the target group or community, thus allowing fast and easy information collection and processing to further the project objectives. In this case, the Census became an objective in and of itself.

The Census did not meet the municipalities’ needs, because by its very nature, a census must have consensus on the legitimacy of its processes for collecting, processing, and interpreting its data, so that in the end, its results help the municipality achieve its goals by increasing its institutional capacity (capacity building) for implementing public policy. Work remains to be done on strengthening this potential.

Some secondary gains were seen during the census experience. During the months that the questionnaire was being filled out, the Educar Program gained a lot of visibility in every microspace of the municipalities where the Census was being done. The teams went everywhere, to the farthest reaches of every municipality. State and national institutions viewed the Census as an educational experience for the municipalities. We must understand, however, that these perceptions were not based on actual firsthand knowledge of the Census, since access to the results was, of course, quite delayed. For example, CONTAG participated in the Census, but did not receive the final results until May 2006. At the time this evaluation was written, ILO still had not received the final census results. MPT had no knowledge [of the results], although it had taken the Census. These institutions happen to use logical operating principles that incorporate quantitative data into their management practices. This means that before performing a census, they reach a priori consensus on whether it would be useful. This did not occur in the municipalities, where, in practice, municipal administration is almost completely dependent on the subjective opinions of administrators, and in many cases can be influenced by elements outside rational planning processes: ideology, culture, interests, etc. MPT in Pernambuco, as well as the MTE/PE, the Council on Rights and the State Forum also understood the process and discussed their partial results.

One negative effect of the Census was job stress for the Program teams, who had to double their efforts so that they could conduct census tasks at the same time that they were working on other goals and objectives, in many cases under inadequate working conditions, which caused conflicts. This overextension of the staff in turn reduced credibility with the municipal governments, due to the impossibility of providing results within a shorter time. Unplanned cost overages and fewer resources available for other activities, since once the task had been started,
it had to be completed. And, as we have already mentioned, the Census was of no use to the Program’s desired objectives: to locate and withdraw more than 10,000 children and adults from WFCL. Its explicit objective was to work with children involved in WFCL. The potential objective was to approach children working in family farming. Family farming has its own dynamics and milieus; however, it is commonly used to hide illicit crops in territories where they are grown. This does not mean that all family farming is linked to illicit agriculture; only a small part of it. However, the use of pesticides is common to both types of farming. The problem is symbolic more than geographical. This symbolic system for hiding crops enables an efficient economic structure. Although the crops may be nearby, those who work on them are not. Illicit agriculture draws invisible borders that are tacitly respected by the population. These borders are highly selective and exclusive. Everyone knows where they are, but no one talks about it. Anyone outside the borders has no access to the inside, even if he or she lives there. At the time of the Census, project administrators thought that, because workers had to visit every rural home, these symbolic borders would be broken down. They thought that any boys identified by the Census as helping support households would automatically be assimilated into the project and made beneficiaries of it. The Census reflected the broad spectrum of child labor, but clarified nothing about child labor in illicit agriculture.

In conclusion, one could say that the Census further increased already excessive demands, generated internal conflicts, and introduced unexpected events into the overall implementation process.

### 5.3.2 Development and Implementation of the Integrated Inclusive Educational Model

The EII had to go through at least three stages: development, implementation, and monitoring. Overall, it had to respond to the need for improvement of the teaching-learning process as a whole, so that, while that it was making significant changes to traditional educational models, it would be turning schools into centers for combating and eradicating child labor.

#### 5.3.2.1 Development of the EII Model

Three teams of professionals and specialists initially participated in developing the EII model: the Educar management team, the SERTA team, and the Axé team. Each team had enough knowledge, based on personal and institutional experiences, to collectively produce a new tool that would simultaneously address both issues: improving education and empowering schools to become centers for combating and eradicating child labor, even in its worst forms.

First of all, these teams had to become one. To do this, they would have to change their initial outlooks and build a terminology base that would combine the individual experiences of each team. This was because none of them had previously handled all of the elements contained in this project at the same time; thus, no one team could claim complete autonomy or leadership in the process of creating the new model. Each team had to view its experience as a set of elements that could end up being partially used within a new whole. Their individual functional models would serve only as parts, not as whole models. The new model would embody a new whole made up of terminology and practices.
This is not what happened, however. In reality, all three teams chose a difficult process of self-defense: defending their previous positions, terminology, practices, and identities. There were serious conflicts between the teams during this attempt. These were aggravated by the fact that the implementation process had not gone smoothly. Excessive demands and the need to serve many targets at the same time took their toll on relationships between the teams. “Many activities were scheduled and cancelled, and that took a toll on training activities.”16 One immediate consequence was the resignation of the Axé team, which delayed the entire process. On several occasions, the SERTA team also concluded that it would be best to leave the project. However, it considered the negative consequences that resigning would have on all of the teams, and decided to stay. Nevertheless, SERTA officially resigned from Educar at the end of 2006.

In the end, this blocked all attempts to create a new EII Model, partly because each team felt that its own practices and models were solid enough, and partly because the teams disagreed on some basic issues relating to the principles and purposes that would be incorporated into the overall model.

In fact, both Axé and SERTA have strong histories. Each has developed working models in every area it has worked in over more than a decade.

Axé was founded in 1990 in Salvador, Bahia. It was conceived and discussed during a time when Brazil was returning to democracy and creating new democratic laws after 10 years of military dictatorship. The Axé Project was planned as a place where street children could get an education. This is why it uses a drawing of a teacher in a street working to turn children into Subjects of Right and Subjects of Desire. Axé views art as education. Thus, the youths in the Axé Program have access to different artistic languages, for two purposes: to educate them and to make them professionals. Axé combines ethics, aesthetics, and art education into a process for rebuilding the lives of boys and girls who have become outsiders. Over its 15 years of operation, nearly 13,700 children and adolescents have been through the Axé Program. Using an educational and artistic process, Axé combats sexual abuse and child labor in the streets.

SERTA, the Alternative Technology Service, is an OSCIP (Organization of Civil Society in the Public Interest) that was founded in August 1989 in Pernambuco, and led from there by Abdalazia de Moura. Since 1992, the SERTA team has worked to establish connections between farming, employment in rural areas, and education in the schools. In 1994, the results of this process were consolidated into what came to be called the PEADS. PEADS is the result of thought and practice in the schools, assistance programs, and training for manufacturers, educators, and youths. Its aim is to help give formal schooling a positive role in sustainable development, at local and other levels. Since 1994, PEADS has been presented at the national level (MEC) and the local level in a broad range of municipalities in Pernambuco, and is now the defining element within SERTA.

The following statements by SERTA members show the stress the teams were under on the issue of creating a joint model: “ICA experienced a paradigm clash: the different methodologies of Axé, SERTA and CPD clashed when they tried to formulate indicators for program success […] At the beginning we had autonomy, but little by little we lost autonomy and finally, the

16 Statement of SERTA team members.
guidelines were being unilaterally defined by the Partners of the Americas Institute (ICA). We turned into workers [...] SERTA felt that it had lost its identity and was being directed by the Program […] Axé understood much sooner what was going to happen to them. Not being able to apply their own methodology led to them leaving.”

A certain amount of resentment developed among the partner institutions. ICA was required to comply with the Project Design, but SERTA, Axé (and later, CPD) were upset to learn that their methods would serve only as material for a methodology that was being characterized as integrated and inclusive. They did not understand why they had to bow to these demands when their methodologies already had histories, but the “New Model” did not even exist, nor had it ever been tried. They also had a dispute in the field: While ICA was bringing the Comprehensive and Inclusive Educational Model to municipalities, SERTA was presenting the PEADS model, and the Axé Project was using its own model. No institution wanted to lose presence or become part of the macro-identity of the Educar Program.

“The main reason, in the final analysis (that is, after all attempts at agreement had been exhausted), was the inability of the Axé (technical and management) team to follow the interinstitutional processes of negotiation and adaptation of proposals and methodologies to the new sertão/semi-arid context. At the same time, it was impossible for Axé to dedicate itself to field work at the needed pace, or even within viable budget parameters, since the team also had to meet demands in Salvador,” said Educar Program manager Stuart Beechler. When the Axé Project left the field, the relationship between SERTA and ICA became polarized.

However, the entire conflict on autonomy and identity reflected the fact that a basic methodological conflict had taken hold: “The problem was the focus on child labor, which was not central for the other institutions,” explained members of the SERTA team.

The model to be developed by the Educar Program would equate qualitative changes in education with the eradication of child labor. This was because it was based on the explicit acceptance that child labor, and its worst forms in particular, were harmful to children and adolescents. Although the Program had been focusing on illicit agriculture and ESCCA, it was going to have to broach the topic of children found working on family farms, although this was not classified as one of the WFCL.

It is interesting to note that ESCCA did not stir up much resistance from project teams, municipal administrators, or the general population. The issues of sexually exploited children and children in illicit agriculture created immediate consensus. People also understood that the activities were illegal. However, the issue of children in family farming did stir up conflicts.

It could have been predicted that neither teachers nor municipal administrators, much less communities, would willingly accept this as a given. The question that arises here is, “Could it have been predicted that the Program’s partner institutions would be resistant to the issue of child labor in family farming?”

Not at first, but careful examination of the words and actions of the two institutions shows that neither the Axé Project nor SERTA had ever made an explicit statement condemning all child labor. Neither had they made any statements defending it. What is found, coincidentally in both
institutions, is the view that work is a pathway toward social inclusion. It is part of an individual’s socialization process. This is why the Axé Project stresses professionalization, which qualifies individuals for urban employment, and SERTA stresses education, which qualifies individuals for rural employment.

As long as the Project Design limited itself to discussions of eradication of WFCL in illicit agriculture and ESCCA, there were no problems. The problems arose when the Program’s implementation process made it clear that, in practice, reaching children working on illicit crops would be very difficult or impossible, as would putting the topic on a list in any case. Therefore, discussions not only within the Program, but also with municipal administrators, teachers in rural schools, and the communities, had to address the issue of child labor in family farming: There it was, clearly visible.

Administrators had no interest in identifying these children and adolescents, nor in making any commitments. Since it was a delicate matter, it was brought up only on occasions of technical assistance, and many activities were performed in towns where there was a greater chance that the public would be truly offended. SERTA was highly resistant to proceeding with the issue.

In practice, broaching the topic of eliminating child labor in family farming would mean open confrontation with the communities. What institution would take on the onus of that challenge? Municipal administrators felt that as long as they were not too costly, the Education Census and teacher training were important issues, and were plenty to deal with. However, they saw no causal connection between these two activities and the eradication of child labor. Many teachers and members of the community felt that improving the quality of the schools was important, but they did not see why the school would disapprove of the “help” children gave their parents in the fields.

This contradiction in views and interests put enormous stress on interactions between internal Program partners and between the partners and the communities. The following quote shows how much stress the Program teams were under in the field: “The stress was much worse in the indigenous and Quilombola villages. The Trukas did not accept how child labor in the village was characterized, nor did they accept taking children out of the fields. Nor did the Pankará. Educar decided to make lists of boys identified as workers and take it to the municipalities to update their information. The lists were not accepted in the village. The municipality updated them, but not the indigenous people.17

“What was important to the municipalities was the training; what was important to ICA was the focus on child labor, and that stress became too much for SERTA,” said SERTA team members. And furthermore: “Our relationship with the municipalities was to work based on their demands, but Educar felt as if the municipality had to obey their demands.”

That was the crux of the matter: Child labor was not the priority for the municipalities; it was the priority for the Educar Program. For the municipalities, quality education was a goal; for Educar, it was only a means. Under this stress, the attempt to build an educational model aimed at eradicating child labor fell apart.

17 Statement of SERTA team members.
That was actually the mission of the Program: to raise issues about education, not because it perpetuates the poverty cycle, but to offer methodological tools that could improve schools and other places for education, not merely for the sake of improvement, but to help them promote a better society with greater opportunities. At the same time, the project aimed to call attention to the human rights of children and adolescents who are at risk and vulnerable. They were being exploited in jobs viewed as customary for them, whether for financial reasons, violence, or because experiencing childhood was not seen as their right. This stress factor had been foreseen even before the Program began. It was faced by the Partners of the Americas team, and not only them, but others: SERTA and CPD trainers, educators, and municipal administrators.

Since the municipalities were demanding training, SERTA felt that its own model, PEADS, would do. In addition, we must remember that SERTA’s relationships with many of the municipalities had begun before the Educar Program, and would continue after it ended. To the municipalities, the Educar Program was bringing back an old partner—SERTA—that was offering them a teaching proposal that had already been tested and officially endorsed. This is how the marriage of convenience emerged between the municipalities and SERTA on the issue of PEADS.

The flood of practical demands involved in the implementation process, institutional wrangling on identities and representations, and resistance on the issue of child labor led to the adoption of PEADS as the educational model for the Educar Program.

PEADS simultaneously uses teaching, research, and extension as tools for innovation, transformation, and social inclusion. The educational process consists of researching economic activities and existing variables that hinder local development in the territories where the children and their teachers live. This methodology promotes development of a broad range of abilities through sensitization, research, raising issues, processes of expansion and interventions capable of transforming individuals’ circumstances by fostering autonomy, and self-actualization among people in the community. In practice, PEADS has set itself apart by choosing to use—

- The school and the student as producers of knowledge about the world, to support processes of development.
- The adolescent as a protagonist and leader, capable of changing his or her environment or circumstances.
- The family as a teaching partner: a source of solutions, not problems.

PEADS also—

- Creates an alliance between policy and productivity to make them viable.
- Sees the interaction between technical/scientific knowledge and popular knowledge.
- Merges formal and informal education of children.
- Addresses the interdimensional relationship between the spiritual and the material.
• Links the universal to the specific, the local to the global, and the macro to the micro.
• Relates subjectivity to objectivity.
• Builds bridges between school and life outside it.
• Studies the interactions between public power and civil society.
• Reveals the relationships between the rural and the urban, and vice-versa.
• Contains four basic steps in its methodology: observe, analyze, act, and evaluate.

In summary, PEADS is an educational model. Its theory is interesting and consistent. It has been privileged with years of successful use and official endorsement. However, unless it was supplemented, it had no way of responding to the immediate objectives of the Educar Program relating specifically to the eradication of child labor. This was why Partners of the Americas had tried to supplement PEADS within the context of Integrated and Inclusive Education.

5.3.2.2 Implementation of PEADS: Creating and Applying the Model

This evaluation observed three elements in the PEADS introduction process: geographical presence, consistency of model presentation, and coherent application of the model.

PEADS was implemented in the same municipalities that had gone through the Education Census: Belém do São Francisco, Carnaubeira da Penha, Cabrobó, Floresta, Ibimirim, Itacuruba, Jatobá, Lagoa Grande, Orocó, Parnamirim, Petrolândia, Salgueiro, Santa Maria da Boa Vista, and Tacaratu (see Table 4 and Figure 3).

If we look at the data in Appendix 1, which lists the number of teachers, schools, and enrollment for Municipal Public Teaching in the 14 municipalities where the Census and PEADS were implemented, we see that the total number of teachers was 2,796, the total number of schools was 853, and the total number of students enrolled was 60,125.

Municipal elementary public teaching alone accounts for 80 percent of the total teachers in the municipalities: 2,241 teachers in first to fifth grades. It has 62.6 percent of schools, a total of 534. In 2005, it enrolled a total of 82.77 percent of students; that is, 49,770.

With this set of data, plus secondary data on work status focusing on rural areas of the PNAD, the Program would have already had ways to set solid delimiting criteria from the beginning of its implementation process. What the data indicate is that in the 14 municipalities of the Census, this corpus was already broad enough for restrictions to be set on Educar Program actions. In these municipalities, all that would have been needed was to guide and focus Program actions to avoid overload.

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18 2005 IBGE data: Total teachers: 2,796; Total municipal schools: 853; Total enrollment: 60,125.
19 These data include only figures from Municipal Public Teaching at the elementary, middle school, and preschool levels. State and federal public teaching data were omitted due to the nature of the Educar Program targets and its networks at the municipal level.
In other words, using only the secondary information available at the time the implementation process was begun, it was already possible to set delimiting criteria to optimize the Program’s capacity: maximize use of financial resources, streamline the work of teams in the field, and, most of all, achieve the highest possible level of homogeneity in incorporating elements of the educational proposal.

Unfortunately, this is not what happened. Networking activities in more than 20 municipalities (not counting other frustrated attempts in the northern states), a census, and training in schools in 14 municipalities, plus municipalities being trained in treating ESCCA cases, were all added to the uncertainties of the election agenda, technical problems, and stress inherent in the process. What the teams remember was that it was a period of chaos, overload, inconsistency, and inadequacy.

With the census delays and the child labor problems, resources were divided and the teams became smaller. Many SERTA employees left so that individuals who understood census data processing could be hired. According to the SERTA team, “From the group of nine, three were left, one for each territory; later, there were only two left to cover three territories. So we went from monthly teaching meetings to meetings that were divided up into teaching and the Census and ESCCA, all at once.” As a consequence, they themselves explain that “the teaching supervision stopped. There were fewer people for more things. And less time.”

It could be said that, in general, there are few criticisms of PEADS as a proposal in the municipalities, although there were some. What most bothered teachers in training were the infrequent meetings, spotty attendance of the Program training teams, failure to meet schedules, and constant postponements. Even schools that had initially shown no resistance to the proposal wound up not knowing how to better integrate elements in the texts for their own use because of the lack of dialogue. When the teams would return, teachers already had new concerns, and their requests turned into gaps that were never filled in.

Many SERTA trainers, going against directions from Educar, ended up promising to provide assistance at school after school, which the Program administrators considered operationally impossible. Educar and the municipalities changed this, so the task of the Educar teams became to train coordinators so that they could support the teachers. This was a sustainable and possible activity, according to the Program management criteria. These persistent conflicts called attention to differences of opinion on how to operate in the field, how to manage the conflicts, and the needs of the so-called microspaces. In the conflict between breadth and depth, breadth finally won out.

It is important to point out that this was usually a case of teams being inadequate—not ineffective. That is, the teams were capable of implementing the proposal, but it was impossible to do this consistently with an unlimited scope. The inordinate number of targets quickly consumed the energies of a small team that became even smaller in midstream. Unfortunately, this operating mode had very negative effects on the implementation process.

The PEADS implementation strategy tacitly followed two trends. On one hand, it was supposed to reach the largest number of municipalities possible; that is, the idea was to maximize the territory covered. On the other, it was supposed to penetrate as deeply as possible into each
municipality. The project managers did not realize that this combination of expansiveness and penetration negatively affected implementation. In practice, the problem was resolved dichotomously: The larger the territory covered, the less it was penetrated.

The SERTA team argued that the problem would have been solved by putting more trainers into the field, and that in any case, the problem was not too many targets, but too few available human resources. In fact, the Program’s managers were constantly attempting to broaden its scope and even increased the number of demands (networking, census, training, etc.). This created a vicious cycle. On one hand, there were more targets to reach and activities to perform, which increased pressure on the available financial resources. On the other hand, the available human resources were overloaded, which led to attendance problems and gaps in the targets’ incorporation of the proposal.

This situation could not be remedied without creating an even more negative impact on the Program. The Program had already made costly commitments, such as the Census in 14 municipalities, which had to be met—even at the expense of negative impacts—in order to avoid further weakening the connections it had forged with the municipalities. Overall, the Educar Program suffered from the Boomerang effect. Once it had settled on a certain operating mode, it would suffer negative impacts whether it corrected its course or not.

The Boomerang metaphor gives a glimpse of what ended up happening to the Program: A tool launched into the field with a far-reaching intent never reached its final destination. In fact, that is what the SERTA team meant when they explained, “They stopped supervising teachers.” SERTA left the project at the end of 2006. During 2007, a year in which a significant portion of the teacher training should have been completed and monitored, almost no training was done.

The failure to impose limits also had negative effects on the issue of distinctions between urban and rural schools. The Program attempted to introduce PEADS in all urban and rural schools. In practice, this was impossible because of the operating mode that had been adopted during the implementation process. In fact, most of the urban schools visited during this evaluation had the same complaint: “Without continuity or them supervising classes, it was better to stop, because when we had doubts, there was no one to ask,” said various groups of teachers interviewed.

Another problem that should have been expected was that many teachers showed resistance toward any proposal for changing the educational model. However, it is important to note that this resistance was clearer and more widespread among teachers at urban schools. For many of them, the PEADS terminology was fine for the countryside, since the tools, examples, and viewpoints it used were rural. They felt that applying the knowledge production processes was good for rural schools, but useless in urban areas.

Of course, this distinction is quite complicated, especially because many children from rural areas attend urban schools. In addition, the economic, social, and cultural relationships between rural and urban areas are very fluid in these regions. Although typically urban phenomena and issues are found in the cities, they can also be seen even in relatively small municipalities such as these. In fact, in these municipalities one does see dynamics that are linked to big cities, media influence, and the consumer world, especially among youths and adolescents.
This criterion alone would have been reason enough to introduce PEADS to schools in both types of areas. However, the teams would have to deal with various levels of resistance from teachers in both rural and urban schools. In fact, PEADS can be applied very well in urban areas, although its materials were designed with rural areas in mind. All one needs to do is read through the methodology without focusing on the rural references. Some teachers understood this and willingly implemented the proposal. For those who were defending more conservative views, however, it was necessary to reinforce the training process, intensify the debate, adapt the terminology, and present urban examples. Since this reinforcing never occurred, recalcitrant teachers often took advantage of the lack of continuity in the training process to become even more resistant to the proposal.

This created another vicious cycle: The many targets to reach and human resources stretched too thin (management style) led to inadequate service. With this management style, plus the resistance to the proposal, it becomes understandable why these two factors (inadequate service and unresolved resistance) created a picture of the PEADS implementation that was characterized by a lack of continuity.

The conclusion is that PEADS’ geographical presence was unsatisfactory. Not because of a lack of targets to be reached. But because of the lack of more stringent spatial delimitation, which would have allowed criteria to be set for selecting more meaningful targets that would have fit within the actual operating potential of the project teams and resources.

To judge the consistency of the model’s presentation, we observed the technical abilities of the teams of professionals who actually presented it in the field, and the PEADS model’s ratio of strengths to weaknesses.

Over more than a decade, SERTA had created a consistent model and formed teams of teachers who could present it and supervise its practice. Besides its understanding and constant use of the model’s terminology and applications, the team has a deep knowledge of the culture and the social, political, and economic conditions in the Pernambuco sertão region, especially its rural areas. They have a deep understanding of the mentality of the region’s residents, teachers, and the educational system in the region. The team has strong ties to the region, and both the teachers and municipal administrators clearly respect them as professionals.

In addition, the PEADS model itself actually addresses three basic elements: (1) It is the result of extensive dialogue with the architects of the Brazilian educational system and contemporary educational systems, and is recognized in many different municipal, state, and national institutional environments in which education is a central theme; (2) It provides answers to problems in the concrete context of the rural, peasant world of Brazil—that is, part of the actual context in which it hopes to be introduced; and (3) The set of concepts and practices it presents is a domain of relevant and consistent relationships that raises doubts about the current educational paradigm and simultaneously proposes another paradigm that is robust enough to fully replace it.

In other words, PEADS can sustain itself, both in theory and in educational practice. The only critical issue is the fact that the discussion of child labor is not an intrinsic element of the original PEADS proposal. Child labor as a problem to be eradicated is a foreign concept that was imposed on the original PEADS concepts because of SERTA’s partnership in the Educar...
Program. The facts show that during the introduction process it was impossible to reconcile the PEADS theory with the theory on eradication of child labor. Because of this, issues relating to child labor always ended up being treated as addenda or secondary topics, not as the central issue of a unique proposal.

It was as if training issues were addressed to SERTA and issues of child labor were the exclusive realm of the Educar Program. Groups of teachers thus received two types of information that, first of all, were unrelated. The SERTA training team, which was already dealing with teachers’ resistance to PEADS, also had to face new resistance on child labor. While the SERTA team felt responsible for PEADS and had answers for any difficulties with it, it felt uncomfortable and overburdened when it had to answer questions about child labor. It is clear that the SERTA team itself was intrinsically resistant to the topic of child labor. And this is what greatly weakened the presentation of the model in the municipalities.

Thus, although the training team’s abilities allowed them to overcome most teachers’ resistance to PEADS, the same did not happen on the issue of child labor. Many stories teachers told during the adoption of the model demonstrate this, either explicitly or implicitly. Many teachers told about how they became aware of their resistance to PEADS and how they later overcame it and became deeply convinced of the need to change the entire educational process. The same teachers later had doubts on the issue of child labor. They still saw it as something natural that they themselves had experienced as children, as part of growing up, and as something that was necessary for the family income. In other cases, they clearly defended PEADS and were enthusiastic about it, while being clearly silent or reticent on the topic of child labor.

Nevertheless, the achievements made with PEADS are important. We know that projects that aim to change teachers’ thinking about their teaching practices and ideas are usually met with great resistance, and in most cases, teachers continue to use the old system. If the SERTA team did not manage to completely overcome teachers’ resistance in the municipalities, especially in urban areas, it was because of the problems we have already discussed: the failure to set limits on spatial coverage. In locations where a lack of continuity was not a problem and there was broadly based, adequate contact, the teams of teachers at the schools went through an intense process of meaningful change. When these teachers were introduced to PEADS, they were able to clearly perceive elements that had been instituted by a traditional educational paradigm, and were presented with a new way of seeing and understanding the school’s teaching process.

Nevertheless, the transition from one paradigm to the other was not automatic. It involved a process of debate, recognition of the proposal’s merit, and self-assessment. Mistrust in the beginning, discovery at the end. Many teachers expressed their thanks. “Today I am a different teacher.” “Our school is different now.” “I suffered through everything before, but not now: I have learned how to enjoy being a teacher.” “I saw myself as the students’ enemy, and I suffered a lot because of it. Today I learned how to experience school in a different way.” “I am realizing my goals every day.” “Before, I would have just finished up a class and talked on and on. Now they teach me everything they know.” “Now the community participates in the process; before they only called teachers to complain.” “I had never seen my students produce so much, create so much, or talk so much; before they were guests of stone in the classroom.” “All you have to do is look at the walls in the school. They’re covered with their work. Before we didn’t let them put anything up; we didn’t want to get them dirty.” “I discovered actors, poets and singers.” “I
thought everything could be found in books. Now I know that in their world everything is full of knowledge.”

The relationship of the student to knowledge changes. It no longer appears to be something outside the student, but something that he or she already possesses. The student-teacher relationship changes. Students become active participants in the process of producing knowledge. The relationship of the school to the community changes. The school researches all of the elements in the life of the community, and the community participates in every phase of the process. It is a source of knowledge, the subject of teaching experiences, and is transformed by the students’ actions. The relationship of the school to local public power changes. The process of knowledge production should lead the community and the school to demand changes in municipal administration.

Perhaps the strongest phase of the entire process has been the so-called returns phase. After setting the terms of a research project that was a diagnostic study of the community, doing the fieldwork, including observations, interviews and questionnaires, and processing the data, the students created different ways of presenting the material. Songs, plays, poetry, improvisations, parodies, drawings, maps, texts with statistics, photographs, and more were presented and discussed with the communities. Mothers and fathers saw the life of the community itself pass before their eyes: its history, its memories, its problems, its conflicts, and its beauty.

Some schools, or classes, went even further. They took their demands to the mayors and the secretaries of Education, Health, and Social Action. Here are some examples of their actions. In Belém do São Francisco in the Projeto Manga de Baixo community, the students discovered the high illiteracy rate. They complained about it to the Secretariat of Education. A club of youths and adults was started to serve a Fishermen’s Association, whose members are the parents of the adult students. In Lagoa Grande, students in one community discovered that most of its members had black ancestry. They ended up requesting that their community be recognized as a Quilombola Community, which made it possible to claim several benefits available for this type of community under national law. In Orocó the community came to the school and began to participate. After PEADS was introduced, the problem of water scarcity was discovered, and they went to City Hall and got water brought to the community. The same happened with PETI and school reform. The idea is for the community to gain autonomy.

Another important gain was introducing PEADS to many PETI centers and some NGOs, such as PROAC, which provide after-school daycare. Social educators who service PETI got a working tool that gave even greater flexibility to the activities they normally do during after-school hours. Strangely, one could say that the PEADS model was adopted much better at PETI than in the schools. This was because, among other things, the PETI structure already included some of the principles of the PEADS model for creating structural changes in the schools. PETI does not separate children by grade or age. It has no set curriculum to follow. It strongly emphasizes play, art, and sports activities.

These elements are not found in the schools. Students are separated by grade and age, there is a set curriculum to follow, and play, art, and sports activities are the exceptions, not the rule. With PEADS, these elements are incorporated in a radical way. The children are free to make choices,
focus more on topics and research projects than on curricula, and everything is done based on art, play, and sports.

Traditionally, the schools viewed PETI as an unimportant place for education. Not even its social educators were seen as teachers. The children were seen as problematic. Many social educators at the PETIs we visited during this evaluation of the Program explained that since the introduction of PEADS, they had been able to do many things that were previously the prerogative of the schools; the schoolteachers began to acknowledge this. PEADS bridged the gap between PETI and the schools. There were many favorable statements along these lines.

Perhaps one of the most important statements about PETI was that, when PEADS was implemented, the crisis it had been facing was ameliorated. In the previous year, the Federal Government had reformulated its rules for stipend payments. Some children were receiving the school stipend and others were receiving the family stipend. The two systems are now being integrated. For many children, this has meant a reduced stipend. One of the immediate impacts was that many children were withdrawn from PETI. Many Secretariats of Social Action began fearing a mass exodus. However, children are gradually returning to PETI. One factor that brought children back to PETI was that they liked it there. In fact, the PETIs visited during this evaluation showed a positive use of PEADS. The children’s productivity using exercises based on PEADS methodology was evident.

In conclusion, All of these elements lead to the realization that in most of the schools and PETIs where it was applied, PEADS methodology achieved a high level of integration of theory and practice. In fact, teachers and social educators learned a new way of thinking about teaching processes, and were able to put the new elements into practice in a relevant way. This is an important indicator of the performance of the teams and of the model itself.

The schools that complained about the lack of continuity in the SERTA team presence also had problems handling the PEADS methodology, as could be expected. At several schools, the teachers had the same complaints: “You reach a point where you don’t know what to do next.” “We want to know what to do with all of this information now.” “We don’t understand how to apply the knowledge that the students have produced.” “It’s not true that things can be changed; we don’t understand how to make these changes.” “And now, we repeat everything all over or we have to look for another methodology.” “That’s it; we’re not going to repeat everything twice.”

These are typical complaints from people who have doubts about the methodology of a model that they have not used long enough or that has not been adequately explained. These complaints are not criticisms of PEADS, however, but symptoms that let us see the effects of the lack of continuity and the training team’s lack of attendance. Likewise, in schools where resistance was not overcome, the use of PEADS was incoherent.

PEADS has been shown to be highly effective in changing and improving education, especially in rural areas. In general, local public administrators, as well as teachers and social educators, recognize this.

Another important result should be mentioned here. During the process of teacher training and application of the PEADS model at the many rural and urban schools in 14 municipalities, a
corpus of quantitative data (the number of teachers trained in PEADS and their students) was generated. All of them were actually beneficiaries of the *Educar* Program as a whole. In terms of the Project Design, they would be indirect beneficiaries. However, due to the failure to set a baseline, which made the direct beneficiaries (children previously working in illicit agriculture and ESCCA who were withdrawn from jobs and are currently in school), unreachable, the actual direct beneficiaries of the *Educar* Program were the teachers it trained and their students.

All students whose teachers received PEADS training and applied the model in their classrooms experienced the effects of the hoped-for improvement in the educational model. Certainly, this sparks a debate on the validity of the objectives achieved and the viability of the desired objectives.

5.3.3 Development and Implementation of the Model in ESCCA Cases: The CPD

The other major objective of the *Educar* Program was to eradicate ESCCA. The same procedure was to be followed for this, including the following prerogatives: identification of communities of occurrence, establishment of local, state, and national institutional networks to confront actors, integration of the Sentinel Program and its activities, training and technical assistance for social service organizations in municipalities, creating a receptive school environment for children involved in ESCCA, victims’ psychosocial development, legal services, and improvement of education in schools and after-school Programs.

5.3.3.1 Development of the ESCCA Model

First of all, developing a model to handle the commercial sexual exploitation of children and adolescents meant incorporating the experiences of the *Axé* Program in its work with street children, the experiences of PAIR, and the prerogatives of the *Educar* Program. That combination would create the model to be implemented. As we have already discussed, difficulties among the Program’s internal partners caused the *Axé* Project to resign. The *Axé* Project was part of the Program in 2004. During that time, the team brought to the field the tools, experiences, and procedures it had successfully used in the city of Salvador in Bahia. In other words, it did not allow development of a model, since its understanding was that the model was already ready. It became unviable for the PAIR, *Axé*, and *Educar* teams to develop a common methodology because of their difficulties in finding points of agreement, working out agendas, and establishing joint working procedures.

When the NGO\(^{20}\) CPD arrived in 2005, discussions began again on the need to develop a model to meet the needs of the *Educar* Program.

Although CPD had no previous experience with ESCCA, its work with sex professionals, transvestites (who had risky sexual practices), alcoholics and drug addicts, and individuals in vulnerable situations or living with domestic violence facilitated the dialogue.

\(^{20}\) An NGO in Recife founded in 1998.
Composed of a multidisciplinary team of psychologists, psychiatrists, anthropologists, and social workers, CPD had its own methodology for dealing with these populations in urban areas. During its years of working with these clients, it had learned some lessons that then became methodological theories. The CPD team offered these lessons to the Educar Program as the basis for a new model. Some of the lessons brought up elements that actually contradicted the pre-established prerogatives of the Educar Program.

To begin with, one prerogative was the idea of confronting the phenomenon. To CPD, this idea was part of a paradigm that included legal complaints, repression, and compulsory actions. Typical elements of programs such as the Sentinel Program, also supported by the Rights Councils and Guardianship Councils. Accepting this idea would have meant reassessing the Educar prerogative based on the strategy of the Sentinel Program and the Councils. CPD saw the schools as part of the problem, as places that excluded and stigmatized some students, while Educar’s hope was for the schools to be places of inclusion. Lastly, CPD viewed exploitation as a work category, invisible work that took place in public spaces where the children were faceless and had no voices. This meant that a program could not start by simply removing children from their workplaces. Educar felt that once a child was identified, he or she had to be removed using socially established mechanisms in the social support network that the Program was meant to strengthen.

With these elements at stake, CPD decided to convince the Educar team to build the model based on new prerogatives: no repression, no legal complaints, and no required actions. It was based on some preconditions. One precondition was that no one would be placed or removed from any location. The understanding was that the phenomenon as a whole was a social process by which individuals leave these places. They themselves must arrange their exit route. The CPD team worked from the theory that once a legal complaint was filed, girls ended up being invaded and then forgotten. During this period, girls would go to other places of prostitution and refuse to stay in complementary programs or even attend school. Thus, one effect of the operating paradigm was that it maintained and perpetuated the problem, with a new complicating factor: the girls’ growing distrust of the institutions that were supposed to give them support. The girls, who were already invisible, learned how to make themselves completely inaccessible.

The result of these contradictions in interests and points of departure was an operating mode that combined elements from both sides:
Table 8: Comparison of Traditional and CPD-Educar Paradigms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional Paradigm</th>
<th>CPD-Educar Paradigm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Operate on basis of legal complaints and through authority-based presence.</td>
<td>• Identify place of work: approach and create connections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Operate based on established institutional structures following regular procedures: Sentinel, Rights Councils, Police, Secretariats of Social Action, Education, and Health.</td>
<td>• Map children’s places of work and living locations. Strengthen contacts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Compulsory withdrawal followed by compulsory inclusion in social programs, schools, and professional programs.</td>
<td>• Educational actions in these places: workshops, art, debates on topics of interest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Invasive monitoring.</td>
<td>• Build connections between children and social assistance institutions and schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Objective gathering of statistics on withdrawal of children from sexual exploitation.</td>
<td>• Train the reference schools that will accept the girls into the PEADS model.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Training of social educators.</td>
<td>• Maintain contacts for the period of time necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Respect the child’s subjective decisions: whether he or she stays in the exploitive situation or leaves it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Training of social educators.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The model that was developed still contained one source of friction: the requirement that the girls attend the so-called reference schools where SERTA had trained the staff in the PEADS model. On this point, the Educar team had to go beyond the established Project Design and its prior agreement with the Program’s funding agency. Meanwhile, it managed to arrive at a new action model for cases of sexual exploitation. As an exercise, it would be interesting to compare many other programs already implemented to see which of these two paradigms they follow, consciously or unconsciously. We might see that most follow the traditional paradigm, which remains in effect at the national level.

5.3.3.2 Implementation of the Model in ESCCA Cases

Once again, three elements were observed: geographical presence, consistency in model presentation, and coherent application of the model.

According to the Project Design, this was to take place in three cities in the Northern Region, as well as in Feira de Santana in Bahia and Campina Grande in Paraíba. However, once the networking process with the municipalities was initiated, the project administrators saw that it would be impossible to follow the initial proposal. In addition, ESCCA activities were detected in municipalities in the Marijuana Polygon, which justified this shift in the initial proposal, and obviously allowed the best use of the project’s financial, human, and logistical resources.

Although ESCCA activities were present in every municipality in the region, the Program was introduced in the following municipalities: Salgueiro, Lagoa Grande, Cabrobô, Paulo Afonso, Serra Talhada, Trindade, Araripina, Ouricuri, Petrolina, Feira de Santana, Campina Grande, and Juazeiro. (See Figure 5.)
Although ESCCA was present in all 12 municipalities, what stands out at first glance is that of the 14 municipalities that went through the Census and received PEADS training, only three (Salgueiro, Lagoa Grande, and Cabrobó) received ESCCA services. ESCCA is also found in those 11 municipalities (or most of them).

In Orocó, for example, the Secretariat of Social Action acknowledges that 10- to 12-year-old girls in the municipality have very active sex lives. “The situation here is getting worse: Many of them work as prostitutes with their own mothers. As a citizen, I don’t know how to approach this. We have the Councils and Social Action, but we haven’t been able to get anything done through them. A lot depends on political sentiment. There is no municipal investment to help those children. The churches don’t do anything either. Here there’s no reason to do anything, because it happens in the forest. We’ve never had the Sentinel Program.”

In Belém do São Francisco, teachers revealed that prostitution is widespread. “There is a lot of ESCCA in the municipality. There are the ‘little hellholes’ (places of prostitution). There are incidents of homosexuals making offers. We don’t have any data. Stories, complaints and visits. Especially a lot of teenage girls between the ages of 16 and 17. There are also mothers and fathers that sell their daughters. Another problem is the lack of values: ‘If you give me 10 cents, I’ll let you touch my breasts.’ There’s also a lot of sexual abuse. It’s in the homes. It’s hard to detect it. The Council is active on it, and there’s also the Sentinel Program. A complaint comes in, the Council schedules a raid, but they never get the children or they cover it up. The Sentinel Program is a service. It includes psychological and social services, and an educator. They work together with the Councils. They have conferences. It has weak points: It has no shelters or homes. It has no reinforced network of places to send them. Sometimes CRAS [the Social
In addition, some of these 12 municipalities had never developed the process, as in Campina Grande (PB) and Feira de Santana (BA). Others did it in a very superficial way, as in Juazeiro and Petrolina. The process was deep-reaching and consistent in only a few, such as Paulo Afonso (BA), Salgueiro, Lagoa Grande, and Cabrobó.

In Campina Grande (BA), the Program’s troubles began in 2003, with the networking process. The elections weakened its connections even more. There were complaints that the mayor was linked to ESCCA-related activities. PAIR made no progress, although it was active at only one school. That school, however, had many ESCCA- and drug-related problems. It was to be the reference school. The municipality was soon dropped from the Program.

In Feira de Santana (BA), there were also problems with the municipal authorities. While the Program was putting an emphasis on providing services, the municipality wanted to put more effort into locating responsible parties and filing legal complaints. Another problem was getting the Secretariat of Social Action to understand the Program policy. They were sending the girls back to other municipalities. It was also hard to find ways to interface with PAIR (Parnerts).

One factor that greatly influenced the situation in these cities was the amount of travel needed to reach them, at a time when the Program was already stretched beyond its operating limits working only in the municipalities of Pernambuco. Campina Grande was the only municipality where the Program was working in the State of Paraíba, and Feira de Santana is located in the interior of Bahia. Juazeiro and Petrolina were affected more by the Program’s inadequate presence. The political network was weak, and its actions did not have much effect.

The model developed by the Educar and CPD teams was taken into the field without first resolving the internal conflict about whether reference schools should have a strong presence in the inclusion process for girls. On one hand, the Educar team felt that PEADS should be introduced into the reference schools, since it would prepare them to enroll the girls and make them feel included. On the other, the CPD team felt that schools should not be used to reach girls involved in ESCCA, because the school system had already written them off.

For the Educar management, “The Educar position was not to ‘reach the ESCCA girls’ through the schools without making the schools part of the girls’ return to a normal life. The difficulty lay in the process of preparing the schools and support, since this was a complex population. Even with CPD’s decision not to rely on the schools, the project could never deny these girls what was a basic right and a fundamental principle—inclusion in the educational process in the schools.”

Experience showed that CPD was basically right. In general, the reference schools were not able to incorporate new values, and their old prejudices won out in the end. It could be argued that this occurred because not enough time or work was put into training these schools. That is possible. However, the way these schools reacted to PEADS training was classic. The SERTA team members felt the difficulty: “We couldn’t get the discussion to move forward […] There was no way to discuss PEADS, and so they did not incorporate the proposal […] There was no way to have direct dialogue with the teachers. That’s why we stopped going to the schools in the city.”
The CPD methodology did not meet the overall teaching demands of the reference schools, but CPD automatically decided to introduce PEADS\(^{21}\) without finding out whether it was even compatible with the schools’ demands. This greatly affected SERTA’s work, but it also showed how mechanisms of resistance are strong in certain institutions. The question remains: Did these reference schools reject PEADS, or did they reject the idea of dealing with girls linked to ESCCA situations?

The CPD team also felt the difficulty: “We invested a lot in the school issue, in the idea of the reference school. When we left the schools and went out into the world, the process was more dynamic, and it gave the girls access [...] We were against the reference schools. We thought every school ought to accept them. Each girl should go the school closest to her. An educator or social worker would take her there to register. We started to work on getting them into the schools. Into medical clinics, too. We started from the principle that they should be able to adapt to life and to the city as a whole,” said Ana Gloria Melcope, coordinator and founder of CPD. The experience of the Secretariat of Social Action in Paulo Afonso Necessidade followed the same principle. The Secretariat felt that there was a need “to sensitize all of the schools in the network to provide them with another approach. Initially, it was one school; the teaching staff there received training. But the girls were sent to other schools too, and that created the need to train other schools in the educational paradigm.” One school was not enough.

Here is an example that is indicative of many similar ones. A social educator commented that the “D.M. school was the reference school. Teachers were trained by the Program. But it didn’t work. The schools resisted it. They say ‘We don’t have any space.’ The education professionals weren’t prepared to welcome that girl. We found other schools, but there were problems. The girls were watched, as if they were going to contaminate the others.” Another example: On this subject, a social educator stated, “But it’s really hard for them to fit in at school. Schools have trouble helping the girls when someone brings the subject up, and after that there are always problems.”

Besides the problem of the reference schools, presentation of the action model was quite consistent. Social educators held training days on basic topics such as citizenship, education, sexuality, concepts, abuse, sexual health, diversity, and ESCCA. They also learned approach techniques that were consistent with the proposal. A new view on the phenomenon that would let them relate to the girls differently. They also learned about the network of institutions that could serve as partners in the process. Mostly, they demystified the phenomenon and reexamined their own preconceptions and resistance. In each municipality, teams of four or five social educators became citizen community agents. They worked in all of the locations in their territory: bordellos, brothels, bars, the streets, and outside houses and schools. In addition to the course, they received a stipend of 150 reals. The municipalities also committed to hiring some of these community agents.

The year 2005 was dedicated to selecting and forming the teams of social educators. The groups selected underwent a 4- to 6-month training process. The Secretariats of Social Action contributed toward hiring these teams, initially paying stipends below the minimum wage, then equaling the minimum wage in the second year (2006). The municipality covered the cost of the

\(^{21}\) PEADS was designed, tested, and effectively applied in rural schools, but not in ESCCA reference schools. This substitution without regard for the context of the model is what is being characterized as automatic.
teams and all of the logistics. With the exception of the municipality of Paulo Afonso (BA), where the team was made up of public school teachers, in the other municipalities they usually chose young people with some high school education or high school graduates. Many of them were unemployed. For some, it was their first job. Often people did not know what it was about, but just wanted to work. They began participating in the training without understanding what it was. Soon they were applying it and identifying with the job objectives.

A tough, fast adaptation process was needed. Some people were afraid of the dark and the places they would have to visit. Others were fearful of criticism, and they were criticized by husbands, family members, and friends. The training addressed all of these feelings, since elements of resistance were always behind them. The goal of the training was to create a team that would have no objections to doing field work, and that was achieved. That was actually more difficult than the objective content. Social educators had to be able to deal with the situation without letting it affect their own morals. The moral training itself was the worst. “We learned to deal with our prejudices, with our self esteem, and with the fear,” explained one social educator. Another saw the difficulties she would have to face in her own home: “My husband really got on my case. What kind of job is that, going out for 8 hours and coming back in the middle of the night? People in the city saw it differently. What was a married woman doing at a gas station at that hour of the night? It was hard to go into the bordellos, the clubs, the hellholes, and see men you knew, fathers, and relatives.”

Later came the trips out to the countryside. At the beginning, there was always someone from CPD who went along with the teams, and later, little by little, the social educators went out alone to the country. They went to other cities to see how the phenomenon worked there.

“At the beginning, it seemed like it didn’t exist. We were used to seeing but not really seeing,” said one of the social educators. “We didn’t know how to act. We couldn’t identify the problem: We learned to see it,” said another. Another said, “We had to arrange strategies for getting to the bottom of things in each place. At the beginning it was hard. We didn’t know how to do that—go into a bordello!”

The initial objective was to be able to see how connections were actually made. We had to map the main locations of prostitution. Find all the places that it happened, even if no one went through there, or the places looked bad or dangerous, and even the farthest places had to be checked. The team had to become familiar with every location, the famous “dens of sin.” That was because those were the places where girls in ESCCA became invisible.

They visited bars, nightclubs, gas stations, bordellos, isolated houses, secluded locations, streets, and areas. They presented themselves as if they were doing an education and health program. At first, they were distrusted, but they were ready for that. People thought they were from the Guardianship Council. But their approach was different. The methodology set up ways for initially convincing and approaching people. They would explain that it was not a raid, that no legal complaints would be made, and that everything would stay in the field. They made a pact of silence. “We had to live with them without becoming conspirators,” explained Ana Glória Melcope.
Initially, they talked to adult sex professionals, such as bordello owners and owners of gas stations. These statements demonstrate the process: “They think it’s strange; they don’t trust you. But gradually, they sat down and talked to us.” “We didn’t know anyone. It was a different world. Now we have a huge number of established relationships.” “Only after we win the trust of the adults do the girls start to appear.” “Now we see the teenagers more.” “When we arrive somewhere, the girls already know us and call the others. We talk about their needs.” These statements show how gradual the process is, until an individual is able to circulate in a world that easily opens up for customers, but slams shut on anyone who presents the slightest threat. Ana Glória Melcope added to the social workers’ statements, “With the routine meetings, the girls kept showing up, and we began to target them and focus attention on them.”

Then came another stage. “We scheduled places for workshops. They themselves suggested topics: Human rights, DST.” Workshops on reading, school, health, and finances—whatever would hold their interest—were held for the girls. The goal was to establish channels of communication that would lead to increasingly personal conversations, until we could reconstruct their history.

“The Educar team looks for them first. We go wherever they are. We sit down with them, listen to them, and create connections. In our offices, the idea is to reduce harm. If they want to stay in prostitution, we want them to at least know how to protect themselves,” explained a social educator in Paulo Afonso.

From that point, the teams tried to widen these girls’ social network via the following: a medical clinic and giving them back their rights, such as school and other social programs; preserving their personal lives, without taking away their identities as prostitutes. This created the potential for bridging the gaps between teenage girls, social assistance, all of the services, and the family. Teenage girls received psychological and social help if they needed it. They should never feel pressured. On the contrary, they should voluntarily accept one of many invitations. It is a matter of getting the girls to the point of being able to trust the institutions and build relationships with them, so that they can stay in touch as long as possible and receive all types of services. “Many of them go to school and then go back to the brothels. There’s no reason to take them out, because then they end up resisting the Program,” reports one social educator. It is not a single service. It is a series of integrated actions. The Program does not try to stamp out prostitution, but tries to help the girls become part of a network so that they can receive many types of services.

The Program had no idea of how many teenagers were in ESCCA situations. As more of them came forward, increased demands were put on the network of human rights protection institutions, but they had no additional support. The network was not working, or it did not have the ability to handle so many cases. Some of CPD’s efforts have been invested in working with this network of social institutions. What was needed was to approach managers in the Secretariats of Social Action, Health, and Education, as well as professionals (psychologists, social services workers, employees, lawyers), and employees who used the CPD model.

Usually, every municipality had an institutional network that had been set up based on the Sentinel Program. That network operated on the basis of legal complaints, since the Program did not do fieldwork. The compulsory nature of the Sentinel Program allowed it (or allows it, where it still exists) to carry out coercive interventions that mobilize an entire legal and police system,
with psychological and social care for the victims and their families. It helps not only victims of abuse and ESCCA, but also provides all types of services for adolescents.

The complaint-based, punitive, and coercive nature of the Sentinel model led to a debate in the municipalities, and, at the beginning at least, a confrontation with the Educar Program. In fact, the Sentinel Program was already being debated at the national level. Consensus had been reached on the harmful effects of its operating mode. Many girls did not adapt to the Sentinel Program. Its procedures ended up stigmatizing them. Many of them disappeared from the institutions and any connections to them were lost when no one appeared again to file a complaint.

In the last few years, with the SUAS, a new national policy, Specialized Social Assistance Referral Centers (CREAS), was launched. All of the social assistance Programs (such as PETI) are being integrated into CREAS. The Sentinel Program is now a specialized service within CREAS. However, municipalities that have not yet introduced CREAS still use the Sentinel Program. In some municipalities, the Educar Program, introduced by CPD, has allowed CREAS-affiliated institutions and employees to gain another outlook. One social worker for the Municipality of Paulo Afonso put it in this context: “In certain situations, it’s no use helping a teenager by telling them that they are wrong or they can’t do something. It does no good to scold them—you have to charm them, win them over. CPD helped us take that view of approaching them without creating barriers. To legitimize the problem, making visits to the brothels. All of that changed the viewpoints of people in the area.”

In some municipalities it was possible to have the Sentinel and Guardianship Council teams attend CPD training sessions. That has reduced friction with the Sentinel Program. In some cases, girls in the Educar Program were able to participate in Sentinel activities. For some activities, integration is possible; for others, it is not. In Paulo Afonso, for example, they understand that it is best not to replace one Program with the other, but to maintain the complementary relationship between Sentinel (quash their activities) and Educar (win them over). The Sentinel Program takes harsh stances, while the Educar Program lets processes occur. One gives people notice; the other invites them in.

At the same time, the municipalities, in conjunction with state governments and public or private institutions, are organizing vocational courses. In Paulo Afonso, for example, computer-training workshops are given every three months, through a partnership with INFRAERO. Courses on art, dance, education, flute, woven painting, and freehand painting are also given. The Mothers Club was opened for pregnant teenagers. Workshop on sewing baby clothes are held there. The Young Apprentice Program is being implemented for businesses.

In general, it is clear that the protective network is fragile. The institutions in the network lack resources and consistent strategies. The demands and needs of the boys and girls coming in often exceed the network’s ability to help. The municipalities have no public structure to help alcoholics and drug addicts. On the issue of young people, there is a void. There are no actions aimed at this segment. “There are cases that slip away from us. Often, there’s nothing that can be done, and they go back to the streets,” said a member of one such municipal network. In general, there is no effective and consistent public policy system for children, and this makes them highly vulnerable.
5.4 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

5.4.1 Spatial Management

In its Project Design, the Project Educar management team included spatial challenges that greatly exceeded implementation capacity. Considering that the project was divided into five large areas (political networking, CPD intervention, SERTA intervention, Census, and monitoring), and that 100 percent of the municipalities were made up of 23 cities, one could say that the lack of spatial delimitation in the design remained the management pattern throughout the implementation process. The space it covered was highly irregular. Figure 6 shows how the actions implemented correspond to a high level of spatial occupation (presence\textsuperscript{\textcopyright}) in some municipalities and a low level of spatial occupation in others.

The spatial management was characterized by—

- A lack of logical means for spatial delimitation.
- A desire for spatial coverage without observing the defining factors of the project, such as financial resources, time, and human resources.

Consequences include—

- A lack of continuity of presence within territory.
- An incomplete presence of the project in most municipalities: Activities were not introduced in all municipalities.
- Weakened ties to local, state, and national institutions.
- Overloaded human and financial resources.
- The creation of excess demand for implementation that exceeded the true project capacity.

Although the project management did not impose spatial limits, the challenges of the space placed limits on project management.

\textsuperscript{\textcopyright} The level of presence was rated from 1 to 10 on the horizontal axis of the graph, and the colored bars represent the Program actions listed in the box next to the graph. If one set of bars is more complete and extends up to a higher number, this means that that set of actions had a larger spatial presence. The black line crossing the graph from top to bottom establishes a curve of presence that shows the irregularities in the space.
Figure 6: *Educar* Program’s Spatial Coverage vs. Actions Implemented

Note: *Monitoramento* = Monitoring; CPD; SERTA; *Censo* = Census; *Articulação* = Networking.
5.4.2 Management of Logical Choices

The baseline proposed in the Project Design was faced with two serious problems. On one hand, the complexity of the phenomenon to be approached (the closed, invisible and unsafe world of children working in illicit agriculture and in ESCCA over an extensive geographical area) created enormous methodological challenges for the Program teams. On the other hand, there were excessive demands, given the Program’s lack of spatial delimitation.

The design proposed to set a baseline and develop comprehensive, inclusive educational models that would be implemented as a means for eradicating child labor. Creation of the baseline was replaced by a Municipal Education Census in 14 municipalities. This was no longer a one-time action, and thus became an objective. The institutions asked to join the partnership were unable to negotiate logical agreements that would have resulted in a single consensual model. Among other things, the lack of logical agreements contributed to the breakup of the original partnership, and caused one of the anchor institutions to leave. In the end, two models were implemented: one for the schools as a whole, and another for providing services for ESCCA cases.

Management of Logical Choices was characterized by—

- The methodological strategy (baseline) was stripped of its essential characteristics and replaced by another option that did not lead to the results needed to obtain tools to make the Program objectives viable.
- A failure to define the weight of each logical choice. For example, the Census took on greater relevance than it had in the Project Design.
- Internal conflicts arising from the partners’ different theoretical outlooks on the problem of eradicating child labor in the field.
- An inability to negotiate consistent logical approaches among the prerogatives of each institution.
- An inability to make WFCL the central focus of the methodology implemented in the schools.
- An inability to maintain the logical parameters established in the initial agreement with the funding organization.
- Difficulties implementing logical choices because of excessive demands on operations: too many targets.
- A lack of continuity in attending training sessions and implementing PEADS in the schools.

Consequences include—

- Difficulties in changing the way target communities viewed child labor.
• Difficulty breaking down teachers’ resistance to new methodologies.

• Difficulty in putting logical implementations into a logical order: The Census took up an inordinate amount of time and space, weakening the other logical implementation processes in education and ESCCA.

• Difficulty in effectively approaching one of the central project objectives: child labor on illicit crops.

• Failure to systematize the logical choices applied in ESCCA.

5.4.3 Human Resources Management

The excessive number of demands created by the failure to set spatial limits caused enormous problems for human resources management.

Characteristics of Resource Management include—

• Imbalance between actual human resources capacity and number of demands for action.

• Constant changes in rules governing partners.

• Problems in establishing regular procedures.

• Difficulties dealing with inter-institutional conflicts.

Consequences include—

• Constant stress on teams in the field.

• Implementation problems multiplied.

• Teams in the field were too small.

• Resignation of project partners.

• Poor conflict resolution.

• Shortcomings in implementation process.

5.4.4 Financial Resources Management

What were the factors that determined the use of financial resources and what was their impact on the Educar Program’s implementation process?
Determining factors include—

- Failure to impose geographical limits. Maximization of coverage area without regard to the Program’s financial or operating capacity.

- Turning activities that were meant to serve as means into objectives: Political networking followed the project trend of maximizing spatial coverage, and setting a baseline was turned into 14 municipal censuses.

Figure 7-A: Overall Distribution of Financial Resources of the *Educar* Program

- Program Activities: 60%
- Wages and Expenses: 32%
- Logistics, Transportation and Travel: 8%

Figure 7-B: Overall Distribution of Financial Resources for *Educar* Program Activities

- PEADS-SERTA: 45%
- Other training and networking activities: 21%
- Census: 19%
- ESCCA-CPD: 13%
- Axé: 2%
Figures 7-A and 7-B shows how Financial Resources Management was structured. Figure 7-B provides a specific breakdown of financial resources among Program activities: Census: 19 percent, PEADS implementation: 45 percent, ESCCA services: 13 percent, cost of the Axé Project: 2 percent, and other training and networking activities: 21 percent.

Together, networking and census activities consumed 40 percent of the Program’s resources for activities. These two items are responsible for weakening the PEADS implementation process, which was closely linked to reaching the project objectives: improving education in the schools and eradicating child labor. Included in this 40 percent are training activities performed directly by the Partners of the Americas technical team.

We should recall that, originally, setting the baseline was not going to consume so much time or commit so many financial resources. Once the Program decided to fund and conduct the Municipal Education Censuses in 14 of the 23 municipalities, the need for financial resources to maintain that decision required cuts in funding that had been planned for training activities. The need arose, for example, to dismiss members of the training teams in order to hire technicians to process Census data.

This type of financial management weakened implementation of training processes, which, paradoxically, had already been sapped by excessive demands arising from the failure to set spatial limits. The training teams’ irregular attendance in the field, one of the factors that contributed to difficulties in breaking down teachers’ resistance to PEADS, was one of the worst consequences of this vicious cycle.

In summary, this allotment of financial resources was responsible for the Program’s inefficiency in implementing its actions.
VI PROJECT IMPACT AND SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

6.1 IMPACT CHART

Three impact charts are shown below. Table 9 describes the impacts of the Program’s spatial coverage. Table 10 explains the impacts of its logical actions. Table 11 examines the impacts of the Program’s networking actions. Within the charts, these elements are analyzed according to the following categories: Desired Impacts, Desirable Impacts, Current Situation, and Impacts Achieved.23

The geographical distribution chart shows the lack of spatial logic in the Project Design. The coverage area became immense when a quantitative criterion was set, possibly unconsciously. By setting limits on the coverage area, quantitative and qualitative parameters are created that allow all project operations to be kept with the actual operating capacity. Thus, the negative impacts that so greatly reduced the efficiency and effectiveness of Program actions could have been avoided.

23 The desired impacts are as described in the project design. The Desired Impacts column introduces concepts in order to draw comparisons. The Desirable Impacts were conceived of “as if” the project design had been ideal. In the case of the Educar Program, this would be as if the Program had introduced spatial limits, and a baseline had been developed rather than a census: the two elements that caused many of the problems in implementation. The Current Status describes the stage arrived at after implementation activities were completed. The Impacts Achieved column describes the positive or negative changes the implementation had on the region covered and shows the difference between the Desired Impacts and the Desirable Impacts.
Table 9: Impact of Spatial Scope

| Desired Impact |  • Eradication of WFCL (illicit agriculture and ESCCA) in 35 municipalities in 6 states in the Northern and Northeastern Regions of Brazil.  
• The Project Design implicitly views its coverage as a quantitative amount: the maximum possible coverage. |
|----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Desirable Impact²⁴ |  • View the coverage area as both quantitative and qualitative data.  
• Eradication of child labor in family farming and in its worst forms (illicit agriculture and ESCCA) in the 12 municipalities of Sub-Médio São Francisco in the State of Pernambuco: Lagoa Grande, Santa Maria da Boa Vista, Orocó, Cabrobó, Belém do São Francisco, Itacuruba, Floresta, Petrolândia, Jatobá, Carnaubeira da Penha, Tacaratu and Salgueiro. It would be desirable to cover a geographical area having uniform socioeconomic characteristics, and within that area, reach the greatest possible coverage of the microspaces within each municipality: optimal scope vs. maximum depth. |
| Current Status |  • Actions taken in 23 municipalities: 3 municipalities in Bahia, 1 in Paraíba and 19 in the state of Pernambuco, divided into three territories.  
• The project’s spatial presence in each territory is irregular: The number of municipalities greatly exceeds the project capacity to cover the area, in terms of expanse.  
• The project has superficial spatial presence in each territory: a tendency to cover the widest expanse reduced the potential for greater depth: inadequate coverage of microspaces. |
| Impact Achieved |  • The project’s spatial coverage negatively impacted its overall implementation process, human and financial resources management, institutional networking structures and goal achievement.  
• The failure to impose spatial limits (delimitation) affected efficiency and effectiveness of project actions.  
• The broader geographical scope resulted in a weaker impact on family farming and illicit crops. |

The Logical Action Chart for the *Educar* Program shows the effects that the Census, which replaced the baseline, caused on the overall implementation process. In this case, an element that was meant to set parameters and guide the implementation process was replaced by another element that became an objective in and of itself. It could certainly be argued that the Census may have long-term impacts, since it could be used to establish more consistent and long-lasting public policy. To achieve this, the Program should have had enough financial and logistical support to guarantee that politically and technically acceptable census results would be available to the municipalities within an acceptable timeframe. That is, the Census should have been viewed as a Program objective. That way, the project could have allotted enough financial, human, and logistical resources to meet all of its demands. The Census was an opportunity; however, it was beyond the project’s possibilities. It would have been another matter if the project had only contributed to the Census, providing technical support to the municipalities during the process. Other elements examined are the models implemented to make changes in education and provide services for ESCCA situations.

²⁴ Desirable Impact: Refers to the ideal impact had the project operated within a spatial area in keeping with the operating limits of the Program. Serves as a tool for comparison and measurement of Impacts Achieved.
### Table 10: Logical Actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desired Impact</th>
<th>Desirable Impact</th>
<th>Current Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Baseline and Census:</strong></td>
<td><strong>1. The Baseline:</strong>&lt;sup&gt;25&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td><strong>1. Baseline and Census:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target population identified and monitored. Municipal Education Plans focusing on eradication of child labor. Based on objective, updated data. Strengthen institutions and make public education policy viable.</td>
<td>Reach target population, given spatial delimitation and concentration of project activities, channeling financial and human resources into critical areas (illicit crops) based on current information. The greatest challenge for the baseline would be finding strategies for reaching children working in illicit agriculture.</td>
<td>Lack of specific information on target population, particularly illicit agriculture, due to fact that baseline was not set at beginning of implementation process. The Program’s technical inability to perform quantitative and qualitative processing of the information collected during the 14-municipality census resulted in long delays in returning results. Results were returned to the municipalities as late as the end of 2006 and the beginning of 2007. This made it difficult for municipalities to officially endorse the results, which led to distancing of municipal administrators from the final data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Development of Comprehensive and Inclusive Educational Model:</strong></td>
<td><strong>2. The EII Model:</strong></td>
<td><strong>2. Implementation of the MEII:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children withdrawn from work on illicit crops and included in an improved educational system with PPPs done based on the MEII, focusing on eradication of child labor.</td>
<td>Children withdrawn from work on family farming and illicit crops and enrolled in an improved educational system with PPPs done based on the MEII, focusing on eradication of child labor.</td>
<td>Disagreements among partner institutions made it impossible to develop an educational model. The model developed by one partner, SERTA, which had worked with PEADS since 1996, was implemented. This model’s strengths are in rural education. 14 municipalities received training; however excessive demands due to lack of spatial delimitation lowered implementation efficiency, resulting in Program absence from microspaces and wide communication gaps between SERTA team and teams of teachers. Resistance to the model took hold in many schools due to implementation problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Development of ESCCA Intervention Model:</strong></td>
<td><strong>3. Development of ESCCA Intervention Model:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children withdrawn from ESCCA and prevented from returning by teams of social educators qualified in the prevention and eradication of ESCCA.</td>
<td>Children withdrawn from ESCCA and prevented from returning by teams of social workers qualified in prevention and eradication of ESCCA.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<sup>25</sup> Baseline: Based on the principle that the census was not a viable activity within the *Educar* Program due to its intrinsic financial, logistical and technical demands. It is thus desirable to follow the initial idea of setting a baseline, found in the Project Design. It should have included two different, complementary stages: (a) Geographically referenced mapping of the social, cultural and economic dynamics of family farming and illicit crops in the municipalities of Sub-Médio São Francisco. (b) A procedure for identifying children working on family farms and illicit crops.
3. Implementation of ESCCA Intervention Model:

Serious disagreements led to resignation of the Axé Project from original partnership. It was replaced by CPD, the NGO that had developed the model, which was then applied in 12 municipalities. Of these, 4 did not perform model activities (Juazeiro, Petrolina, Feira de Santana and Campina Grande).

1. Census:

As a typical quantitative strategy, the Census did not have the ability to approach children working on illicit crops. In this sense the impact was negative, since the project lost its central focus. The direct beneficiaries described in the Project Design for Illicit Agriculture were not reached. As a result, the initial status remained unchanged.

Given the delay in returning census results and the loss of official approval, we cannot confirm institutional strengthening or creation of public policy.

Even the few municipalities that did not contest the data still did not make effective use of them in administrative processes.

Unless strategies for official endorsement of the data are implemented, the impact of the Census will be minimal for most municipalities.

2. PEADS:

Wherever the implementation process overcame difficulties, the PEADS model showed outstanding potential for changing educational concepts and practices, linking schools to their communities, teachers to the PETI social educators, students to producing their own knowledge, and students to the need to mobilize the public sector to further development of their communities.

However, it showed little capacity for introducing new outlooks and actions toward child labor in general, and no capacity for approaching the subject of child labor in illicit agriculture.

In general, the PPPs of the schools did not incorporate the PEADS model.

It reached a large number of beneficiaries: The teachers who were trained and the students who experienced the implementation of the PEADS model. In actuality, this was the population effectively reached by the project. They became indirect rather than direct beneficiaries.

3. The CPD:

The methodologies implemented prompted radical changes in the outlook and behavior of teams from municipal public organizations with regard to the issue of ESCCA. Old practices of filing legal complaints, enforcing punitive measures and requiring compulsory actions began collapsing.

Proof of strengthened institutions and incorporation of methodology into local public policy:

The network of institutions and organizations that enact and create public policy on ESCCA was strengthened in 8 municipalities.

The methodology showed enormous potential for identifying child victims of ESCCA and forging lasting ties with them, which strengthens possibilities for withdrawing them from their environments in the mid- and long term. 334 girls and teenage girls between the ages of 8 and 17 have been identified.

ESCCA is becoming visible.
**Impact Achieved (con’t)**

The teams have gained knowledge for education on its hidden dynamics: For example, they confirmed the existence of sex tourism and a trafficking network. One girl in the *Educar* Program was trafficked to Rio de Janeiro. The team knows of cases of trafficking to Recife.

Low impact on reference schools, which showed resistance to the process.

PEADS does not address the need to prepare schools to accept these boys and girls coming from ESCCA situations.

Finally, the Institutional Networking Actions chart shows the positive and negative impacts of the project implementation process, with their determining factors, at the local, territory, state, and national levels. The institutional network formation process had strengths at the local level; however, there were factors that made it impossible to strengthen state and national networks. The difficulty of incorporating project activities into public policy directly correlates with the difficulty of effectively approaching the different institutions involved, both vertically and horizontally.

**Table 11: Disposições de Rede Institucional**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desired Impact</th>
<th>Networks of public and private institutions for the Program objectives at local, state and national levels. Public policies formulated and implemented according to the parameters of the Program’s models.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desirable Impact</td>
<td>Networks of public and private institutions for the Program objectives at local, state and national levels. Public policies formulated and implemented according to the parameters of the Program’s models.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Current Status | **Local Level:**  
Contacts and intensive negotiations were held in 23 municipalities. Mayors and Secretariats of Education and Social Action received the offer for Program implementation.  
Relationships were established at all levels of the municipal education network and the child protection network: School coordinators, schools, PETIs, Rights Councils, Guardianship Councils, etc.  
**Territory Level:**  
The Program divided the municipalities into groups called territories as a way to streamline implementation of its activities. In principle, representatives of these municipalities and members of Program teams were to meet periodically to refine processes and share experiences.  
**State and Federal Levels:**  
The high level of complexity and the great number of contingencies and demands created by the Program’s lack of spatial delimitation weakened its ability to maintain institutional relationships at the state and federal levels. The Program became absorbed in its fieldwork. Despite full participation of institutions such as CONTAG and the MEC in the census process, networking processes that would strengthen implementation of Program actions or formulation of public policy have not been confirmed. |

26 Desirable Impact: Refers to the ideal impact had the project operated within a spatial area in keeping with the operating limits of the Program. Serves as a tool for comparison and measurement of Impacts Achieved.
Local Level:
In general, the greater the number of municipalities in the Program, the lower its networking capacity.

Efforts to incorporate a single model forged stronger ties among institutions in the educational network within the municipalities: The Secretariat of Education, its various levels, and the schools. However, this was still not enough to for the Program’s educational model to be made into an actual Municipal Public Policy. Only some municipalities are committed to maintaining and deepening the benefits obtained through implementation of the PEADS model. Public policies aimed at eradicating child labor in family agriculture or illicit agriculture remain unconfirmed.

The same occurred with institutions in the Social Protection network: the Secretariat of Social Action, the Rights and Guardianship Councils, and Programs that provide services to vulnerable individuals.

In general, municipalities seem to be adopting permanent teams of social workers dedicated to providing services for ESCCA cases. In this sense, there has been progress toward incorporation of the Program model as public policy.

Territory Level:
Due to the spatial dispersion of the municipalities comprising each territory, an institutional network was not formed.

State and Federal Levels:
Because most institutions are unfamiliar with the Program’s implementation process, positive experiences will not move beyond the local level.

There was no impact on national public policy aimed at eradicating the worst forms of child labor.

6.2 PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

The left column in Table 12 on the next page lists sustainability indicators. The right column provides analyses of the project’s potential for sustainability, in light of the implementation process and considering positive and negative factors that would foster or hinder sustainability. Higher sustainability is related to the potential to create action models that could become public policy.

Sustainability indicators are elements in the Program context that could sustain the actions implemented, and therefore indicate possible sustainability strategies. The sustainability potential examines whether sustainability indicators were present in the Program context.
Table 12: Sustainability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process Produce</th>
<th>Sustainability Indicators</th>
<th>Potential for Sustainability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Census</strong></td>
<td>Municipal networks of public and private institutions incorporating the Census into planning and public policy. Municipal administrators taking a leading role in using the data and translating it into public policy. State and national institutional networks validating the Census (IBGE, MEC, IPEA, and others). Implementing strategies for obtaining official endorsement of results. Municipal Development Plans, (general or individual sectors) using census data. Communities discussing census data and seeking solutions based on its indicators. Full disclosure of results in municipalities and [sic]</td>
<td>Low sustainability potential, due to operating difficulties and subsequent delays in returning census data. The Census has yet to be fully endorsed by most municipalities, and thus has lower potential for use as a policy planning tool. Especially municipal administrators’ failure to take the lead in officially endorsing the data. No political force due to lack of action in state and national institutional networks, where the Census has greater acceptance as a strategy. Lack of disclosure of census data at local, state and national levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PEADS</strong></td>
<td>Inclusion of model in Teaching Policy Projects in the schools. Maintenance of the model in schools that have already implemented it. Repeating the experience in other schools, PETIs, and other institutions that care for children or adolescents. Adoption of the model as an element of the Municipal Education Plan: public policy. Process led by municipal administrators, teachers and members of the community. Adoption of the model in state and federal public schools in the municipalities. Adoption of the model in private schools. Discussion of the proposal at the territorial and regional levels via networks of municipalities. Discussion of the Proposal in urban and rural communities. Development of complementary methodological strategies</td>
<td>High sustainability potential, given the proposal’s ability to actually change educational theory and practice, as well as relationships between teachers and students, schools and communities, students and knowledge, and schools and the public sector. PEADS still does not address the need to provide schools with theoretical tools that delegitimize child labor in the communities, especially rural ones. As an educational model, PEADS is coherent and consistent. It needs to develop complementary tools that aim to eradicate child labor in family farming and illicit crops. Resistance to PEADS, which is normal given the culture of educators, who tend to maintain traditional models, particularly in urban areas. If resistance is not overcome, it will diminish the proposal’s sustainability potential. Overall, the proposal has been accepted by municipal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27 Although the census was not considered an objective in the project design, it has been included here as a product, since in practice, it replaced the baseline and became another Program objective.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process Produce</th>
<th>Sustainability Indicators</th>
<th>Potential for Sustainability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>compatible with PEADS that allow observation, identification and removal of children from child labor in all of its forms, especially illicit agriculture.</td>
<td>administrators, school leadership, teachers, communities and students. It needs to be systematically introduced in all schools, avoiding any gaps in communication or staff coverage of territories. Groups of municipalities are already networking to retain the proposal as a model for the local public network.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Methodology and Providing Services for ESCCA | Official endorsement of the experience by local administrators: adoption as a public policy. Replication of experience in other municipalities and states. Adoption of the model as a public policy. Technical supervision and support for teams of social educators, employees and volunteers in the social protection network. Maintain the process of training, discussing and broadening the methodology. Systematization of experiences. Maintain actions for longer period of time. Action must continue independently of the Program. Discussion of methodology in other areas of the municipal public sector. Discussion of the methodology at elementary schools and other public and private schools. Discussion of the methodology in the communities. | High sustainability potential, given the methodology’s ability to actually penetrate the closed world of sexual exploitation of children and adolescents, creating understanding and connecting child victims of ESCCA to the network of protective institutions. The municipalities are in agreement that implementation of this method created positive changes in the ESCCA situation. Teams of social educators are being paid by the municipalities, and all indications are that they will continue to be employed by the municipalities. High potential for the Program to become public policy: It is not very costly, and uses the existing protective network structure. Its experiences have yet to be systematized: concepts, techniques, procedures, strategies, results and knowledge generated about the lives of girls in ESCCA situations. This hinders discussion or incorporation of the new paradigm among employees in the protective network, schoolteachers, or members of the community. There is an ongoing need for education and discussion of this issue; thus, these activities must continue. Omitting or dropping this factor diminishes the sustainability potential. |
VII FINDINGS

Here we will provide complete answers to the specific demands in the Terms of Reference presented by the USDOL to the evaluation team.

First, we will examine whether the Educar Program partially or fully addresses the USDOL-stipulated objectives for EII projects. Second, we will examine whether the Educar Program responds to the results we have reviewed. Then we will respond to the questions asked in the TOR, and bring up other considerations arising from the evaluation process.

Table 13: Comparison of Educar Program to General Objectives of EI Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives of USDOL Child Labor Education Initiative (EI) Projects</th>
<th>Educar Program Compared to USDOL EI Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Heighten awareness of the importance of education for all children and broadly mobilize actors to improve and expand educational structures.</td>
<td>The Educar Program, by implementing PEADS, actually introduces into the municipal context a wide-ranging discussion on the need to improve the educational system based on new paradigms that serve the developmental needs of children and communities. Local administrators approached this discussion positively, and overall, are prepared to implement fundamental changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Strengthen formal and complementary educational systems to give children who are working or at risk of working incentives to take greater advantage of school.</td>
<td>PEADS greatly reinforces relationships between students and teachers, students and knowledge, and students and schools. This encourages students to stay in the school system, since they feel that they are active participants in a process; they play the main role. This gain is produced by the methodology implemented, and affects every child who experiences the PEADS educational process. By lowering truancy, it reduces the risk that children will view work as an alternative. However, PEADS still needs to develop concepts and strategies focusing on the issue of children’s right not to work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Strengthen national institutions and policies on education and eradication of child labor.</td>
<td>If properly systematized, the Educar Program’s experience with PEADS implementation could potentially serve as the pilot program for state and national public policy on education, especially in rural areas. To cover the issue of child labor, the PEADS model must develop complementary methodology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ensure the long-term sustainability of these efforts</td>
<td>Because of its management problems, the Educar Program does not meet concrete conditions for achieving long-term sustainability of the actions it implemented. However, aside from its problems, the fundamental concept of the Educar Program as an EI project has high sustainability potential. It could serve as a pilot project to refine similar initiatives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 14: Comparison of *Educar* Program Results to Expected Results for EI Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected EI Project Results</th>
<th><em>Educar</em> Program Results Compared to Expected EI Project Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Increase educational opportunities (enrollment) for children involved in or at risk of child labor, and/or withdrawn from WFCL.</td>
<td>In the region where the <em>Educar</em> Program was implemented, child labor in family farming is a tradition, and children often work on illicit crops. The <em>Educar</em> Program was shown to be ineffective in eradicating these phenomena. Along with changes in the educational system, effective methods would need to be established to locate and identify working children. Such methodologies must be of a qualitative nature and be ongoing, not simply applied once, and must be tailored to the unique characteristics of illicit farming (invisibility of the children, cultural acceptance, and high risk if approached). We have already mentioned that the Program’s experience with ESCCA methodology can make a positive contribution. Especially because during the implementation process, it showed a high potential for penetrating the uniquely closed world of child victims of ESCCA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Motivate children to stay in the educational system and complete their education.</td>
<td>Overall, the paradigm changes to the teaching-learning relationship made through PEADS re-energized the world of school, for both teachers and students. Initial resistance can be broken down as long as the implementation process is consistently managed (reducing the number of unknowns introduced by lack of continuity), adequate (length of training and monitoring) and official (endorsed by municipal administrators, schoolteachers and the community).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Increase children’s chances of success in informal education, formal schools, or vocational programs.</td>
<td>The <em>Educar</em> Program’s experience was with PETI, which cares for children in after-school programs. The application of PEADS in those programs got a much better reception than in schools, due to the characteristics of PETI: It does not separate children by age or grade, has a flexible curriculum, and focuses on play, art, and sports activities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15: TOR Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOR Questions About the <em>Educar</em> Program</th>
<th>Evaluation’s Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Evaluate the validity of the entire <em>Educar</em> Program project. Assess whether this project contained an appropriate, realistic and effective model for the eradication of child labor in illicit agriculture and in commercial sexual exploitation of children and adolescents in the Northern and Northeastern Regions of Brazil.</td>
<td>The Project Design has problems that will negatively impact its activity implementation process: (1) No spatial delimitation; (2) The specific universe of each target population (illicit agriculture and ESCCA) differed too greatly from that of the other (this imposed a dual structure on the original project, and in practice, led to non-complementary efforts); and (3) In particular, strategies for reaching the population involved in illicit crops were found to be inadequate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR Questions About the Educar Program</td>
<td>Evaluation’s Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Evaluate whether the project’s structure was based on consistent hypotheses (community motivation, government, sociocultural factors, and political and economic conditions).</td>
<td>The original project’s general text on the issue of child labor on illicit crops and in ESCCA, and its conditioning social, political and economic factors is correct and well supported. However, the Project Design does not include local and regional texts on these phenomena. This gap should have been filled by setting a baseline as the first step in the implementation process. This was not done.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. How did the choice of geographical target areas impact project execution? What was the effect of excluding the municipalities originally included in the project?</td>
<td>The Project Design failed to set spatial delimitation criteria that considered the project’s predetermined operating capacity, based on previously established funding, human resources, and time constraints. In practice, its goal of reaching 35 municipalities in 6 northern and northeastern states greatly exceeded its actual capacity. Only 23 were reached during the implementation process. However, even these were served quite inefficiently. The impacts of this were negative: excessive operating demands, overloaded human resources, overspending on logistics, internal management conflicts, and, especially, difficulty implementing actions uniformly in all intended targets. This created spatial discontinuity (in terms of scope) and superficiality (in terms of depth). A more coherent and homogeneous spatial scope in terms of policy, culture, and geography would have given the implementation process logic and greater depth: It would have reached the greatest number of schools in each municipality while providing adequate monitoring.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. What is the project’s impact on its individual beneficiaries (children, parents, teachers, etc.); social organizations (local NGOs, community groups, schools, etc.); and government (local, state and federal)?</td>
<td>The strategies that the project implemented did not identify children and adolescents involved in illicit agriculture. This universe remained resistant to intervention. When PEADS was implemented, elementary school students, especially their teachers and the surrounding communities, had positive experiences with an innovative educational model. Municipal education administrators saw the potential to actually change educational practice and theory. Within this population, it is common for many students to both study and work in family farming. Although these children benefited from PEADS, this did not substantially change their views on child labor, nor their practice of it. The implementation of ESCCA methodology effectively identified and forged ties with children, adolescents and their families who were engaged in or at risk of ESCCA. An invisible phenomenon became visible. This paves the way for a mid- and long-term process of including these children in programs, activities, or institutions within the social protection network. This is still only a possibility.</td>
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<td>5. How effective was the project in strengthening public policy and local institutions?</td>
<td>Using its experience with the PEADS model, the Program created the potential to make sweeping changes to local educational models. Overall, municipal administrators saw this potential, and some municipalities are already organizing to make the process more far-reaching. If the Census had been performed in a timely manner under the right technical, logistical, and political conditions, it would have made an essential contribution toward creation of public policy. This became a lost opportunity. The Program’s actions in training teams of social educators on ESCCA show high potential for creating public policy. These teams of social educators are still doing this work, being paid by the municipalities. This indicates the municipalities’ intent to maintain these activities. The social protection network has also reacted positively to the changes in the approach to ESCCA introduced by the CPD methodology.</td>
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<td>6. Address the overall coordination of PETI with other government programs, considering that the Educar Program targets those sectors viewed as gaps in government Programs.</td>
<td>At the local level, the Secretariats of Social Action and social educators gave positive evaluations of the implementation of PEADS in the PETIs. The PETIs assimilated the proposal more quickly and intensively than the schools. The structure of PEADS is compatible with the structure of PETI: Neither program separates children by age or grade, neither has a set teaching curriculum, and both focus on play, art, and sports activities.</td>
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<td>7. Evaluate the overall effectiveness of the institutional partnership in Program execution.</td>
<td>Serious problems in internal networking among the partners led to the resignation of Axé in the first year and SERTA at the end of the third year of implementation. ICA’s leadership of the Program’s general management processes, and the need to adhere to the agreements and objectives established in the original project created conflicts and negative impacts. There were as many disagreements on logic, concepts, and the stance toward child labor as there were on management, human resources administration, and activity implementation.</td>
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<td>8. Evaluate the sustainability of the PEADS methodology developed by SERTA and adapted to the project objectives and context.</td>
<td>The PEADS model strongly addresses the need to improve the teaching-learning process. It effectively introduces a new paradigm into the teaching system, especially in rural areas. However, due to basic conceptual issues, it does not address the need to eradicate child labor, especially in the case of child labor in family farming. For this purpose, it needs to be supplemented with additional concepts. Also, it does not serve the teaching needs of urban schools considered for providing services in ESCCA cases, the reference schools.</td>
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<td>9. How did the project incorporate the category of gender and the family-culture perspective in its overall activities in the two target sectors, which are very different (illicit agriculture, which mostly involves male child laborers who live with their families, and ESCCA, which mostly involves girls who are isolated from their families)?</td>
<td>As we have already said, the two targets (illicit agriculture and ESCCA) do not complement one another. They operate in parallel. Thus, it is clear that the ESCCA actions, carried out by CPD, focus on girls basically because most of the children in this situation are girls. However, services were also provided to males, given the emerging phenomenon of male prostitution in the region. Another strong result was the ability to enter the world of these children using this method, even meeting their families and understanding their values and beliefs. The other target was never reached. The methodology that was implemented does not approach the world of boys working on illicit crops, does not make them visible, and generates no knowledge about them. Nor was any major progress made in approaching children, either male or female, working in family farming. The partner institutions found no relevant logical elements that would have allowed them to make consistent presentations on these phenomena to schoolteachers. The endorsement of child labor in family farming and its coexistence with illicit crops have created unyielding resistance. The idea of making the eradication of child labor the focus of the entire educational improvement process was untenable, and thus in practice, the project focus became the process of training teachers in the PEADS model.</td>
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<td>10. Actions taken on behalf of Evaluate ESCCA victims. How successful was the project in incorporating the specific needs of ESCCA victims into the educational services?</td>
<td>The methodology applied by CPD within the context of the Educar Program was successful because it established ways to identify the children, families, locations and processes in the (always inaccessible) ESCCA world. The Program has left several teams of social educators in place who are equipped with the theory and consistent practices for continuing this work. It will also leave behind institutional structures and administrators who are more aware and open to new methodological possibilities. However, the idea of establishing reference schools as an element for immediate inclusion [of ESCCA victims] turned out to be ineffective. The schools’ resistance to the children and the inability to make this specific demand compatible with the PEADS model made it impossible to establish it as an alternative. The girls’ resistance to the schools also had an influence. The slow process of building relationships should also allow educational alternatives for these children and adolescents to emerge.</td>
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<td>11. Evaluate the actions taken on behalf of children working in illicit agriculture. How successful was the project in incorporating the specific needs of child workers in illicit agriculture into the educational services? What could be learned from the Educar Program about child labor in illicit activities?</td>
<td>As we have already stated, this specific population was not reached. Thus, knowledge about this world was not increased. It is now possible to formulate new ideas about children who attend school and work with their families on family farms. Especially from the viewpoint of giving students tools to strengthen their ability to work in the fields; that is, making them carriers of knowledge who can add value, not simply work as unskilled, unpaid laborers. This is not a tool for eradicating child labor, but a way to keep children from being exhausted by unskilled, dangerous tasks that result in low productivity and little profit. They should become creators of wealth by using sustainable practices in the fields. Perhaps this new approach can move past any further discussion of help vs. work and allow new logical developments to emerge.</td>
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<td>12. USDOL views those children withdrawn or prevented from engaging in child labor through the project’s direct educational services as direct project beneficiaries. Was the project able to collect accurate data on its direct beneficiaries and obtain reports containing common USDOL indicators (withdrawal, prevention, retention, and completion)? USDOL requires partners to follow up on the status of every direct beneficiary. Did the project follow up on the status of children prevented from engaging in or withdrawn from child labor?</td>
<td>This is a monitoring exercise based on the census survey. However, it is difficult to interpret these data based on USDOL definitions. It may be necessary to include as Program beneficiaries all those teachers who received PEADS training and implemented the methodology at their schools, as well as their pupils. Quantitatively, this procedure would be more feasible and legitimate. From the evaluatory viewpoint, there is no way to count the children withdrawn from illicit agriculture or family farming. In practice, the direct beneficiaries established in the Project Design were unreachable, and the indirect beneficiaries (teachers and students applying the PEADS model) were the true beneficiaries of the Program’s actions. Since the ESCCA universe is quantitatively small, it should be possible to perform quantitative and qualitative monitoring, if not on those children withdrawn from ESCCA and enrolled in school, at least on children who were reached and remain in contact with teams of social educators, and those who participate on a part- or full-time basis, temporarily or permanently, in programs, services, courses, workshops, and the like.</td>
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<td>13. What actions or results of the Educar Program could be considered valuable contributions to the effort to reduce child labor in Brazil?</td>
<td>One fundamental contribution is the paradigm shift in education. The PEADS model has actually improved the teaching-learning process. Strengthening education in the schools leads to higher numbers of children staying in the educational system, with their families’ approval. Establishing methodologies for ESCCA intervention that allow institutions to actually approach children working in ESCCA. Replicating this methodology in a wide range of cities and regions in Brazil will allow a shift in the modus operandi of the protective network that is still functioning on the basis of legal complaints, punishment, and compulsory actions, thus keeping the world of exploited children hidden from view.</td>
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| 14. Which actions contributed the least toward achievement of the project’s main objectives? Why weren’t these actions more valuable or effective? Why shouldn’t the project have pursued these actions? What would have been more valuable? | **Lack of logic in spatial scope:** diluted the Program’s presence and in general, burdened its operating capacity and resources. Proper spatial delimitation would have allowed a consistent implementation process and caused a much greater impact.  
**The Baseline:** Since it was in the Project Design, it had an essential function. The set of methodologies and instruments that should have been applied, but were not, left the project with no means of identifying children in illicit agriculture, and no monitoring mechanisms.  
**The Education Census:** Because of its technical difficulties and consequent delays in data processing, the failure [of municipalities] to endorse its results, in addition to the high cost of conducting it in 14 municipalities, decreased funding for training activities and greatly increased expenses and work locations, the Census was one of the activities that contributed the least to the general objectives of the proposal.  
The decision to perform 14 censuses seems to have followed the same logic as the proposed spatial scope: the bigger, the better. It failed to take the project’s financial and operational limits into account.  
However, the Census, which was entirely financed and controlled by the Program, took on a paternalistic character. Conducting a census is the duty of the municipalities. Although many municipalities have technical or even financial difficulties, a census is not something that can be wholly provided by a private entity, even if it has no hidden political agenda.  
Setting the baseline proposed in the original Project Design would have: yielded essential information about the universe of children working on family farms and in illicit agriculture, allowed more accurate and logical decisions on spatial scope, and focused project activities in critical areas. |
<p>| 15. Have there been any unexpected consequences or results, positive or negative, of the project’s actions or activities? | Due to its failure to collect preliminary data because no baseline was established, the project lost the opportunity to better understand the universe of children in illicit agriculture and to conduct a process of inclusion and monitoring of these children in lawful environments. The target population was never actually reached. |</p>
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<td>16. What are the implications of the project results for future programs?</td>
<td>Future programs will need to take particular care with the Project Design, and implement qualitative, ongoing research tools that actually allow the target population to be effectively approached. Because of its nature, this phenomenon cannot be observed using quantitative, single-use methods. Projects must therefore set up strategies that take a continuous approach toward reaching and understanding these populations. The results seen with the strategies implemented for ESCCA should provide ideas for other experiences: The lengthy process of approaching children in ESCCA allowed [teams] to create real, more sustainable conditions for removing these children from their situations. Experience shows that this is a process, not a series of single, isolated events. Time, consistency, and a persistent approach will be essential parts of any methodologies that are conceived and implemented. Parameters for a logical spatial scope must be established before the implementation process is begun. This means prior evaluation of the factors (financial, human, technical, and logistical resources) that will determine the project’s operating capacity, relative to its objectives and spatial scope. It is important to evaluate the conceptual and ideological bases that motivate and legitimate partner institutions’ participation in social projects. Such differences cannot be allowed to overpower the need for the project to steer its partners’ actions toward the objectives set forth in its design. Any differences must be clarified before implementation is begun, so that the project can present an agreed-upon set of concepts and practices. Especially when the project deals with culturally ingrained phenomena, such as family farming. This means assuming and defending difficult positions in dealings with communities and institutions. Finally, as the Educar Program did, we should include the goal of changing perceptions of the phenomenon, raising institutional and community awareness, and the like.</td>
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### LESSONS LEARNED

#### Table 16: Lessons Learned, by Evaluation Category

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<td><strong>Project Design/Implementation Issues</strong></td>
<td>View the project area as both quantitative and qualitative information. Quantitatively, the project must define the geographical area that will receive services. This is the macro level. Qualitatively, the project must define the depth to be reached by project actions. This is the micro level. It would be desirable to cover a geographical area that has uniform geographical and socioeconomic characteristics, and, within that area, achieve the greatest possible coverage of the microspaces within each municipality: optimal expanse plus maximum depth. In any case, determination of the project space must be made after prior evaluation of the project's operating capacity (financial, human, and technical resources). This will serve to set limits on the project's spatial scope. The characteristics of WFCL, their invisible nature, illegal status, and cultural acceptance must be taken into account when planning activities. These cannot be limits, but methodological challenges. These elements must be considered either in the Project Design or in developing models for approaching or serving those engaged in these activities. This leads to the fundamental methodological discussion on whether to use quantitative or qualitative methods. Due to the nature of these phenomena, quantitative methods are usually ineffective as tools for approaching individuals. To avoid social policing, qualitative processes will need to be established that allow strategic opening of these closed universes. Learning to move within these spaces is essential for understanding its dynamics, rhythms, and weaknesses. Such knowledge of the phenomenon can enable creation of models that actually contribute toward its eradication. In these cases, setting a baseline is an essential stage in the process of creating understanding of the phenomenon. However, this must be done without exhausting the project’s intrinsic needs. Resources would need to be allotted to maintain an ongoing process of data accumulation that would impact the phenomenon over the medium and long term. In other words, it is important to understand that we do not have adequate knowledge to confront this type of phenomenon. Therefore, every project must include resources and actions whose goal is ongoing accumulation and systematization of specific data on the phenomenon.</td>
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<td><strong>Partnership and Coordination Issues</strong></td>
<td>Normally, knowing the abilities and history of an institution is enough to ask it to join a partnership. However, experience has shown us that it is extremely important to evaluate the conceptual and/or ideological agreements or disagreements that each institution’s theories may provoke. These theories may or may not contribute toward partners reaching basic consensus. In any case, such consensus is crucial for developing implementation procedures for project activities. This prior consensus cannot be a given; it must actually be established. That way, when outside institutions’ conceptual or ideological views on the central project elements inevitably clash with those of the internal partners, the partners will have a solid, consensual response. Thus, every partner would be ready to take on the inevitable onus of these confrontations, and contradictory statements by partners would be avoided.</td>
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### Management and Budget Issues

The spatial scope of a project cannot exceed its operating capacity, which is determined by very objective factors: financial resources, human resources, and technical resources. It is management’s task to obtain maximum results within these limits. However, it must not throw off the implementation process by creating myriad demands that begin to spread the project too thin, weakening its actions and exceeding its teams’ operating capacities, or even reducing team size, thus damaging implementation of crucial project actions.

### Sustainability and Impact

In general, sustainability is seen as something that is dependent on the decisions of public entities to incorporate an action or set of actions into public policy. When this fails to happen, it is usually because the entities lack adequate funding, or because the actors involved have changed before the final policy can be created. We therefore need to seek other ways to ensure sustainability. For example, get the target population of an action to incorporate a new methodology or new perspective with such force that the methodology or perspective becomes a grassroots policy demand. That is, an action becomes sustainable when it creates a solid consensus among the target population about how to deal with a specific phenomenon. In the case of family farming, for example, it is well known that as long as the population holds firm to the conviction that this type of work is not harmful to children, it will not demand that municipal administrators set a policy to eradicate it. Meanwhile, municipal administrators feel that they will become unpopular if they attempt to set such a policy. This differs from what is happening with ESCCA. In this case, most of the population feels uncomfortable about the phenomenon, and the actions that have been implemented provide (as happened in the *Educar* Program) effective methodologies and tools for the Program teams to obtain effective results. Thus, the process of consolidating public policy moves from the bottom to the top, and gives administrators reasons and political motives to incorporate an action into public policy.
## Table 17: Good Practices, by Evaluation Category

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<th>Category</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Project Design/Implementation Issues</strong></td>
<td>Introduction of educational models containing conceptual and practical elements that are consistent and have been sufficiently tested: the PEADS model. One highly positive factor is that this educational proposal was developed in the same cultural context in which it was implemented.</td>
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<td>Introduction of PEADS to schools in remote locations (for example, on the islands of the São Francisco River in the municipality of Belém do São Francisco) and getting results qualitatively equal to those from better-equipped schools in better locations.</td>
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<td>Research done by the schools on the socioeconomic and environmental status of the municipalities, and return events, such as those that promote a closer relationship between the schools and their communities.</td>
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<td>Development of daring models for serving children in ESCCA situations by proposing essential procedures as crucial elements in the process: for example, identifying children and forging ties with them. The basic contribution is to provide methodological procedures that lift the veil of invisibility from the phenomenon while distancing themselves from classic procedures such as legal complaints, punishment, and compulsory actions.</td>
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<td>A non-invasive, non-punitive approach to the families of children in ESCCA situations.</td>
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<td>Relationships that teams of social educators have formed with children in ESCCA situations in Paulo Afonso (BA) and Lagoa Grande (PE), have allowed deep understanding of the dynamics of the phenomenon.</td>
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<td><strong>Partnership and Coordination Issues</strong></td>
<td>Institutional networks at the local level created positive spaces for project implementation.</td>
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<td>Systematic involvement of the Secretaries of Education in the PEADS implementation process in the municipalities.</td>
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<td>Systematic involvement of the Secretaries of Social Action and the entities comprising the social protection network in implementation of the methodology for serving individuals in ESCCA situations.</td>
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<td>Partnerships with other institutions to broaden the social protection network, offering workshops and courses for children in ESCCA situations in Paulo Afonso.</td>
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<td>Involvement of PETI centers in the implementation of PEADS. Rapprochement of schools to PETI.</td>
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<td><strong>Sustainability and Impact</strong></td>
<td>Incorporating teams of social educators into the municipal structure is a way to sustain actions beyond the end of the Program.</td>
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<td>Diffusion of the education and ESCCA models from the bottom up, thus creating another way of viewing these phenomena. The use of these models then becomes a demand for administrators and encourages translation of these actions into public policy.</td>
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CONCLUSIONS

- The *Educar* Program has serious design flaws in its spatial component. The consequences of this were clear throughout the implementation of project actions, and in fact compromised its viability. The spatial structure was actually modified during the implementation process, with successive reductions in scope.

- Spatial delimitation criteria needed to be established in the Project Design. These limits ought to be arbitrarily imposed wherever there is such a high incidence of WFCL in a territory that no project would be able to intervene. Herein lies the danger of taking action based on a desire to tackle the entire problem.

- The baseline was the initial task in the project implementation process, and its objective was to quickly create tools to facilitate implementation; however, it was replaced by 14 Education Censuses. The project’s specific population in illicit agriculture remained unreachable. In actuality, the real beneficiaries of project actions were its indirect beneficiaries: teachers and students who were trained in the PEADS model.

- The Program did not demonstrate technical or political abilities during its performance of the municipal censuses. The excessive delay in obtaining census results had harmful effects on subsequent project phases. The Census greatly increased already excessive demands, created internal conflicts, and introduced unexpected contingencies into the overall implementation process. Finally, due to all of these circumstances, the Census lost the potential to create a lasting impact on education in the municipalities. The need remains to establish strategies for official endorsement of the Census.

- Implementation of the PEADS model greatly strengthened relationships between students and teachers, students and knowledge, and students and schools. This increased student retention rates in the school system. This gain resulted from implementation of the PEADS methodology. It will affect every child who experiences the PEADS-based educational process. By lowering truancy, it lowers the risk that children will view work as an alternative. However, PEADS still needs to develop concepts and strategies that focus on the issue of children’s right not to work.

- The geographical presence of PEADS was unsatisfactory. Not because of a lack of targets, or trainers’ lack of skills. But because of the lack of more stringent spatial delimitation, which would have allowed criteria to be set for selecting more meaningful targets that would have fit within the actual operating potential of the project teams and resources.

- The methods implemented for providing services in ESCCA situations sparked significant changes in understanding and behavior toward the phenomenon. The old practices of legal complaints, punishment, and compulsory actions began losing ground. There is confirmation that institutions have been strengthened and that the methodology has been incorporated into local public policy.
The ESCCA methodology makes the phenomenon visible. The teams found ways to gain understanding of its hidden dynamics, confirming the existence of sex tourism and a trafficking network. Low impact on reference schools, which proved to be resistant to the process. PEADS does not address the need to prepare these schools to welcome children coming from ESCCA situations.

Program actions were not able to reach children working in illicit agriculture. The methodology implemented did not approach the world of boys working on illicit crops, did not make them visible, and generated no knowledge about them. Nor was there any major progress confirmed in approaching children, male or female, working in family farming. The partner institutions found no relevant logical elements that would have enabled them to make consistent presentations to schoolteachers on these phenomena. The PEADS model does not include methodological tools for obtaining positive results.
RECOMMENDATIONS

- There is a need to set up strategies for official endorsement of the municipal censuses by state and national institutions, such as MEC and IBGE, which can validate the process and the results, thus legitimizing the Census in the municipalities.

- A more focused effort will be needed to divulge and debate the Municipal Census data.

- It will be important to encourage and endorse all of the possibilities that are emerging from continued use and/or expansion of the PEADS model in the municipalities of the region.

- Systematize experiences with PEADS, especially in rural schools and PETIs, in order to shed light on other educational experiences in other regions of the country.

- Collect and systematize data on the individual experiences of schools that best developed the PEADS model. Create a way to recognize the achievement of these teams of teachers and make their results known. For instance, create a collection of poetry, improvisations, music and drawings by students from a broad array of schools.

- Reinforce and continue ESCCA training and monitoring activities in order to consolidate results.

- Systematize the methodology implemented in ESCCA cases, organize its concepts, and promote its public debate. Systematize knowledge of the phenomenon gained through implementation of the methodology.

- Formally present the results of the process to the national institutions in FNPETI and other international institutions, such as the ILO.

- In future programs of this type, it will be important to:
  - Pre-evaluate the spatial scope of projects to establish their viability.
  - Encourage qualitative criteria for approaching phenomena that are difficult to handle because they are illegal, hidden, or culturally ingrained. In the future, projects should establish ongoing strategies for approaching and understanding these universes.
  - Evaluate the conceptual and theoretical dispositions of potential partner institutions to ascertain a priori whether the potential exists for reaching basic consensus on project principles and objectives. In addition, introduce tools for ongoing use in accumulating knowledge throughout the project implementation process.


