How Would Target-Date Funds Likely Impact Future 401(k) Accumulations?

Jack VanDerhei
Research Director
Employee Benefit Research Institute

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Thank you for your invitation to testify today on this important topic. I am Jack VanDerhei, research director of the Employee Benefit Research Institute. EBRI is a nonpartisan research institute that has been focusing on retirement and health benefits for the past 30 years. EBRI does not take policy positions and does not lobby.

Last year, as part of EBRI’s analysis of the likely impact of the Pension Protection Act’s safe harbor automatic enrollment and automatic escalation provisions, we developed a stochastic simulation model to project future 401(k) balances as a function of various plan design variables as well as assumptions with respect to various employee behavioral responses.

Today I will report on the results I obtained using the EBRI simulation model to determine how target-date funds (TDFs) would likely impact 401(k) participants assumed to be automatically enrolled. I realize that TDF use in 401(k) plans is not limited to those automatically enrolled, and our March 2009 EBRI Issue Brief by Craig Copeland provides significant detail on the differences. However, based on our simulation results, it appears that this 401(k) auto-enrollment will represent the majority of TDF use in the future and hence I will concentrate my comments today on those results.

The simulation model starts with all workers, whether or not they are currently enrolled in a 401(k) plan, and tracks them through age 65 by stochastically assigning job change, whether the new employer sponsors a 401(k) plan, cashout behavior, and financial market performance. In addition, we use the EBRI/ICI 401(k) database to statistically impute asset allocation under participant directed baseline scenarios.

Although the model produces several output metrics, the one of most interest for today’s discussion is the ratio of “401(k) accumulations” divided by wage at the time of retirement—or, for purposes of cashout behavior discussed later, the time of job change. Most of the analysis presented today will focus on the percentage increase or decrease of those balances moving from participant-directed investments to target-date funds.

Given my time constraints, I will limit my comments today to the comparison of “average” TDF in terms of equity allocation; however, I have included sensitivity analysis in the appendix for both the most aggressive and most conservative TDFs as well.

As you can see from the table of figures on page 8, I am bifurcating my results into those dealing with account balances at retirement and those dealing with account balances at job change for those who cash out. Although the results for these figures all assume baseline rate of return assumptions (which are provided on the last page of the handout), results for alternative return assumptions are provided in the appendix (Figures 8–12).
Figure 1 shows the interquartile range for the percentage increase in balances moving from participant direction to target date funds. As you can see from the medians in the middle column for each age cohort, the average impact appears to be minimal (less than 1 percent); however this can be very deceiving. The 25th and 75th percentiles show that this can make a huge difference, especially for those exposed to TDFs at a relatively young age. For those 25–29, the top 25 percent have at least an 8 percent gain, but the bottom 25 percent have at least a 5.9 percent loss.

Given the incredible range of asset allocations because of individual participant investment direction, it should not be surprising that the adoption of TDFs has a large range of different outcomes. Figure 2 shows the same type of analysis as the previous figure, although this time the relative gains are displayed as a function of the participant’s initial equity allocation. Obviously, the primary advantage of TDFs when viewed in this context is the expected gains for those with an initial equity allocation of less than 40 percent. Although the median gains are still relatively small (less than 5 percent for all groups other than those with zero equity exposure), the 75th percentile is in the range of a 14–25 percent gain for those under 30 percent equity allocation, while the 25th percentile is only a 2–6 percent loss.

While some financial advisors may argue that less than a 30 percent equity allocation may be optimal for those very close to retirement age, it is likely that this will not be the case for younger participants. To show the potential value of TDFs for young employees, I bifurcate the analysis in Figure 2 for those under age 45 (Figure 3) and those 45 or over (Figure 4). As you can see in Figure 3, the positive results of TDFs in the lower equity allocation range are much more pronounced with the 75th percentiles for those with less than a 30 percent allocation in the positive 25–37 percent range, while the losses associated with the 25th percentile is always less than 6 percent. Moreover, even the median gains in this range are in excess of 5 percent for all groups.

While the previous figures illustrated that TDFs can indeed make a substantial difference in balances at retirement for some participants, another concern that was often expressed after the proposed qualified default investment allocation (QDIA) regulations were released dealt with the potential impact on participants who were likely to cash out their 401(k) balances at job change rather than rolle them over to an individual retirement account (IRA) or retain them in a 401(k) plan. Figure 5 shows the expected impact on these individuals of moving from participant-directed investments to TDFs, as a function of the employee’s tenure on the job. The median impact is extremely small (1 percent or less); however the interquartile range increases with duration, as expected, and the 75th percentile for those with 11 or more years with the employer exceeds 6 percent.

Another related issue during the discussion period for the proposed QDIA regulations dealt with the potential utility of including a stable-value alternative. Figure 6 shows the results of an average TDF vs. a stable-value fund on those who cash out if one assumes that the entire equity portion of the TDF is based on U.S. equity. Two interesting, but conflicting, messages come through:
First, the median increase from TDFs is positive, reaching a value just in excess of 5 percent for those in the highest tenure category.

However, the probability that a participant who cashes out would have had a larger balance in stable value consistently remains in the 40 percent range.

Figure 6a shows a similar analysis assuming that 2/3 of the equity portion of the TDF is based on U.S. equity and 1/3 is based on non-U.S. equity. In this case the median increase from TDFs is still positive for all three tenure groups; however, it reaches its maximum value of 1.3 percent for those with between 6 and 10 years of tenure before falling to less than one percent for those with more than ten years of tenure. The interquartile range of the increase in balances increases with tenure as expected. The 75th percentile figures indicate that 25 percent of the participants in the lowest tenure cohort would have experienced at least a 7.7 percent gain in an average TDF as opposed to stable value funds and that the gain would have increased to 14.6 percent for the mid tenure group and reached 18.8 percent for those with more than ten years of tenure. Conversely, the 25th percentile figures indicate that 25 percent of the participants in the lowest tenure cohort would have experienced at least a 5.6 percent loss in a TDF as opposed to stable value funds and that the loss would have increased to 10.4 percent for the mid tenure group and reached 16.1 percent for those with more than ten years of tenure.

The probability that a participant who cashes out would have had a larger balance in stable value as opposed to the average TDF under this U.S/non-U.S. equity allocation assumption is in the 47-48 percent range across the tenure ranges.

Figures 6a compared the average target date fund (in terms of equity concentration) with the stable value alternative; however, as pointed out in Copeland (2009) there is a large heterogeneity of equity concentrations among TDFs. Therefore, I repeated the analysis in Figure 6a with the most aggressive TDF for each age cohort (Figure 6b) as well as the most conservative TDF for each age cohort (Figure 6c). Since the assumption that 1/3 of the equities are invested in non-U.S. equity appears to be much more realistic for most of the TDFs, I keep this assumption constant for Figures 6b and 6c.

Figure 6b shows that when the aggressive TDF is compared to stable value funds, the median increase from TDFs is still positive for the first two tenure groups but reaches a maximum value of 1.2 percent for those with between 6 and 10 years of tenure before falling to a negative 1.5 percent for those with more than ten years of tenure. The 75th percentile figures indicate that 25 percent of the participants in the lowest tenure cohort would have experienced at least a 9.0 percent gain in an aggressive TDF as opposed to stable value funds and that the gain would have increased to 16.6 percent for the mid tenure group and reached 20.5 percent for those with more than ten years of tenure. Conversely, the 25th percentile figures indicate that 25 percent of the participants in the lowest tenure cohort would have experienced at least a 7.3 percent loss in a TDF as opposed to stable value funds and that the loss would have increased to 14.1 percent for
the mid tenure group and reached 22.1 percent for those with more than ten years of tenure.

The probability that a participant who cashes out would have had a larger balance in stable value than under an aggressive TDF is 48 percent for those with the lowest tenure, increases to 50 percent for those in the mid group and actually becomes greater than 50 percent (53 percent) for those with more than ten years of tenure.

Figure 6c shows that when the conservative TDF is compared to stable value funds, the median increase from TDFs is positive for the all tenure groups increasing from 1.1 percent for the lowest tenure group to 2.2 percent for the other tenure groups. The 75th percentile figures indicate that 25 percent of the participants in the lowest tenure cohort would have experienced at least a 7.0 percent gain in a conservative TDF as opposed to stable value funds and that the gain would have increased to 13.7 percent for the mid tenure group and reached 17.2 percent for those with more than ten years of tenure. Conversely, the 25th percentile figures indicate that 25 percent of the participants in the lowest tenure cohort would have experienced at least a 4.5 percent loss in a conservative TDF as opposed to stable value funds and that the loss would have increased to 8.3 percent for the mid tenure group and reached 12.8 percent for those with more than ten years of tenure.

The probability that a participant who cashes out would have had a larger balance in stable value than under a conservative TDF is 44-45 percent for those with the two lowest tenure groups and increases to 48 percent for those with more than ten years of tenure.

Finally, Figure 7 shows the same analysis as Figure 6 but this time comparing an average TDF with a money market fund. The medians in this case are substantial: ranging from approximately 5 percent for the lowest tenure range to approximately 1/3 for those with 11 or more years in the plan. Moreover, the probability that the TDF balance exceeds the money market account for this group is monotonically increasing from 71 percent for the lowest-tenure group to 85 percent for those in the highest-tenure group.
References

Endnotes

1 See VanDerhei and Copeland (2008) for more detail.
2 See Copeland (2009) for more detail.
3 For more information on the EBRI/ICI database, see VanDerhei et al. (2008).
4 This denotes both the 401(k) balances with either the current employer or previous employers that have been retained as well as any IRA balances that are attributable to 401(k) rollovers.
5 For more information on the return assumptions, see Park (2009).
6 It is important to note that a different set of asset class return, volatility and correlation assumptions are used when either stable value or money market alternatives are included in this paper. Unlike the baseline and alternative assumptions used elsewhere in this analysis, this set of assumptions are based on historical data from 1989 to 2008 (the longest time series available for stable value return data). See the third panel of Figure 13 for additional information.
7 Given the identical return assumptions for U.S and non-U.S. equity in the baseline and alternative return assumption scenarios (the first two panels of Figure 13), it is not necessary to bifurcate the other analyses based on the assumed allocation of equity.
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Figure 1: Increase in balances (401(k) + rollover IRA) at retirement age as a function of initial age in average target date vs participant direction: Baseline return assumptions

Source: Author's simulations based on June 16, 2009 modifications to the EBRI/ERF Retirement Security Projection Model. For additional detail on the model, see VanDerhei and Copeland, "The Impact of PPA on Retirements Savings for 401(k) Participants," EBRI Issue Brief, June 2008
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Source: Author's simulations based on June 16, 2009 modifications to the EBRI/ERF Retirement Security Projection Model. For additional detail on the model, see VanDerhei and Copeland, "The Impact of PPA on Retirements Savings for 401(k) Participants," EBRI Issue Brief, June 2008
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Source: Author's simulations based on June 16, 2009 modifications to the EBRI/ERF Retirement Security Projection Model. For additional detail on the model, see VanDerhei and Copeland, "The Impact of PPA on Retirements Savings for 401(k) Participants," EBRI Issue Brief, June 2008
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Source: Author's simulations based on June 16, 2009 modifications to the EBRI/ERF Retirement Security Projection Model. For additional detail on the model, see VanDerhei and Copeland, "The Impact of PPA on Retirement Savings for 401(k) Participants," EBRI Issue Brief, June 2008
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Source: Author's simulations based on June 16, 2009 modifications to the EBRI/ERF Retirement Security Projection Model. For additional detail on the model, see VanDerhei and Copeland, "The Impact of PPA on Retirement Savings for 401(k) Participants," EBRI Issue Brief, June 2008.
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Source: Author's simulations based on June 16, 2009 modifications to the EBRI/ERF Retirement Security Projection Model. For additional detail on the model, see VanDerhei and Copeland, "The Impact of PPA on Retirements Savings for 401(k) Participants," EBRI Issue Brief, June 2008
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Source: Author's simulations based on June 16, 2009 modifications to the EBRI/ERF Retirement Security Projection Model. For additional detail on the model, see VanDerhei and Copeland, "The Impact of PPA on Retirement Savings for 401(k) Participants," EBRI Issue Brief, June 2008
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Source: Author's simulations based on June 16, 2009 modifications to the EBRI/ERF Retirement Security Projection Model. For additional detail on the model, see VanDerhei and Copeland, "The Impact of PPA on Retirements Savings for 401(k) Participants," EBRI Issue Brief, June 2008
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Prob TDF > SV = .56
Prob TDF > SV = .52

Prob TDF > SV = .55

Tenure

Source: Author's simulations based on June 16, 2009 modifications to the EBRI/ERF Retirement Security Projection Model. For additional detail on the model, see VanDerhei and Copeland, "The Impact of PPA on Retirements Savings for 401(k) Participants," EBRI Issue Brief, June 2008
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Source: Author's simulations based on June 16, 2009 modifications to the EBRI/ERF Retirement Security Projection Model. For additional detail on the model, see VanDerhei and Copeland, "The Impact of PPA on Retirement Savings for 401(k) Participants," EBRI Issue Brief, June 2008
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Source: Author's simulations based on June 16, 2009 modifications to the EBRI/ERF Retirement Security Projection Model. For additional detail on the model, see VanDerhei and Copeland, "The Impact of PPA on Retirement Savings for 401(k) Participants," EBRI Issue Brief, June 2008
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Source: Author's simulations based on June 16, 2009 modifications to the EBRI/ERF Retirement Security Projection Model. For additional detail on the model, see VanDerhei and Copeland, "The Impact of PPA on Retirements Savings for 401(k) Participants," EBRI Issue Brief, June 2008
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Source: Author's simulations based on June 16, 2009 modifications to the EBRI/ERF Retirement Security Projection Model. For additional detail on the model, see VanDerhei and Copeland, "The Impact of PPA on Retirements Savings for 401(k) Participants," EBRI Issue Brief, June 2008
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Source: Author's simulations based on June 16, 2009 modifications to the EBRI/ERF Retirement Security Projection Model. For additional detail on the model, see VanDerhei and Copeland, "The Impact of PPA on Retirements Savings for 401(k) Participants," EBRI Issue Brief, June 2008
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Source: Author's simulations based on June 16, 2009 modifications to the EBRI/ERF Retirement Security Projection Model. For additional detail on the model, see VanDerhei and Copeland, "The Impact of PPA on Retirement Savings for 401(k) Participants," EBRI Issue Brief, June 2008
**Baseline Asset Class Return, Volatility, and Correlation**

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<th>Non-U.S. Equity</th>
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Source: Grant Gardner and Yuan-An Fan, *Russell’s Approach to Target-Date Funds: Building a Simple and Powerful Solution to Retirement Saving*, August 2006.

**Alternative Asset Class Return, Volatility, and Correlation**

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**Truncated Asset Class Return, Volatility, and Correlation Using Historical Data from 1989 to 2008**

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Source: Standard & Poor's, Morgan Stanley Capital International, Barclays Capital, and Hueler Analytics. Note: S&P 500 Index is used for U.S. equity, MSCI EAFE Index for Non-U.S. equity, and Barclays U.S. Aggregate Index for fixed income. Hueler Analytics Stable Value data are used for stable value funds.