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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC HEARING: DEFINITION OF FIDUCIARY INVESTMENT ADVICE MARCH 2, 2011

Department of Labor Auditorium U.S. DOL FRANCIS PERKINS BUILDING 200 Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C.

1	PROCEEDINGS
2	MS. BORZI: We're going to start in a couple
3	minutes. So if the first panel would just come up and
4	take their seats up here, that will save us a little
5	bit of time.
6	MR. DAVIS: Okay. The second day of our
7	definition of fiduciary hearing is called to order. We
8	have Panel No. 8, Mr. Goldberg, Ms. Carlisle, Mr.
9	Reilly.
10	Before we get started though, a couple of
11	administrative announcements. One, it's important that
12	everybody speaks into the microphone. It's really
13	important for the transcript person to be able to hear
14	clearly what everybody is saying so she can capture the
15	words correctly.
16	Secondly, we had a couple of issues yesterday
17	with people plugging their laptops into the sockets on
18	the wall and having the cord so that it traipsed across
19	the aisle. That's actually an OSHA violation and that
20	would not be a great story to have an OSHA violation at
21	the Department of Labor. So we would strongly
22	encourage you not to do that and power up

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1 MS. BORZI: Plus, you'll be removed by our 2 OSHA people. MR. DAVIS: So with those two administrative 3 announcements we will go ahead and get started. 4 Mr. Goldberg with the ESOP Association will start. 5 MR. GOLDBERG: 6 Okay. Thank you. I am Larry Goldberg and I'm here on behalf of 7 8 the ESOP Association. We're happy to have the opportunity to get in front of you guys today to talk a 9 10 little bit about our comments on the regulations or proposed regulations. 11 12 First, I'll just mention, the ESOP 13 Association is, as we say in our comments, an organization that has over 1,000 members, largely 14 15 companies with ESOPs. About 50 percent of the members of the Association are companies with less than 100 16 17 employees and those are companies who really hold the 18 key links to jobs in their local communities as well as 19 the larger companies; the same for the larger employers in the Association. 20 21 The Association is really committed to 22 helping companies put in great ESOPs with great results

1	for the participants as well as all the other parties
2	to the transaction. So we like the opportunity to be
3	able to talk to you guys about how to improve or
4	address problems that you see in the ESOPs area.
5	I have really three comments I'd like to
6	or three points I'd like to make today to you.
7	The first one I'm going to talk about is just
8	the Association would be interested in some more
9	clarification about the problems that you've seen with
10	appraisals and I'll talk about that more.
11	And secondly, we would point out, we're not
12	sure the proposal really will solve the problems that
13	you've identified in the preamble and certainly we do
14	think there are some negative effects on ESOP
15	participants and ESOP formation from the proposal we'd
16	like to talk about.
17	And then, finally, we'd like to suggest some
18	alternative approaches that might better achieve your
19	goals and also promote ESOPs at the same time.
20	So in looking at the comment at the proposal
21	it seems like there's three stated reasons for the
22	proposal. First, that the market for retirement plans

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1	has changed over the years, in the last 30 years.
2	Second that there's some conflicts of interest in the
3	marketplace among service providers and then finally,
4	third, that there's incorrect valuations that you're
5	seeing of employer securities.
6	So with respect to the first point, there
7	are, as other speakers have said, lots of changes in
8	the marketplace. I'm not sure there's been that much
9	change in the ESOP marketplace. The relationship of
10	the trustee hiring an appraiser to perform an
11	independent valuation is actually much the same today
12	as it was back in the '70s when the regs were the
13	rules were in place.
14	As far as conflicts of interest go, I mean,
15	just in looking at our own membership and talking to
16	folks, we're not seeing that appraisers are suffering
17	from conflicts of interest with other parties to the
18	transaction so definitely we could look for some more
19	clarity from you guys on that.
20	I think where that leads us is to focus on
21	the last point, which is incorrect valuations and that
22	that's really the focus of the ESOP aspect of this.

1	The term "incorrect valuations" implies to us
2	that there's sort of a mistakes being made, that
3	there's a or that there's a right and wrong way to
4	do appraisals and so some people are doing them the
5	wrong way and some are doing them the right way. But,
6	in fact, the appraisal really is much more of a
7	professional opinion as to value and professional
8	judgments involved. So I think once someone
9	establishes they're following the Uniform Standards for
10	Appraisals and they're an ASA or other meet other
11	qualifications to perform appraisals, it may just be a
12	matter of a difference of opinion of professional
13	judgment as to whether an appraisal would be considered
14	correct or not.
15	You know, for example, if you're I guess
16	if you're looking at somebody who is just applying the
17	book value method and no other method of valuing stock
18	in an industry where that's clearly inappropriate that
19	may be an incorrect appraisal. But I think a judgment
20	call on what the multiples are, what the correct EBIDTA
21	multiples are in an industry is much more of a
22	professional judgment that we could disagree over.

1	So, I guess, that led us to speculate that,
2	you know, perhaps you're seeing unprofessional
3	appraisal reports and I guess we're wondering whether
4	those are being performed by experienced and
5	credentialed appraisers.
6	You know, as I said, in comparing some notes
7	with other people in the Association, I think what
8	we're seeing is that there has been a significant
9	increase in Department of Labor investigations of ESOPs
10	and a lot of looking at ESOP valuations, but I'm not
11	really aware that there have been the investigations
12	like that that have turned into litigation. And, in
13	fact, a lot of those have been closed out where the
14	Department has apparently found the valuation was
15	perfectly fine.
16	So, let me turn to does the the question I
17	had was: does the proposal really solve the problems
18	that you've identified? I think that, again, if you
19	if the problem is that it's an incorrect appraisal,
20	meaning the appraiser doesn't understand valuation
21	theory, if that's what we're getting at, I'm not sure
22	that solves the problem.

1	One of the, I guess, ugliest things I think
2	I've read in a case in a while was the Gutierrez case
3	in the Ninth Circuit where the District Court really,
4	you know, went on and on about the appraiser who was
5	involved there. I think he either didn't have a high
6	school diploma or didn't have a college degree, was a
7	convicted felon who I think whose felony was
8	related to a financial crime, which is terrible and I
9	don't think any of us want to have those people
10	appraising companies either.
11	But at the same time, I'm not sure making
12	that guy a fiduciary would have changed the outcome
13	there in terms of would that person have performed that
14	
	appraisal and done it the way he did. I think maybe
15	the problem there was the trustee fell down in its
16	duties of not really carefully selecting the
17	professional to provide that service. And so, I guess
18	my contention would be I'm not sure making that guy a
19	fiduciary would solve the problem.
20	In addition, and just looking at there's
21	at least an implication I think in the proposal that
22	over-valuations of stock may be a problem. And in

1 thinking about that it seems like there's both over-2 valuations and under-valuations that can be a problem 3 with ESOP's.

You've got transactions going on where an 4 ESOP's the buyer and you wouldn't want to have the 5 appraiser over valuing stock in those situations but, 6 at the same time, with ongoing ESOPs that are just 7 8 getting annual valuations where their benefit distributions are based on those -- the appraisal, if 9 that's being over- valued the participants, of course, 10 11 are getting more money than they should be getting. 12 So, I think that's -- I'm not sure if we make people 13 fiduciaries here, it perhaps leads to a more conservative approach by appraisers that you're not 14 going to get the outcome you want either because I 15 think then I'm not sure just conservative is the 16 17 solution to the problem.

But, again, you know I think the ESOP Association and other speakers here from the appraisal community would love to have the chance to work with you guys to talk about maybe what -- you know -- what would work.

1 That clock's moving faster than I thought it 2 would. Okay. 3 So next point I want to make is about -- does the proposal -- what does the proposal do to the 4 appraisal and ESOP community and what are some of the 5 problems that are caused? I quess I'd start by saying, 6 7 others have said this yesterday, there is an increased 8 cost to ESOP companies from the proposal and I think those costs take the form first in appraisers are going 9 to need to buy fiduciary liability insurance. 10 11 Right now, I can't tell you how much that Perhaps we can give you some data on that. 12 costs. But 13 what the ESOP trustee community is facing right now is a situation where costs are increasing for their 14 15 fiduciary liability insurance and, in fact, I think the market is beginning to shrink for that professional 16 17 service because of the difficulty in finding adequate 18 fiduciary liability insurance. So I'd be concerned that appraisers are going 19 20 to face the same marketplace when they go out to try to 21 create this new product with their insurers of getting 22 fiduciary liability insurance.

1	The second concern we have is that we may be
2	driving the good people out of the marketplace and
3	keeping the bad people who maybe are producing
4	appraisals that you're seeing that are a problem.
5	And probably first on that list of concerns
6	is that the folks who are working at multidisciplinary
7	firms where there's investment banking services,
8	there's M&A services, there's capital market services,
9	those people tend to be a small percentage of that
10	firm's gross revenues and we're afraid that what those
11	firms will find is that it's not worth keeping those
12	people around because of the additional fiduciary
13	exposure that's being caused.
14	The third cost is, I think everybody who's at
15	a risk of fiduciary, probably needs their own lawyer.
16	So I think you'll find appraisers are going to have to
17	hire their own law firm to represent them in each of
18	these transactions, which adds another law firm to ESOP
19	deals and increased costs.
20	I also, similarly, I think probably every
21	lawsuit that gets filed against an ERISA excuse me,
22	an ESOP fiduciary is going to name the appraiser as a

1	defendant. And, in fact, I think if the case has
2	pretty much anything to do with the trustee's actions,
3	it's probably going to be malpractice for the
4	plaintiff's firm not to name the appraiser as a
5	defendant in the case.
6	And in thinking about how that might work, I
7	mean, there may be ways to shape the fiduciary limits
8	of the appraiser, but then I look at what courts have
9	done with fiduciary rules and I think I'm not sure even
10	if you try to come up with a rule today, you're going
11	to save these appraisers from years of litigation
12	trying to figure out what the standards are.
13	And, finally, I just think there's going to
14	be some confusion between the role of the trustee and
15	the role of the appraiser in trying to execute
16	transactions where now the appraiser's providing a
17	product, which is a valuation report, and the trustee
18	goes out and makes decisions based on report, if, in
19	fact, they're both fiduciaries it may be that there's
20	not a clear decision-maker there because both parties
21	will feel some fiduciary obligation to make things come
22	out the way they think they should come out.

1	So, finally, just to mention some thoughts we
2	had about alternatives, you know, first I think we had,
3	as I suggested, I think dialoging with the appraisal
4	community would be to talk a little further about
5	the problems are would be a great idea.
6	Can I just take about thirty more seconds?
7	I think in terms of independence, if you look
8	to the adequate consideration regulations, they almost
9	defined independent appraiser for us. And I think if
10	you took the opportunity to go back those, there's
11	probably some relatively straightforward things you
12	could put in there like do you think CPAs auditing the
13	financials should or shouldn't be independent? Do you
14	think somebody who's done estate planning for the
15	shareholder other shareholders of the company and
16	have delivered valuations, are they or are they not
17	independent?
18	I mean, I think there are some rules that you
19	could come up with there that would be relatively
20	straightforward. And, similarly, I think in terms of
21	accreditation, without creating a new Department of
22	Labor system that has its own accreditation for

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1	appraisers, which would be way too complicated	
2	probably, I don't think you'd want to do it, there's a	
3	lot out there in terms of USPAP, the AICPA; there's a	
4	lot of standards to look to. I think you could just	
5	borrow those and graft them into the adequate	
6	consideration regulations to create a standard for	
7	accreditation.	
8	Okay. I'm going to stop. Thank you very	
9	much. I apologize for going over my time.	
10	MR. DAVIS: Ms. Carlisle.	
11	MS. CARLISLE: Good morning. My name is	
12	Linda Carlisle. I'm a partner at White and Case and	
13	have served as general counsel of the Employee-Owned S-	
14	Corporations of America or ESCA since its creation.	
15	ESCA is the national voice for S-corporations	
16	owned by ESOPs or Employee Stock Ownership Plans.	
17	ESCA's members include privately held ESOP-owned S-	
18	corporations and many professional firms that deal with	
19	the ESOP community.	
20	ESCA, its member companies and their tens of	
21	thousands of employee owners appreciate the opportunity	
22	to speak with you this morning about these proposed	

regulations that would expand the types of advice and 1 2 recommendations that constitute rendering investment 3 advice for purposes of the definition of a fiduciary under ERISA. 4 In particular, the proposed regulation would 5 make the provision of an appraisal or a fairness 6 7 opinion to an ESOP concerning the value of securities 8 or other properties investment advice with the result that the duties and liabilities of an ERISA fiduciary 9 would be imposed on such person providing the appraisal 10 or a fairness opinion. 11 12 As you know, ESOPs are required under 4975 of 13 the Internal Revenue Code, to be designed primarily to 14 invest in employer securities. Section 401(a)(28) of 15 the Internal Revenue Code requires an ESOP to provide -- to obtain a valuation of such employer securities at 16 17 least annually. 18 In addition, 4975 of the Code and 408(e) of ERISA provide that an ESOP may not purchase employer 19 securities for more than adequate consideration, i.e., 20 21 the fair market value of the employee securities as

22 determined in good faith by the ESOP trustee or named

1 fiduciary.

2	Since S-corporation stock is by definition
3	not publicly traded, the ESOP trustee or the named ESOP
4	fiduciary with respect to the ESOP, cannot rely on
5	market prices or public quotations to determine the
6	fair market value of the stock. Accordingly, such ESOP
7	trustee or ERISA fiduciary generally engages an expert
8	appraiser to give advice regarding the fair market
9	value of the employer securities.
10	ESCA members, therefore, have a keen interest
11	in the effects that the proposed regulation would have
12	on the advisers who provide these annual appraisals to
13	their S-corporation ESOPs.
14	As background, section 3(21)(a)(ii) of ERISA,
15	as you all know, defines a fiduciary with respect to an
16	employee benefit plan to include, "any person that
17	renders investment advice for a fee or other
18	compensation with respect to any monies or properties
19	of such plan or has authority or responsibility to do
20	so."
21	Regulations issued by the Department of Labor
22	in 1975 further defined the circumstances under which a

1	person is considered to render investment advice to an
2	employee benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA.
3	Under the regulation, a person that does not
4	have discretionary authority or control with respect to
5	the purchase or sale of securities or other property,
6	does not have discretionary control, would not be
7	considered to be rendering investment advice or
8	would be considered to be rendering investment advice,
9	rather, only if the five following conditions are met:
10	Such person renders investment advice as to
11	the value of the securities; such advice is rendered on
12	a regular basis; such advice is rendered pursuant to a
13	mutual understanding; such mutual arrangement will
14	serve as the primary basis for acquiring the stock; and
15	such mutual arrangement or understanding will be
16	individualized based upon the particular needs of the
17	plan.
18	Shortly after 1975, the Department of Labor
19	addressed specifically the appraisal duties of a
20	privately-owned S-corporation not S-corporation but
21	ESOP company and issued an advisery opinion, which
22	concluded that the valuation of closely held employer

1	securities to be purchased by an ESOP, did not involve
2	an opinion as to the relative merits of purchasing
3	securities, but that would be relied upon and would not
4	constitute investment advice.
5	That has been the law since 1976. Thus,
6	pursuant to this advisery opinion, the DOL specifically
7	considered whether a person who provides an ESOP with a
8	valuation opinion with respect to closely held employer
9	securities should be considered to be a fiduciary and
10	determined that it should not.
11	The Department of Labor in the proposed
12	regulations has stated in the Preamble why you think it
13	is appropriate now to change the law that has existed
14	for a couple of decades. The Preamble notes that a
15	common ERISA violation is found to be in their in
16	your enforcement initiative with respect to ESOPs'
17	incorrect valuations of employer securities. And these
18	cases include instances in which planned fiduciaries
19	have reasonably relied on faulty valuations prepared by
20	professional appraisers.
21	The Preamble states that the Department of
22	Labor believes that broadening the definition of

1	investment advice to include appraisals and fairness
2	opinions may directly or indirectly address these
3	enforcement issues and align the duties of such
4	appraisals such appraisers with those of the plan
5	fiduciaries.
6	The proposed regulations would expand the
7	types of advice and recommendations that result in
8	fiduciary status to include the provision of an
9	appraiser for a fairness opinion.
10	This change would supercede the DOL's 1976
11	advisery opinion, thus fiduciary status would be
12	imposed on all persons who provide an ESOP with an
13	appraisal for the purchase of employer securities or
14	with respect to its required annual valuation.
15	ESCA is concerned about the proposed
16	regulation because it would in it results in a major
17	expansion of the legal liability and increased costs of
18	insurance for appraisers.
19	ESCA understands that for many top-tier
20	appraisal firms, ESOP appraisals are not a major
21	portion of the firm's business.
22	ESCA's concerned that such established and

1	well-respected appraisal firms will choose to
2	discontinue their ESOP appraisal work rather than face
3	the additional legal exposure and insurance costs that
4	come with fiduciary obligations. Removing the most
5	experienced and competent ESOP appraisers for the ESOP
6	appraisal market will force many ESOPs to use smaller
7	and less experienced appraisers who may not be able to
8	provide superior service and necessary ESOP expertise.
9	In addition, increased insurance costs that
10	ESOP appraisers will incur will be passed on to the
11	ESOP.
12	ESCA's concerned that such increased costs
13	will diminish the retirement savings of the S-
14	corporation ESOP participants and may discourage the
15	formation of S-corporation ESOPs.
16	Thus, ESCA's concerned that expanding the
17	definition will not improve the quality of appraisals
18	but rather will have the perverse effect of reducing
19	the number of competent appraisers available to make
20	such valuations and would significantly increase ESOPs'
21	cost of obtaining the necessary advice.
22	Comments with respect to the proposed

1	regulations have suggested alternative approaches to
2	the problem. ESCA has not endorsed any specific
3	alternative approach but urges the Department of Labor
4	to consider alternative means of ensuring correct
5	valuations. Among the alternatives suggested and other
6	comments it is that regulations provide more specific
7	guidance to ESOP fiduciaries regarding their duties to
8	correctly value employer securities.
9	The DOL proposed regulations issued in 1988
10	that remain in proposed form set forth guidance
11	regarding how ESOP fiduciaries should determine fair
12	market value of closely held employer securities to
13	ensure that such valuations are good faith
14	determinations of fair market value.
15	The Department of Labor, however, has never
16	finalized those regulations and guidance issued by the
17	Department of Labor in final regulations at this time
18	need not be limited to the guidance in the '88 regs and
10	could provide specific guidance regarding the necessary
20	expertise, training or experience providing valuation
21	opinions to an ESOP.
22	My last sentence. It has been 35 years since

		22
1	the Department of Labor first issued the regulations	
2	that govern the types of investment advice	
3	relationships that give rise to fiduciary duties. Given	
4	the potential problems raised by the proposed	
5	regulations with respect to privately owned ESOP	
6	companies, ESCA respectfully requests that the	
7	Department of Labor not adopt the proposed regulation	
8	until it has thoroughly considered other ways to ensure	
9	that ESOP-owned S-corporations receive reliable	
10	appraisals.	
11	Thank you for your time.	
12	MR. DAVIS: Thank you, Ms. Carlisle.	
13	Mr. Reilly.	
14	MR. REILLY: Good morning. Good morning, my	
15	name is Robert Reilly. And let me commit that I will	
16	not take all ten minutes to read my statement.	
17	MS. CARLISLE: I only took thirty seconds	
18	more.	
19	MR. REILLY: It's like the Academy Awards.	
20	When I'm not volunteering for the AICPA, I do	
21	work for a valuation firm. In fact, I've worked in the	
22	valuation profession since 1976. I performed my first	

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1	valuation of an ESOP-sponsored company in 1981, so I've	
2	been performing such valuations for 30 years. And over	
3	that 30-year period, I've performed hundreds of	
4	valuations of employee benefit plan sponsored	
5	companies. I'm involved in dozens of such valuations	
6	each year and I've testified on numerous occasions in	
7	Federal court with regard to the quality of ESOP-	
8	related sponsored company valuations.	
9	And I was asked to say that by the AICPA just	
10	to give my reason for being the member of the committee	
11	who was asked to be here today. But today I am here	
12	representing the American Institute of Certified Public	
13	Accountants or the AICPA, and specifically the Forensic	
14	and Valuation Services Executive Committee, the FVSEC.	
15	Thank you for the opportunity to present our	
16	views on the Department's proposed rule that redefines	
17	the circumstances under which a person is considered to	
18	be a fiduciary under ERISA by reasons of providing	
19	advice to the employee benefit plan or to a plan	
20	participant.	
21	The proposal specifically includes the	
22	preparation of appraisals in connection with plan	

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transactions related to the value of securities or
 1
 2
    other property.
              The AICPA is the national professional
 3
   membership association of over 360,000 certified public
 4
   accountants. The AICPA has a forensic and valuation
 5
   services section for CPAs that perform business
 6
   valuation services and the AICPA administers the
 7
   Accredited in Business Valuation or ABV credentialed
 8
 9
   program.
              ABV credential holders must hold a valid CPA
10
11
    certificate, pass a rigorous examination, have a
    significant amount of business valuation experience and
12
13
   maintain continuing professional education
    requirements.
14
              ABV credential holders are committed to
15
    continuously improving their valuation skills and
16
17
    expertise resulting in increased professional
18
    competency.
19
              Many CPAs perform business valuation
    services. Many of these CPAs regularly value the stock
20
21
    of employer corporations that sponsor an employee stock
    ownership plan, an ESOP, or other employee benefit
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1	plan. These employer stock evaluations are typically
2	performed for transaction, taxation or plan
3	administration purposes.
4	We commend the Department on its concern and
5	diligence relating to the quality of employee benefit
6	plan sponsor company valuations. The issue of the
7	quality of sponsor company valuations is real and it
8	affects plan participants. Substandard valuations of
9	the sponsor company may cause the associated benefit
10	plan to make an incorrect investment decision if the
11	sponsor company stock was improperly valued at the time
12	that the benefit plan purchases the employer
13	securities.
14	If the employer stock valuation is too high,
15	then the plan participants would earn a decreased rate
16	of return on their investment.
17	We firmly believe, however, that treating the
18	sponsor company valuation analyst as a plan fiduciary
19	is exactly the wrong way to address this issue. In
20	fact, defining the valuation analyst as a fiduciary
21	will be disadvantageous to benefit plan participants

1	Let me take a few minutes to summarize our
2	concerns as discussed in our comment letter, then I
3	will spend the remainder of my time discussing what we
4	believe is the appropriate and cost-effective solution
5	to the problem of substandard valuations.
6	As stated in our formal comment letter to the
7	Department, we have four significant concerns
8	with the proposed change:
9	One, the proposed change, the definition is
10	incompatible with the Internal Revenue Service
11	regulations for an independent appraisal of employer
12	securities.
13	Two, the proposed change does not address the
14	underlying issue of proper qualifications and
15	professional standards for performing valuation
16	services.
17	Three, the proposed change will increase the
18	cost of valuation services for ESOP and other benefit
19	plans and,
20	Four, the proposed change will restrict the number of
21	valuation specialists willing to perform sponsor
22	company valuations for ESOP and other benefit plans.

1	First, the conflict with the IRS requirements
2	for independence is a real and significant issue. As a
3	fiduciary, a valuation analyst would have to perform
4	the valuation in a manner that is in the best interest
5	of the plan participants; whereas, the IRS requirements
6	
	require the valuations be performed such that the value
7	is the most correct value without regard to the impact
8	of that value on the end user.
9	Second, holding valuation preparers to the
10	standard of a fiduciary would open the door to
11	increased litigation, which in turn significantly
12	increases the cost of insurance for valuation analysts
13	if they can get such insurance at all.
14	Third, many of the most reputable and well-
15	established firms would likely stop offering valuation
16	services for employee benefit plans due to the
17	increased risk driving the very professionals who are
18	best suited to prepare such valuations away from this
19	work.
20	And, fourth, for firms that continue to offer
21	these valuation services, the increased cost would be
22	passed on to the plan participants through higher plan

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1
    administration costs or decreased earnings of the
 2
    sponsor company.
 3
              So what is the solution? The sponsor company
    appraisals should be performed by a qualified
 4
    individual in accordance with valuation standards. We
 5
   believe a qualified appraiser should have proper
 6
    credentials that demonstrate the individual has the
 7
    education and experience to perform sponsor company
 8
    stock valuations.
 9
10
              We recommend that the Department require all
11
    sponsor company valuations to be performed by
12
   professionally credentialed valuation analysts.
                                                      Those
13
    valuation analysts would be required to prepare the
   valuation in compliance with generally accepted
14
   business valuation standards similar to those standards
15
16
    encompassed by Internal Revenue Code section
17
    170(f)(11)(e) related to qualified appraisers.
              Those standards include minimum education,
18
19
   experience, and licensure or certification
20
    requirements.
21
              We recommend that the Department establish
22
    similar minimum qualification requirements for employer
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1	stock valuations. If the Department would require
2	similar requirements for the preparation of valuations
3	for employer benefit plans, then the risk of a plan
4	receiving a low quality appraisal would be
5	substantially mitigated.
6	The AICPA issued Statement on Standards for
7	Valuation Services No. 1 or SSVS-1 in June of 2007.
8	SSVS-1 established standards for AICPA members who are
9	ownership engaged to estimate the value of a business,
10	business interest, security or intangible asset.
11	Since SSVS-1 was issued, all other domestic
12	valuation organizations have changed their valuation
13	standards so they are professionally equivalent. These
14	SSVS-1 standards outline minimum requirements
15	for:
16	One, the development of an opinion of value;
17	and two, the reporting of that opinion.
18	We believe the AICPA professional credentials
19	and professional standards meet the current valuation
20	and analyst requirements of the Internal Revenue Code.
21	In contrast, the definition of the sponsor company
22	valuation analyst as a fiduciary is fundamentally in

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conflict with the independence requirements for 1 2 valuation analysts as presented in the Internal Revenue 3 Code. Again, thank you for your time and interest 4 I would be happy to answer any questions. 5 today. MS. BORZI: Okay. Let me start with this 6 7 last point that you made because it -- every time I've 8 seen it throughout the comments and I -- I just don't get it, how the Code standard that you have to provide 9 the most -- the independent standard and the most 10 correct standard is fundamentally incompatible with the 11 fiduciary standard. 12 13 In the fiduciary -- the fact that you perform 14 activities in the best interest of participant and 15 beneficiaries doesn't mean you put your finger on the scale in their favor. Both of these standards ask the 16 person doing the valuation to do -- to provide the most 17 18 correct, in the words of the Code, valuation. I just -- please help me, because I don't 19 20 seem to be able to reconcile the fact that you all have 21 -- that you have said here and many of the commenters have said in their comments that these are 22

31 irreconcilable standards and I really don't get it. So 1 2 could you help me out here? 3 MR. REILLY: Sure. Let me answer first and the other panelists may want to answer as well. 4 I would agree if valuation was a science like 5 measuring chemicals in a laboratory or even something 6 as simple as telling time where you could look at a 7 8 watch an everyone in this room could agree that that number is 29 minutes right now. 9 Then, there should be no difference between 10 being a fiduciary and being independent. I personally 11 believe, and I believe the AICPA would -- I'm saying 12 13 this for the AICPA as well. The problem is is a lot of 14 judgment in evaluation. There is always a reasonable 15 range within all approaches that we use, within all methods that we use, within all the procedures, within 16 17 methods, within approaches. 18 If I'm totally independent I want to go right down the middle, and if anything be maybe slightly 19 conservative with regard to the valuation. But really, 20 21 I want to go right down the middle every time a 22 judgment has to be called in selecting procedures,

methods and approaches or -- and the other way around, 1 approaches first, methods and procedures and in 2 3 quantifying the valuation variables that go into each of these. 4 If I'm a fiduciary, however, I can't ignore 5 that within my reasonable range; that would be 6 professionally supportable and I'd be willing to 7 8 testify to, would be absolutely professionally 9 supportable if I know it's in the best interest of my 10 client to have a range -- to have a conclusion that's slightly to the right of center or slightly to the left 11 12 of center. And I could just as easily justify right as 13 left, frankly, I'm going to select right. 14 MS. BORZI: But that's not -- that -- I guess I still don't understand because, again, the fiduciary 15 standard as interpreted by the Department and by the 16 17 courts is not that you ignore everything else and 18 single-mindedly put your finger on the scale so you do 19 -- I mean, so that you do the best interest of the 20 participants. 21 If that was -- if that were true, there 22 wouldn't be any instance in which you could actually

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fairly balance the interest of the participants and the 1 2 other people involved and that's not the way the 3 fiduciary rules work. I really, honestly do not see the 4 incompatibility here. Do you have to be careful? Yeah. 5 But, you know, that's what the fiduciary standard 6 7 demands of everybody that they be careful. So, you 8 know, anyway, I don't see this argument and --MR. REILLY: I see what you're saying, ma'am, 9 but I --10 11 MS. BORZI: I mean, I can see why you're afraid but that's what every -- every fiduciary, the 12 13 point of the fiduciary rules is that you have to be careful. 14 MR. REILLY: I agree. And let me say this. I 15 16 don't believe -- again, we all have our own personal opinion. I don't believe it's putting your finger on 17 18 the scale. I believe the scale has --MS. BORZI: I don't either. I think that's 19 20 what the fiduciary rules say you can't do. 21 MR. REILLY: But I don't think that's what 22 I'm suggesting.

1 MS. BORZI: Yeah. 2 MR. REILLY: I'm suggesting that the valuation scale says anything between 10 pounds and 11 3 pounds is equally legitimate. 4 MS. BORZI: And I don't think anybody, 5 certainly nobody here at the Department is going to 6 waste resources going after somebody who gives a 7 valuation that's within the reasonable range. 8 9 But if you look at the reported cases, one of my criticisms of the Department when I was in the 10 private sector is they only took the safe cases. 11 Thev only took the cases in which no reasonable person in 12 13 America could think, like the case you cited, that that 14 person gave an evaluation that was consistent with 15 anything, professional standards or not. 16 So I don't think that the record that the Department has shows that it's going to go after people 17 18 who make valuations when there's a reasonable range. 19 But I want to move on to another question because I don't want to take all the time. 20 21 The other thing that I noticed about all 22 three of you is that you seem to assume that if the

1	valuator if the person making the valuation comes
2	from a large well-respected entity that somehow the
3	quality of all those valuations is without reproach.
4	And, similarly, you make the point that the
5	most important thing is credentials, you know, how well
6	credentialed people are. Well, again, if you look back
7	at the cases that have been reported and the
8	investigations that the Department has done, what you
9	see is improper valuations are not limited to the small
10	fly-by-night valuation companies. Some of the people
11	that the Department has sued are large well-respected
12	firms. And I don't want to cast dispersion on the firm
13	or firms but I don't I don't understand your
14	assumption that because somebody works at a large firm
15	that therefore, they are beyond reproach.
16	MS. CARLISLE: Do you want to do that first
17	or
18	MS. BORZI: So can you
19	MS. CARLISLE: I'll be happy to. And, first
20	off, we did I did not mean to imply that large firm
21	versus small firm means good versus evil. What I did
22	mean to suggest is that in a large firm that has a big

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1	valuation practice if a small portion of that practice	
2	is geared towards ESOP valuations that firm, which by	
3	definition has a large client base, has large a	
4	large number of employees in the profession, will shy	
5	away, may shy away, from doing ESOP appraisals in the	
6	future. Okay.	
7	I am saying that that firm may, as Robert	
8	said a few moments ago, have people that are well	
9	versed in determining the appropriate range of	
10	appraisals just because they do it for a lot of people.	
11	Does that mean that a small firm can't do that? Of	
12	course, not. Okay. I as well as you know many	
13	excellent professionals in small firms and large firms.	
14	It wasn't generalization but it was meant to point out	
15	that we are afraid that we will lose that pocket of	
16	expertise. Not the only pocket but that pocket of	
17	expertise that resides in the big firms.	
18	Did that help?	
19	MS. BORZI: And finally, I have a request for	
20	all three of you, because all three of you mentioned in	
21	some way that an alternative you would suggest that the	
22	Department pursue is to look look to revitalize, if	

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you will, or re-examine the adequate consideration 1 2 proposed reg. 3 So here's my request. If you could submit for the record some suggestions that you would have of 4 very specific things that given what the proposed 5 regulation was that you think might be helpful if we 6 were to re-examine that to add to that regulation to 7 8 solve these problems. So that would just be my 9 request. 10 And thank you very much for your testimony. 11 MR. GOLDBERG: You know what, one thing I would add on the big versus little. 12 13 MS. BORZI: Sure. 14 MR. GOLDBERG: I would agree with the comment 15 that I also did not mean to imply you guys have an easy of just drawing a line 16 17 MS. BORZI: And because some of the people we 18 have sued have --19 MR. GOLDBERG: -- small is bad is good. 20 MS. BORZI: -- a million credentials. 21 MS. CARLISLE: I agree. 22 MS. BORZI: The highest credentials that

would be. And that that -- that isn't sufficient is 1 2 what I'm suggesting. 3 MR. GOLDBERG: Yeah, one thing that I think the Association wanted to point out is what gets lost, 4 I think, in the community if those firms stop doing 5 ESOPs it's because they are engaged in lots of 6 different kinds of financial advisery services, that I 7 8 think just add to the knowledge pie of this world of 9 the ESOP community, I think, removing those investment bankers and capital markets people out of the ESOP 10 advisery community is just kind of a loss to the 11 12 knowledge base. 13 MS. BORZI: I hear you. 14 MS. CARLISLE: Yes. MR. REILLY: And that was the same -- I don't 15 mean to -- but I think this would be of interest to 16 everyone on the panel if I may. I think that's -- the 17 18 small versus large is not a quality it's how much can you afford? If you work for a small firm and I'd have 19 20 to say, my firm is a small firm, so I don't want to say 21 that's low quality. We can --22 MS. BORZI: But I know some expensive small

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1	firms.	
2	MR. REILLY: But not only well, I think we	
3	are an expensive small firm.	
4	But the question is: Can a small firm afford	
5	the cost of insurance to be a fiduciary? A large firm	
6	may be able to, they have hundreds of millions of	
7	dollars of revenue a year. A small firm may not simply	
8	be able to afford the cost of the insurance.	
9	And with regard to credentials versus	
10	standards, and this is something and I'm saying this	
11	as a CPA and I know the AICPA staff members will	
12	probably throw tomatoes at me when I say this, but it's	
13	not a credentials issue in my opinion. It's not the	
14	letters after your name. The only thing you get with	
15	the letters after your name is the requirement to	
16	comply with standards. Anyone who complies with	
17	standards, whether they're AICPA or ASA or IBA or	
18	USPAP, if you had a rule that the valuation analyst	
19	should comply with one or more of these standards I	
20	think that solves the problems. The only thing the	
21	initials buy you is if I'm a CPA I have to comply with	
22	those standards. I'm also an ASA, I have to comply	

with those standards. I'm also a CBA, so I have to 1 comply with the Institute of Business Appraiser 2 3 standards because I'm required to. Someone who doesn't have those initials but 4 still complies with the standards, you get the same 5 quality. 6 7 MS. BORZI: I mean, as you know, we do a lot of work with the AICPA and the discussion for another 8 9 day is of what real teeth -- what real teeth these have -- these standards have, what kind of enforcement. 10 That's not the issue today. 11 12 So let me just turn it over to Michael. 13 MR. DAVIS: Yeah, and I wanted to ask about 14 this cost issue, the fiduciary insurance issue which you just brought up, Mr. Reilly. And I would ask this 15 16 of all the panel. 17 You all testified that you're concerned about 18 the availability of fiduciary insurance, the cost of that insurance. Can you be more specific? 19 I think, Mr. Goldberg, you said you don't have that data with 20 21 you but you could send it forward maybe for the record. 22 But if you guys could give us a better sense

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1	of now, who are the providers? How much does it cost?
2	How is it priced? Is there really an issue with
3	capacity in the marketplace today and are you concerned
4	that if this reg goes forward as proposed, that there
5	wouldn't be adequate capacity to really cover the
6	entirety of the marketplace? Can you be more specific?
7	MR. REILLY: I don't have the numbers, but I
8	could provide them as well.
9	I can say this from my own personal
10	experience. The company I work for is called
11	Willamette Management Associates. It's a funny
12	sounding name, but many years ago, Willamette valuation
13	Willamette Management Associates was a registered
14	investment adviser where in addition to performing
15	valuation services, we actually gave investment advice.
16	We couldn't afford to continue doing that. The
17	insurance was just too expensive.
18	As a regional firm, we only have three
19	offices, as a small, small firm, we simply couldn't
20	afford to continue operating, giving investment advice
21	because we needed to have the fiduciary insurance to be
22	a registered investment adviser. We just had to drop

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that line of business and focus entirely on business 1 2 valuation services. 3 Every year, the cost was expensive. And that was the decision we made 20 years ago. Now, I've got 4 to believe the cost of insurance is a lot higher today 5 than it was then. 6 7 We could all find, I'm sure, current price 8 quotes for you but it was a very expensive proposition for us. 9 10 MR. GOLDBERG: I would just add, again, I don't have the numbers but I think just to benchmark it 11 12 a little bit, when I see clients buying fiduciary 13 liability insurance for their company and their 14 transactions, the premiums they're paying on an annual basis probably look like -- they're probably actually 15 somewhat similar to the cost of getting an appraisal 16 17 done if not a little bit more than larger companies. 18 So if a company is spending \$20,000 to get an 19 appraisal done it wouldn't surprise me to find that the 20 insurance premium that company's paying for fiduciary 21 liability insurance right now is on the order of 20 to 22 \$40,000 as a premium. So it's not a perfect example

1	but if you graft it on the fiduciary exposure, the
2	insurance company's taking in that policy and saying
3	I'm going to provide this to an appraisal firm, you
4	know, that might be a benchmark to look at.
5	But I do think that, you know, the appraisal
6	community perhaps can come up with better data to give
7	you on it.
8	MR. DAVIS: And is that fiduciary insurance
9	provider marketplace a fairly diffuse set of providers
10	or is it just a few who sort of dominate the market and
11	sort of have a lot of control over
12	MR. GOLDBERG: Few who dominate the market.
13	MR. DAVIS: Is that right?
14	MR. GOLDBERG: I would would you
15	MR. REILLY: That was exactly our experience.
16	MS. CARLISLE: Yeah.
17	MR. REILLY: We went through an insurance
18	broker and we received a quote from two or three
19	companies every year and we understood that was
20	basically those were the players.
21	MS. CARLISLE: But I understand you're asking
22	for more than anecdotal?

44 1 MR. DAVIS: Right. 2 MS. CARLISLE: If we can provide it. 3 MR. DAVIS: That would be great. MS. CARLISLE: Yeah, and we -- all I can give 4 you is anecdotal and we'll see what we can do to 5 provide you with. 6 7 MR. DAVIS: That would be great. 8 And, Mr. Goldberg, I just had a question. I'm just really excited that the Association's testifying. 9 But I did want to understand better the Association 10 11 itself. It represents both corporations and there's a 12 13 second there professional membership for service providers? 14 15 MR. GOLDBERG: Right. MR. DAVIS: Are there circumstances that may 16 land differently for those two classes of groups that -17 18 - for which their interest may diverge? 19 MR. GOLDBERG: Between service providers and 20 companies? 21 MR. DAVIS: That's right. 22 MR. GOLDBERG: Sure. Yeah. I think that's

1	right. I mean, the you know, the company members
2	the organization is really I guess I would describe
3	it this way. The organization is really a company-
4	dominated organization. It exists for the benefit of
5	the companies that have ESOPs. And I can tell you as a
6	service provider our expectation is we're supposed to
7	donate lots of free time helping stock companies and
8	volunteer our services.
9	So I think but if you you know, if you
10	looked at the for example, the impact of this, I
11	mean, I think increasing the cost to ESOP companies of
12	having an ESOP might cause ESOP companies to either
13	abandon their ESOP or companies that don't have an ESOP
14	to not have one. That's an impact.
15	But on the service provider side, you know, I
16	think there are some service providers who may look at
17	this and say, you know, the best thing that could
18	happen here is you guys drive out of business three or
19	four of my biggest competitors and I'm a member of the
20	ESOP Association and that's probably not a bad outcome
21	for me from a business standpoint.
22	So, I think there could be some mixed, you

1	know, interest among the service providers of the ESOP
2	Association. But really in giving our comments, I
3	think what's most constructive for you guys and what
4	we're trying to convey is really what the company
5	members who have employee ownership are looking at.
6	MR. DAVIS: That's great. Thank you so much.
7	MS. CARLISLE: Well, let me let me also
8	just mention, because ESCA also has service providers
9	and member companies.
10	ESCA is primarily though a member company
11	organization. So the comments are taking into account
12	the views of our advisers but it is truly focusing on
13	the impact to the S-corporation ESOP
14	MR. DAVIS: Okay.
15	MS. CARLISLE: company.
16	MR. DAVIS: Thank you very much.
17	MS. CARLISLE: Thank you.
18	MR. LEBOWITZ: So it seems to me that we
19	have, I think, a consensus that there's a problem in
20	the with valuations in the context of ESOPs. We
21	certainly think there's a problem. And as someone who
22	has some responsibility for an enforcement program, you

know, I kind of see that problem almost everyday. 1 2 And the frustrating part I think I can 3 represent from our point of view of our investigators and our enforcement people is that what we see is that 4 the individual who who's at the center of the 5 transaction is essentially unreachable under the 6 current rules in any enforcement legal process. 7 8 And all that means is that everybody else has more responsibility, more liability, but ultimately the 9 loss may fall on the participants themselves because we 10 can't reach the person who was really -- who, as I said 11 and I think you would agree, is at the center of the 12 13 transaction, the person whose expertise is essential to a determination of how much the plan's going to pay for 14 15 these assets. 16 And, you know, I think any solution to the problem has to be -- has to take that into account that 17 18 there's a -- it's a situation that cries out for some 19 kind of resolution. And I'm not sure that, you know, 20 as Phyllis was saying, adding requirements for 21 credentials in the absence of any kind of effective 22 mechanism for enforcing those credentials, we could put

credentials in a regulation, but if there's no sanction 1 2 for not requiring -- for not meeting those standards, 3 what's the point? We already have a situation in the auditing 4 area where a plan administrator is required to hire an 5 auditor to perform an audit on behalf of participants 6 and beneficiaries. If the auditor performs a sub-7 8 standard audit who gets penalized? It's not the 9 auditor under our statute, it's the plan -- it's the plan basically, it's the plan administrator. I don't 10 11 think we need another one -- another odd provision like 12 that. 13 So, I mean, that's -- those are more 14 observations than questions, I guess. But, let me ask Mr. Reilly, tell me what the role of the plan's auditor 15 is in transaction -- in conducting an audit in the 16 17 context of an ESOP, and specifically, with regard to 18 the valuation. Does the auditor have any responsibility for determining whether it's a 19 20 reasonable audit? I mean, what is the -- just what are 21 they supposed to do, because they're ultimately going 22 to issue an opinion?

49 1 MR. REILLY: Surely. But, remember, there 2 are two really fundamentally different opinions. There's the audit opinion prepared by the CPA and the 3 valuation opinion. 4 MR. LEBOWITZ: And I'm talking about the 5 auditor's opinion. 6 7 MR. REILLY: Okay. 8 MR. LEBOWITZ: And I'm talking about the auditor's opinion. The auditor is going to render an 9 opinion for the plan. 10 11 MR. REILLY: Sure. 12 MR. LEBOWITZ: About the financial statements 13 that the plan has issued. MR. REILLY: Surely. In that case, and 14 15 again, I'm a valuation guy. It's been over 30 years since I was an audit guy for a few years. But the 16 17 auditors do have to comply with auditing standards. So 18 they do have to comply with the SASs, the Statements of 19 Auditing Standards in auditing any entity including an 20 employee benefit plan. And if there are valuation 21 aspects to the financial statements as their would be 22 in fair value accounting in certain corporations or in

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this case, the value of the employer securities, they 1 2 do have to comply with the SAS requirements for 3 performing due diligence procedures with regard to the valuation. 4 That doesn't mean they recreate the 5 valuation, they don't --6 7 MR. LEBOWITZ: Well, what does it mean? 8 That's my question, what does it mean? What -- just what does the auditor pass -- does the auditor pass 9 Does the auditor have a responsibility to 10 judgment? say this looks -- this doesn't look right, I'm going to 11 issue -- I'm not going to issue an opinion or I'm going 12 13 to issue an adverse opinion or a qualified opinion? Just -- I've never really understood this in all the 14 15 years I've been trying to figure out the role of -- you know, just what the significance of an audit opinion 16 17 is. 18 Well, I'm going to have to pass, MR. REILLY: because I personally have never performed an audit of a 19 20 pension plan or ESOP. 21 MR. LEBOWITZ: I would --22 MR. REILLY: I can find out for you and get

1 you a written answer.

2	MR. LEBOWITZ: Well, I see there are others
3	here from the AICPA, but I would I would ask that
4	the AICPA, for the record, give us their understanding
5	of what the auditor's role is in the context of an
6	ESOP, typical ESOP transaction and just and
7	specifically, with regard to the valuation that's
8	prepared.
9	MR. REILLY: I can answer though from the
10	other side, again, being participating in really a
11	couple of hundred valuations over the years. We
12	rarely, if ever, communicate with the auditors. We may
13	occasionally seek questions
14	MR. LEBOWITZ: That doesn't surprise me,
15	frankly.
16	MS. BORZI: Therein lies the problem.
17	MR. LEBOWITZ: I think that's entirely
18	consistent with our sense of things that the auditors
19	really don't spend a lot of time assessing the quality
20	of the valuation. And but I I don't want to get
21	into an area that you're not in a position to
22	MR. GOLDBERG: Can I just add a little bit of

color to that. I do have an accounting degree, 1 2 although I'm not a licensed CPA. 3 So the accounting profession did come out with guidelines that -- a while back that have caused 4 not only plan auditors but maybe more importantly, the 5 auditor of the company's financial statements to be 6 obligated to look at the ESOP valuation and test the 7 8 reasonableness of the ESOP valuation. 9 And I can tell you from experience, the AICPA could comment better than I can. But our clients who 10 have -- I'm sorry, I'm speaking on behalf of ESOP 11 Association and these are our members. They -- you 12 13 know, their experience I think now is that they are 14 turning over their valuation reports to their auditors 15 of their companies' financial statements because they're being required by AICPA to test the 16 17 reasonableness of that. And there have been instances I know of that where there's been heated discussions 18 19 between the ESOP valuation firm and the companies' auditors to really get to the assumptions being made 20 21 and the report and, you know. 22 So I would say, since I think this is, you

know, a relatively recent development that is on the
company side, there's probably more that will develop
from this. But right now I think the start we're off
to is that accountants are looking very hard at these
ESOP valuations.
MR. REILLY: Well, I do know that's true. We
do have to submit either through the company or
directly to the audit firm, our valuations to the
accountants. It may be that we do a decent job because
we don't get a lot of questions back. But we do submit
our valuations to the accounting firm either directly
or through the
MR. LEBOWITZ: Well, again, in the nature of
an observation, in each one of our cases in our
investigations there's an audit and even in the most
egregious situation some auditor has said this is
didn't say anything about the quality of the valuation.
There are other problems that exist in our
statute in terms of being able to bring any effective
sanction against the auditor in that circumstance. But
the point I'm making is that there are auditors and we
do wonder what their what their role is in this. And

1	they are supposed to be the a safeguard here and
2	it's hard to it's hard to know exactly how that
3	process is supposed to work.
4	The only other observations I'm making a
5	bunch of observations this morning. It did occur to me
6	yesterday actually listening to many of the witnesses
7	and then hearing you this morning, talking about the
8	possibility at least that people will decide if we do
9	what we've proposed to do. Valuation firms may decide
10	to withdraw from the ESOP market.
11	I've been around for a while and it I
12	don't know that I could count up there's a number
13	high enough of the times that I've heard various
14	various parts of the employee benefit service provider
15	community say, "If you do this, we're not going to
16	provide services to plans anymore." I'm amazed that
17	there's anybody out there who provides any service to
18	any employee benefit plan, because we've actually done
19	some of those things and, yet, they're still there.
20	But, anyhow.
21	MR. GOLDBERG: I'll give you one example of
22	that, ESOP trustees. I do agree with your comment, but

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1	if you look at the marketplace for ESOP trustees today,	
2	it's very different than it was several years ago. And	
3	I think that a lot of firms that were in the business	
4	got sued. And even when they won lawsuits, what they	
5	found was the insurance costs and the costs of just	
6	being in the business was just	
7	MR. LEBOWITZ: Well, let me I don't want	
8	to	
9	MR. GOLDBERG: too high to make a profit.	
10	MR. LEBOWITZ: take too long but let me	
11	just do you think that might change if the person	
12	who's at the center of this transaction, the valuator	
13	might have some culpability, might share in the	
14	liability for doing it for doing an improper	
15	valuation?	
16	MR. GOLDBERG: In that people won't sue the	
17	trustee but they'll sue the fiduciary?	
18	MS. CARLISLE: They'll sue everybody.	
19	MR. LEBOWITZ: It could be somebody else.	
20	MS. CARLISLE: They'll sue everybody. It's	
21	joint and several liability.	
22	But could I make some observations on your	

1 observations?

2 MR. LEBOWITZ: It's to share it a little more 3 equitably, don't you think? MS. CARLISLE: One observation that you made 4 is that we all -- there is a consensus that there are 5 problems with ESOP valuations. I mean, I'm not sure 6 that that consensus is shared by the private sector. 7 8 Okay. To the extent we understand that there are 9 problems with the ESOP valuations, we will do everything we can to address those, but I'm just noting 10 11 that I'm not sure that there is a private sector as well as public sector consensus there. 12 13 When you say the center of it all is the 14 appraisal, the trustee or the ESOP fiduciary is the 15 person who has to accept the appraiser. Okay? Has to get the appraisal. To me, they are at the center of 16 17 the transaction and they are definitely fiduciaries. 18 So those are just my -- oh, and with respect to services, the other, I agree with you. 19 The sky is 20 always falling and people are always leaving. But I am 21 -- but it is true that costs will go up and they will 22 impact the benefits to ESOP participants and that's

1 what we are concerned about.

2 MR. HAUSER: Mr. Goldberg, based on your 3 experience in the industry, do you think that plan fiduciaries generally when they seek an appraisal, are 4 looking for the most correct opinion as to value or do 5 you think they're slanted, they're looking for a 6 slanted opinion? 7 8 MR. GOLDBERG: Well, I'd say my short answer is I think they're looking for the most correct --9 10 MR. HAUSER: And do you think they breach their fiduciary obligations by asking for the most 11 12 correct opinion? 13 MR. GOLDBERG: No. No, I don't. 14 MR. HAUSER: So do you think then that the 15 fiduciary duty of loyalty in the case of these fiduciaries requires them to do anything other than get 16 the most accurate information about what the valuation 17 18 is so they can act in an informed manner? 19 MR. GOLDBERG: Yeah. Actually -- well, it 20 would, because I think once they've contracted to get this valuation and they've seen the price or more often 21 22 a range of prices, I think the duty of loyalty really

1	kicks in in terms of executing their fiduciary
2	responsibilities as a trustee to decide what do I do
3	with this work product? Am I doing benefit
4	distributions and taking into account a lot of factors
5	about the ongoing company and I'm looking at it through
6	that lens or a transaction.
7	So I guess I would say the loyalty I would
8	say is exercised by the trustee.
9	MR. HAUSER: I agree completely with that.
10	So, Mr. Reilly, when you're doing you've heard Mr.
11	Goldberg testify. I mean, don't you think that you're
12	not doing any favors to the fiduciaries if you slant
13	the opinion in any way? I mean, isn't the best thing
14	you can do for the plan and the fiduciary is just to
15	give an honest rendering of what you think the best
16	value is, including the best range of values and then
17	let them go execute on it?
18	MR. REILLY: Under the current definition of
19	a fiduciary where the valuation analyst is not the
20	fiduciary, I would agree with that entirely.
21	MR. HAUSER: No, but the guy asking you the
22	question and looking for the valuation, he is a

59 fiduciary and I don't think he has any duty to look for 1 2 a slanted appraisal. So why would you have a duty to 3 slant the appraisal if you became the fiduciary? MR. REILLY: Well, while he doesn't have a 4 duty to ask for a slanted appraisal and I'm not 5 suggesting that personally I want to give a slanted 6 7 appraisal --8 MR. HAUSER: I don't think so. 9 MR. REILLY: -- he does have a duty to try to get the lowest price if the ESOP is buying the stock 10 11 and to get the highest price if the ESOP is selling the 12 stock. 13 MR. HAUSER: Right. But that's his job in 14 executing the -- you know, doing the negotiations, 15 doing the transactional work on behalf of the ESOP. And in actually executing his fiduciary responsibilities 16 17 isn't it best that he just know what your best estimate of what the real value is so he can make sensible 18 decisions about what the right point to sell at and 19 20 what the right point to buy is? 21 MR. REILLY: Again, if he is a fiduciary and 22 I am not, I would agree. If we are both fiduciaries or

I'm a fiduciary, now it's my obligation to help the 1 ESOP buy at the lowest price and sell at the highest 2 3 price. So if I can otherwise present a range of 4 values but it's now time for the ESOP to sell out to a 5 corporate acquirer, let's say, I don't have to present 6 7 the entire range. I can present the top half of that 8 range. Now, that's still within my range but I am --9 and I'm not saying that's again my finger is on the scale, because I feel very comfortable with that range 10 but I'm trying to then as a fiduciary help my client, 11 12 the ESOP, sell its -- the employer's stock for the 13 highest price it can get when it wants to sell. 14 MR. HAUSER: Will that anxiety go away if we 15 make it clear in our regulation or in the Preamble that that's just not your duty with respect to the plan even 16 17 if you're a fiduciary? 18 MR. REILLY: That would go a long way, yes, 19 sir. 20 MR. HAUSER: Okay. And I guess going to this 21 range point, most -- I've done a fair amount of ESOP 22 work and most of the valuations I've seen -- and

1	valuation work. Most of the valuations I've seen
2	present a range. I mean, so it is when you're
3	talking about, you know, kind of where within the range
4	your price should be, are you suggesting that you would
5	actually give a different range depending on whose side
6	of the transaction you were or just at kind of the
7	strike point or what have you for the fiduciary, you
8	know, might be in a different point within that range?
9	Or what are you saying?
10	MR. REILLY: Well, again, if I was a trustee,
11	I'm not suggesting I would give a different range. The
12	range wouldn't go from \$8 a share let's say \$20 a
13	share to \$24 a share. I wouldn't move it then to \$26
14	to 30. If the range is 20 to 24, I may present 22 to
15	24. That's still within my reasonable range of values.
16	I'm not going outside the range, I'm not moving the
17	range over. I may be presenting the range that would
18	help my client buy at the low price and sell at the
19	high price as long as I'm still professionally
20	comfortable that I'm within my range.
21	MR. HAUSER: As you understand it, and really
22	for anyone on the panel, is there currently a set of

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1	non-ERISA state law or other obligations that, you	
2	know, require that the valuation firm render its	
3	opinion in accordance with professional standards that	
4	they rendered impartially and that would give injured	
5	parties a means of obtaining a remedy in the event that	
6	you didn't meet those standards?	
7	MR. REILLY: Well, I won't let me just	
8	give my answer and then you'll get the legal answer	
9	from the lawyers.	
10	But I did mention that I have testified a	
11	number of times in what I call and this isn't the	
12	correct title, the "failed ESOP cases." And in those	
13	cases, either what's happened is the ESOP participants	
14	believed that they paid too much years down the road	
15	and the plan itself sues a number parties, including	
16	the valuation analyst. Or, in other cases, the selling	
17	stockholders think that they received too little for	
18	the sale of their stock and they sue the valuation	
19	analyst and the charge there's not so I don't know	
20	if you all could bring this suit, because it's not an	
21	ERISA violation, it's a gross negligence violation.	
22	You were simply negligent or grossly	

1	negligent. You recommended 20 to \$24. It really
2	should have been \$10 or it should have been \$30, but
3	I've testified either in defense of the valuation
4	analyst or as an expert witness against the valuation
5	analyst in probably a good handful of cases two
6	handfuls of cases related to these types of plan
7	participants as the plaintiff or selling shareholders
8	as the plaintiff where numerous parties could be the
9	defendant, the lawyers, the fiduciary, but the
10	valuation analyst is always named as a defendant in
11	those cases.
12	MR. HAUSER: But to what extent do your
	MR. HAUSER: But to what extent do your clients think you're standing behind these valuations
12	
12 13	clients think you're standing behind these valuations
12 13 14	clients think you're standing behind these valuations and accountable for them? How clear are you about the
12 13 14 15	clients think you're standing behind these valuations and accountable for them? How clear are you about the limit being gross negligence or negligence, or what
12 13 14 15 16	clients think you're standing behind these valuations and accountable for them? How clear are you about the limit being gross negligence or negligence, or what exactly is your sense of what your clients understand
12 13 14 15 16 17	clients think you're standing behind these valuations and accountable for them? How clear are you about the limit being gross negligence or negligence, or what exactly is your sense of what your clients understand your accountability to be for the valuations you render
12 13 14 15 16 17 18	clients think you're standing behind these valuations and accountable for them? How clear are you about the limit being gross negligence or negligence, or what exactly is your sense of what your clients understand your accountability to be for the valuations you render under current law?
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	clients think you're standing behind these valuations and accountable for them? How clear are you about the limit being gross negligence or negligence, or what exactly is your sense of what your clients understand your accountability to be for the valuations you render under current law? MR. REILLY: Well, I personally again,

1 that side of the transaction.

2 I believe our clients think we are responsible for the valuation and we should be held 3 accountable for the valuation and if there's reasons to 4 think after the fact that they bought the stock for \$20 5 based on our valuation when the real value was \$30, 6 well, if they -- that would be the seller being --7 8 complaining about that. But if they bought the stock for \$20 when the real value was \$10, I would think that 9 we would be named. 10 11 In fact, there was a case when we were named. We were a defendant in a case, it was dismissed but we 12 13 were named as a defendant in a case where an ESOP said 14 we paid too much because we relied on a Willamette 15 valuation and after a lot of discovery it was dismissed. But we were named and we incurred a lot of 16 legal fees for a company our size, you know, a lot of 17 18 legal fees defending ourselves. 19 MR. HAUSER: Did you have an insurance carrier for that? 20 21 MR. REILLY: We had an insurance carrier who 22 picked up a portion of the expense but we still had our

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own deductibles and other expenses I think didn't cover 1 2 it. 3 And we had to hire other valuation analysts to come in and support our work and attorneys and go 4 through depositions and all of that. 5 MR. GOLDBERG: You know, if I can just add 6 7 one other thought to that, because I think maybe the 8 Association might disagree with one comment Robert made. 9 In terms of --10 11 MR. DAVIS: Could you speak into the mike? 12 MR. GOLDBERG: Yeah. 13 In terms of trying to define the scope of the 14 fiduciary, I think, you know, sitting here today, I 15 think a group of ERISA lawyers could try to draft a definition very tightly of what this valuation 16 fiduciary is that attempts to address some of these 17 18 concerns. 19 But I think that what seems open-ended to me 20 at least, is that when you then toss that out to the 21 plaintiff's bar to litigate and figure, number one, they're going to name appraisers as defendants in every 22

1	lawsuit that gets filed. And, number two, that will
2	give the courts the chance to sort of shape what these
3	narrowly defined terms are.
4	I'm just afraid what will happen is I'm a
5	fiduciary, I've produced this report, people have gone
6	off and used it to do things and yet I have no ERISA
7	fiduciary responsibility apart from defending the
8	correctness of the report. I just think the
9	opportunity is there for courts to really put a lot
10	more at my doorstep as an ERISA fiduciary for things
11	the trustee has done with my report and the analysis
12	it's gotten.
13	You know, and fiduciary litigation can, you
14	know, go out of control as we've all seen.
15	MR. PIACENTINI: Good morning.
16	MS. BORZI: Good morning.
17	MR. PIACENTINI: So I think I heard, at least
18	from Mr. Reilly and maybe from others that there can be
19	a difference in different valuations in terms of where
20	you come out in the range. Pardon me. Where you bound
21	the range, because there is some judgment inherent in
22	any valuation and sort of depending on whose behalf

you're working and so forth. 1 2 So, and we talked a little bit about -- you 3 know, had some debate, I guess, about how that might or might not work if you're a fiduciary. 4 How does it work now? Where does the 5 valuation, you know, sort of move and because of, you 6 7 know, what -- because of on whose behalf you're 8 preparing it? 9 MR. REILLY: Well, let me answer it first as the valuation guy. I would say right now without --10 because we, or our fiduciaries, we can put the 11 valuation right down the middle of the road, put the 12 13 range right down the middle of the road whether I'm 14 working for the selling stockholder or whether I'm 15 working for the plan participants, whether it's a buy side transaction or sell side transaction or just an 16 17 annual administrative allocation, I can put the range 18 right down the road and not have to worry about who I'm 19 working for because I don't have the obligation to help 20 my client get the best deal that they can get. 21 MR. PIACENTINI: And the client is the 22 trustee?

68 1 MR. REILLY: If we're working for the -- ESOP 2 would be the trustee, yes, sir. 3 MR. PIACENTINI: And the trustee is sometimes often or not the plan sponsor? 4 MR. REILLY: No. Well, it could be the --5 MS. CARLISLE: It could be. 6 MR. REILLY: It could be an independent 7 8 trustee or it could be an employee directed -- it could 9 be an employee trustee. 10 MR. PIACENTINI: Are any of these answers different in the case of a leveraged ESOP, sort of at 11 the beginning where there's this big transaction taking 12 13 place versus down the road in annual valuations? 14 MR. REILLY: From a valuation perspective, I 15 would say no. 16 MR. PIACENTINI: Okay. MS. CARLISLE: Now, can I -- can I just --17 I'm not an appraiser but I -- you know, I am a lawyer 18 that deals a lot with appraisals and my view has always 19 been valuation is an art, not a science as we've talked 20 21 There is always a range of appropriate answers about. and fair market value will be within that range, 22

1	between a willing buyer and a willing seller regardless
2	of what point in time the transaction is appraised or
3	values are determined.
4	MR. GOLDBERG: Yeah, I would just add quickly
5	if your question at the end there was the difference
6	between a transaction versus ongoing ESOP, I think one
7	difference would be when presented with a range of
8	values a trustee who's negotiating a new leverage
9	transaction would be able to use that range to try to
10	negotiate a deal of let's say the low end of the range,
11	but understand what room the trustee has in the
12	negotiations to try to get to a deal with a third party
13	who may be wanting to get the highest price they can
14	get for their shares. Whereas, in an ongoing ESOP
15	valuation, the consideration's still there, I think, in
16	terms of range, the appraiser still may report a range,
17	but now you get a trustee who's making decisions not
18	about acquiring shares or selling them as much as kind
19	of running the benefit distribution system of the plan
20	and the annual administration in where the trustee
21	feels the value should fall within that range for
22	administration.

1	So I think those considerations are probably
2	different ones, more external dealing with a third
3	party transaction whereas the others are more internal.
4	MS. CARLISLE: Yeah, it's still you're
5	always concerned about in the annual appraisals what
6	are you allocating to your participants this year that
7	will impact the allocations to participants in
8	subsequent years, so you have to be extraordinarily
9	careful in all appraisal situations.
10	But this this whole concept of what is an
11	appraisal is the range going to change and the like?
12	Remember, an ESOP trustee is required to not pay more
13	than fair market value. I can certainly pay less,
14	okay? So that range does not preclude me from
15	negotiating a deal less than the range.
16	MR. PIACENTINI: Okay. Let me ask just one
17	other question. So in this general topic of ranges and
18	whether they vary or not, depending on who the client
19	is and so forth and how wide ranges might be sometimes,
20	there is some academic research in this area that's
21	come to my attention.
22	Let me cite just one example. I just want to

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1	see whether some of you have looked at some of this or	
2	other research and whether you have a reaction.	
3	So this is a 2002 Harvard study by Moore, et	
4	al. And one of the findings of the study and one	
5	experiment they carried out with 112 auditors, auditors	
6	for buyers valued a deal at 12.3 million while auditors	
7	for sellers valued it at 21.4 million. So that strikes	
8	me as sort of a wider range than we've mostly talked	
9	about except where we were talking about abuses.	
10	So I wonder if there's any reaction to that.	
11	MR. GOLDBERG: Well, I'm not familiar with	
12	that study.	
13	MS. CARLISLE: I'm not.	
14	MR. GOLDBERG: But I think off the top of my	
15	head, my reaction to that would be this is just buyers	
16	and sellers out in the marketplace who have so many	
17	different things	
18	MS. CARLISLE: It is.	
19	MR. GOLDBERG: going on in terms of	
20	strategic players in their industry versus not.	
21	You know, what an ESOP appraiser's supposed	
22	to do is figure out willing buyer, willing seller, the	

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Revenue Rule 59-60 standard, which does narrow the road 1 2 a little bit. You know, I think you'd find the range of 3 values when someone is -- when an appraiser is told 4 give me a valuation under 59-60 versus I've got a 5 friend here who wants to sell their company, let's talk 6 about a range of reasonable values out in the 7 8 marketplace. 9 MR. PIACENTINI: But in terms of the credentials and the standards that you all said 10 applied, within the profession they'd be the same in 11 12 both circumstances or not? 13 MS. CARLISLE: Yes. MR. GOLDBERG: The credentials? 14 15 MR. PIACENTINI: The credentials and --16 MR. GOLDBERG: Yes. 17 MR. PIACENTINI: -- standards that apply 18 within the profession? 19 MR. GOLDBERG: Yeah, I think that would be 20 the same. 21 MR. PIACENTINI: Thank you. 22 MR. DAVIS: Thanks, Panel 8.

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1 Thank you very much. 2 MS. CARLISLE: Thank you. 3 MR. REILLY: Thank you, sir. MR. DAVIS: Panel 9. We'll make an orderly 4 transition. 5 Panel 9 is Donna Walker with the American 6 Society of Appraisers, Larry R. Cook representing Larry 7 8 R. Cook Associates and Jeffrey Tarbell, representing firms that provide valuations and fairness opinions. 9 10 You guys all set? 11 MS. WALKER: I think so. MR. DAVIS: Okay. We'll start with Donna 12 13 Walker representing the American Society of Appraisers. 14 MS. WALKER: Good morning. Thank you. 15 The American Society of Appraisers appreciates the opportunity to testify today at on 16 17 EBSA's proposed fiduciary rule, which would broaden ERISA's definition of the term "fiduciary" to include 18 19 individuals who provide ESOP related appraisal services. 20 21 My name is Donna Walker. And I'm testifying 22 on behalf of the ASA. By way of personal background,

1	I'm an accredited senior appraiser credentialed by ASA
2	in business valuation and have been providing ESOP
3	related services since 1984. I'm a developer and
4	teacher of the ASA course on ESOP, valuing ESOP shares
5	and I'm all the past president of the ASA and a current
6	member of the Business Valuation Discipline Committee
7	of ASA.
8	The American Society of Appraisers submitted
9	some extensive written comments expressing our strong
10	opposition to the proposed rule. ASA is sincerely
11	interested in working with the Department to address
12	demonstrated patterns of weakness in the reliability
13	and independence of ESOP valuations and to explore the
14	most cost-effective way to strengthen the ESOP
15	valuation function.
16	We believe the current proposal is both
17	inappropriate and a counter-productive response to
18	EBSA's concerns. In our view, the proposed
19	appraiser as a fiduciary approach is inappropriate for
20	several reasons:
21	First, because it is totally unproven as a
22	method that is likely to enhance the quality of

1 appraiser services.

2	Second, it is inconsistent with the appraiser
3	reform programs adopted through the rest of the
4	government by every federal agency with the
5	responsibility for administrating or regulating
6	valuation services, including the Internal Revenue
7	Service.
8	And, third, because it would force thousands
9	of professionally credentialed appraisers who provide
10	ESOP services, including those who adhere to the
11	Uniformed Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice
12	or as it's commonly referred to as USPAP, to violate
13	their ethical obligation to be independent of all
14	parties and interest involved in a transaction
15	including an ESOP appraisal.
16	It is also ASA's view that the proposed rule
17	is actually counter-productive not only to the general
18	public policy purposes of ESOPs, but also to the
19	specific interest of the very people the proposal is
20	supposed to protect, the employee/owners of ESOP plans
21	and the protection of those plan's assets.
22	The Rule as proposed, would impose

1	significant financial burdens on the ESOP appraisers by
2	requiring them to purchase, in addition to standard E&O
3	insurance, special high cost E&O policies, which would
4	cover the enhanced liability for the liability risk of
5	the fiduciary status.
6	Moreover, the increased exposure to personal
7	liability that the proposed Rule creates will drive
8	many highly experienced ESOP appraisers out of this
9	practice area, thereby sharply reducing the pool of
10	qualified individuals available to value employee
11	plans.
12	In our opinion, the bottom line is that the
12 13	In our opinion, the bottom line is that the proposed Rule will increase the cost of ESOP valuations
13	proposed Rule will increase the cost of ESOP valuations
13 14	proposed Rule will increase the cost of ESOP valuations and these costs will ultimately be borne by the
13 14 15	proposed Rule will increase the cost of ESOP valuations and these costs will ultimately be borne by the sponsors and employee beneficiary of those ESOP plans.
13 14 15 16	proposed Rule will increase the cost of ESOP valuations and these costs will ultimately be borne by the sponsors and employee beneficiary of those ESOP plans. If imposing fiduciary status on appraisers
13 14 15 16 17	proposed Rule will increase the cost of ESOP valuations and these costs will ultimately be borne by the sponsors and employee beneficiary of those ESOP plans. If imposing fiduciary status on appraisers were the was the only way or even the best way to
13 14 15 16 17 18	proposed Rule will increase the cost of ESOP valuations and these costs will ultimately be borne by the sponsors and employee beneficiary of those ESOP plans. If imposing fiduciary status on appraisers were the was the only way or even the best way to improve both the independence and reliability of ESOP
13 14 15 16 17 18 19	proposed Rule will increase the cost of ESOP valuations and these costs will ultimately be borne by the sponsors and employee beneficiary of those ESOP plans. If imposing fiduciary status on appraisers were the was the only way or even the best way to improve both the independence and reliability of ESOP appraisals, then the negative and disruptive results
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	proposed Rule will increase the cost of ESOP valuations and these costs will ultimately be borne by the sponsors and employee beneficiary of those ESOP plans. If imposing fiduciary status on appraisers were the was the only way or even the best way to improve both the independence and reliability of ESOP appraisals, then the negative and disruptive results discussed would perhaps be unavoidable. But the

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1	neither the only best way to address your concerns but
2	indeed in our opinion, it will create many more
3	problems than it solves.
4	While the ASA does not doubt that faulty or
5	even abusive ESOP related appraisals occur on occasion,
6	the collective judgment of our most experienced members
7	in this area of appraisal practice is that problematic
8	appraisals are rare and that a pattern of such abuses
9	just does not exist.
10	But even if it did, there is a way to
11	strengthen ESOP valuations that is not only proven but
12	avoids the proposed Rule's two most negative effects,
13	which undermine is the undermining of the
14	independence of ESOP appraisers and the substantial
15	increase in cost in performing ESOP valuations.
16	We respectfully urge EBSA to adopt the
17	appraisal reform model being utilized successfully by
18	all other Federal agencies with important valuation
19	responsibilities. Specifically, reliance on
20	professionally credentialed appraisers who have
21	demonstrated valuation competency and who are legally
22	prohibited from self-dealing and who are fully

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1	accountable for the integrity of their work, either to
2	a state appraiser licensing board, in the case of real
3	estate appraisals or to a recognized professional
4	appraiser credentialing organization in the case of
5	business valuation appraisals.
6	An appraiser's failure to be independent to
7	adhere to generally accepted appraisal standards when
8	performing an appraisal can, and does, result in
9	imposition of sanctions, including in the most serious
10	cases, a loss of a license or a credential.
11	Importantly, Congress thought highly enough
12	of this type of appraisal reform model that we are
13	urging adoption of, that it was made part of the
14	Dodd/Frank Financial Reform and Consumer Protection Law
15	for the purposes of insuring the integrity of
16	appraisals in connection with mortgage loans and other
17	collateralized extensions of credit.
18	Also important, is that this same basic
19	appraisal reform model is in effect at the Internal
20	Revenue Service in connection with ensuring the
21	independence from a liability of valuations for a
22	variety of tax related purposes, including the billions

of dollars annually in non-cash charitable 1 2 contributions. 3 We highlight this fact that the IRS utilizes this model because of the mutual responsibility and 4 interest that EBSA and IRS share in assuring the ESOP 5 plans comply with Federal laws and properly safequard 6 the assets of plan beneficiaries. This strong 7 8 mutuality of interest and responsibility extends to ensuring the integrity and reliability of ESOP 9 valuations. 10 11 Indeed, in Chapter 12 of EBSA's enforcement manual it discusses and describes the agreement between 12 13 the DOL and the IRS for the coordination of investigations of employee benefit plans. Additionally, 14 one of the required elements of qualified 15 16 -- of qualified pension, profit sharing and stock bonus plans under the Internal Revenue Code 17 18 involves the use of independent appraisers to value 19 plans and their assets. This relevant provision states 20 and I quote: 21 "A plan meets the requirements of this 22 subparagraph if all valuations of employer securities

1	which are not readily traded on an established
2	securities market with respect to activities carried
3	out by the plan are by an independent appraiser.
4	For purposes of the preceding sentence, the
5	term 'independent appraiser' means any appraiser
6	meeting the requirements similar to the requirements of
7	the regulations prescribed under section 17(A)(1)."
8	IRS regulations and guidance pursuant to Code
9	section 170, established the particulars of who is a
10	qualified appraiser and what constitutes a qualified
11	appraisal in connection with the deductibility of non-
12	cash charitable contributions and for other certain
13	tax-related valuation purposes. Our February comment
14	letter discussed this in detail on Pages 3 and 4.
15	ASA's comment letter to DOL on the rulemaking
16	proposal noted, approvingly so, that DOL has proposed
17	but not yet adopted, regulations relating to prohibited
18	transaction exemptions whose valuation components move
19	in the direction of the IRS valuation requirements.
20	Given the closely aligned responsibility and
21	interest of both the DOL and the IRS, with respect to
22	ESOPs and ESOP enforcement actions, and given the

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1	migration of the proposed EBSA valuation requirements	
2	for prohibited transaction exemptions in the direction	
3	of those required by the IRS for many tax purposes, and	
4	given the overall success of Federal agencies reliance	
5	in professionally credentialed appraisers to value	
6	tangible and intangible property in many of the most	
7	important federally related transactions, we strongly	
8	believe that the adoption of valuations requirements	
9	similar to those adopted by the IRS for all ESOP	
10	valuations is both logical and very desirable.	
11	This concludes my testimony. I thank you for	
12	your the time and I'll be ready to answer any	
13	questions you might have.	
14	MR. DAVIS: Thank you.	
15	Mr. Cook.	
16	MR. COOK: Yes. Thank you very much.	
17	My name is Larry Cook. I am the owner of	
18	Larry Cook and Associates, P.C. in Houston, Texas.	
19	Thank you for allowing me to provide testimony today at	
20	the Department of Labor Fiduciary Definition Hearing.	
21	I can only hope that my testimony along with	
22	many others opposing the proposed definition expansion	

of fiduciary to include appraisers will provide the 1 2 catalyst for reassessment and overcome this rule 3 change. It is with strong conviction that I come to 4 Washington today compelled to respectfully oppose the 5 manner, the fiduciary definition rule seeks to 6 strengthen the reliability of ESOP valuations. 7 In my 8 opinion, if this definition of fiduciary prevails, it will spell the demise of small company ESOPs. It will 9 force a substantial number of qualified appraisers to 10 11 end their services to ESOPs. 12 I think it important that my testimony come 13 from my direct personal knowledge and experiences from several career perspectives of which I've served for 14 15 the past 38 years. 16 I was out of college two years and an officer of a small private construction company when ERISA 17 18 became law in 1974. As part of the cessation plans of 19 those -- of a sole shareholder of this company, I 20 researched, recommended and assisted in implementing a 21 new retirement plan called an ESOP. 22 At age 27, I became a beneficial stockholder

1	of the company that I worked for through this employee
2	stock ownership plan. I served as a plan administrator
3	for the ESOP and a longstanding profit sharing plan.
4	When I left the company after about 11 years of
5	service, I was fully vested in both plans.
6	As a result of my activities with the ESOP, I
7	chose a career path as a business appraiser. Over the
8	next decades, I have worked with business owners and
9	management of private businesses in a variety of
10	successful engagements that include the implementation
11	of employee equity, incentives and ownership through
12	ESOPs.
13	For the past 28 years, I've provided business
14	appraisals for ESOPs. I have served several appraisal
15	organizations at the national, state and local level.
16	I've published a book, Financial Valuation of Employee
17	Stock Ownership Plan Shares. I've co-authored a
18	technical book of valuation Financial Valuations,
19	Applications and Model with James R. Hitchner and
20	others.
21	I believe in the detail and the ideals of
22	capitalism and that all employees can share in the

1	opportunity to be enriched through a beneficial
2	ownership of equity in the very company in which they
3	work; in a system where a shareholder of a private
4	company has a mechanism of passing their equity shares
5	to employees for their retirement.
6	On numerous occasions, I've experienced the
7	incentivized power of a well-implemented and managed
8	ESOP. I've witnessed the overwhelming strength the
9	participant of an owner of the company has from a
10	janitor to an engineer. I have lived the American
11	Dream of company ownership and spent a career promoting
12	its benefits to others.
13	This is why I've traveled to D.C. today to
14	represent not only myself but the collective views of
15	the valuation members of the Financial Consulting
16	Group, the Loren D. Stark Company and a voice for many
17	companies' shareholders and employee participants in
18	hopes of providing a perspective that will assist in
19	the continuation of that aspiration of widespread
20	employee equity ownership.
21	In an attempt to minimize repetition and in
22	the interest of time, I hope to convey three

1	straightforward points that this change and definition
2	brings from a plan, a participant, a sponsor, a
3	fiduciary and an appraiser's perspective.
4	Number one, risk. In the proposed rule
5	change context, the appraiser would be held personally
6	responsible for any damages incurred by a plan
7	participant as a result of a breach of duty.
8	As it stands today, without the proposed rule
9	change, I wonder what my responsibilities will actually
10	be. Will this duty extend to acts of management of the
11	company? Will corporate and participant transactions
12	entail a duty? What and how is control over the plan
13	assets extended to the appraiser? Will the appraiser
14	be held liable for actions of co-fiduciaries? Who
15	would bring an action against the appraiser in this
16	context? What actually is the statute of limitations
17	responsibility of the appraiser?
18	Looking back 30 years, I can't help but ask
19	myself if informed with a certainty of my person, and
20	profession being exposed to this level of risk and
21	liability as currently proposed in this definition
22	change, I would undoubtedly have chosen a different

1 career path.

2	Number two, conflict of interest. The
3	appraiser in the context of the proposed rule change
4	will act solely on the behalf of participants and their
5	beneficiaries with undivided loyalty. In reflecting on
6	the proposal, I have asked myself these among others:
7	Will the duty of the appraiser be likened to
8	a power of attorney where decisions are to be made
9	solely on a principal's behalf? How will the appraiser
10	exercise discretion or control over the plan and the
11	administration of benefits to participants? How will
12	the appraisal satisfy the professional ethics and
13	standards of the appraisal societies with which they
14	are members, where this proposed definition change runs
15	in direct contradiction to those core standards?
16	How many how very different this is than
17	where appraisers practice today. And how the conflicts
18	of interest landscape will change should this proposed
19	definition rule be confirmed and allowed to stand.
20	I come back the same conclusion, this
21	proposal is incompatible with the results with the
22	realities of professional standards and the practice of

1	financial valuations. Impartiality, objectivity and
2	independence collectively spell professional neutrality
3	and speak to those foundational standards that anchor
4	the appraisal profession for all of us.
5	The proposed rule will pose an uncompromising
6	risk and conflict of interest to appraisers and the
7	users of their services. Appraisers will no longer be
8	independent or impartial of all parties in interest
9	involving the transactions or annual valuations of
10	participant accounts; a sobering reality for us all to
11	be aware of.
12	Number three, cost. Why is it that
12 13	Number three, cost. Why is it that professional liability insurance is so specific to
13	professional liability insurance is so specific to
13 14	professional liability insurance is so specific to exclude coverage of fiduciary responsibility and more
13 14 15	professional liability insurance is so specific to exclude coverage of fiduciary responsibility and more specifically, those related to ERISA? We know that the
13 14 15 16	professional liability insurance is so specific to exclude coverage of fiduciary responsibility and more specifically, those related to ERISA? We know that the cost of insurance will increase the cost of ESOP
13 14 15 16 17	professional liability insurance is so specific to exclude coverage of fiduciary responsibility and more specifically, those related to ERISA? We know that the cost of insurance will increase the cost of ESOP valuation services. And any increase in cost to the
13 14 15 16 17 18	professional liability insurance is so specific to exclude coverage of fiduciary responsibility and more specifically, those related to ERISA? We know that the cost of insurance will increase the cost of ESOP valuation services. And any increase in cost to the plan or the sponsor of the plan will negatively impact
13 14 15 16 17 18 19	professional liability insurance is so specific to exclude coverage of fiduciary responsibility and more specifically, those related to ERISA? We know that the cost of insurance will increase the cost of ESOP valuation services. And any increase in cost to the plan or the sponsor of the plan will negatively impact the plan participants. In this proposed rule context,
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	professional liability insurance is so specific to exclude coverage of fiduciary responsibility and more specifically, those related to ERISA? We know that the cost of insurance will increase the cost of ESOP valuation services. And any increase in cost to the plan or the sponsor of the plan will negatively impact the plan participants. In this proposed rule context, appraisers will assess the potential cost of exposure

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1	insurance coverage, or the merits of litigation filing,	
2	the added risk factors will necessitate the appraiser's	
3	consideration of exposure to deductibles, the energy	
4	for furnishing documents and the disruption of services	
5	to other engagements.	
6	With widespread reasonably priced	
7	professional liability coverage that extends to cover	
8	the appraiser as a fiduciary, few professional	
9	appraisers will assume the personal liability.	
10	Additionally, and assuming an adequate liability	
11	coverage is afforded, there remains the haunting cloud	
12	of expanded litigation, defense of the appraiser's work	
13	product, not to mention the proposal runs foul of all	
14	independent standards.	
15	The proposed rule will impose costly	
16	unnecessary and unrealistic burdens to the appraiser	
17	and the plans they serve.	
18	As my friend in Houston with over 50 years	
19	experience with thousands of ERISA plans, Don Stark of	
20	the Loren D. Stark Company said, and I quote: "The	
21	single largest expense to a small ESOP is the cost of	
22	the appraisal. Should the Department of Labor	

fiduciary proposal prevail it would undeniably increase 1 the cost of an appraisal and that alone will signal the 2 end of the small ESOP." 3 Finally, painting a picture of the existing 4 climate of private business trends transitioning from 5 one generation to another, we are in the midst of a 6 baby boomers that closely held companies transacting 7 8 their equity ownership. The next eight years or so will mark the most significant transitioning by 9 selling, gifting, contributing or liquidating non-10 public company ownership perhaps in our country's 11 12 history. It is the time where the option of 13 transitioning private company equity to the next 14 generation can be made in whole or in part using an ESOP as the transition of choice for those companies 15 that have a workforce and management to possess that 16 17 think like owners culture to do so. 18 Because of the level of personal liability

19 that will be imposed on appraisers, the significant 20 cost increase to the appraiser and further to the ESOP 21 and the conflict of interest posed under this proposed 22 rule I respectfully and vehemently disagree with the

90 potential rule. 1 2 With my years of professional experience involved in ESOPs and their valuation, it is my 3 professional and personal belief that this proposed 4 rule will nail -- will be a nail in the coffin for 5 small ESOPs. 6 7 I plead with the Department of Labor to 8 reconsider this proposal and against the best interest of ESOPs and their participants. 9 10 That concludes my testimony. And, again, I thank you for allowing me to be here today. 11 12 MR. DAVIS: Thank you so much. 13 Mr. Tarbell. 14 MR. TARBELL: Thank you. Good morning. My name is Jeff Tarbell and 15 I'm a director with Houlihan Lokey and I have more than 16 20 years of experience rendering valuations and 17 18 fairness opinions related to employee stock ownership 19 plans or ESOPs. 20 I'm testifying on behalf of seven firms that 21 provide ESOP valuations and fairness opinions and these firms are believed to be -- to have some of the largest 22

1	and most active ESOP valuation practices in the
2	industry. In fact, the professionals in these
3	organizations are arguably the most experienced and
4	qualified professionals currently providing such
5	services.
6	As set forth in our comment letter, we have
7	serious concerns about the impact of the proposed
8	regulation on our professional responsibilities and on
9	the more than 10 million active and retired employees
10	who rely upon their company's ESOP for their retirement
11	security.
12	We strongly believe that ESOP valuation and
13	fairness opinion providers should continue to be
14	excluded from the definition of investment advice for
15	the following reasons:
16	First, we believe the longstanding rationale
17	for excluding ESOP valuation and fairness opinions
18	remains valid today. As the DOL noted in its 1976
19	advisery opinion, an ESOP valuation or fairness opinion
20	does not make a recommendation as to a particular
21	investment decision. It does not address the relative
22	merits of purchasing employer securities and it nor

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1	does the ESOP valuation or fairness opinion provider
2	have any decision-making authority over a trustee's
3	decision whether to purchase or sell the employer's
4	securities.
5	In other words, ESOP an ESOP valuation or
6	fairness opinion does not constitute investment advice.
7	And I would respectfully, strongly disagree with the
8	assertion made previously that the valuation provider
9	is the center of an ESOP transaction. That is the
10	trustee's job.
11	Consequently, we do not understand why
12	providers are singled out for fiduciary treatment when
13	control over the terms and conditions of an ESOP
14	transaction actually lie with other parties to the
15	transaction.
16	Second, we are not aware of evidence that can
17	conflicts of interest or incorrect or biased
18	valuations are a common problem in ESOP valuations and
19	fairness opinions. In fact, at the conclusion of my
20	remarks, we would appreciate if the panel would respond
21	to the question of whether such evidence exists and if
22	it does exist, we would ask the DOL to make the

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evidence publicly available in order to allow an 1 2 opportunity for public comment. 3 With respect to conflicts of interest, it's my understanding that none of the seven firms for which 4 I speak perform ESOP valuations or fairness opinions 5 for contingent compensation and each firm's fee 6 arrangements are fully disclosed in their engagement 7 8 letters. Third, we submit that the proposed regulation 9 is at odds with the impartiality and independent 10 requirements under professional standards of valuation 11 practice as well as the Internal Revenue Code. 12 13 Professional valuation associations such as 14 the ASA and the AICPA require their members to approach 15 and perform valuations with independence and impartiality. Making a provider of ESOP valuations or 16 17 fairness opinions a fiduciary, does effectively make 18 them an advocate and partial to plan participants, and 19 it therefore, violates the ethical guidelines of these associations as well as the fundamental principles of 20 21 independent appraisal. 22 In addition, as Ms. Walker explained more

1	fully, under the Internal Revenue Code, valuation
2	providers are required to provide an independent
3	opinion of value. The IRS looks to generally accepted
4	appraisal standards to determine if a valuation has
5	been conducted impartially and independently including
6	the principles embodied in the Uniform Standards of
7	Professional Appraisal Practice. It is clear under
8	both the Internal Revenue Code and well-established
9	professional standards, that the role of the valuation
10	professional is not to advocate for a value or an
11	investment on behalf of anyone, instead to provide an
12	impartial and independent opinion of value.
13	And, again, I would strongly disagree with
14	the assertion made previously that the range of value
15	is dependent upon the client who hires you. Our task
16	is exactly contrary to that. Our task as an
17	independent valuation firm is to provide a range of
18	value independent of who hires us.
19	Fourth, we believe the proposed regulation
20	would have serious unintended adverse effects by
21	decreasing the service value to ESOP companies and plan
22	participants. If the proposed regulation is finalized

1	in its current form, ESOP valuation opinion ESOP
2	valuation and fairness opinion providers will need to
3	purchase fiduciary insurance, incur ongoing legal fees
4	and expand their scope of non-valuation and fairness
5	opinion work. This will dramatically increase the cost
6	of providing such services. And I'll be happy to
7	discuss cost if you have those questions, as I believe
8	you probably will.
9	Those costs will be passed on to ESOP
10	companies and ultimately affect the balance of plan
11	participant accounts. The overall quality of ESOP
12	valuation and fairness opinions may drop because many
13	firms, including the firms in our group, will have a
14	significant disincentive to continue providing ESOP
15	valuations and fairness opinions in light of increased
16	risks and oversight.
17	In fact, we believe that it is unfortunately
18	the larger firms with the most qualified and
19	experienced professionals perhaps who generally have
20	other sources of business that are the most likely to
21	leave the ESOP market. Consequently, we believe more
22	valuations will be performed by low cost providers who

1	sometimes compensate for a lack of experience and
2	training by offering their services at low prices.
3	Fifth, we believe that the relationship
4	between an ESOP trustee and an ESOP valuation and/or
5	fairness opinion provider will be undermined by making
6	the provider a co-fiduciary. In a proposed
7	transaction, the parties have a very clear
8	understanding of their roles.
9	The ESOP trustee's role is to conduct a
10	prudent investigation as to the merits of a particular
11	investment decision. And as part of that process, the
12	ESOP trustee normally retains ERISA counsel and an
13	independent valuation provider to assist them in
14	evaluating the financial terms of the proposed
15	transaction including obtaining an opinion as to the
16	value of the employer's securities proposed to be
17	purchased or sold, which opinion the independent
18	trustee reviews and analyzes. That valuation opinion
19	is only one of many factors that is considered by the
20	trustee when they make their investment decision.
21	For example, the advice provided by legal
22	counsel as to the terms of a particular transaction,

1	which is certainly material to the overall economic
2	value of the proposed deal excuse me, and yet, the
3	attorney would not be deemed a fiduciary under the
4	proposed reg.
5	Were both the trustee and the valuation
6	provider co-fiduciaries, these well-established
7	relationships are disrupted. For example, the ESOP
8	trustee may simply may cede financial issues to the
9	provider thereby eliminating the benefit of a rigorous
10	review of the valuation or the ESOP valuation provider
11	may not be able to cede final decision-making authority
12	to the trustee on areas of disagreement creating
13	confusion, expense and inefficiency.
14	For example, if the valuation provider
15	provides a range of value and the trustee decides to
16	purchase shares for a price other than the mid point of
17	that range, as the co-fiduciary under the proposed
18	regulations, what would you propose the valuation
19	provider do?
20	The question comes down to who's in charge
21	and who holds ultimate responsibility for the
22	investment decision, which is clear under the current

1	reg but just the opposite under the proposed
2	regulation. As a result, an ESOP company may decide
3	that retaining two co-fiduciaries is expensive,
4	unnecessary, and problematic and therefore, the ESOP
5	company may eliminate the independent trustee in favor
6	of an internal trustee or committee, or eliminate the
7	trustee role entirely which would eliminate a critical
8	part of the prudent investigation process.
9	For these reasons, we urge the Agency to
10	modify the rule in the following respects:
11	First, the DOL should create a safe harbor
12	for valuation and fairness providers, allowing them to
13	perform traditional ESOP related services as a non-
14	ERISA fiduciary. As long as the valuation or fairness
15	opinions provider does not exercise decision-making
16	authority over the investment decision, does not render
17	advice concerning the relative merits of a proposed
18	transaction or any available alternative transaction,
19	and does not provide individualized investment advice
20	to the ESOP or the participants on investment policies
21	or strategies or folio composition or diversification

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1	Rather, the provider's only role is to	
2	provide an independent and impartial opinion of value.	
3	The fact that the provider does not have decision-	
4	making control in a particular transaction is	
5	consistent with the treatment of fairness opinion	
6	providers outside of the ESOP context where the	
7	company's board, not the provider of the opinion, bears	
8	the decision-making authority and responsibility on	
9	behalf of the company shareholders.	
10	Second, if the DOL's aim is to provide	
11	guidance on critical ESOP valuation issues, the DOL can	
12	do that directly. Many providers of the ESOP	
13	valuations and fairness opinions are members of	
14	professional valuation organizations that continually	
15	examine complex valuation issues including those	
16	related to ESOPs. We're confident that such	
17	organizations would welcome DOL's participation in such	
18	discussions.	
19	In closing, I would like to emphasize that we	
20	approach valuations of privately held ESOP stock	
21	seriously and rigorously. We well understand that	
22	these valuations affect the retirement assets of ESOP	

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1	plan participants. We disagree with the Department's	
2	assumption, however, that making us fiduciaries will	
3	somehow change or improve how we conduct our financial	
4	analysis.	
5	If there is a problem with substandard	
6	quality of work in preparing ESOP valuations and	
7	fairness opinions, it likely derives from inexperienced	
8	and unqualified providers. And making those parties	
9	fiduciaries is not going to transform them into	
10	experienced and skilled professionals. It will,	
11	however, put us in direct conflict with the independent	
12	requirements of our profession, create legal	
13	uncertainty and impose responsibility on us without any	
14	actual decision-making power or authority.	
15	Thank you for the opportunity to testify and	
16	I welcome your questions.	
17	MR. DAVIS: Thank you.	
18	MS. BORZI: I want to thank all of you for	
19	your testimony. Just a couple of questions.	
20	You have I didn't I can't I didn't	
21	count the numbers of experience, but you clearly have	
22	many years of experience in the valuation context, so	

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1	can you give me a sense of how often in your experience	
2	does the ESOP trustee rely on the valuation that	
3	they've been given by the valuation expert?	
4	MR. TARBELL: Are you asking me?	
5	MS. BORZI: I'm asking any or all of you.	
6	MR. TARBELL: In my experience, their task is	
7	to rely on it in part, but it is ultimately the	
8	trustee's responsibility to determine valuation.	
9	MS. BORZI: Have you so they generally do	
10	rely on it. Are there experiences that any of you had	
11	where the valuation that the ESOP trustee is given, the	
12	ESOP trustee has said I want a second opinion or is	
13	that a common industry practice?	
14	MR. COOK: I can give you a I hope this	
15	works. I can give you a specific situation and it goes	
16	to answer one of your questions from the previous one.	
17	MS. BORZI: Sure.	
18	MR. COOK: This is a real live one where they	
19	were terminating an ESOP; they were terminating a plan.	
20	The company did not own the the ESOP did not own it	
21	100 percent. I can't recall exactly the percent. It's	
22	been years ago. But the trustee went out and didn't	

102 get one but two valuations independent of one another. 1 2 There was an 18 percent disparity between the values on 3 terminating the plan. I was asked to come up and take a look at 4 that plan and see which of the two were the most 5 reasonable to assist that trustee in making that 6 determination. 7 8 MS. BORZI: Sure. 9 MR. COOK: If I were to follow the proposed definition of fiduciary, my duties would be for the 10 sole benefit of those employee participants. I am now 11 in a pretty big quandary. Is it the 18 percent higher 12 13 one or the lower? Because it was clear -- it would be 14 clear that that one that was 18 percent higher would be in the benefit of those employee participants. Unlike 15 the reality was, the lower value was the one I 16 17 considered to be closer to that of reality. 18 I now am placed in a position of making the decision as the trustee should have, of which that 19 20 trustee would rely on. That makes it the case for 21 exactly what we've been talking about here. We have to 22 be independent, we have to be objective and impartial

in doing the work that we do. 1 I can tell you categorically that the 2 trustees in these small plans rely on what I give them. 3 MS. BORZI: Yeah, I'm going to get to the 4 impartiality question in just a minute. What I'm 5 really trying to see is from the point of view from 6 your experience and from your point of view when you 7 8 give an opinion there is certainly an expectation that the trustee will rely on it, not exclusively 9 necessarily as you point out, but obviously when you 10 give that opinion you're using your best judgment and 11 you're assuming that the trustee's going to rely on it? 12 13 MR. COOK: Yes. 14 MS. BORZI: Am I incorrect in making that assumption? 15 16 MR. COOK: In my circumstances that would be 17 the case. 18 MS. BORZI: Okay. So the notion that 19 obviously you took some offense that that the valuation, the person doing the valuation is at the 20 center of the transaction is -- is not as off-the-mark 21 22 as you seem to suggest. Would a trustee go forward

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104 without a valuation opinion? 1 2 MR. TARBELL: Well, I think that -- I'll 3 respectfully -- we'll agree to disagree on the point, but the trustee needs to make the decision on whether 4 to go forward or not. 5 Just like when I buy stock that's publicly 6 traded, I need to know the price before I make the 7 decision. 8 9 MS. BORZI: Right. 10 MR. TARBELL: But the price alone doesn't tell you whether to buy or sell it. There's 11 fantastically more --12 13 MS. BORZI: But the price is an essential 14 part of the decision-making tools that you use. MR. TARBELL: It's essential, but in a 15 private company -- and, you know, if you're dealing 16 17 with a public stock, it is a dominant decision factor. 18 If you're dealing with a private company, there are, 19 you know, there are dramatic other things, a dramatic number of other factors that the trustee should 20 21 consider. 22 MS. BORZI: Like?

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1	MR. TARBELL: The quality of the management.	
2	Their opinion of the is this a you know, is this	
3	is a declining industry or an upward industry. The	
4	structure of the transaction do I believe this is too	
5	much debt on this leverage, the ESOP deal or not.	
6	I mean, we provide a you know, I don't	
7	mean to dismiss it or minimize its importance but we	
8	provide a mathematical number. And, again, it's one of	
9	many factors. But once we provide that piece of	
10	information to the trustee, they seek, you know, a	
11	tremendous amount of legal advice and have a	
12	responsibility to then decide without our input whether	
13	or not to enter into the transaction. So there's a big	
14	difference between providing a piece of information.	
15	That's important, and deciding whether or not to pull	
16	the trigger and do the deal or not.	
17	MS. BORZI: Okay. One other short question	
18	and then I'm going to get to the impartiality	
19	discussion. And that is, Mr. Tarbell, you suggested	
20	that in a big company context where big companies have	
21	as part of their services that they offer ESOP	
22	valuation, that were the Department to move forward in	
1		

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1	some form of this proposal which would make the person	
2	providing the valuation opinion a fiduciary for	
3	purposes of that opinion, and that's actually something	
4	that I was concerned about and the way you described	
5	this, Mr. Cook.	
6	Fiduciary duty attaches only to the duties	
7	that you actually perform. It doesn't make you broadly	
8	liable for any other thing that could possibly take	
9	place. So to the extent that you would render a	
10	fiduciary would be if a person were a fiduciary and	
11	the the fiduciary activity that they would be	
12	engaging in, is rendering an opinion, all those	
13	peripheral things that the ESOP trustee would be	
14	responsible for, a co-fiduciary would not be	
15	responsible for. You're only responsible for the	
16	things that the duties that you perform.	
17	So back to my question, I got sidetracked	
18	here. So are you basically saying that Houlihan Lokey	
19	would withdraw from this business?	
20	MR. TARBELL: Well, we'll make the decision	
21	if the rule passes. But I would say that there's a	
22	strong opinion in my firm as to by those who make	

107 those decisions that that's -- this is an unacceptable 1 2 amount of risk relative to the revenues that we 3 generate from this business. MS. BORZI: Okay. What percentage of your 4 5 revenues is generated from this business? Do you have an idea? 6 7 MR. TARBELL: Less than 1 percent. 8 MS. BORZI: Okay. Now I want to get to the -9 - the question -- I don't know whether you were in the audience when we were -- I was talking with the other 10 panel about this, but I -- I see no conflicts between 11 the duty that you have under the Internal Revenue Code 12 13 to render the most correct opinion and the duty you 14 would have under fiduciary rules, because the fiduciary rules do not -- do not require you to be an advocate 15 16 for the participant. 17 What you would be required to do is basically 18 do the same thing that you're supposed to be doing under the Internal Revenue Code which is to render the 19 20 best opinion you can with the same kind of impartiality 21 and independence. The fact that it's -- that the duty 22 flows to the participants and beneficiaries, the

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1	participants and beneficiaries do not expect, nor would	
2	they be entitled to expect that you put your finger on	
3	the scale in their favor. They have the same	
4	objectives of an opinion that is in the best the	
5	most correct that you could possibly render that's	
6	impartial in an independence independent form.	
7	And I just I'm wondering and if you	
8	look at the ERISA case law you'll see that that's what	
9	the courts have said. So I'm wondering why it is that	
10	you think that these are I know you strongly believe	
11	it, I'm not I'm not disputing that you strongly	
12	believe feel strongly about this and I respect that.	
13	But I'm wondering what evidence you have that that	
14	would be the result?	
15	MR. COOK: With the difference between what	
16	IRS does?	
17	MS. BORZI: Right.	
18	MR. COOK: Well, that wasn't part of my	
19	testimony, but I'll be more than happy to address	
20	MS. BORZI: Well, I think it's more of a sub-	
21	rosa, a part of what you were concerned about because	
22	you said this would require you to I forgot the	

109 third word, I didn't write fast enough to get the third 1 2 word you used. 3 MR. COOK: Sorry. MS. BORZI: But you said that if this 4 proposal were adopted you could no longer render an 5 impartial or independent opinion or whatever that third 6 word was. 7 8 MR. COOK: Anything that will create any independence question or impartiality question, and a 9 fiduciary does that in my opinion, changes the balance 10 and the landscape of what we work through as one of our 11 bedrocks to doing valuation work. A fiduciary 12 13 responsibility in my mind puts me in a different place than I am now. It's obvious in a different place or 14 15 you wouldn't be bringing this up. 16 MS. BORZI: Yeah. So if we said in the 17 regulation --18 MS. WALKER: May I make a comment on your 19 question? 20 MS. BORZI: Certainly. 21 MS. WALKER: I guess, accepting what you just 22 said that our role would be exactly the same, then I

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1	guess my question to you then why impose a fiduciary	
2	status on us, because it has negative consequences and	
3	I don't think it gets to what I perceive to be your	
4	ultimate concern which is about the quality of	
5	appraisals and appraisers.	
6	And I think by I don't think fiduciary	
7	status is equates to competency.	
8	MS. BORZI: Well, the question really is: In	
9	terms of in terms of qualifications, impartiality	
10	and independence is part and parcel of the duty that	
11	you have. And if what let me just turn the question	
12	on its ear here.	
13	If what you're telling me is that everyone	
14	who renders a valuation opinion does so with the utmost	
15	conformance to the independence impartiality standard,	
16	part of competence is are these features. So,	
17	therefore, what the only difference I see is that	
18	under a regulation, which holds you to those standards,	
19	we would have a method of enforcing it if those	
20	standards warrant that. And which is where I was	
21	going a minute ago.	
22	And so, to the extent in a regulation, in the	

111 same regulation that imposed these kinds of duties, we 1 2 made it clear that the nature of the duty with respect 3 to impartiality and independence is exactly the same duty that you would have now under the Internal Revenue 4 Code. 5 Would that make you feel a little more 6 confident that -- that we would not be asking you to do 7 8 something like putting your finger on the scale for the participants? 9 10 MS. WALKER: Let me respond to that. Again, I go back to that I am going to do that anyway. 11 I do that anyway. I have to because I'm an ASA. I have to 12 13 follow USPAP and I'm --14 MS. BORZI: And what are the enforcement 15 mechanisms? 16 MS. WALKER: I'll tell you. 17 MS. BORZI: Okay. 18 MS. WALKER: And I follow USPAP, and I work -- I do work for -- before the IRS and so I know I must 19 follow their rules and regulations, and their rules and 20 21 regulations as they apply to ERISA. 22 So I still say I do that, but I do not want

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to have the fiduciary status, because it gives me other 1 2 issues of costs and risks that I don't think are --3 MS. BORZI: Yeah, I get that, but I'm --MS. WALKER: -- appropriate. 4 MS. BORZI: -- just trying to address this 5 one issue here. 6 7 MS. WALKER: Well, I think -- I guess I have 8 -- I think I have addressed it. I'm saying, we -- we will -- qualified appraisers will follow independents 9 and lack of bias and they don't need a fiduciary duty 10 11 to do that. 12 MS. BORZI: And what happens if they don't? 13 MS. WALKER: Okay. Well, I think under -- if 14 they follow USPAP or they're a credentialed appraiser, 15 they can be brought up for violations of their professional practices under ASA or USPAP and they can 16 be brought for violations. We have an ethics procedure 17 18 where people -- anyone --19 MS. BORZI: Are they then debarred? What 20 happens? 21 MS. WALKER: They may be. There are several 22 -- the process is that you have to have a written

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1	complaint. There's some process, there's an ethics	
2	committee that looks at these and there are there	
3	are a number of possible outcomes. There are called	
4	suggestions where you do something that is considered	
5	to be unethical or against professional practices and	
6	you are suggested a way to correct it. You're supposed	
7	to take a course or something.	
8	MS. BORZI: Uh-huh. And is there so you	
9	take a course?	
10	MS. WALKER: Okay. Well, that's the	
11	that's the minimal. You could be censured. You can be	
12	suspended and you can be expelled.	
13	MS. BORZI: Okay. And if and what happens	
14	if after those	
15	MS. WALKER: So then you can no longer hold	
16	yourself out as an ASA. If you do some the IRS has	
17		
18	MS. BORZI: Do people render these opinions	
19	if they're not an ASA, if they don't have those letters	
20	after their name?	
21	MS. WALKER: They may, but I think we're	
22	advocating that by looking at credentialed appraisers,	

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you will have people who've got the experience, the 1 2 education to give competent appraisals. And the IRS has -- has sanctions against 3 appraisers. You may not be allowed to practice before 4 the IRS and that's --5 MS. BORZI: And do you have a sense of how 6 7 often they're applied? 8 MS. WALKER: They have an Office of Professional Practice that is looking into that. 9 10 MS. BORZI: Well, we'll certainly reach out 11 and explore those things. 12 MS. WALKER: And so -- and they are doing 13 that. So I think appraisers who work before the IRS 14 certainly take those as serious consequences and have 15 looked at the IRS's new requirements of what is a qualified appraiser and a qualified appraisal. And I 16 17 think those are credentials that, as we said in our 18 testimony, the IRS has accepted and other agencies have 19 accepted and they are proving to be workable models. 20 MS. BORZI: Okay. I don't want to take 21 anymore time, but thank you for your suggestions and 22 your testimony.

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1	MR. TARBELL: May I just make one comment?	
2	MS. BORZI: Sure.	
3	MR. TARBELL: The ultimate enforcement in our	
4	industry is that you don't get hired again. And to the	
5	extent that someone is, as you said, as Donna said,	
6	expelled from the ASA or to the extent that they do	
7	biased or non-independent or just schlocky work, and	
8	they are still getting hired by a plan trustee who is	
9	accepting their valuations, then I think I think	
10	what we have here is a trustee problem, not an	
11	appraiser problem.	
12	MS. BORZI: How how do trustees know that	
13	is this made public? Is there a press release if	
14	you're expelled from the ASA? How do	
15	MS. WALKER: It's published. I mean, it's	
16	not in the New York Times but it is published.	
17	MS. BORZI: But where is it published? Or	
18	MS. WALKER: I mean, you should be able if	
19	someone holds themselves out to be an ASA	
20	MS. BORZI: No, I'm saying they're not. So	
21	you	
22	MS. WALKER: Yeah, you should be able to	

1 MS. BORZI: So you expel them. They take 2 those three letters off their resume, but they still hold themselves out. 3 MS. WALKER: But they would have to -- you 4 would have to look into the person's background. 5 Ι mean, they're not going to tell you in its -- if you 6 call the ASA they would probably give you that 7 information. 8 9 But, again, I guess I agree with Jeff's point about that is that I think there is some responsibility 10 11 on the trustee to interview and understand --12 MS. BORZI: Unquestionably. 13 MS. WALKER: -- appraising --14 MS. BORZI: Unquestionably. I'm with you. 15 MS. WALKER: They should be able to -- they should be able to find that out and if they look to see 16 17 if they have credentialed appraisers who have 18 experience, then they should know that those people are interested enough in credible appraisals to, you know, 19 20 to be -- to have gone to a -- belong to an organization 21 that teaches and tests and requires peer-review of 22 reports and requires continuing education.

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1	So that should tell you as a trustee then	
2	that this is a serious professional appraiser.	
3	MS. BORZI: Okay. I'm going to just stop	
4	there, cause I've dominated the time, and I don't want	
5	to.	
6	MR. DAVIS: Just quickly, I'll ask you	
7	this panel the same question I asked Panel No. 8. And,	
8	I think, Ms. Walker, in your comment letter you talked	
9	about the E&O insurance costs going up dramatically if	
10	this reg was passed as proposed or finalized as	
11	proposed.	
12	Do you have more specifics? And I guess I	
13	would ask this of the entire panel, specifics as to,	
14	you know, how much would the fiduciary rider cost as a	
15	separate policy? Who are the providers? Just be more	
16	specific in terms	
17	MS. WALKER: I don't have any more specifics.	
18	I personally for my firm have looked and asked for a	
19	quote on those kinds of policies. They don't exist	
20	right now, because appraisers have not been fiduciaries	
21	before.	
22	Now, I have every confidence that the	
1		

1	insurance market will produce a product. How much it
2	will cost I don't know. But E&O insurance is very, I
3	think, quite expensive for the coverage you get. I
4	expect this will be more expensive. So I can't give
5	you a dollar amount but certainly and that is just
6	one component of the expense.
7	I think appraisal firms will have to look at
8	that insurance, they'll have to look at the overall
9	risk, which will mean that they'll have to have more
10	legal counsel. And if as a fiduciary, you would
11	have to have legal counsel in every transaction that
12	you were involved in.
13	So, no, I can't give you a dollar amount. I
14	guess my point is that there is some amount and it will
15	be borne in large part by benefit plans because
16	appraisal firms will try to pass those expenses on to
17	the extent they can to to the plan.
18	MR. DAVIS: But in your comment letter, you
19	stated that the cost, it would be extremely costly is
20	what I think your quote was.
21	MS. WALKER: Yes, I think it will be.
22	MR. DAVIS: So what was the basis of saying

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that it was extremely costly if you don't have more 1 2 specifics? 3 MS. WALKER: Well, because I understand the cost of errors and omissions insurance and I talked 4 just generally about other fiduciary types of insurance 5 is expensive. You know, I can't go out there and price 6 a policy now for -- for an appraisal firm to be a 7 8 fiduciary. It doesn't exist. MR. DAVIS: Anybody else? Thank you. 9 MR. TARBELL: Well, the insurance isn't the 10 11 only cost either. MR. DAVIS: Yeah, I understand that, but I 12 13 just want to stay with the insurance topic now. I understand the litigation costs. But just with respect 14 15 to insurance. MR. TARBELL: But there's a component of 16 insurance, which is the retention or the deductible. 17 18 MR. DAVIS: Okay. MR. TARBELL: And my understanding from ESOP 19 fiduciaries is that's about \$500,000 normally. I'll go 20 out on a limb but I think, you know, I've done this 20 21 22 years, I have a pretty good idea that for a lot of

small ESOP providers that's a year's worth of profits. 1 2 So, and in other words, and again, we're not 3 concerned -- I don't think we're all concerned about suits from the DOL, what we're concerned about is suits 4 from the plaintiffs part. And, you know, you may 5 interpret the reg one way but there's -- you know, 6 7 other people have sat at these chairs the last couple 8 days that may interpret them extremely differently. 9 And to the extent that we have to fight one lawsuit, win or lose, just to get your name off the 10 11 cover, you know, you may not get to that -- you may not even get into your insurance but you may end up paying 12 13 the \$500,000 and that's enough to put some of these providers out of business. 14 MR. DAVIS: Mr. Cook, did you have a thought? 15 16 MR. COOK: Let me just answer this. The cost of insurance is one piece of this. Okay. 17 This is 18 something I didn't bring in testimony. I will now. I'm also a registered investment adviser and 19 I hold a securities license. I'm done if this is 20 21 I'm done, because I handle an outside business passed. 22 activity for the -- as defined by Security Exchange

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1	Commission, no insurance will cover. I will remove	
2	myself from this and I've done this 38 years now.	
3	Either that or I will have to jettison part of two	
4	parts of my business, the ESOP side of it and the	
5	securities side.	
6	There's a cost that goes larger than that of	
7	just the premiums; that of defending ourselves to a	
8	plaintiff's attorney that is always going to include	
9	us, always on anything that goes down inside of an ESOP	
10	or any other ERISA plan. Those are the costs that are	
11	going to impact us.	
12	We can take conflict of interest as being a	
13	great argument. Risk is where we are not going to be	
14	able to provide the same thing we provide now. It	
15	makes it extremely complicated.	
16	MR. DAVIS: Thank you.	
17	MR. LEBOWITZ: To my mind, this you know,	
18	this issue is really about accountability. And I think	
19	that's really what we've been talking about mostly this	
20	morning.	
21	Ms. Walker, when you you took let's	
22	talk a little bit more about the IRS requirements. Now,	

122 if the -- if the appraiser fails the IRS requirements, 1 what happens under the tax law, what's the consequence? 2 3 MS. WALKER: Well, under the regulations now for tax purposes, you have to be a qualified appraiser 4 or appraiser. 5 MR. LEBOWITZ: Qualified as they define it? 6 7 MS. WALKER: Yes. 8 MR. LEBOWITZ: And if you're not? If you --9 MS. WALKER: Well, they say then it's not acceptable --10 11 MR. LEBOWITZ: Meaning a deduction is --12 MS. WALKER: Yeah, that the --13 MR. LEBOWITZ: -- there's a tax consequence? 14 MS. WALKER: Right. That they would not --15 MR. LEBOWITZ: It's a -- so somebody's accountable in a very tangible way? There's a penalty 16 and the penalty is that a deduction is disallowed, 17 18 correct? 19 MS. WALKER: Yes, the IRS will say they don't 20 accept that --21 MR. LEBOWITZ: So there's nothing comparable 22 on our side. I mean, you suggested we adopt those

123 kinds of standards but -- and, again, to my mind, this 1 is all about accountability about holding people 2 responsible for what they've -- for the actions they've 3 taken. 4 Under the Code there's a -- there's a clear 5 and tangible penalty for violation of those standards 6 7 and that is that a tax penalty is applied. What -- there's nothing comparable on our 8 side --9 MR. TARBELL: There's more than that. 10 11 MR. LEBOWITZ: There is no deduction. MS. WALKER: Well, no and the deduction is to 12 13 the taxpayer not to the appraiser, but there are --14 there are --15 MR. LEBOWITZ: But there is a penalty? 16 MS. WALKER: There is a penalty of monetary -17 18 MR. LEBOWITZ: That applies to somebody. It 19 applies to the client of the appraiser. 20 MS. WALKER: There is a monetary penalty that can be levied against the appraiser. 21 22 MR. LEBOWITZ: Okay.

124 1 MS. WALKER: And the appraiser can be barred 2 from performing tax-related appraisals. MR. LEBOWITZ: And under ERISA, we --3 MS. WALKER: Which is the real hammer. 4 MR. LEBOWITZ: -- have -- we can do neither 5 of those things. There is no monetary penalty, there's 6 7 no civil penalty for --8 MS. WALKER: Well, certainly --MR. LEBOWITZ: -- performing substandard 9 appraisals and there's no -- we have no ability to bar 10 an appraiser from providing services to clients. 11 12 MS. WALKER: Well, I think you could probably 13 get that authority and --MR. LEBOWITZ: Would you support legislation 14 15 to do that? MS. WALKER: Yeah, I think -- again, I --16 17 MR. LEBOWITZ: You would. Would you, Mr. 18 Cook? 19 MS. WALKER: I think that's a way to look --20 MR. LEBOWITZ: Can I get an answer from Mr. 21 Cook? 22 MS. WALKER: Well, wait. Let me -- you

haven't let me answer your question. 1 2 I think accountability is the issue. And I 3 think under the IRS Code, which also has some authority over ERISA, that perhaps that Code could be enforced. 4 I do think you should be able to bar people 5 if -- from practicing under ERISA; that's what IRS has 6 done and that has been, I think, something that 7 8 appraisers who practice in that arena, you get their attention. 9 10 Of course, the issue is then we will want to 11 work with you to be sure that those rules and regulations we think are appropriate and we have an 12 13 appropriate access to be sure that we get due process 14 in that. 15 But, again, I think our whole idea about looking at credentialed appraisers are the base -- by 16 17 looking at someone who has a credential, they are 18 accountable. 19 MR. LEBOWITZ: And I agree with that, but 20 again, for someone who's involved in the enforcement 21 operation here, if it's not enforceable, it's a 22 voluntary standard that essentially is the same thing

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as having a speed limit that would just -- whatever you 1 2 feel like driving. We suggest it's 65, but you want to 3 go 90, that's okay too. Anyhow, Mr. Cook and, Mr. Tarbell, would you 4 comment on this? Do you think that this -- that 5 approach that Ms. Walker was just talking about is on -6 - that would make some sense --7 8 MR. COOK: Let me --9 MR. LEBOWITZ: -- to create a statutory standard and one that would be enforceable on a 10 tangible way? 11 12 MR. COOK: We work under that environment 13 currently with the Internal Revenue Service. MR. LEBOWITZ: Not under this you don't. 14 15 MR. COOK: I understand. But, somehow, I'm getting the sense, and I understand it has got to be 16 frustrating from an enforcement perspective. 17 I hear 18 what you're saying. But at the other side of this is it would have seemed from listening to the comments 19 here that it makes -- builds the case at least that's 20 21 what I'm hearing, that as appraisers in an ESOP 22 environment, we're immune from anyone.

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1	Would not the trustee have a cause of action	
2	against us for any errors or acts or omissions or	
3	anything that we do? Would they not have a cause of	
4	action if you were to pursue or Department of Labor,	
5	not you, were to pursue that trustee for a faulty	
6	valuation for whatever reason, would not that trustee	
7	have a subrogation ability to come back against us?	
8	Would not that be their duty to do so? Is it not why	
9	we have a trustee with a fiduciary responsibility and	
10	it provides us the opportunity to make recommendations	
11	and suggests and, yes, opine on exactly what that	
12	trustee might be willing to transact those shares with	
13	the participants to be?	
14	I think we're in a very compliant position as	
15	being an appraiser as we sit here today without the	
16	fiduciary requirement.	
17	MR. LEBOWITZ: And what we're talking about	
18	could well be an alternative to that. In other words,	
19	a statutory something that's in the statute that	
20	prescribed professional standards and also imposed a	
21	penalty for failure to meet them.	
22	MR. COOK: I would	

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1	MR. LEBOWITZ: But not fiduciary standard,	
2	not with all of the problems that you've that you've	
3	identified.	
4	MR. COOK: I believe there is much wisdom in	
5	the 1988 proposed adequate consideration. There was a	
6	lot of wisdom. If anybody ever read my book, which a	
7	few have, you will see that I think that is a bedrock.	
8	I don't agree with 100 percent, but if you get 100	
9	percent agreement with everybody, somebody's not	
10	thinking somewhere.	
11	But there are so many positive things that	
12	are written so specifically in that 1988 ruling that	
13	impose things for us as appraisers for what a trustee	
14	could lean on as being a and to assist them if they	
15	do their job right in assessing not only what appraisal	
16	firm to hire, but also the valuation itself.	
17	MR. LEBOWITZ: I guess that was an answer.	
18	MR. COOK: It was an answer.	
19	MR. LEBOWITZ: Thank you.	
20	Mr. Tarbell?	
21	MR. TARBELL: Well, I would disagree with the	
22	premise that there is a consensus that there is a	

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1	problem. But to the extent that something had to	
2	change, we would far rather see the IRS model of	
3	testing value as to what defines incorrect, monetary	
4	penalties on the appraiser and potential disbarment,	
5	then we would see the proposed reg pass as it is	
6	written.	
7	MR. LEBOWITZ: Thank you.	
8	MR. HAUSER: Let me maybe following up on	
9	Alan's comments earlier this morning, let me just, you	
10	know, start with something that's more an observation	
11	than a question.	
12	And the observation is that from our	
13	standpoint, and we could have a discussion about why	
14	the legal framework plays out this way, but from our	
15	standpoint, the appraiser, if a fiduciary, would not	
16	have a duty to bias their work in favor of the plan.	
17	And, in fact, we don't think you're doing a favor to	
18	the plan if you give advice essentially that amounts to	
19	telling it what it would like to hear as to the price.	
20	We think you're doing a disservice in that	
21	circumstance, just as we don't think right now that	
22	fiduciaries of ESOPs or any other kind of plan should	

1	be asking their advisers when they're asking for an
2	opinion to slant the advice or they should be looking
3	for advisers who would slant the advice.
4	Everybody's job when it comes to getting
5	advice as to what the price should be is just getting
6	it right. Then it's the job of the other fiduciaries
7	to execute on that, to make sensible decisions based on
8	an informed position on what the true range of values
9	is.
10	And, you know, if you give wrong advice, if
11	you inflate it because they're a seller, you deflate it
12	because you're a buyer, you're doing they're a
13	buyer, you're doing a disservice. They need to know
14	what the number really is so they can decide which
15	deals to sensibly forego or not.
16	So I think that's a complete red herring, I
17	think it's false, but what we can do for sure is make
18	that clear. We can make it clear that your duty does
19	not require in any way slanting an opinion. It doesn't
20	require in any way compromising your impartiality when
21	you render an opinion as to advice and it doesn't
22	require you to exceed the normal scope of your

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1	engagement in the sense of getting involved in the	
2	mechanics of actually, you know, negotiating on what	
3	the transaction price should be. It requires none of	
4	that.	
5	So to the extent that there's any anxiety	
6	right now that's based on those concerns, that we can	
7	and would rectify whatever we do with this regulation.	
8	So I don't think that's a problem.	
9	So that, I guess, leads me to the a couple	
10	questions, and one is I agree, the trustee's job is to	
11	ultimately, the responsibility rests with the	
12	trustee to decide whether or not to move forward with	
13	the transaction. And it's a very weighty	
14	responsibility. They have to read the report, they	
15	have to understand it, they have to identify what the	
16	assumptions are underlying it. They have to think	
17	about whether any kind of sensitivity analysis was	
18	done. They have to ask themselves if the mathematical	
19	portion and the appendix actually matches the narrative	
20	in the document. There are a million things involved	
21	in it. It's very hard.	
22	But the fact is, as Mr. Goldberg from the	

1	ESOP Association testified earlier, we're often talking
2	about, you know, small businesses and small owners that
3	they're mainly what they know is how to do their
4	operating business. They know how to produce whatever
5	it is they produce. They're not valuation experts and
6	they look to you for that advice.
7	And what I'm not understanding, and what I'd
8	like you to respond to now after this long lead up, is
9	is assuming that the obligation is simply to render
10	a professional, competent, impartial decision that's
11	within the range of professional judgment, recognizing
12	that it is a range, that this is somewhat subjective
13	and it requires judgment, I get the sense from all
14	three of you that you think there's something
15	fundamentally unfair about about you being called to
16	account and when the result of your advice is somebody
17	relies on it and the plan is injured by it in the sense
18	of being on the hook for those losses.
19	And I guess I'm wondering what you know,
20	putting aside the issues of costs and benefits, that's
21	a separate discussion, I get the sense that you think

22 there's something fundamentally unfair about you being

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1	on the hook if you cause those losses. And I'd just	
2	like to understand why that is, because, again,	
3	speaking as an enforcement person, it has been truly	
4	frustrating to us in some of these cases where it's	
5	really seemed to us like the engine that made the deal	
6	go was the appraiser, and the price was really, really	
7	wrong and it really didn't reflect competent judgment,	
8	but that person we can't go after.	
9	We can go after the guy who's running an	
10	operating company was also the trustee and relied on	
11	you. To me, if anything, that seems more unfair in the	
12	current regime, and I'd just like to understand why you	
13	disagree because I think you all three plainly do?	
14	MR. COOK: As one observation to another one	
15	here.	
16	MR. HAUSER: Please, only fair.	
17	MR. COOK: Again, I can't speak for anybody	
18	but me. I've been around ESOPs a long time. At the	
19	end of the day, I sense from your observation, that	
20	there is no pressure that can be applied to me as an	
21	appraiser if I really, really, miss it. That's just	
22	not true. That trustee has a cause of action against	

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		1:
1	me and my liability policy, assuming I have one, and	
2	they nothing precludes them from saying if you said	
3	it's messed up and you prove that to the trustee for	
4	them not to subrogate there, is there? Am I missing	
5	something?	
6	MR. HAUSER: Well, I think you are in a sense	
7	and maybe you can respond to this too. But the problem	
8	for I mean, again, remember, the whole framework.	
9	And I think all three of you echoed this was that,	
10	well, the trustee's really the person on the hook.	
11	So now ask yourself, if I'm a trustee and I	
12	think that the valuation went bad, at least unless	
13	and until some participant or the Department of Labor	
14	happens upon it and sues me, don't I have a powerful	
15	disincentive not to bring the lawsuit against the	
16	appraiser because that's almost putting a target on my	
17	back?	
18	If I'm saying I I shouldn't have relied on	
19	this appraisal because it was incompetently rendered,	
20	I'm also saying from a conventional fiduciary	
21	standpoint, I breached my duties as a fiduciary in	
22	relying on it. That's a powerful disincentive for	

1 ever bringing that lawsuit.

2	And then, the other issue is in a number of
3	these cases what we've seen is that the transactions
4	are, you know, sometimes the abuse is just somebody's
5	gotten the price wrong. They've rendered an
6	incompetent job, it really was kind of imprudent.
7	Other times it's a company that's being
8	drained in substantial part of its assets for the
9	benefit of a corporate insider. And the fact is the
10	corporate insider is the guy driving the transaction.
11	He's not going to sue you because he's in on the deal.
12	MR. TARBELL: Well, you identify a
13	hypothetical there of a trustee who's who's
14	reluctant to sue their valuation firm because they've
15	improperly relied on the appraisal. The core of that
16	problem is that the trustee improperly relied on the
17	appraisal. That the fact that they've gotten
18	themselves into that mess is not is not our mistake.
19	MR. HAUSER: You don't is that what you
20	tell your customers? I mean, they hire you because
21	they think they should be able to rely on you, don't
22	they?

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1	I mean, I'm not saying what's core and what's	
2	not core. I'm saying you're both there. And it seems	
3	on this maybe I'm being superficial but it seems	
4	on the surface, it seems unfair to have kind of your	
5	customer in the dock, but you're not there with them	
6	when they relied on your advice.	
7	MR. TARBELL: Well, we are there with them.	
8	MS. WALKER: Yes.	
9	MR. TARBELL: We are exposed to their to	
10	their judgment and liability and ability to sue us.	
11	I don't think it's unfair and I do think	
12	you're simplifying it with all due respect. The fact	
13	is that, yes, they hire us because we think they	
14	think we will give them a reasonable opinion of value.	
15	But that doesn't relieve them of their duty to	
16	investigate.	
17	Just like I mean, ignore ESOPs. Think	
18	Delaware law right, corporate law. Right? A board	
19	of directors akin to a trustee is not relieved of its	
20	duty to investigate the advice it receives.	
21	MR. HAUSER: I appreciate that. And so that	
22	let me just say a completely different question and	

1	maybe I'll just direct this to you, Ms. Walker.
2	But I I I understand the point about
3	credentials and state regulation and licensing and all
4	the rest when it comes to real estate appraisers. But
5	can you identify are there any states, and I don't
6	know the answer, I mean, are there any states right now
7	that impose licensing, testing, sorts of requirements
8	on people who appraise stock or who are in that
9	business or limit their ability to practice based on
10	any any conduct or qualification standards?
11	MS. WALKER: Well, for business valuations
12	there is no state licensing. And we certainly don't
13	advocate that. But, again, we think if you look to
14	credentialed appraisers you will look at people who are
15	both, you know, independent, competent, and
16	accountable, which I think is what we're trying to get
17	at.
18	MR. HAUSER: And are there any state laws
19	that specifically, you know, purport to even provide
20	remedies specifically for appraisers apart from, you
21	know, for claims against appraisers, apart from kind of
22	general negligence standards and the like that you can

138 1 think of? 2 MS. WALKER: I don't --3 MR. COOK: Again, I don't know --MS. WALKER: I don't know. 4 5 MR. HAUSER: Okay. MR. COOK: I'm also a CPA and have 6 credentials, okay? My license with the state is that I 7 8 must do -- do professional care and I cannot undertake 9 any project or any engagement that I am not competent If I do and it is brought up, my license 10 to do so. will be suspended or I will go to disciplinary action 11 depending upon the severity of how I messed up. 12 13 MR. HAUSER: So, and that's a good point. 14 Thank you. But if your license were taken away as a 15 CPA and in the state you practice in, would you still be able to market yourself as an appraiser for stock? 16 17 Would any -- are you aware of any state law 18 that would --19 MR. COOK: I'm not aware --20 MR. HAUSER: -- prevent you from doing that? 21 I'm not aware of any. I'm not. MR. COOK: MR. HAUSER: Okay. Thank you. 22

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1	MR. TARBELL: Larry and I are both registered	
2	representatives under FINRA and while that is not	
3	directly a business valuation issue, you know, that	
4	organization as well as the Charter Financial Analyst	
5	Program, which I and Ms. Walker are a member of, and	
6	many ESOP appraisers are, and the ASA, have have	
7	you know, they're not toothless in enforcement.	
8	There are and, in fact, most serious at	
9	FINRA, there are very serious regulations about	
10	customer complaints, about complaints to the	
11	organization regarding ethics and those are taken	
12	seriously and, you know, that's an important question	
13	the trustee should ask their appraiser. And I think	
14	they are eventually if finally, you know, adjudicated,	
15	they are a matter of public record.	
16	MR. HAUSER: Thank you very much.	
17	MS. BORZI: Can I just ask one quick	
18	question?	
19	Are you then required under those rules to	
20	when you sign your engagement letter to tell your	
21	customers they have the right to complain to FINRA?	
22	MR. TARBELL: We don't perform ESOP	

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valuations as a broker/dealer. I don't know the answer 1 2 to that. I mean, the answer must be no, because we 3 don't and we don't do them as a broker/dealer. But even if we did, I don't -- I couldn't tell you the 4 5 answer. MR. PIACENTINI: I guess I want to follow up 6 7 just a little bit more on the question of sanctions 8 within the profession and credentialing because it's 9 not yet completely clear to me how public these 10 sanctions are. 11 Ms. Walker, you said that a trustee could call up and find out whether somebody was still 12 13 accredited. So I quess that goes to whether they've 14 been expelled. But it sounds like that's not somehow posted publicly, they actually have to call up. 15 16 And are the lesser sanctions public information or not? 17 18 MS. WALKER: The lesser sanctions I don't believe are. But, again, I think -- I think it would -19 20 - I would hope a trustee would know. I guess if I was 21 a trustee and I was hiring an appraiser I'd ask. I 22 have been asked, you know, do you have any sanctions

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1	against you? Have you ever been you know, had any	
2	action against you by your professional organization?	
3	So, you know, there is that kind of due	
4	diligence on the part of the trustee that I think can	
5	get to some of these sanctions and whether there's been	
6	any ethical violations on behalf of an appraiser.	
7	MR. PIACENTINI: That might be the trustee	
8	discharging their duty. But it's less clear whether	
9	they would always be told, I guess.	
10	Are there examples of these kinds of	
11	sanctions that have occurred in ESOP cases, ESOP	
12	abuses? Do you know or	
13	MS. WALKER: I don't know.	
14	MR. PIACENTINI: Okay. Then I have a	
15	question for Mr. Cook. In questions for Ms. Borzi, you	
16	talked about an example where there were two valuations	
17	18 percent apart. And you were asked to opine on which	
18	one was better. So and that was a termination.	
19	MR. COOK: That's correct.	
20	MR. PIACENTINI: So just so I'm clear so then	
21	what's going on in that transaction is the company's	
22	buying back the stock or	
1		

1	MR. COOK: Yes.
2	MR. PIACENTINI: Okay. And then I guess my
3	last question for anybody on the panel, for the first
4	panel, I gave an example of some academic research that
5	had found that appraisers who are, you know, told sort
6	of in an experimental setting that they're conducting a
7	valuation on behalf of a buyer come to a value at least
8	in this particular study, came to a value that was only
9	a little more than half of the value that people who
10	were told they were performing this valuation for a
11	seller.
12	Have you seen research in this area as this -
13	- is there a view you have on what we should think
13 14	- is there a view you have on what we should think about, about that sort of thing?
	-
14	about, about that sort of thing?
14 15	about, about that sort of thing? MR. TARBELL: I'm not familiar with the study
14 15 16	about, about that sort of thing? MR. TARBELL: I'm not familiar with the study and I haven't seen research in the on the topic so I
14 15 16 17	about, about that sort of thing? MR. TARBELL: I'm not familiar with the study and I haven't seen research in the on the topic so I can't address the study. But but there was a
14 15 16 17 18	about, about that sort of thing? MR. TARBELL: I'm not familiar with the study and I haven't seen research in the on the topic so I can't address the study. But but there was a fundamental premise and I think, you know, I know some
14 15 16 17 18 19	about, about that sort of thing? MR. TARBELL: I'm not familiar with the study and I haven't seen research in the on the topic so I can't address the study. But but there was a fundamental premise and I think, you know, I know some of the previous participants on the previous panel for

1 and who hired you.

2	Not in our world as ASAs, not when we are
3	asked to determine fair market value. That is you
4	know, I couldn't disagree with anything stronger. It
5	doesn't it is and that you know, that's a
6	fundamental problem here where some of the disagreement
7	is is that we're our task, as we've been trained to
8	do, is to determine value from an independent, unbiased
9	perspective without identification of or assumption
10	of the identity of a willing buyer of the buyer or
11	seller, right there, hypothetical parties, yet, there's
12	this statement that a fiduciary acts in the best
13	interest of a plan participant. And it's very hard to
14	reconcile those two statements.
15	MR. PIACENTINI: May I make a request of you
16	all and that's that obviously who knows what's going to
17	be in the final regulation, but it seems to me if we
18	were to include appraisers, you're going to want us to
19	say something on this point about independence and
20	partiality, scope of the engagement and the like. And
21	it would be very helpful if you could give us a comment
22	on what you'd like that language to look like if it

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1	came to that.	
2	MR. TARBELL: And, you know, I don't know	
3	that there's any effect of me saying this, but I think	
4	to the extent that you're considering putting in	
5	provisions like that, it would also be very helpful for	
6	us to see those regs and have a chance to comment on	
7	them before they're issued final.	
8	Thanks.	
9	MR. PIACENTINI: I have nothing else.	
10	MR. DAVIS: Thanks, Panel 9.	
11	We went a little longer than scheduled, but	
12	we wanted to make sure we got all the questions out. It	
13	was a spirited dialogue and we appreciate it.	
14	Thank you very much.	
15	We'll move right into Panel 10. And after	
16	lunch, we'll try to get back on schedule. But if Panel	
17	10 can come up.	
18	Panel 10 we have Mr. Hardock with Davis and	
19	Harman, Mr. Kaswell, with the Managed Funds Association	
20	and Mr. Anderson with the Retirement Industry Trust	
21	Association.	
22	We'll start with Mr. Hardock.	

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1	MR. HARDOCK: Thanks. I'm Randy Hardock. I'm	
2	a partner at Davis and Harman. Our firm represents	
3	numerous large financial institutions including	
4	insurance companies, mutual fund companies, brokerage	
5	firms and banks.	
6	I appreciate the opportunity so speak with	
7	you today.	
8	For the almost 50 million U.S. households	
9	with an IRA it's imperative that the Department's	
10	proposed changes to the investment fiduciary definition	
11	be successfully coordinated with the SEC review of the	
12	appropriate standard of care or standard of conduct	
13	applicable to broker/dealers providing investment	
14	advice to retail customers and including especially	
15	IRAs.	
16	I'm not going to focus on substance, on what	
17	the DOL and SEC should be doing, but rather on the	
18	process for jointly getting to the correct answer, the	
19	best answer for participants.	
20	The bad news I think is that on the 10th	
21	Panel of the second day, I, and probably you, feel that	
22	everything has been that can be said already has	

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1	been said, just not by me. The good news for me is	
2	that every question that you probably have has already	
3	been asked and answered, just not by me. So I'll recap	
4	a little bit of what I heard yesterday and I hope you	
5	heard also and briefly give you our perspective.	
6	First a few of the points that were raised,	
7	really by multiple witnesses yesterday and in multiple	
8	comment letters.	
9	I start with IRAs are different. They are	
10	not ERISA plans. They are regulated in large measure	
11	by the Internal Revenue Code, with the Internal Revenue	
12	Code Prohibited Transaction Rules and Internal Revenue	
13	Code penalties, ultimately enforced by the Internal	
14	Revenue Service. You have great responsibility there,	
15	but the IRS also is involved.	
16	IRAs also exist in a very different	
17	environment from employment-based retirement plans, but	
18	generally a retail environment without the involvement	
19	of an employer.	
20	We also learned yesterday and you already	
21	know this, that there is very little analysis that has	
22	been done on the costs of the DOL's proposed changes in	

the IRA world, costs that could ultimately, almost 1 2 certainly will ultimately, be passed through to 3 consumers. Witnesses also noted that an integral part of 4 the ongoing congressionally mandated SEC review of the 5 standard of care that should be applied to brokers and 6 dealers, including specifically whether brokers and 7 dealers should be treated as fiduciaries includes the 8 IRA world and IRAs specifically. 9 10 We heard that the SEC and the DOL projects were interrelated, that they overlapped at least at 11 some level. And we heard that the DOL and the SEC 12 13 projects had the potential to conflict in substantial ways and thereby potentially impede the provision of 14 investment assistance to individuals and cause 15 widespread disruption of IRA providers and the way they 16 provide services, particularly in the commission-based 17 environment. 18 19 There was considerable discussion of how 20 exactly the department and the SEC should interact. Ι 21 think somewhat tongue-in-cheek, Phyllis, you said 22 should the DOL just roll over and follow the SEC lead?

Obviously, not. 1 2 But the two government agencies do need to 3 work together and the words are "coordinate" or "consult" or "harmonize." I don't really know the 4 difference between those words. I think certainly 5 there is a consensus that the agencies need to work 6 together and that they would work together. So we 7 8 agree with that approach. 9 But I'm also, you know, living in the real world and I know that everyone over there who has ever 10 worked on a cross-agency project knows just how painful 11 that can be. The other agencies don't always agree 12 13 with you and that's a difficult process. 14 All too often when agencies say they're coordinating, they basically go in, having made up 15 their minds on what they think the right answer is and 16 17 then -- and then argue about it and try and beat the 18 other agency into submission. So we urge you in this context not to go in 19 20 and to actually work with the SEC. This is really an 21 opportunity to do that and to get to a better answer 22 for everybody in the case of IRAs, because any other

1 approach in this world -- in the IRA world could be 2 very dangerous.

SEC and DOL should not craft their own rules 3 in advance, get their feet set in stone and then get 4 together at the end of the process and look for direct 5 That is not going to be the best approach conflicts. 6 for consumers. As one of the witnesses said yesterday, 7 8 I'll paraphrase him, what ends up happening in that world is you may get dual standards and the good guys 9 incur the costs, the good guys follow the rules and the 10 11 bad guys don't in the IRA world.

12 Rather we urge you to follow the principles 13 laid out in the President's recent Executive Order 14 which requires active coordination, not simply 15 notifying other agencies of pending projects. The Executive Order is very critical of regulatory 16 17 requirements that are inconsistent or overlapping and 18 requires agencies to attempt to promote coordination, 19 simplification and harmonization.

20 Consistent with that direction from the 21 President, the Department and the SEC should start 22 working together now towards a clear single standard

1	150 fairness opinions conduct for broker/dealers providing
2	investment assistance to consumers.
3	This does not mean the Department rolls over
4	and does what the SEC says or vice-versa. Rather, the
5	agencies should work together from the outset in a
6	mutual effort to create a single consistent and clear
7	set of rules applicable to brokers and dealers
8	assisting customers with their IRAs.
9	Yes, the fiduciary and transaction rules
10	applicable to IRAs and the securities laws are
11	different. They have different objectives and both the
12	SEC and the Department have their own responsibilities
13	with respect to those statutes. But the benefits of a
14	consistent rule from our perspective given the
15	consumer are significant and that needs to be the goal.
16	In concluding that the same standard of care
17	should apply uniformly to both broker/dealers and
18	investment advisers, the SEC staff study concluded that
19	different standards of care served to confuse retail
20	customers and the consistent standards would increase
21	consumer protection. That's what's needed in the IRA
22	space, a single consistent standard.

1	The Department has the authority to achieve
2	that objective through the fiduciary definition or
3	through prohibited transaction class exemptions.
4	Tim, you asked yesterday whether all of the
5	problems or many of the problems that were raised could
6	be dealt with by changing or tweaking the existing
7	prohibited transaction exemptions or providing new
8	ones. I think the answer may well be yes, but you
9	haven't done so. And that is obviously a great concern
10	when you're dealing with potentially massive
11	disruptions in the way business has always been done.
12	Disruptions that you may well not intend.
13	So those PT exemptions are critical and must
14	be adopted and considered concurrently with any changes
15	in the investment fiduciary definitions in order to
16	avoid that unnecessary disruption, particularly in the
17	IRA space. You've done that in the past with PT
18	exemptions associated with regulations and it is
19	completely appropriate in the case of major changes
20	like those you're dealing with right now.
21	And just as changes with the DOL's investment
22	fiduciary definition should be coordinated and

		1.
1	harmonized with the SEC standards, appropriate PT	
2	exemptions should to the extent possible be harmonized.	
3	Once again, we appreciate that it's difficult	
4	to reach that consensus opinion and that it could take	
5	time. It also may lead you to conclude that it may	
6	make sense to break out these non-ERISA plans from	
7	other issues addressed in the proposed investment	
8	fiduciary regulations, as you did for welfare benefit	
9	plans under 408(b)(2), and now that project is ongoing	
10	in that context.	
11	But it doesn't, once again, mean that the	
12	Department should step aside and just wait to see what	
13	the SEC does. It doesn't have to mean that. Actually,	
14	a dialogue starting right now between the DOL and the	
15	SEC and I caution to say this, I dare to say this to	
16	all of you, but the Treasury and the IRS folks who are	
17	going to be responsible for enforcing this regime in	
18	the IRA PT rules, those agencies should, consistent	
19	with the President's Executive Order, agree at the	
20	outset that the goal should be to work to arrive at a	
21	single standard for broker/dealer's interacting with	
22	retail customers in the IRA space.	

153 1 As I said, that single standard if properly 2 implemented and enforced consistently by the SEC and 3 the IRS, would be in the best interest of IRA participants. 4 5 MR. DAVIS: Thank you. Mr. Kaswell. 6 7 MR. KASWELL: Thank you. My name is Stuart 8 Kaswell and I am general counsel for the Managed Funds Association. 9 10 MFA is pleased to provide the statement in connection with the Department of Labor's hearing on 11 the proposed definition of the term fiduciary under the 12 13 Employee Retirement Income Security Act. 14 MFA represents professionals who manage and 15 advise hedge funds, funds of funds, and manage future's funds as well as industry service providers. 16 17 MFA's members manage a substantial portion of 18 the approximately \$1.9 trillion invested in absolute return strategies around the world. 19 20 MFA strongly supports the Department's goal 21 of protecting benefit plans and their participants and we recognize that imposing fiduciary status in certain 22

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1	circumstances is important to achieve that goal. We
2	also support the Department's efforts to examine its
3	existing rules to see if they have become outdated.
4	Our concern, however, that the Department's
5	proposed definition of fiduciary may be broader than
6	intended. And it inadvertently could capture many
7	market participants that Congress and the Department
8	previously have explicitly determined should not be
9	fiduciaries under ERISA.
10	Each of the issues discussed in my testimony
11	today are also addressed in MFA's February 3rd comment
12	letter.
13	Before discussing the specifics of the
14	Department's proposed rules, it is important to note
15	that hedge funds and other alternative investment
16	vehicles are a valuable component of the investment
17	portfolio for sophisticated investors including pension
18	plans. The properly managed addition of hedge funds to
19	a portfolio sorry provides diversification, risk
20	management and returns that are not correlated to
21	traditional equity and fixed income markets. These are
22	critical benefits that help plans generate sufficient
1	

1 returns to meet their obligations.

The value that hedge funds add to plan portfolios is demonstrated through the significant investments made by plans and endowments in hedge funds. Plans and endowments in every state invest in hedge funds because of the benefits to their investment portfolios.

8 The proposed rule may make a broad range of 9 entities fiduciaries for purposes of ERISA, including 10 the general partner and adviser to a fund that does not 11 hold plan assets under ERISA and persons providing 12 valuation services to such non-plan asset funds.

13 While it is clear whether -- while it is 14 unclear whether the Department intended to include such parties within the scope of the proposed rule, we 15 respectfully submit that such an interpretation would 16 17 be inconsistent with a clear Congressional mandate that such entities should not be fiduciaries under ERISA. 18 19 Congress most recently spoke to this issue when it enacted the Pension Protection Act of 2006, 20 21 which added section 342 of ERISA. Section 3(42) states, 22 as you know, the assets of any entity shall not be

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1	treated as plan assets if immediately after the most	
2	recent acquisition of any equity interest in the	
3	entity, less than 25 percent of the total value of each	
4	class of equity interest in the entity is held by	
5	benefit plan investors.	
6	The statutory language and the Department's	
7	rules clearly demonstrate that advisers and service	
8	providers to non-plan asset funds are not fiduciaries	
9	under ERISA.	
10	Because the language in the proposed rule is	
11	drafted so broadly, we are concerned that it could be	
12	interpreted in a way that is inconsistent with the	
13	plain language of ERISA as well as with the	
14	Department's own rules and guidance with respect to	
15	non-plan asset funds.	
16	Accordingly, we urge the Department to make	
17	clear in any final rule that nothing in the rule will	
18	cause a general partner, adviser or service provider to	
19	a non-plan asset fund to become a fiduciary because of	
20	any statement, report or recommendation regarding the	
21	value of the non-plan asset fund or any of its assets.	
22	We also are concerned that the proposed rule	

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1	could make the general partner or adviser to a plan	
2	asset fund a fiduciary to plan investors simply because	
3	the plan asset fund sends periodic reports to fund	
4	investors. Such an interpretation would create	
5	uncertainty as to whether the fees charged by an	
6	adviser could violate the prohibited transaction	
7	provisions of ERISA. As a result, managers may not	
8	provide comprehensive information to plan investors.	
9	Each of the service providers or counter-	
10	parties that provide information regarding the value of	
11	an asset also could be a fiduciary under the proposed	
12	rule, which could invalidate their asset-based fee	
13	compensation. Faced with potentially prohibitive costs	
14	or the inability to find suitable service providers,	
15	funds may be reluctant to take investments from ERISA	
16	plans which would greatly limit plans' alternative	
17	investment options.	
18	We urge the Department to consider a more	
19	narrowly tailored approach with respect to determining	
20	which persons involved with the valuation of assets of	
21	a plan fund, asset fund should be considered	
22	fiduciaries.	

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1	Turning to other topics, we are concerned	
2	that the selling exception may not adequately cover the	
3	marketing activities of pooled investment funds. We	
4	recommend that the Department revise the exception to	
5	cover the selling of services and investment products	
6	by a fund or its adviser to a new and existing	
7	investor. A fund's marketing activity should not by	
8	itself create a fiduciary relationship.	
9	Further, the proposed rule requires that the	
10	seller warn the plan that its interests are adverse. We	
11	urge the Department to delete the term "adverse." In	
12	our view, it should be sufficient if a seller makes	
13	clear that it is providing marketing services and not	
14	impartial investment advice. We would have no	
15	objection requiring marketers to state when they have a	
16	financial interest in the outcome.	
17	The selling exception also should make clear	
18	that it covers counter-parties and swaps and other	
19	lending credit arrangements. Finally, it should cover	
20	contractual rights and the exercise of those rights.	
21	Without appropriate exceptions fund counter-parties may	
22	refuse to deal with any fund any plan asset fund	

because the risk that the counter-party could be deemed 1 2 a fiduciary. 3 The proposed rule also changes three wellunderstood tests for determining fiduciary status which 4 remove uncertainty and clarity from the definition. 5 First is mutual understanding. We believe 6 the rule should be based on both parties' understanding 7 8 when a person becomes a fiduciary, as under current law. Eliminating the term "mutual" creates uncertainty 9 whether a plan could elect on its own to make another 10 person a fiduciary. 11 12 We respectfully urge the Department to reinstate the term "mutual." 13 Second, may be considered. Another change is 14 that advice does not need to be a primary basis for a 15 plan's decisions. A person may become a fiduciary if 16 17 the advice may be considered in the plan's investment decision. 18 We respectfully submit that this formulation 19 is overly broad and could apply to all information 20 21 conveyed to the plan. The proposed rule would create significant uncertainty and potentially broad liability 22

1 for market participants.

2	The Preamble to the proposed rule states that
3	the rule is intended to capture persons who
4	significantly influence the decision of plan
5	fiduciaries and have a considerable impact on plan
6	investment. We urge the Department to use that
7	standard, "significantly influence" rather than may be
8	considered in the test for when advice should be deemed
9	fiduciary advice.
10	Third, tailored advice. Under the proposal,
11	public recommendations such as information provided at
12	conferences and publicly available research materials
13	may be deemed fiduciary advice regardless of the forum
14	and even if the recommendations are not tailored to a
15	particular plan. While the Department may have not
16	intended this far-reaching result, the proposal creates
17	uncertainty as to the scope of recommendations that
18	will be deemed fiduciary advice.
19	Accordingly, we urge the Department to amend
20	this part of the proposed rule.
21	We also are concerned that the definition of
22	fees in the proposed rule could be interpreted to

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1	require aggregating many unrelated transactions	
2	resulting in fiduciary status for unwitting service	
3	providers. It is critical for market participants to	
4	fully understand the scope of this new definition.	
5	Accordingly, we encourage the Department to	
6	provide guidance on the intended scope of the	
7	definition and to allow a further period for public	
8	comment.	
9	MFA appreciates the opportunity to testify	
10	before the Department. We hope to play a constructive	
11	role in shaping any changes to the scope of the	
12	fiduciary status rules.	
13	I'd be pleased to try to answer any	
14	questions.	
15	MR. DAVIS: Thank you, Mr. Kaswell.	
16	Mr. Anderson.	
17	MR. ANDERSON: Good morning. My name is Tom	
18	Anderson. I'm the vice chairman and founder of the	
19	Pensco Trust Company and president of the Retirement	
20	Industry Trust Association who I reference as RITA.	
21	The good news is that we're near the end of	
22	this hearing for you. The bad news is I'm going to be	

		16
1	adding to the litany of concerns, however, the good	10
2	news there is I have fewer concerns than some of the	
3	others because of the nature of our business.	
4	I do appreciate the opportunity to testify on	
5	behalf of our organization. We are a nonprofit	
6	national trade group consisting of federally and state	
7	registered banks and trust departments or trust	
8	companies and we administer approximately 400,000	
9	retirement accounts with approximately \$55 billion in	
10	retirement assets.	
11	RITA members generally act as directed	
12	custodians or non-discretionary trustees of self-	
13	directed IRAs and individual pension plans like 401(k)s	
14	for sole providers.	
15	These plans generally hold alternative assets	
16	including real estate, private equity, private debt,	
17	real estate being foreign, domestic, and many other	
18	alternative assets that are permitted under the	
19	Internal Revenue Code. We also include traditional	
20	assets such as stocks and mutual funds.	
21	Unlike the majority of the nation's IRA	
22	administrators and custodians, we don't channel or	

163 limit the choices of the clients' investments. The 1 client can be the fiduciary and usually is, along with 2 another selected fiduciary like an adviser, directs us 3 to acquire whatever assets that are permitted under the 4 law. 5 In that sense and by virtue of the facts that 6 we provide no investment advice and we sell no 7 8 investment products, but for some of the provisions under the proposed regulations, we are about as far 9 from being fiduciaries as most of the people who 10 11 testified here in the last two days. 12 However, because of certain elements within 13 the Department's proposal, we will indicate our 14 objections, which we believe could potentially be 15 harmful to not only us but the Americans that we serve. In short, there are three problematic 16 elements in the Department's proposal that resulted in 17 18 our wanting to be here to testify. 19 First, we do not believe self-directed custodians and trustees should be deemed fiduciaries 20 21 merely for reporting assets and their values determined 22 by other third parties as implied in the current

1 proposal.

We do believe that we should be able to provide helpful information to participants and IRA owners on the rules, tax consequences and mechanics of both discretionary and mandatory distributions. We think, in fact, that's our duty as -- under our service agreements.

8 And, lastly, we believe that IRA custodians 9 should be granted the same exemption from being 10 considered investment advice, that is the provision of 11 educational material and a platform for the 12 distribution of mutual funds and other securities as 13 granted defined contribution plan administrators.

14 To support our position, RITA members have never been deemed fiduciaries heretofore. RITA is not 15 hiding behind our disclosures but being judged by our 16 17 contractual obligations and our actions. RITA members 18 do not give investment advice. Consequently, we do not contract nor charge for something that we don't 19 provide. We also do not sell investment products nor 20 21 do we have any business relationships with ASA sponsors or advisers. We do not determine the value of assets 22

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1	we hold as self-directed custodians. It is the	
2	fiduciary's responsibility to obtain the value and to -	
3	- and we report on that after we receive it from them.	
4	Custodians are, however, subject to certain	
5	reporting obligations under the Internal Revenue Code.	
6	Most notably custodians of IRAs must provide annual	
7	evaluations in order to comply with reporting	
8	requirements of the Code. In doing so, self-directed	
9	custodians report values that are provided by third	
10	parties such as investment providers and investment	
11	managers who in turn may rely on professional valuation	
12	or appraisal firms.	
13	Furthermore, self-directed custodians do not	
14	have the legal authority to demand from investment	
15	sponsors the information that would be required to	
16	independently perform valuations on alternative assets.	
17	I think it is both infeasible and unrealistic to assign	
18	responsibility when the authority to execute it is	
19	neither existent or granted in conjunction with that	
20	responsibility.	
21	As stated by several parties yesterday, the	
22	mere act of passing through the value of an asset	

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1	determined by someone else should not be considered a	
2	fiduciary act even in conjunction with a distribution	
3	event. In addition, we feel it is axiomatic that a	
4	person without discretionary authority is not acting as	
5	fiduciary. In fact, the very notion of extending	
6	fiduciary status to self-directed custodians is at odds	
7	with ERISA's functional definition of a fiduciary.	
8	A person is a fiduciary only to the extent	
9	that that person is performing a fiduciary function and	
10	the mere transmittal of valuation information is not a	
11	fiduciary function.	
12	Similarly, one can fairly characterize the	
13	role custodians serve satisfying the reporting	
14	obligations of the Code as a mere ministerial role,	
15	which again is a type of a role that ERISA clearly	
16	views as non-fiduciary.	
17	I would also like to at this point agree with	
18	my colleague over here that we're talking IRAs here for	
19	the most part or non-ERISA pension plans. So there's	
20	even more of a reason to divide the issue.	
21	As clarification on this point to eliminate	
22	fiduciary status for mere reporters of asset values is	

1	critical to ensuring the ongoing viability of self-
2	directed IRAs and retirement plans. I think all of us
3	in the industry appreciate the Department's efforts and
4	that of other regulators to raise the bar, if you will,
5	to avoid the next Bernie Madoff. But let's all be
6	clear here Bernie was a fiduciary and the imposition of
7	new regulations wouldn't have helped. And, basically,
8	the enforcement of the existing regulations were was
9	needed. It would have helped immensely.
10	The moral here is the imposition of new
11	regulations has to be carefully thought through so the
12	intended consequences achieved in a manner that is
13	cost-effective overall for the intended beneficiary,
14	the consumer. Put another way, if we end up through
15	additional regulation to pass on more net expense to
16	the retirement system and savers that we serve, we have
17	missed the mark.
18	To demonstrate how easy that is, and in all
19	deference to Ms. Borzi, I have to be honest and admit
20	that I did unintentionally consume a small amount of
21	foie gras last evening when I when I intentionally
22	ordered the chestnut soup at Marcel's without having

1 read the small print.

2	So I think while the five points that are
3	exist in the 1975 Code for exceptions, are maybe
4	subject to some consideration for change, I think the
5	one thing that's good about those five points is
6	they're understandable and digestible and you can, much
7	like IRC 4975, you can maintain compliance with them.
8	But seriously, I'd like to say that we concur
9	with many of the previous speakers as follows:
10	The proposal appears well intentioned but has
11	the potential to have negative consequences that could
12	far outweigh the intended benefits.
13	Expanded rules and regulations could result
14	in inefficiencies, unnecessary litigation, loss of
15	services and higher costs.
16	The proposal, if not harmonized with that of
17	the other regulators, could result in the development
18	of overlapping and conflicting regulation between
19	regulators which is likely to do nothing more than add
20	more legal expense and litigation.
21	We agree with the Department, we agree with
22	the Department that entities should not hide behind

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1	their disclosures. I for one believe that actions, not	
2	words of disclosures, speak louder than such words and	
3	I believe case law substantiates that the courts do as	
4	well. In other words, if it walks and quacks like a	
5	duck, it is a duck despite what it quacks to the	
6	contrary.	
7	As stated yesterday, fiduciary status should	
8	be based on the actual nature of the advice provided	
9	and not what is said about the advice in terms of what	
10	what it might be might be when it is provided.	
11	To conclude for us, imposing a fiduciary	
12	status on custodians would also not serve the policy	
13	concern that is motivating the Department. Directed	
14	custodians do not operate under any conflict of	
15	interest nor are they in a position to exert any	
16	influence over plan decisions. When they furnish plan	
17	reports to satisfy tax law requirements the custodian	
18	is merely complying with the sorry, supplying the	
19	information provided by third parties.	
20	Unfortunately, the potential imposition of	
21	fiduciary status could have enormous consequences. IRAs	
22	hold more than 4 trillion in retirement assets which	

represents more than one-quarter of all U.S. 1 retirement wealth. It is critically 2 important that directed custodians continue to offer 3 cost-effective administrative services to millions of 4 Americans diligently saving for retirement. 5 Custodians do not currently carry fiduciary 6 insurance and more than likely would be unable to 7 8 obtain it even at a high cost. Some custodians could exit the industry leaving fewer providers to administer 9 retirement plans and at higher cost to consumers. 10 This 11 in turn could result in fewer investment choices for retirement savers, less investment diversification and 12 13 therefore, higher investment risk for American savers. 14 In conclusion, for the reasons discussed 15 above, we urge the Department to modify the final regulation to explicitly provide that the custodians 16 17 who furnish valuations or do value assets prepared by 18 third parties on plan reports are not investment 19 fiduciaries. The absence of such a clarification would 20 have enormous implications for our industry, the 21 clients we serve and the retirement system. 22 Thank you for consideration and we're open to

1 any questions.

2	MR. DAVIS: Thank you.
3	MS. BORZI: Well, notwithstanding the fact
4	that your Panel 10, I think you I want to thank you
5	for your valuable contribution to these hearings. And
6	everyone will be relieved to know that I have a just
7	a few things that I want to say and then I'm going to
8	disappear.
9	And for those of you who are of the panels
10	this afternoon, you will probably be even more relieved
11	to discover that I'm not going to be here this
12	afternoon because I'll be with the Secretary at the
13	PBGC Board Meeting.
14	So really, there are just there's just
15	really one thing that I want to say and I want to
16	reiterate it for the people who weren't here yesterday.
17	Randy, we're not going to take your advice to begin to
18	coordinate now, because actually we've been trying to
19	work with the other agencies and have been working with
20	the other agencies for quite a while because we think
21	it we thought that this was very important. We
22	worked with the SEC, with the CFTC, from prior to the

1	enactment of Dodd/Frank and, of course, we have a
2	longstanding relationship with the IRS.
3	I am completely mindful because both of us
4	had prior lives, about the difficulty of working
5	together. And that's why yesterday I made it quite
6	clear that what we're trying to do is harmonize these
7	rules, and that's our goal and objective. Not just
8	and the reason I engaged in that dialogue with Steve
9	Saxon yesterday was because on one of the earlier
10	panels we were admonished that coordination wasn't good
11	enough. That if coordination meant just talking to
12	each other and telling each other what we're doing that
13	that wasn't good enough. And there isn't anything that
14	I agree with more than that.
15	So let me also repeat something that I said
16	yesterday and I feel very strongly about, we have no
17	intention and there's no mileage for us, to increase
18	the cost to the regulated community by having you have
19	to comply with multiple and conflicting standards.
20	Having been in this business for too many years than I
21	care to count, certainly since the passage of ERISA,
22	I've seen both in the public sector and the private but

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1	in the government and the private sector, I've seen the
2	destructive and counter-productive impact of
3	conflicting rules and regulations. And if there's one
4	thing that I'm determined to avoid it's that.
5	So you should nobody should have any doubt
6	of our desire to avoid all the concerns that you and
7	the prior panelists have exhibited. Is it going to be
8	easy t try to reconcile these things? Probably not.
9	But are we committed to doing it, the answer is
10	absolutely, yes.
11	But I can't resist pointing out one thing and
12	you were in the audience yesterday I think when I
13	when I responded to this as well. There is not we
14	cannot guarantee, given the fact that we have multiple
15	legal regimes here, that broker/dealers will have a
16	single standard. And that was the nature of my
17	question yesterday, because I was a bit confused about
18	some of the testimony.
19	Yesterday, a lot of people talked about it
20	and you referred to it as well, the SEC study of broker
21	that was required in Dodd/Frank. And people tend to
22	talk about how there needs to be a uniform federal

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1	standard as if that had a much broader direction from
2	Congress for application. You correctly stated that
3	this uniform Federal standard that Congress directed
4	the SEC to study was under the securities laws and it
5	had to do with whether the standards that currently
6	apply to investment advisers should advise should
7	expand be expanded to broker/dealers.
8	But certainly there's no implication and one
9	should take none from Congress' direction to the SEC to
10	look at that, that that in any way means that our ERISA
11	standard which is a higher fiduciary standard than that
12	in the securities law needs to be subrogated to that,
13	if you will.
14	So as building on what Alan observed
15	before, in my mind, the project that we're engaged in,
16	the mutual dialogue that we're engaged in and the
17	it's all about three things. It's about
18	accountability, it's about transparency, and it's about
19	conflicts of interest.
20	And my hope, my goal, is not just that we
21	will try to harmonize the potential conflict in these
22	other statutes but that we will continue to work with

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1	all of you in the regulated community. I heard some	
2	very important things over these past two days and	
3	surely agree with at least some fairness opinions them.	
4	And to the extent that we can address them	
5	and work cooperatively we're going to. That will be	
6	our goal. So with that, I'll stop and have my	
7	colleague here ask his questions.	
8	MR. DAVIS: I have no questions. I can't top	
9	that. I'll pass it on to Alan.	
10	MR. LEBOWITZ: None from me. Thanks for your	
11	thoughtful comments.	
12	MR. PIACENTINI: I guess I have just one	
13	question for Mr. Hardock. In terms of IRAs being	
14	different, I will note that there are some IRAs that	
15	are also ERISA plans and for that purpose, do they go	
16	in the bucket with the plans or in the bucket with IRAs	
17	or in a third bucket or why?	
18	MR. HARDOCK: I think as a I think I	
19	started saying I was going to talk about process and	
20	not substance. I think they are in a third bucket. You	
21	clearly have different factors there and you would need	
22	to have that be part of the process.	
I		

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1	And as Phyllis indicated, you have	
2	responsibilities not only there but in interpretative -	
3	- or in the allocated responsibility in the IRA space.	
4	So, but I do think there are different factors that	
5	would have to be taken into account there.	
6	MR. PIACENTINI: Thanks.	
7	MR. WONG: I just have one question. This is	
8	for Mr. Kaswell. In talking about plan asset vehicles,	
9	he seemed to express concern that with respect to a	
10	plan asset vehicle, when the general partner sends out	
11	a statement to its investors reflecting the value that	
12	that would be considered fiduciary in nature under the	
13	proposal.	
14	So my question is: Under current law would	
15	you view that fiduciary that valuation of the plan	
16	asset vehicles assets as being fiduciary in nature in	
17	and of itself just because it's a plan asset vehicle?	
18	MR. KASWELL: Well, I think with respect	
19	certainly with respect to the investment adviser's act	
20	that the advisers to the fund is a fiduciary and to the	
21	securities law. Now, I understand I'm sitting in the	
22	Department of Labor not at the SEC and I get it. But	

1 the responsibilities of the -- of the adviser in that 2 setting are formidable.

3 There are very strong incentives to get it right and we know that if we don't get it right, bad 4 5 things can happen. That if you set it too low because fees for investment managers are linked to the -- how 6 well the fund does you've hurt yourself. 7 If you set it 8 too high and somebody's redeeming, you're going to bail 9 out somebody, you're going to pay out somebody at a higher rate and penalize the rest of the -- the rest of 10 the advisers -- the rest of the investors, excuse me. 11

12 So we think that there are strong incentives for an adviser to get that right and to make sure that 13 14 the -- the assessment -- the analysis on the evaluation is as correct as they can make it and also want to be 15 16 able to go to outside parties if we're not sure we have 17 the expertise internally, the manager, that is, so that 18 it can say well, we think for most of these assets we can do it but we want to get some outside advice to 19 20 validate our own analysis. We want to make sure that 21 all of those things remain open. 22 MR. WONG: And just -- so I'm making sure I

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1	fully understand your response. We are talking about a	
2	plan asset vehicle that has greater than 25 percent	
3	benefit for an investor and doesn't meet one of the	
4	exceptions in the current plan asset regulation?	
5	MR. KASWELL: Right.	
6	MR. WONG: Is that correct?	
7	MR. KASWELL: Yeah. I must admit that since	
8	I am not an ERISA lawyer, I can get lost in this. And	
9	so if we need to clarify for the record I'm happy to do	
10	that.	
11	MR. WONG: Okay. We'll clarify that. Just	
12	please feel free to do so.	
13	MR. KASWELL: Sure.	
14	MR. DAVIS: Thanks, Panel 10. Thanks for	
15	your time. Very helpful comments. We're going to	
16	adjourn lunch and reconvene on time at 1:15. So we'll	
17	see you in just about an hour.	
18	AFTERNOON SESSION	
19	MR. DAVIS: If the members of Panel 11 could	
20	approach the stage, take your seats. We have Mark	
21	Smith with the Financial Services Institute:	
22	John Watts and Peter Schneider; Primerica and Brian	

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1	Tate with the Financial Services Roundtable.	270
2	Okay, Panel 11, we'll start with Mark Smith.	
3	MR. SMITH: Good second afternoon of the	
4	hearing. I am Mark Smith from the Sutherland Law Firm.	
5	And I'm testifying today on behalf of the Financial	
6	Services Institute or FSI. My testimony focuses on the	
7	impact of the proposed definition of fiduciary on plan	
8	participants and IRA owners who obtain investment	
9	services through independent broker/dealers.	
10	FSI is a policy and advocacy organization for	
11	independent broker/dealers and independent registered	
12	representatives. In the U.S., approximately 201,000	
13	registered representatives operate as self-employed	
14	independent contractors of independent broker/dealers	
15	rather than employees of an affiliated broker/dealer	
16	firm.	
17	Independent broker/dealers primarily engage	
18	in the sale of packaged products, such as mutual funds	
19	and variable insurance products to invest individual	
20	investors in retirement plans and have been an	
21	important part of the retirement savings community for	
22	more than 30 years.	

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1	Independent broker/dealers and their	
2	representatives are especially well suited to provide	
3	middle-class Americans with the investment products and	
4	services necessary to achieve their retirement security	
5	and other financial objectives and goals.	
6	The proposed redefinition of fiduciary is	
7	without question among the most consequential ERISA	
8	rulemakings the Department could undertake. The	
9	existing regulatory definition of investment advised	
10	fiduciary promulgated in 1975, just after the enactment	
11	of ERISA has informed 35 years of practice for employee	
12	benefit plans and providers of investment services to	
13	those plans.	
14	While FSI addressed a number of issues in our	
15	comment letter, our principal point today is that the	
16	financial services industry in the main is not and	
17	cannot be organized as ERISA fiduciaries. I should	
18	emphasize that this is not because FSI's members see	
19	their interest as adverse to those of plan participants	
20	or other investors. The objective and aspiration of	
21	independent broker/dealers is to serve the best	
22	interest of their customers and FSI supports, for	

1	example, a harmonized securities law standard for
2	broker/dealers and investment advisers that promotes
3	investor interest and choice, transparency, low cost
4	investment products and services and the avoidance of
5	conflicts.
6	And having noted that, I do feel obliged to
7	note that FSI's written comment letter did not exhort
8	the Department to harmonize with other agencies given
9	our absolute confidence that the responsible agencies
10	already were actively and constructively engaged in
11	that process in a manner that will be a credit to all
12	at the end of the day.
13	MR. DAVIS: Thanks, Mark.
14	MR. SMITH: You're most welcome.
15	Instead, our concern reflects the reality
16	that financial services companies sell investment
17	products and services. Specifically, independent
18	broker/dealers and their registered representatives
19	provide highly regulated professional investment
20	services to investors in accordance with standards of
21	conduct specified by the SEC, FINRA, State Insurance
22	Commissioners and other regulators in addition to the

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1	Department. Most often, they are lawfully compensated	
2	on a commission basis, a form of compensation allowed	
3	service providers under ERISA but not investment advice	
4	fiduciaries as the Department interprets the statute.	
5	Over the last 35 years, the Department has	
6	devoted significant resources to building a regulatory	
7	structure that makes it possible for broker/dealers to	
8	continue their important services for plans and their	
9	participants and necessarily so.	
10	The investment services provided by	
11	broker/dealers are both exclusively available for them	
12	in many cases as a matter of federal and state law and	
13	integral to the purposes of ERISA plans.	
14	The requirements of this regulatory structure	
15	turn in many instances on whether the broker/dealer is	
16	or is not acting as an investment advice fiduciary for	
17	the plan. Since independent broker/dealer firms are	
18	most fundamentally selling firms, doing business in the	
19	ordinary course on a commission basis inconsistent with	
20	the requirements for ERISA fiduciaries, a distinction	
21	between non-fiduciary and fiduciary activity is	
22	sensible both in the marketplace at law. And whatever	

1 its perceived faults, the current five part regulatory 2 test for investment advice fiduciary status provides a 3 reasonably reliable way for independent broker/dealers 4 to structure their relationship with the plan on either 5 a fiduciary or non-fiduciary basis as appropriate to 6 the circumstances.

7 FSI's concerned that the Department's 8 proposed redefinition of fiduciary status upsets this 9 carefully crafted and balanced regulatory structure. 10 The proposed replacement of the five-part test with the 11 new multi-factor test would substantially prevent a 12 broker/dealer in a plan from purposefully and reliably 13 arranging their relationship on a non-fiduciary basis.

14 It may even be that ordinary broker/dealer 15 sales activity incidental to securities transactions 16 would be treated as investment advice under the 17 proposed multi-factor test.

Moreover, the new excerptors in the proposed in the proposed regulation as drafted, neither provide a reliable means for a plan and a broker/dealer to avoid fiduciary status when that status is both unintended and unwarranted, nor reflect a distinction

under ERISA between marketing and fiduciary activity 1 2 recognized by the courts. 3 In short, the -- in our judgment, the proposal threatens to undo 35 years of work by the 4 Department to assure that the necessary investment 5 services provided by securities firms remain available 6 on viable terms to ERISA plans. 7 8 Also, there are entirely legitimate business reasons for financial services firms to limit their 9 activities to plans to non-fiduciary services. 10 The 11 incremental risks and costs of acting as an ERISA 12 fiduciary is, for many firms, beyond the prudent reach 13 of their resources. If the final regulation does not provide a clear path to avoid fiduciary status where 14 15 appropriate, these firms will be driven out of the retirement market by regulatory uncertainty rather than 16 17 for any reason on the merits which is not to the 18 benefit of plans, their participants or our capital 19 markets. 20 Given the detriment to plans and their 21 participants of leaving these issues unaddressed, we 22 respectfully submit that any final regulation must

unambiguously provide a means for broker/dealers to
 continue in the ordinary course to provide their
 necessary services to plans other than as ERISA
 fiduciaries.

5 This might be accomplished in a variety of 6 ways, which are outlined in FSI's comment letter to the 7 Department. They might include providing a specific 8 exemption crafted for broker/dealers or reframing the 9 selling exception to cover investment intermediaries 10 who state in writing that they are not undertaking to 11 act as fiduciaries in the manner required by ERISA.

12 I should also comment on the potentially 13 profound impact of the proposed redefinition on IRA owners who work with independent broker/dealers. 14 We 15 share the view you have heard from many others that the proposal would have the unintended consequence of 16 17 constraining both the choices of IRA owners and the 18 availability of commission-based products and services 19 in a manner that may increase costs and reduce 20 retirement savings.

21 Accordingly, we concur that in light of the 22 fundamental structural differences between ERISA plans

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1	and IRAs, the Department should consider whether the	
2	appropriate scope of fiduciary status should be	
3	different for IRAs and Title I plans.	
4	Finally, I should also note that while we did	
5	not cover this point in FSI's written comments, we have	
6	come to the conclusion that it would not be possible to	
7	meet the 100-day 180 days after publication	
8	effective date in the proposal. If the final	
9	regulation necessitates either any meaningful analysis	
10	of or any adjustments to the millions of relationships	
11	independent broker/dealers have with ERISA plans and	
12	IRAs, no less than 12 months would be required.	
13	We didn't want you all to think just cause we	
14	hadn't commented on it we didn't care.	
15	This concludes FSI's testimony. We	
16	appreciate the opportunity to testify today and welcome	
17	the opportunity to answer your questions and work with	
18	the Department on this important regulation.	
19	MR. DAVIS: Thanks so much, Mr. Smith.	
20	Now, Mr. Watts and Mr. Schneider.	
21	MR. SCHNEIDER: Yes. Peter Schneider. I'm	
22	the general counsel, executive vice president of	

1 Primerica.

2 On my right is John Watts who's the chief 3 counsel of our broker/dealer.

We very much appreciate the opportunity to discuss the proposed rule with you and we very much want to work with the Department to try and craft the rule if there's going to be a change in a way that allows companies like ours to function.

9 And what I thought I'd do is tell you a 10 little bit about Primerica, because Primerica's very a 11 interesting company but I think more importantly, we 12 operate in a marketplace, in an IRA marketplace that 13 I'm not sure you've heard a lot about. So I'd like to 14 start there.

15 So, Primerica is -- we have an insurance company, we have a broker/dealer, which is what's 16 17 relevant here, and we will also do a loan for a client. 18 The households that we go into are distinctly 19 middle market households. So our clientele is going to earn between \$30,000 a year and \$100,000 a year. 20 Thev 21 way I like to characterize our client is if you go into 22 a Wal-Mart you're going to see our client. If you go

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1	into a Target you're going to see our client. They're
2	probably not going to be in Neiman Marcus and they're
3	probably not going to be in Family Dollar. So that's
4	where our clientele is going to be.
5	And we have tremendous diversity among our
6	client base and they have extraordinary needs that
7	frankly, are not met at all by the traditional
8	broker/dealers, because the small account, the small
9	investor, the investor that does not have a huge nest
10	egg of money to invest, has not been where the
11	traditional industry is focused for the simple reason
12	that the transition sizes tend to be very small.
13	So what a Primerica rep does, and we have a
14	lot of them, so, we have about 20,000 Primerica
15	representatives, I think it might make us the largest
16	broker/dealer in the country by number of reps, we will
17	knock on doors that no one's knocking on.
18	And let me tell you what we do. First of
19	all, we knock on the door. So we're going to go into a
20	household that has probably never met with someone in
21	the financial services industry and we're going to sit
22	down at their kitchen table, we're going to help them

understand their needs. We're going to talk to them 1 2 about death protection and that's our insurance 3 product. We're going to talk to them about how to 4 5 manage debt. What we would say in our market, the saying we have, is they have "too much month at the end 6 of the money." So they always have debt. And they are 7 8 very unlikely to have any savings. 9 So, anecdotally, we looked at what we find when we come into a household with respect to an IRA. 10 And out of 25 homes that we go into and sit across from 11 those families, about 5 are going to have any IRA at 12 13 all and they're very likely to be unfunded. 14 And so what's our goal? Our goal is to take 15 that family and first of all, give them a financial education. So I did bring some materials, which I can 16 17 pass out. I don't know if we're supposed to be 18 distributing things our not, but we have something called How Money Works, which takes them through --19 20 it's a very good document. It takes them through 21 financial education. We have little brochures about 22 IRAs 'cause our clients probably don't know a lot about

1 IRAs.

2 And what we want them to do -- if we do our 3 job, we go into this household and we do our job, they're going to have debt protection, they're going to 4 have a better understanding of their debt. 5 We can't always help them with that, especially with the current 6 lending environment, although we only did fixed rate 7 8 loans, never variable mortgages. And we only do, by 9 the way, term insurance. We don't believe in whole life insurance for our market. We will pay this year 10 11 about a billion dollars in death claims to middle 12 market personnel. 13 But focusing on, I think, what you care about 14 is the IRA. So about almost 60 percent of all the accounts we open are IRAs. Around 56, 57 percent are 15 16 IRAs. 17 18 And what we want that family to do is to put money aside for retirement. We'll also, by the way, we 19 also carry 529 college savings plans. So we're looking 20 21 at save for college, save for retirement. But the main 22 thing is save. Because in this market with our

1	clients, the biggest competition we have is not
2	broker/dealers, not ERISA plans a lot of the folks
3	in our market don't have employers who are going to
4	provide them with 401(k)s.
5	The biggest competition we have and I'm not
6	being facetious is American Idol, because if we were
7	not in that home helping that family, they're going to
8	get distracted by all the things we all get distracted
9	with in life and they're not going to put money aside.
10	So our goal is to start them savings. And so
11	we'll take what we do what's called "pre-authorized
12	checking" so we'll set up a monthly debit to a checking
13	account that will then go into an IRA. And we'll do
14	\$50, we'll do \$100. You know, these are not huge
15	accounts but you have to start somewhere. And over
16	time, these accounts accumulate a fair amount of money,
17	although, they're still very modest when you compare
18	them to other broker/dealers.
19	We also have though, just like everyone else,
20	we have a fixed cost infrastructure. So we have to
21	have websites, we have to have a platform, we have to
22	send out account statements, we have to pay a

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representative to go into that home. We have to have 1 2 compliance and we have to have legal; all of that 3 exists. And, by the way, you have to do that for a 4 small account and you have to do that for a big 5 The difference is the big account can easily account. 6 afford those costs; the smaller account it's much more 7 8 challenging. 9 And the fear that we really have with the Department of Labor's proposal is this: 10 We 11 can't figure out how that can work economically in a 12 marketplace like ours. What we do know is how the current market works. The broker/dealer model that we 13 14 deal with day in and day out works. It's able to 15 provide enough revenue, a commission to a representative for opening an account. It's able to 16 17 help us defray our infrastructure. It helps us service a client. 18 But if the prohibited transaction rule, if 19 20 this applies to us, if we become a fiduciary for what 21 we do and the prohibited transaction rule applies to 22 us, then you've got to look at a model change. And if

		19.
1	we go to an advisery model where there's going to be a	
2	fixed fee based on assets, it doesn't work. And the	
3	reason it doesn't work is number one, the asset sizes	
4	aren't enough if you're going to charge a small fee.	
5	So if someone's putting \$1,000 into an	
6	account in a year, that's \$11.50 that's for fixed costs	
7	and paying the rep. In today's gas prices they	
8	probably can't drive across town to do that servicing.	
9	So you have that concern.	
10	But the alternative to that is well, why	
11	don't you just make the advisery fee enough to cover	
12	all of your costs. Well, now you're at an advisery fee	
13	that is so exorbitant that it doesn't make sense for	
14	that account to open an IRA. So naturally what they	
15	would do is they'd look for other products. But we're	
16	believers in IRA, we think it's good for our clients.	
17	We think it's important to save money for retirement.	
18	And, finally, you got to have a	
19	representative. The folks in our market, as well	
20	meaning as they are, they're not going to be solicited	
21	by other broker/dealers and they're very unlikely to	
22	walk into a bank and just open an IRA on their own.	

		1
1	That representative plays a crucial role. So in an	
2	advisery model there's all sorts of licensing	
3	requirements that they would have to go through to get	
4	themselves licensed as an investment adviser and other	
5	duties what would be continuing.	
6	That's the struggle we have and that's the	
7	concern we have with the rule. What is very important	
8	to us is that the Department really understand how this	
9	rule affects the small investor, the starter IRAs,	
10	because the danger is if that's not understood, and	
11	it's just a bludgeon approach, that will substantially	
12	impact the ability of companies like ours and then a	
13	lot of companies like ours to service that initial	
14	small investor. And that's what we'd ask of the	
15	Department.	
16	MR. DAVIS: Okay. Thank you.	
17	Mr. Tate.	
18	MR. TATE: Hello. Good afternoon. And thank	
19	you for the opportunity to testify today. I'm Brian	
20	Tate with the Financial Services Roundtable.	
21	The Roundtable supports strong consumer	
22	Protections for retain investors. We have long been	

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1	supportive of the harmonization of the regulations for	
2	broker/dealers and investment advisers when providing	
3	personalized investment advice about securities to	
4	retail customers.	
5	Consistent with Congress' interest in	
6	developing a uniform standard of care, we believe that	
7	these worthy goals can be achieved without subjecting	
8	broker/dealers and investment advisers to duplicative	
9	and overlapping regulatory regimes that create	
10	confusing confusion among investors and may not	
11	recognize and allow for differences in the business	
12	models, services and products provided by a range of	
13	financial services professionals.	
14	Last year, Congress pursuant to Dodd/Frank,	
15	charged the SEC with studying the obligations of	
16	broker/dealers and investment advisers. The SEC was	
17	mandated to report on the effectiveness on existing	
18	federal, state, legal, or regulatory standards in the	
19	protection of retail customers relating to the	
20	standards of standards of care for broker/dealers,	
21	investment advisers and their respective associated	
22	persons when providing personalized investment advice	

and recommendations about securities to retail 1 2 customers. 3 In their report, the SEC staff recommended that the SEC promulgate rules to implement a uniform 4 fiduciary standard of conduct for broker/dealers and 5 investment advisers when providing personalized 6 investment advice about securities and to retail 7 8 customers and such other customers as the SEC determines. 9 The staff recommended that the SEC define the 10 standard of care as a duty to act in the best interest 11 of the customer without regard to the financial or 12 13 other interest of the broker/dealer or investment 14 adviser providing the advice. As part of the rulemaking, the staff 15 recommends that the SEC address not only the clones on 16 17 the universe -- uniform fiduciary standard, but that it 18 also provide guidance on specific scenarios to assist 19 broker/dealers in transitioning to the new standard. 20 Many of the issues that we would expect that 21 -- the SEC address are included in the DOL's proposed definition of fiduciary. Accordingly, it is critical 22

1	that DOL and the SEC work together to develop a
2	practical approach that addresses investor protection
3	needs but preserves investor choice and accommodates a
4	range of business models.
5	The DOL's proposal would substantially
6	increase the categories of service providers who are
7	deemed fiduciaries for purposes of ERISA. The
8	Roundtable believes that the wide reach of proposed
9	language would have unintended consequences that could
10	create uncertainty among service providers and
11	potentially reduce the level and types of services
12	available to benefit plan to plan beneficiaries and
13	individual retirement accounts.
14	One fundamental issue that we need that
15	will need to be resolved is the Department's
16	prohibitions I mean, prohibits persons or entities
17	that are deemed fiduciaries from engaging in certain
18	activities. But the SEC generally allows entities
19	deemed to be fiduciaries such as broker/dealers that
20	are duly registered as investment advisers or
21	affiliated broker/dealers and advisers to manage
22	conflicts of interest by disclosing them to clients.

1	Under the proposed rule, an oral or written
2	representation or acknowledgement by a person that is
3	acting as a fiduciary or making recommendations would
4	result in imposition of fiduciary status.
5	We agree that if a person providing advice
6	represents or acknowledges that they are acting as a
7	fiduciary, such a person should be deemed a fiduciary.
8	The Roundtable is concerned, however, that if oral
9	representations are sufficient to confer fiduciary
10	status, faulty recollections by persons interacting
11	with financial institutions could result in after-the-
12	fact fiduciary status. Thus, we strongly urge the
13	Department to provide that a person can only be deemed
14	a fiduciary by formal writing.
15	As proposed, there would be no longer as
16	proposed there would no longer be a requirement that a
17	plan fiduciary provide advice on a regular basis or
18	mutual understanding. As a result, a person could be
19	deemed a fiduciary as a result of one off conversation,
20	an informal discussion with human resource
21	professionals or other inadvertent triggers.
22	If a plan manager happens to have informal

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1	one off discussions at a conference with a variety of	
2	contacts, which the plan executes transaction and	
3	receives brokerage commissions, it is unclear whether	
4	each of these context in the context employers would	
5	then become fiduciaries. The risk of inadvertent	
6	fiduciary status will reduce the flow of information in	
7	the marketplace as broker/dealers and other financial	
8	institutions will sharply curtail the ability of	
9	personnel to have even informal communications with	
10	clients and potential clients.	
11	Furthermore, without a mutual agreement	
12	requirement, misunderstandings between parties may	
13	arise. We believe that the current mutual agreement	
14	requirements provide certainty to both parties of a	
15	fiduciary relationship and creates an environment that	
16	encourages an exchange of information including any	
17	issues related to a conflict of interest.	
18	Roundtable members are concerned next, the	
19	Roundtable members are concerned about the seller's	
20	exemption, specifically that regarding securities	
21	brokers, insurance agent or real estate brokers makes a	
22	recommendation to a plan regarding the purchase of a	

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1	security or property and ends up not acting for the	200
2	other side of the transaction. They will not be able	
3	to rely on this on this exception.	
4	In addition, if this exception is adopted as	
5	proposed, we respectively ask that the Department	
6	clarify the meaning of "adverse interest." Also, we	
7	respectfully assert that a requirement to inform a	
8	party that otherwise has a customer relationship that	
9	is that a broker/dealer is adverse, could	
10	potentially result in investor confusion and	
11	effectively limit investor choice in selecting brokers.	
12	Additionally, since the proposed regulation	
13	may expand the definition of investment advice to also	
14	include referrals to or recommendations of investment	
15	advisers the Roundtable believes that the seller's	
16	exception should be expanded to include recommendations	
17	regarding the purchase of services and not limit it to	
18	recommendations of purchases of or sales of	
19	property.	
20	The Roundtable supports the Department's	
21	recognition that many service providers offer up	
22	platforms of investments that do not involve rendering	

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1	investment advice but instead provide a menu of	
2	investments from which plan fiduciaries can select a	
3	more limited menu that will be made available to plan	
4	participants.	
5	In the context of IRAs and 401(k) plans,	
6	however, we believe that it would be helpful for the	
7	DOL to provide additional guidance regarding what	
8	constitutes individualized needs. And we particularly	
9	ask that the SEC clarify the application of the	
10	investment platform exceptions to IRAs.	
11	Roundtable members are keenly concerned that	
12	the elimination of mutual written agreement	
13	requirements and practical elimination of the seller's	
14	exception would greatly diminish, if not eliminate, the	
15	range of a range of account services including	
16	information tailored to a particular investor's needs	
17	provided to retail investors by broker/dealers. This	
18	would result in two classes of investors.	
19	The first would be investors who can afford	
20	to pay higher fees based off the size of their accounts	
21	or assets under management. Those investors would	
22	receive investment advice.	

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1	The second class of investors would be those	
2	who have brokerage accounts and generally only pay fees	
3	when the, affected transactions receive investment	
4	advice that is incidental to their trades to those	
5	trades.	
6	The Roundtable believes that if the regular	
7	basis and mutual understanding requirements are	
8	eliminated this second class of investors is likely to	
9	no longer receive investment advice unless the investor	
10	is willing to establish an advisery advisery account	
11	which likely will result in higher fees for the	
12	investor.	
13	Next, further guidance is needed as to when	
14	the line between investment advice and investor	
15	education is drawn. We are concerned that the	
16	availability of information to non-advisery clients	
17	likely would also diminish because of concerns that	
18	educational information or opportunities to participate	
19	in occasional web casts or conference calls might be	
20	deemed investment advice and result in inadvertent	
21	fiduciary relationships.	
22	Regarding appraisals, Roundtable members are	

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1	particularly concerned that the exception in the	200
2	proposed regulation has the potential of making every	
3	report provided by a trustee or custodian, a plan of	
4	fiduciary or fiduciary service.	
5	We respectfully recommend that the Department	
6	revise the proposed text of the regulation by omitting	
7	the requirement that the report be provided for	
8	purposes of compliance with the reporting and	
9	disclosure requirements by the Act.	
10	We are also concerned about the impact the	
11	inclusion of appraisals of securities and property	
12	could have on ESOPs as well as hard to evaluate assets	
13	such as swaps and derivatives.	
14	We do not believe that the preparers of the	
15	appraisals, valuation or fairness opinions should	
16	themselves be deemed fiduciaries for purposes of the	
17	Act. Rather, we believe that the fiduciary	
18	responsibility should rest with the provider of	
19	investment advice to use appropriate diligence in	
20	selecting the preparer of the opinion or report.	
21	We think it would be more appropriate to	
22	require this category of market participant to meet	

certain minimum qualification standards. 1 2 We also note that providers of fairness 3 opinions are generally already subject to comprehensive regulation by the SEC as broker/dealers in the case of 4 municipal securities and municipal advisers. 5 With respect to management of securities or 6 7 other property the proposal applies to advice or 8 recommendations as to the management of securities or other property; however, no guidance is provided as to 9 the meaning of management of securities or other 10 11 properties. For example, it is unclear whether this 12 would include record keeping and other administrative 13 services or even a recommendation as to a property 14 management company to use for a rental property. 15 The Roundtable respectfully requests that DOL clarify that the phrase "management of securities or 16 17 other property" does not include recommendations of 18 administrative services, property management, or other 19 non-investment management related services. 20 In regards to compensation, we believe that 21 the proposed definition of compensation is too 22 expansive and would include brokerage commissions,

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1	mutual fund sales and insurance sales commissions as	
2	well as fees and commissions based on multiple	
3	transactions involving different parties.	
4	The proposal's inclusion of brokers'	
5	commissions including those with respect to mutual fund	
6	shares in the insurance products paid in the course of	
7	providing investment advice, steps ahead what Congress	
8	had directed to the SEC to consider whether to	
9	eliminate the broker exception from the definition of	
10	investment adviser under the Investment Adviser's Act.	
11	The current statutory provision allows	
12	broker/dealers to provide investment advice in	
13	connection with the execution of securities	
14	transactions for customers as long as brokers	
15	(Bell rings signifying time is up.)	
16	MR. TATE: Can I get an additional minute?	
17	MR. DAVIS: Sure. Go ahead.	
18	MR. TATE: Thank you.	
19	The current statutory provisions allow	
20	broker/dealers to provide investment advice as long	
21	in connection with the execution of securities	
22	transactions for customers as long as the broker	

1	receives only brokers' commissions for effecting a
2	transaction and does not receive a separate fee for
3	providing the advice.
4	The Department's proposal, however, would
5	essentially make the ability of broker/dealers to avail
6	themselves of this exception. Given that Congress
7	specifically charged the SEC in the Dodd/Frank Act to
8	study the regulation of broker/dealers and investment
9	advisers to engage in rulemaking necessary to address
10	any gaps in the regulation, we believe that the SEC and
11	not the Department, should be charged with promulgating
12	any regulation that potentially fundamentally changes
13	the manner in which broker/dealers are compensated.
14	Finally, the Roundtable is particularly
15	concerned that the application to affiliates is overly
16	broad and far-reaching without identifying the actual
17	potential harm to investors. It would be logistically
18	difficult to track compliance for complex multi-
19	national financial institutions that engage in a
20	variety of investment advice, transactional insurance,
21	real estate and other potentially covered activities in
22	numerous entities.

207 1 We respectfully ask that Department narrow 2 its application to affiliates. 3 Thank you for your time and I'm happy to answer any questions you have. 4 MR. DAVIS: Thanks so much, Mr. Tate. 5 We'll turn to the government panel now. 6 Before we do, I just wanted to let people know we did 7 have some substitutions over lunch. 8 Jeffrey Monhart is a senior member of our 9 Office of Enforcement to my left. 10 11 To my immediate right is Ivan Strasfeld who is the head of our Office of Exemption Determinations. 12 13 Leslie Perlman with the Solicitor's Office. 14 Joe Piacentini and Fred Wong remain from this 15 morning. So with that, I'll turn to Jeff. 16 17 MR. MONHART: Thanks, Michael. 18 I have a question for the witness from the Financial Services Institute. In your 19 comment letter you make mention of the existing 20 regulatory principles for brokers' suitability and best 21 execution, but, of course, ERISA imposes different 22

standards: prohibition against self-dealing and the 1 2 duty of loyalty. 3 So in the space that you described, brokers dealing with small plans and participants, isn't it 4 hard to ignore the potential for conflict when the 5 broker is compensated solely by commissions? 6 MR. SMITH: The -- there really is a -- kind 7 8 of fundamental tension here between regulatory constructs that are at work in this area. 9 The securities law constructs, the insurance regulatory 10 constructs, do not exclude the possibility that a 11 representative can both look after the best interest of 12 13 the client and be paid on a commission basis. 14 The ERISA regulatory construct has worked in 15 a different way on that. The way you all have accommodated that, of course, is, you know, in the 16 17 course of preparing this letter it was an occasion to 18 kind of reflect back on all the work you all have done over the years to fit broker/dealers into ERISA's 19 20 regulatory structure, you know, starting from five 21 minutes after ERISA was enacted up through individual 22 PTEs that you were granting last year.

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1	The amount of time and effort you all have	
2	put into fitting broker/dealers into ERISA regulations	
3	is staggering it seems to me. I mean, there's been a	
4	significant part of the way you all expended your	
5	resources. And as best as we can figure out, it's	
6	worked. As best as we can figure out, the	
7	broker/dealers have continued to be able to provide by	
8	and large the services that the plans need on a viable	
9	basis for both and primarily acting in a non-fiduciary	
10	capacity. And we're not aware that there's been any,	
11	you know, systemic abuse that would suggest that the	
12	existing structure isn't working that you guys you	
13	all didn't succeed in what you set out to do, and that	
14	the existing structure is not effectively working for	
15	plans and their participants.	
16	MR. MONHART: One more.	
17	MR. DAVIS: Go ahead.	
18	MR. MONHART: And a question for the witness	
19	from the Roundtable, please. You coin an interesting	
20	phrase in your comment letter, "the inadvertent	
21	fiduciary status." And you mention that "the	
22	inadvertent fiduciary status might have a chilling	

effect on informal communications." 1 2 I'd just like for you to elaborate on that. 3 It sounds like the inadvertent fiduciary status is sort of like kryptonite, it would have a chilling effect. 4 But I'm not really following why that would be. 5 In order for a plaintiff to make that a case you have to 6 7 have a fiduciary, a breach and a breach that causes a 8 loss. So how would informal communications be 9 chilled by this so-called inadvertent fiduciary status? 10 11 MR. TATE: I would say that the overall goal for all of, I guess, the regulations from whatever 12 13 department makes them, should be to encourage and 14 facilitate conversations between all parties. And that -- that the appropriate disclosures are made, that the 15 consumer or the investor gets all the information that 16 17 they need to make good decisions. And I think that 18 anything that we can do to help facilitate that process 19 would be extremely helpful. I think if there is a -- if there is still a 20 21 gray area of who is and who is not a fiduciary and if I 22 make a certain statement whether or not I am now a

fiduciary when I'm only having a conversation or that 1 2 we are just meeting for the first time or -- there is a number of scenarios that one could think of where one 3 could say, as we addressed in our testimony, that are 4 just conversations and aren't giving, I guess, regular 5 advice on -- and it's not the primary basis for making 6 7 a decision, and if those -- if those standards go away, 8 then you're having a conversation and there is -- and 9 coupled with the fact that there may or may not be any kind of written disclosure or written agreement that we 10 are -- I am representing you at some point, I think it 11 causes confusion. 12

13 And I think if you don't have those standards 14 in place then, again, as we pointed out, after-the-fact 15 that we've had a conversation, well, one person may be thinking that we're having a conversation for another 16 17 reason and the other party thinks we're having a different kind of conversation I think there could be 18 some confusion there at the end of the day. Once we 19 20 step away from that conversation, a couple of days, 21 weeks, months later and come back and say, hey, he was 22 a fiduciary and the other party goes I don't believe we

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had that conversation. I thought we were talking about 1 2 something else. 3 And so going back to our testimony, I think having a written mutual understanding, a written 4 agreement that I am representing you in this X 5 capacity, I think would be extremely helpful going back 6 7 and saying overall for everyone's time, going -- you 8 know, this is the conversation that took place and here's why and this is what we talked about. 9 10 MR. MONHART: Thank you. 11 MR. DAVIS: I don't have many questions. I did want to make one observation though and 12 13 I think it was, Mr. Smith, you talked about 35 years of 14 work that the Agency has done in this space. At the 15 same time, one of the premises of the regulation is the marketplace as it changed appreciably over the 16 17 course of those 35 years and the kinds of conversations 18 now that happen weren't conversations that happened 35 19 years ago. 20 One of the conversations we had yesterday 21 with some members of the financial industry suggested 22 that at least in this case, they did think there was

some value to revisiting at least the regular basis and 1 2 the primary basis requirements as promulgated in the 3 '75 req. I think I heard from Mr. Tate, my 4 understanding is I think that you guys are basically 5 saying that you would not support revisiting even those 6 two planks of the five-part test but for the rest of 7 8 the panel would you be in agreement that those are two elements of the test that should be revisited given the 9 way the market operates today? 10 11 MR. SMITH: I'm not clear that I agree with that point. Plainly the market, the -- you know, well 12 13 marked transition from a defined benefit universe to a defined contribution universe, plainly there have been 14 15 changes in retirement plans in that respect. It's not clear to me though that the nature 16 of the conversations or the need -- the -- kind of the 17 18 fundamental sorts of services that plans need from financial service providers is materially different 19 20 just -- because of that transformation. 21 We continue to think, for the reasons we've 22 discussed, we continue to think that it's essential

1	that there be an avenue for broker/dealers acting in
2	the ordinary course to continue to provide services to
3	on a non-fiduciary basis to plans. We think that
4	the consequences of going beyond that are potentially -
5	- are very significant in terms of what it would mean
6	for products and services necessary to plans that would
7	be available to them in the marketplace.
8	So our concern is primarily that there needs
9	to be a reliable and certain avenue to get to that
10	result. It does seem to us that there are there are
11	there's more than one way to get there. If you all
12	judge that you need a revision in the test for other
13	purposes but you can find a way to give us a certain
14	reliable way to structure appropriate arrangements
15	other than a fiduciary basis, you know, it's the
16	kind of the certainty and the reliability of fairness
17	opinions, that outcome, I think is what's most important
18	to our members.
19	MR. DAVIS: Okay. And just one question
20	for the members from Primerica. It sounds like you
21	guys provide a tremendous service in knocking on the
22	doors that you knock on and talking to new entrants,

1 new savers.

2	I did want to understand a little bit better
3	though in terms of you talked about the commission
4	structure, the so the brokers earn a commission for
5	opening the account. Is there also a commission earned
6	for the sale of certain products? And if that is the
7	case, are those arrangements disclosed in the
8	conversations? And if so, how are those compensation
9	arrangements disclosed?
10	MR. SCHNEIDER: So I'll start it and I'll let
11	Mr. Watts jump in. They do earn a commission. They do
12	earn a commission for the sale of the products. All of
13	our compensation is disclosed.
14	We also and this is where the prohibited
15	transactions issue comes in for us.
16	MR. DAVIS: I'm sorry, when you say it's
17	disclosed, what form of disclosure happens? Is it
18	within a contract, is there a conversation, typically,
19	how does that happen?
20	MR. WATTS: Well, it's disclosed in the in
21	the product prospectus initially. And we also
22	supplement that with our own disclosure documents that

we deliver to the point of sale. 1 2 MR. DAVIS: Okay. Keep going. 3 MR. SCHNEIDER: And so, the -- the struggle, I think, that firms like ours are going to have is we 4 also, for example, will receive a record keeping fee. 5 We keep the records. We have to have that 6 7 infrastructure. The mutual fund company doesn't want 8 to -- really want to do that for these small accounts. 9 And so we will receive a record keeping fee, a set amount to -- from the fund company to help us 10 defray the expense, the fixed expense of maintaining 11 12 that account. 13 We -- again, we make disclosures about that 14 that's in our materials so we address it with the 15 client. But if that is taken away, and only the client is the only source of those funds, it really becomes 16 17 cost prohibitive for the client to have an account. 18 That's what's going to -- that's what's going to 19 happen. And, because if -- let's say, you're putting 20 21 away \$50 a month into a mutual fund and at the end of 22 the year it's \$600 if I've done my math right. You

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1	know, \$600 you're going to have at the end of that	
2	year. Not bad, frankly, if you're a nurse or a laborer	
3	or a plumber, you've gotten started. But if you have	
4	to absorb all of the costs associated with the	
5	maintaining that account yourself, and upfront, our	
6	modeling shows that we would have to take hundreds of	
7	dollars from that client in order to make that work	
8	today. And that doesn't make any sense for the client.	
9	Right now the fund company will help defray	
10	that expense. Again, we deal with it, we deal with the	
11	disclosure, someone's got to be that record keeper. So	
12	someone's going to be paid for that. It could be a	
13	third party and then you avoid any of the of what I	
14	think you'd be concerned about, which is, you know, a	
15	payment coming to us. So the payment would go to	
16	someone else. But the trouble is when the payment goes	
17	to someone else and we deal with the client, because	
18	it's our call center and all that, we don't have any	
19	source of revenue to defray that expense other than	
20	that client. And that's the problem.	
21	So there's got to be some flexibility on that	
22	aspect of the rule for accounts of a size like ours.	

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218 1 John, do you want to add anything to that? 2 MR. WATTS: No, no. 3 MR. SCHNEIDER: Okay. MR. DAVIS: Last question. 4 Mr. Tate, you've already sort of dealt with 5 your concerns or the Roundtable's concerns about the 6 7 seller's exception. Just curious from other members of 8 the panel, there was a seller's exception in the reg as codified and put forward, but I assume that you think 9 that the exception as it's currently drafted is too 10 11 restrictive. And, first, is that the premise of what 12 13 you're saying? And two, what enhancements would you 14 make to the exception beyond what was promulgated? MR. SMITH: I'll be glad to speak to that. 15 16 MR. DAVIS: Okay. MR. SMITH: The -- in our judgment, the 17 exception as drafted seems to speak clearly to counter-18 parties and is less clear to us than it speaks to 19 intermediaries. 20 21 It speaks in terms of -- of property it less 22 -- it less -- it clearly speaks to sales activity with

respect to the management of plan assets. 1 2 It speaks -- it requires a statement of 3 adversity of interest that's -- it's not clear to me why we'd want to be encouraging anyone to be thinking 4 It seems to us that could be much more 5 in those terms. effectively formulated as -- as not being in a position 6 7 to act as a risk fiduciary, go to the ultimate conclusion. 8 9 So it seems to us that it is -- it is -- to the extent that it, as drafted, it only applies to 10 counter-parties, it is too narrow. And to the extent 11 12 that it -- and it seems to use that you could improve 13 and refine the way you formulated a seller. If your 14 objective is to provide an exception in circumstances 15 where a service provider is well and truly acting in a selling capacity as distinguished from a fiduciary 16 17 capacity. It seems to us that you can -- you can 18 improve the way that the exception has been drafted. 19 I would like to add -- I agree MR. TATE: 20 totally with what Mr. Smith just mentioned, but also 21 stating from -- if you're having a long-term 22 relationship, if you're Primerica or any other company

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1	that's going to someone's house or meeting someone in a	
2	professional environment, you don't want to start your	
3	relationship off as stating we have opposed interest in	
4	this.	
5	I mean, I don't know if you go to the store,	
6	the store has, you know, an opposed interest, they want	
7	to make money and you want to buy a product. If they	
8	stated off you know, from the jump, that our	
9	interests are opposed to each other, you're going to	
10	sit there and pause and go why is he telling me this	
11	before we go further into our relationship.	
12	MR. DAVIS: And we took earlier testimony on	
13	this point too, that there were some concerns expressed	
14	about the use of the term "adverse." And I would make	
15	the same request of you that if you have language that	
16	you think sort of captures the concept in a way without	
17	the use of that term, the record's going to be open	
18	another 15 days after the hearing, we'd welcome your	
19	input on that.	
20	MR. TATE: Thank you. We'll definitely look	
21	into it.	
22	MR. DAVIS: Thanks.	

221 1 MR. STRASFELD: My turn? 2 MR. DAVIS: Yes. 3 MR. STRASFELD: Mr. Smith? MR. SMITH: Sir. 4 MR. STRASFELD: Can you hear me? Can you 5 hear me now? 6 7 You seem to be our every go-to guy. 8 I had a couple of questions. So your -- your small brokerage business is it -- what are the products 9 that they sell? Is it just stock, bonds, insurance? 10 11 MR. SMITH: No, they typically -- they most typically sell mutual funds and variable insurance 12 13 products. 14 MR. STRASFELD: Right. MR. SMITH: Sometimes fixed insurance 15 products. They may offer a variety of services, sort 16 of pertinent to that. 17 18 MR. STRASFELD: Right. So they're dual 19 registered as broker/dealers? 20 MR. SMITH: They are very often dual 21 registered, yes. 22 MR. STRASFELD: All right. And so in almost

222 all those instances they receive commission income for 1 2 the --3 MR. SMITH: When they're acting in their broker/dealers capacity, that's correct. 4 MR. STRASFELD: And what about as an 5 insurance agent? 6 MR. SMITH: Typically, in a commission basis 7 8 as well. MR. STRASFELD: All right. So at the -- so 9 all of that under -- like every -- well, everything 10 under ERISA is illegal. You start off with that 11 premise. So to the extent -- so the next hurdle would 12 13 be well, since it's illegal there are a bunch of 14 statutory exemptions. So I assume currently you're 15 relying on the statutory exemption for service providers since, you know, you're of the view you're 16 17 not a fiduciary but for this proposal? MR. SMITH: That or 75-1 or some other --18 19 MR. STRASFELD: All right. 20 MR. SMITH: -- some other exemption that 21 doesn't -- that is not premised on fiduciary status. 22 MR. STRASFELD: So to the extent that you --

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1	you do become a fiduciary, and I guess it's one of the	
2	reasons I'm up here, trying to gauge you know, what	
3	exempt what class exemptions or individual	
4	exemptions are available or what exemptions might have	
5	to be considered by us to the extent this goes forward.	
6	And so currently there are two exemptions for	
7	fiduciaries which seem very relevant to you which is	
8	86-128 for broker/dealer, you know, for a	
9	MR. SMITH: Exactly.	
10	MR. STRASFELD: broker/dealer fiduciary	
11	and 84-24 where the insurance agent becomes an	
12	investment adviser.	
13	Does that and those are you know, those	
14	are at least in my view, which is, of course, I've	
15	been doing this for a long time, do not seem	
16	particularly onerous. They're basically, upfront	
17	approval, disclosure and for instance, in the	
18	broker/dealer universe there's be an annual portfolio	
19	of turnover ratio which I always found to be relevant,	
20	at least in my personal finance.	
21	MR. SMITH: Yeah, I would agree other than	
22	the the additional reporting that are 86-128 is	

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somewhat -- is atypical for the way broker/dealers 1 2 typically do business and does entail some additional 3 costs. But I substantially agree. MR. STRASFELD: So if -- besides those two 4 5 class exemptions what would -- what would be missing? MR. SMITH: Well, I mean, to the extent that 6 7 we are engaged in Agency transactions other than in 8 mutual funds, you -- you are moving from 408(b)(2) or 75-1 to 86-128. 9 10 MR. STRASFELD: Right. 11 MR. SMITH: Principal transactions. That's not a large part of our business but it is an 12 13 occasional part of our business. Principal 14 transactions if we're not a fiduciary we can rely on 15 75-1, if we are a fiduciary, we're out of business. MR. STRASFELD: Right. Now, what kind of 16 principal transactions are they? Is this equity or 17 18 debt primarily? 19 MR. SMITH: I don't know the answer to that. 20 MR. STRASFELD: All right. Just one last 21 observation. You said -- I believe you suggested that 22 you would -- you would like it if you could -- if the

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service provider could disclose to the plan that he's 1 2 not a fiduciary. 3 MR. SMITH: Yes. MR. STRASFELD: Now, that works under 4 securities laws but it does not work under ERISA since 5 ours is a functional definition. So you could say 6 you're not but if you are, you are. And there's 7 8 probably not much we could do about that. That's --9 MR. SMITH: Well, I'm not sure I agree with The -- we have an existing definition 10 you on that. under the existing rule. Certainly, it's black letter 11 law that we have a functional definition. 12 13 MR. STRASFELD: Right. MR. SMITH: But the expectations and 14 15 understandings and the services that are provided by the parties under the existing definition informs the -16 17 - helps to inform the outcome on this, correct? 18 MR. STRASFELD: But you're really talking --19 you're limiting yourself to the construct of an investment advice fiduciary, you're not talking about 20 the other functional --21 22 MR. SMITH: No.

226 1 MR. STRASFELD: Right. So that's -- all 2 right. That's fine. 3 MR. SMITH: That's right. Exactly right. MR. STRASFELD: All right. I got you. 4 MR. SMITH: You know, and our suggestion on 5 this point is that there's a value to certainty on this 6 issue, a value for plans and participants, the 7 8 certainty on the investment advice fiduciary issue. MR. STRASFELD: Right. But in that context 9 only? 10 11 MR. SMITH: Specifically in that context, 12 correct. 13 MR. STRASFELD: Primerica, I still don't 14 actually understand what you do once you get in 15 someone's house? 16 MR. SCHNEIDER: Well --17 MR. STRASFELD: What is it you're selling 18 You know, obviously I've been looking at them? products for 30 years so I'm -- from my vantage point, 19 what kind of products are you selling them, you know, 20 and how -- you're obviously compensated by and large 21 22 through commissions of some sort. Well, what is it

227 you're actually selling them? 1 2 MR. SCHNEIDER: Well, I'll go -- first of 3 all, we have many reps who are willing to come to your home and help you understand this. 4 But what -- what we're selling, is --5 MR. STRASFELD: My father was a broker and I 6 7 barred him from my house. 8 MR. SCHNEIDER: Well, what we're selling, first of all, we sell term life insurance. 9 So Primerica owns a life insurance company. 10 11 MR. STRASFELD: Right. MR. SCHNEIDER: We are opening an IRA for the 12 13 client and so in that IRA we exclusively sell mutual We do not sell equities, we do not do options. 14 funds. 15 We're sort of more defined by what we don't do. So we will sell mutual funds. 16 17 Of course, we also will do non-IRAs so, you 18 know, non-qualified funds --19 MR. STRASFELD: Right. Now, the mutual funds 20 21 MR. SCHNEIDER: -- you can open with us. 22 MR. STRASFELD: -- they can't be no-load

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cause there's be no way you could get compensated. 1 2 MR. SCHNEIDER: Correct. MR. STRASFELD: So what kind of mutual --3 they are -- they're just load funds? 4 5 MR. SCHNEIDER: Yeah, so you -- American funds, Fidelity, Van Kampen, Legg Mason, AIM, Pioneer, 6 all the major funds. And the problem that we have and 7 8 going back a little I think in a way to Mr. Davis' question, the variable -- the variable nature of the 9 compensation is an issue under the Department of Labor 10 11 rules. So we actually levelize compensation at the rep 12 level. 13 So from a representative's standpoint, the 14 representative is indifferent to what's sold. They're 15 going to get the same comp no matter what the client 16 buys. 17 MR. STRASFELD: How does that work, because 18 that's actually pretty interesting? Because most 19 brokers -- just like my dad, most broker/dealers, you know, if you don't generate commissions by the end of 20 21 the month, you don't eat. And you -- you know, you can 22 only eat what you kill.

229 1 So how -- your model seems different. How 2 does -- how does it work? 3 MR. SCHNEIDER: Well, our model is different because we will allow representatives to be part-time. 4 So we don't have any quotas. So they'll still eat if 5 they don't sell. 6 7 MR. STRASFELD: Right. 8 MR. SCHNEIDER: So, but they're -- but in 9 order to reach this market, this demographic, what we've got to do is put a -- get a part-time 10 representative. Think a teacher. 11 12 MR. STRASFELD: Right. 13 MR. SCHNEIDER: Nine months out of the year 14 in teaching, during the summer they can be a Primerica 15 representative earning income. 16 MR. STRASFELD: But how exactly are they compensated if they're not getting commission income? 17 18 MR. SCHNEIDER: They are getting commission 19 income. MR. STRASFELD: But how is it leveled out? 20 21 MR. WATTS: Well, it's not -- it's not 22 leveled from -- the firm is getting variable payments

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1 from the mutual funds. 2 MR. STRASFELD: No. That I understand. But 3 how is it translating --MR. WATTS: We have leveled within the firm 4 by establishing what we call commissionable dealer re-5 allowance. We have capped it where the cap -- we've 6 capped it at a percentage so that everybody gets paid 7 8 the same no matter what fund they sell. 9 MR. STRASFELD: So, for instance, if -- they would get 30 basis points if they sold the American 10 11 funds or Van Kampen or whatever. Whatever fund they sold, their piece of the action would always be the 12 13 same across-the-board? 14 MR. WATTS: Yeah, if they sold an equity fund 15 that had a 5 percent load and they -- and somebody else sold an equity load that had a 5-1/2 percent load, both 16 17 reps are only going to get paid on the 5 percent. 18 MR. STRASFELD: Right. But they would get 19 different amounts for selling a bond fund or an equity 20 fund? 21 MR. WATTS: Correct. 22 MR. STRASFELD: Although it would be the same

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for all bond funds and all equity funds? 1 2 MR. WATTS: Correct. 3 MR. STRASFELD: All right. And, again, the same question as I asked earlier, you're -- I assume 4 you're relying on our service provider statutory 5 exemption based on the assumption that to date you're 6 not a fiduciary? 7 8 MR. SCHNEIDER: Right. We don't -- we do not consider ourselves a fiduciary. 9 MR. STRASFELD: Right. So you comply with 10 our service provider statutory exemption, which is 11 available for non-fiduciaries? Cause you are -- I 12 13 mean, you acknowledge you're providing a service to a 14 plan or in this case an IRA? It's not a trick 15 question. MR. SCHNEIDER: No, I know. We're not a --16 we're not ERISA lawyers. We're not ERISA lawyers. We 17 18 do have an ERISA lawyer in the audience. 19 MR. STRASFELD: Let me go -- that's even 20 better. 21 Let me rephrase it because that could be 22 somewhat confusing. You're -- you're -- as far as IRAs

		23
1	go, they're the transactions are still prohibited	
2	but they're looked at in terms of the Internal Revenue	
3	Code. They have their their parallel-prohibited	
4	transaction provisions and they have parallel statutory	
5	exemptions.	
6	So for our Title I plan there's a statutory	
7	exemption for providing services to the plan and	
8	there's a parallel provision under the Code. So in the	
9	absence of your compliance with that regardless of	
10	whether you are a fiduciary or not, you would be	
11	engaging in prohibited transactions.	
12	So I'm asking and assuming that you're	
13	complying with the same statutory exemption under the	
14	Internal Revenue Code for the provision of services to	
15	IRAs.	
16	MR. WATTS: We believe so.	
17	MR. STRASFELD: I'll answer it.	
18	MR. SCHNEIDER: Yeah, I mean	
19	MR. STRASFELD: The answer has to be "yes,"	
20	to	
21	MR. SCHNEIDER: Yeah, I'm sure the answer the	
22	answer is "yes." We're not going to we're not going	

233 to -- in that respect, we're not going to be any 1 2 different than tons of broker/dealers. 3 MR. STRASFELD: Right. So that's --MR. SCHNEIDER: We're going to look just like 4 them. 5 MR. STRASFELD: Because it was just -- like, 6 7 my point earlier, if you're not a fiduciary you still 8 have prohibited transactions and you need to use a 9 statutory exemption. If you do have -- if you are a fiduciary, then chances are, as I noted, you'll have to 10 turn to a class exemption. And you would have to --11 obviously, you -- you know, to the extent you do become 12 13 a fiduciary under our reg as ultimately proposed, you 14 will be forced into using class exemptions as well or -15 MR. WATTS: You do have the option of --16 17 MR. SCHNEIDER: And I understand -- my 18 understanding is -- again, without being an ERISA 19 lawyer, my understanding is those exemptions will be 20 problematic that -- for example, one I heard if you're 21 an insurance agent and also an investment adviser. 22 Our representatives have series 6 mutual fund

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1	licenses, they're not investment advisers. It becomes	
2	a problem to make them an investment adviser.	
3	MR. STRASFELD: Well, no, no, no. You don't	
4	under our term "investment adviser is different.	
5	So the question is: If you come if you	
6	for instance, if you came in under our old or actually,	
7	it's our current investment adviser, you would be a	
8	fiduciary by reason of providing investment advice but	
9	it would require no special designation under insurance	
10	or securities law. You would just functionally be a	
11	fiduciary and you would need to comply with that	
12	exemption.	
13	And that exemption is basically kind of	
14	disclosure generated with approval and there's	
15	disclosure of commissions and fees and stuff and mutual	
16	funds and insurance.	
17	So it seems to me there really should be no	
18	reason you couldn't comply with that. It doesn't	
19	require a special designation of fiduciary. You are	
20	if you're functionally an investment adviser you're	
21	forced into that exemption.	
22	MR. SCHNEIDER: I'll take that as good news,	

235 but that's not -- our understanding is it's 1 problematic. Perhaps we can address it with, you know, 2 3 a supplemental comment. 4 MR. DAVIS: That's what I was going to 5 suggest. MR. SCHNEIDER: That precise point. 6 7 MR. DAVIS: If you want to go back and talk 8 to your ERISA staff that --9 MR. STRASFELD: Yeah, as to why it doesn't And I guess, Mr. Smith --10 fit. 11 MR. SMITH: Yeah. 12 MR. STRASFELD: -- can do the same. 13 MR. SMITH: Yeah, Ivan, and the other point, 14 of course, is I mean, the choice is either to observe 15 the exemptions or leave the market. 16 MR. STRASFELD: That's right. 17 MR. SMITH: And I was talking to a -- last month to a -- a broker/dealer of substance, it's a 18 regional firm, operates in multiple states, is --19 doesn't have Primerica's 20,000 representatives, but 20 21 probably is somewhere between 500 and 1,000 representatives. They probably have a gross revenue of 22

about 75 million a year. 1 2 Their conclusion is they can't afford the 3 risk. This is -- it's a privately held firm, they have about \$3 million of net capital under FINRA 4 requirements. They just can't -- they just can't see -5 - even if we can give them prohibited transaction 6 solutions, they just can't see taking on the risk of 7 8 becoming a fiduciary and they're doing good things for people in IRAs and the micro and small plan market. 9 10 MR. STRASFELD: I'm questioned out. 11 MR. DAVIS: Okay. Thanks. MS. PERLMAN: I really only have one short 12 13 question and I apologize if this has been asked before. 14 But everybody's talking about the cost of compliance, but have any of you actually quantified what it would 15 16 cost? 17 MR. SCHNEIDER: We have not. 18 MR. WATTS: We have not. MR. SCHNEIDER: Well, we've quantified what 19 20 we would have to do to go to an advisery model. And what we've looked at is we would have to have a minimum 21 22 account size of \$25,000 for that to work. So, and, you

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1	know, we're still doing which is basically not	
2	serving our market, because to get to that level that's	
3	very difficult for any middle market person to get to	
4	that level. So we've looked at that.	
5	In terms of the compliance and cost, I mean,	
6	obviously you're going to have increased cost, but I	
7	think from our standpoint that's not the issue. It	
8	goes back to can we afford, can we structure the	
9	compensation from the client in a way that allows the	
10	client to get the service from a representative? Can	
11	you do that?	
12	We don't think we can do that under the rule	
13	as the Department of Labor has proposed it. That's why	
14	we're very anxious to have the dialogue with the	
15	Department to see what can be done. Because I have to	
16	believe it's not your intent to force out of the market	
17	firms that are opening standard IRAs for, you know,	
18	kind of regular folks. I'm sure that's not what you're	
19	interested in doing.	
20	And so there's got to be a I would think	
21	there's got to be a solution to that. I would hope.	
22	MR. PIACENTINI: So, my question is also for	

		23
1	Mr. Schneider. And I'm the economist on the panel so	
2	I'm going to ask about the economics, I think, of what	
3	we've been talking about for more of the legal	
4	dimensions of it.	
5	And in a way I think your explanation of the	
6	compensation arrangements and so forth in your market	
7	segment have really helped me get my head around a	
8	theme that's been going on this morning which is that	
9	some business models compensation arrangements work	
10	where others don't.	
11	But I still don't quite have it, so I'm	
12	hoping you can help me just a little bit more. So you	
13	couldn't service small accounts if you had to use a	
14	flat fee model or an asset-based model. And you said	
15	if you tried to it would be exorbitant. And, yet,	
16	clearly you are generating the revenue you need to	
17	cover your costs now. The business model does work.	
18	So whatever that exorbitant revenue	
19	whatever revenue would be exorbitant in one sense is	
20	not in another sense, the same revenue I guess, cause	
21	you have to generate the same amount of revenue.	
22	MR. SCHNEIDER: There's really two reasons.	

239 And let me try and -- our time -- I guess we still have 1 2 time. 3 First of all, part of it is legal. So under -- as I understand -- again, we're not ERISA, but as I 4 understand it under the Prohibited Transactions Rule, 5 you can only get compensation from the client. You 6 can't -- it would be a violation of your fiduciary 7 8 standard to take compensation from the fund or at least 9 unequal compensation, revenue sharing, for example. 10 MR. PIACENTINI: This is revenue sharing 11 we're talking about? 12 MR. WATTS: Record keeping. 13 MR. SCHNEIDER: Record-keeping fees. So if 14 you cut all that out, then the client needs to pay that. So that client -- and the client needs to pay 15 that upfront. 16 17 MR. WATTS: Or annually. 18 MR. SCHNEIDER: Or annually. And it needs --19 and they're a small account when they start. 20 MR. PIACENTINI: Right. 21 MR. SCHNEIDER: And the account is so small 22 it can't absorb those expenses.

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1	MR. PIACENTINI: But if that piece of the	
2	revenue is being filled in now by revenue sharing back	
3	from the fund, then it sounds like that is in some	
4	sense being allocated to the larger accounts, right?	
5	And that that's cross subsidizing to help you open	
6	small, open new accounts and incubate small accounts?	
7	MR. SCHNEIDER: So that's the other reason I	
8	was going to get to.	
9	MR. PIACENTINI: That's kind of what's going	
10	on. So if you charged a an asset-based fee that was	
11	similar to the revenue sharing, then that would perform	
12	the same function?	
13	MR. SCHNEIDER: You would have to be a 30	
14	percent fee.	
15	MR. WATTS: But nobody would open the	
16	account.	
17	MR. SCHNEIDER: Yeah.	
18	MR. PIACENTINI: No, no. I'm saying I'm	
19	saying if you had in the same proportion as revenue	
20	sharing is now and, again, it would fall	
21	disproportionably out of larger accounts, but wouldn't	
22	that end up being essentially the same money coming	

from the same place? 1 2 I mean, if it's revenue sharing now it's 3 built into the expense structure of the mutual funds, it's reducing the net return, right? I mean, that's 4 how that works? 5 MR. SCHNEIDER: But the structure today helps 6 accounts, smaller accounts before they're bigger 7 8 accounts because the mutual fund company is going to 9 pay us a record keeping fee, let's say \$18 and they're going to pay Merrill Lynch a record keeping fee of say 10 Merrill Lynch has \$200 billion of assets under 11 \$18. We have \$20 billion of assets under 12 management. 13 management. 14 And so in a way, we're aided by that structure. That helps companies open small accounts. 15 And so we're the beneficiary from an economic 16 17 standpoint of that. 18 Think of it like a -- I hate to use the analogy, but going through a buffet line. Everyone 19 20 pays the same price. Some people really load up their 21 plate and the small investor is a very -- that's a 22 costly account to have. The guys who load -- so we're

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the load-up-the-plate guys.
 1
 2
              Then some go through a buffet line and
 3
    they'll just take a little bit. They help defray the
    expense of the small investor. And so because it's
 4
    sort of a -- more of fixed fee that you'd get.
 5
                                                   And
    that works for everybody. Once you take that away and
 6
    you need to fully allocate the expense on just that
 7
 8
    IRA, just that investor, that expense becomes
   prohibited.
 9
10
              What the -- what the revenue sharing and
    other payments do for us is it basically helps us to
11
   pay for our platform, our fixed costs, that's what that
12
13
   helps.
           And once that's taken away and the full load
14
    goes on the investor, it's too big a load.
15
              MR. WATTS: And the expenses of that account
    are actually allocated to that investor. It is
16
    prohibited for that investor to open the account.
17
18
              MR. SCHNEIDER: Yeah, it just does it for --
19
              MR. PIACENTINI:
                               Right.
20
              MR. SCHNEIDER: And it's got to be upfront.
21
    So the other thing is -- in a way it's financed over
    time otherwise.
22
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243 1 MR. PIACENTINI: Thank you. 2 MR. SCHNEIDER: I mean, the economics are 3 interesting and it may be worth addressing in more detail. I suppose we're out of time. 4 MR. DAVIS: Yeah, but again, you can 5 supplement the record if you'd like to. 6 7 MR. PIACENTINI: Thanks. 8 MR. WATTS: If you have questions for us that we haven't answered, then we will. 9 10 MR. PIACENTINI: All right. 11 MR. WATTS: If you want to get them to us, we'll to our best to answer them. 12 13 MR. PIACENTINI: Yeah, great. Thank you. 14 MR. DAVIS: Thank you. 15 We'll call Panel 12 to the stage. Jennifer Eller, Real Estate Appraisal Coalition. Charles Tharp, 16 Center on Executive Compensation and Vincent Vernuccio, 17 18 Competitive Enterprise Institute. 19 Let's go ahead and get started. We'll start 20 with Ms. Eller. 21 MS. ELLER: Thank you. Good afternoon. My 22 name is Jenny Eller and I'm a principal at Groom Law

1 Group.

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I'm testifying today on behalf of the Real Estate Appraisal Coalition, a group of firms that value and appraise real estate assets. On an annual basis, this coalition is responsible for providing valuation estates with respect to over half a trillion dollars in real estate assets belonging to ERISA plans.

8 We appreciate the opportunity to comment on 9 this important proposed rule.

10 At the end of the day the debate over the proposed rule is a discussion about whether and how 11 broadening the definition of fiduciary will better 12 13 protect pension plans. It's the view of Coalition 14 members that as it relates to appraisal and valuation 15 of real estate held by plans, the proposed rule would not provide enough additional protections to plans to 16 17 justify the additional cost.

18 Under the proposed regulation, a person
19 providing advice on an appraisal or a fairness opinion
20 about the value of real estate held by a plan may be
21 deemed a fiduciary.

In the Preamble to the proposed rule, the

		245
1	Department specifically notes that including real	-
2	estate appraisal activities within the definition of	
3	fiduciary activities would be a change from current	
4	law. I can think of two reasons why the Department	
5	might consider broadening the definition of fiduciary	
6	to include real estate appraisal activities.	
7	The first would be to impose a set of conduct	
8	standards on real estate appraisers. And the second	
9	would be to prohibit fee conflicts.	
10	In the Coalition's view, this reasoning would	
11	be justified if there were no existing standards of	
12	conduct for real estate appraisers or if existing	
13	standards were inadequate or non-uniform, and if there	
14	were evidence of misconduct or fee conflicts on the	
15	part of appraisers. However, just the opposite is	
16	true.	
17	First, there is an existing comprehensive	
18	uniform set of appraisal standards known as the Uniform	
19	Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice or USPAP	
20	that applies to all real estate appraisal activities.	
21	These standards govern all aspects of the appraisal	
22	process, including substantive knowledge and experience	

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1	required of each appraiser, the performance of	
2	appraisals, appraisal reviews, appraisal report	
3	content, including client disclosures and appraisers'	
4	ethical obligations.	
5	The ethical obligations in the standards are	
6	thoroughly defined and specifically prohibit the	
7	performance of an appraisal with bias or an intent to	
8	mislead or defraud. The standards also prohibit	
9	appraisers from receiving compensation contingent upon	
10	the reporting of a predetermined result or upon the	
11	amount of a value opinion.	
12	The Department has now identified appraiser	
13	misconduct or fee conflicts in the context of real	
14	estate appraisals undertaken for employee benefit plans	
15	as an area of focus let alone an enforcement priority.	
16	The Department's been very clear about its enforcement	
17	priorities in recent years and has stated that it is	
18	focusing enforcement resources on areas where the	
19	Department perceives the greatest threats to	
20	participants' retirement security. However, the	
21	Department has no enforcement initiatives involving	
22	real estate appraisal activities.	

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1	As recently as 2008, in testimony to the	
2	ERISA Advisery Council on hard to value assets, the	
3	Department did not identify real estate appraisal and	
4	valuation as a concern. The Department's lack of	
5	findings identifying problems in this area demonstrates	
6	that additional regulation is unnecessary and will add	
7	little value for plans.	
8	Now, I'd like to talk a little bit more about	
9	the USPAP standards because we think it's important	
10	that you understand the degree to which federal	
11	government regulators oversee the establishment and	
12	enforcement of these standards and the extent to which	
13	the standards are already incorporated into federal	
14	law.	
15	The Federal Financial Institutions	
16	Examination Council or FFIEC is the inter-agency body	
17	of federal financial regulatory agencies and includes	
18	the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the	
19	FDIC, the National Credit Union Administration, the	
20	OCC, OTS, the newly created Bureau of Consumer	
21	Financial Protection and the Federal Housing Finance	
22	Agency.	

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1	The FFIEC includes the Appraisal Sub-	
2	Committee which oversees state appraiser regulatory	
3	programs, monitors appraisal standards of federal	
4	financial institutions, maintains a registry of state	
5	certified and licensed appraiser and monitors and	
6	reviews the operations of the Appraisals Standards	
7	Board, the entity responsible for issuing the USPAP	
8	standards.	
9	The original goal of establishing federal	
10	agency oversight of appraisal standards in 1989 was to	
11	ensure that appraisers acted under uniform standards.	
12	In 2010, as part of the Dodd-Frank Act,	
13	Congress updated and strengthened FFIEC oversight of	
14	appraisal standards in response to the financial	
15	crises.	
16	Federal agency oversight of appraisal	
17	standards also means that the standards are	
18	incorporated into federal regulations. For example,	
19	regulations issued in December 2010 by all of the FFIEC	
20	agencies require any federally regulated financial	
21	institution to have standards in place for monitoring	
22	real estate appraisers. The regulations specifically	

1 incorporate the USPAP standards.

2	As a result, federal, and as a practical
3	matter, state regulated financial institutions rely on
4	USPAP standards to select, evaluate and monitor real
5	estate appraisers, including when these institutions
6	are acting on behalf of employee benefit plans. The
7	USPAP standards require impartiality, objectivity and
8	independence. Appraisers are not permitted to advocate
9	the cause or interest of any party.
10	A significant concern for appraisers is
11	whether and how this focus on objectivity can be
12	reconciled with the fiduciary duty under ERISA section
13	404 to act solely in the interest of participants and
14	beneficiaries.
15	The requirement that appraisers act with
16	strict objectivity is also at odds with the assumption
17	in ERISA section 406(b)(2) that a fiduciary is always
18	acting on behalf of a plan.
19	Appraisers are also concerned about ERISA's
20	co-fiduciary liability provisions and the extent to
21	which this new source of liability will mean that
22	appraisers are required to monitor the actions of a

		2
1	fiduciary to whom the appraiser provides services.	
2	The limitation in the proposed regulation	
3	that specifically addresses appraisal activities is	
4	also problematic. First, the limitation puts the	
5	burden on the appraiser to demonstrate the	
6	understanding of the recipient of appraisal information	
7	about the appraiser's role. This is difficult in any	
8	case but it's particularly difficult where as the	
9	proposed rule appears to envision, the appraiser is	
10	working for a party with "adverse interests" to the	
11	plan. And the limitation would require that the	
12	appraiser communicate the fact that it is not an	
13	undertaking to be impartial.	
14	It would be difficult, if not impossible, for	
15	an appraiser to comply with USPAP and to comply with	
16	this limitation.	
17	Fiduciary status and the accompanying	
18	expansion of the scope of appraisal firm liability	
19	would necessarily result in increased costs to plans.	
20	Most real estate appraisal firms are simply not	
21	organized they cannot conduct business as an ERISA	
22	fiduciary. To undertake this responsibility would	

1	require firms to incur additional expenses associated
2	with insurance and legal compliance among other things.
3	Given the ubiquity of the USPAP standards and
4	the fact that these standards are intended to promote
5	uniformity in appraiser regulation, we submit that
6	layering ERISA fiduciary responsibility on top of USPAP
7	would be costly, disruptive and burdensome without
8	adding meaningful value or protection for plans.
9	ERISA imposes fiduciary duties with respect
10	to valuation of plan assets including real estate
11	investments upon a plan's administrator. Specifically,
12	the administrator of an ERISA plan is required to
13	report current value of the plan's assets on the Form
14	5500.
15	The Department has advised plan fiduciaries
16	of their duty to understand and evaluate valuation
17	information received about plan investments. If the
18	Department is concerned about valuation issues, it
19	should provide guidance to plan administrators and
20	investment fiduciaries on their duties in connection
21	with the valuation process.
22	Valuation guidance would be consistent with

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1	the recommendations made by the 2008 ERISA Advisery	
2	Council Working Group on hard to value assets and by	
3	the U.S. GAO in a 2008 report on Pension Plan	
4	Investment and Hard to Value Assets.	
5	The Coalition does not believe that a real	
6	estate appraiser undertaking traditional appraisal	
7	activities should be entered as a fiduciary. To the	
8	extent that the final regulation could impose fiduciary	
9	status on appraisers we recommend that the Department	
10	include a specific limitation such that real estate	
11	appraisers who conduct an appraisal subject to the	
12	Uniform Standards will not be treated as providing	
13	investment advice under ERISA.	
14	Incorporating these standards would leverage	
15	off of existing uniform standards to ensure that	
16	employee benefit plans and participants are protected.	
17	We appreciate the opportunity to testify on	
18	this proposal and we look forward to working with the	
19	Department to craft a workable solution.	
20	Thank you.	
21	MR. DAVIS: Thank you.	
22	Mr. Tharp.	

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1	MR. THARP: Good afternoon. My name is	
2	Charlie Tharp and I'm the Executive Vice President for	
3	Policy at the Center on Executive Compensation here in	
4	Washington.	
5	The Center is a research and advocacy	
6	organization that seeks to provide a principles-based	
7	approach to executive compensation.	
8	In my testimony today I'll hit on three key	
9	points. The first point is that we believe that the	
10	proposed regulations are overly broad and would have an	
11	unintended consequence of imposing costs and perhaps	
12	limiting access to valuable information and services to	
13	plans.	
14	Secondly, we advocate that if someone is	
15	considered a proxy adviser is considered a fiduciary	
16	today under the rules, that that shouldn't change.	
17	And the third recommendation we have is that	
18	we'd like to have the Department of Labor undertake a	
19	comprehensive study of the proxy advisery industry, and	
20	I'll give you some details as to why we think that is	
21	important.	
22	The Preamble of the proposed regulations	

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1	notes that the definition of a fiduciary would include,	
2	for instance, advice and recommendations as to the	
3	existence of rights that are pertinent to shares of	
4	stock and that would cover voting proxies.	
5	First, with respect to the regulation itself	
6	as I've indicated, we believe that the proposed	
7	definition of fiduciary is too broad and would not	
8	should not be adopted as it's currently drafted. The	
9	fear, again, is as been mentioned by others, is that	
10	there would be individuals who currently are considered	
11	to be fiduciary advisers, would be swept under that and	
12	would increase the cost to plan participants and to	
13	sponsors of plans. Merely providing information	
14	without more we don't believe should be deemed to be a	
15	fiduciary adviser.	
16	It may be helpful for a second just to	
17	provide some background of the proxy advisery industry	
18	because that's where the bulk of our comments are	
19	focused. Because the voting of proxies is an important	
20	fiduciary duty and the annual volume of proxy	
21	information has increased tremendously, institutional	
22	investors rely on proxy advisers for advice.	

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1	The proxy advisery industry has undergone	
2	significant consolidation at the same time their	
3	influence has increased due to the following factors:	
4	First, the share ownership on the part of	
5	institutional investors has increased from 47 percent	
6	of the fortune 1000 in 1987, to over 76 percent today.	
7	The expansion by the SEC of permissible proposals that	
8	may be included in shareholder resolutions has also	
9	increased. In the growth and the volume of information	
10	that must be analyzed has caused companies to rely high	
11	heavily on proxy advisery firms who must analyze	
12	hundreds of thousands of pages of information just on	
13	compensation alone.	
14	The influence of the proxy advisery firms on	
15	the exercise of voting rights is projected to increase	
16	as regulatory changes, such as we've just witnessed	
17	under Dodd-Frank, further increase the number of votes	
18	that must be cast and hence, the influence of the proxy	
19	voting process.	
20	Proxy advisery firms today are scarcely	
21	regulated through a patchwork of regulations that do	
22	not clearly cover the activities of the proxy advisery	

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1	industry. The patchwork, in fact, was part of the	
2	motivation for the SEC's 2010 concept release, which	
3	requested input on proxy advisery industry. The	
4	release notes that some have argued the proxy advisery	
5	firms are controlling or significantly influencing	
6	shareholder voting without appropriate oversight. There	
7	are many conflicts in the proxy advisery industry but	
8	the most serious problem facing the industry is a	
9	conflict of interest. As noted in the 2007 GAO report	
10	the largest and most influential proxy advisery firm,	
11	ISS, provides services to companies to help them gain	
12	favorable votes on their resolutions and proposals	
13	while at the same time, selling the services of	
14	recommendations on those very votes to their clients.	
15	Proxy advisers also have a conflict of	
16	interest when they provide voting recommendations on	
17	shareholder initiatives that are backed by their owners	
18	or institutional investors who are offering their	
19	clients such as pension funds. This economic	
20	relationship does give the impression of a favorable	
21	analysis of those proponents' resolutions.	
22	In particular, Glass Lewis, which is the	

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1	second largest of the proxy advisery firms, is owned by	
2	the Ontario Teacher Pension Plan Board, which is one of	
3	the largest activist institutional shareholders.	
4	There's an increasing parallel interest between the	
5	conflicts that were noted in credit rating agencies and	
6	those of the proxy advisery firms. Just as the credit	
7	agencies would receive fees for rating a company this	
8	is similar to the proxy advisery firm selling their	
9	fees and then recommending votes on those same	
10	companies.	
11	Proxy advisery firms are not accountable for	
12	the inaccuracies in their analysis and we did a survey	
13	just in 2010 of the 300 companies and the Human	
14	Resource Policy Association and our subscribers in the	
15	Center, and we found that 53 percent of the respondents	
16	had experienced inaccuracies in the final published	
17	report on their compensation programs.	
18	Perhaps due to industry pressures we're	
19	seeing more of these inaccuracies. To increase	
20	profitability, the proxy advisery firms have outsourced	
21	the proxy data mining and research activities to low	
22	cost countries such as the Philippines and have hired	

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1	seasonal temporary employees with little or no business	
2	or proxy experience. We believe that solutions to this	
3	inaccuracy problem would include the enhancement of the	
4	quality control procedures, including giving companies	
5	a chance and sufficient time to comment on the reports	
6	so they can help identify and correct inaccuracies	
7	currently, at best you give 24 hours off and over a	
8	weekend, establishing protocols for dealing with	
9	inaccurate reports.	
10	There's also another concern and it is in	
11	part due to the economics of the proxy advisery	
12	industry that they use a one-size-fits-all approach to	
13	governance voting. We believe that they should take	
14	into account differences in company situations,	
15	strategies and approaches and have a tailored informed	
16	recommendation on voting proposals.	
17	The ERISA requirements enforced by the	
18	Department of Labor and the investment advisery	
19	requirements enforced by the SEC fail to provide a	
20	comprehensive regulatory structure for the proxy	
21	advisery firms.	
22	Starting with the Avon letter in 1988 the	

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1	Department of Labor has held that the voting of proxies	
2	is an important fiduciary activity and a valuable plan	
3	asset under ERISA. Therefore, the fiduciary duties of	
4	loyalty and prudence apply to voting. Moreover,	
5	pension fund fiduciaries including those that delegate	
6	proxy-voting responsibilities to their investment	
7	managers have a responsibility to monitor and keep	
8	accurate records of their proxy voting activities.	
9	To the extent that proxy advisery firms do	
10	exercise discretion over the voting of proxies, they	
11	are considered fiduciaries under existing regulation	
12	and the term of fiduciary. However, only one of the	
13	firms ISS actually votes proxies and would fall under	
14	that fiduciary responsibility, not Glass Lewis.	
15	While the Department of Labor seeks to	
16	preserve plan assets through more protective measures,	
17	the SEC aims to protect investors by providing them	
18	with material information upon which to make informed	
19	decisions. The SEC puts the responsibility on	
20	investors to utilize available information properly and	
21	to monitor the quality of that information. The	
22	Investment Advisers Act of 1940, is the principal	

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1	regulatory scheme that applies to advisery firms and
2	the SEC is responsible for its enforcement.
3	The fiduciary duties imposed by the SEC are
4	dramatically different than those fiduciary duties
5	imposed by ERISA. Instead of providing prohibiting
6	conflicts of interest, the SEC simply provides that
7	such disclosures must such conflicts must be
8	disclosed. Even though the SEC regulatory scheme
9	incorporates a fiduciary concept it has been scarcely
10	enforced and even then, it does not provide sufficient
11	protection for ERISA plan assets.
12	The Center asserts that the proposed
13	regulation, to be clear, is overly broad and we believe
14	that the right solution is to engage the Department of
15	Labor to engage in a comprehensive and detailed study
16	of the proxy advisery industry. Given that your charge
17	in the Department of Labor is to protect plan assets
18	and those that hopefully will have a long-term value
19	for plan participants, the Center believes that it's
20	appropriate that the Department of Labor initiate
21	
	greater oversight over the proxy advisery industry.

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1	to plan fiduciaries about how to properly evaluate the	
2	information provided by proxy advisery firms which they	
3	use and rely on heavily in discharging their already	
4	established fiduciary duties of voting proxies. The	
5	Center seeks uniform and consistent treatment of proxy	
6	advisery firms as the current regulatory oversight	
7	differs based upon whether a firm is a registered	
8	investment adviser or not, and only one of the proxy	
9	firms is and that's ISS not Glass Lewis.	
10	The Center also requests that Department of	
11	Labor prohibit proxy advisery firms from providing	
12	consulting services to corporate issuers if they also	
13	provide an independent analysis on those same	
14	companies.	
15	Additionally, the Department should require	
16	that proxy advisery firms disclose the financial	
17	relationship with issuers so that institutional	
18	investors and pension plans can make an informed	
19	decision as to the credibility of recommendations and	
20	whether a conflict exists or not.	
21	Thank you for the opportunity to testify here	
22	today and I'd be happy to answer any questions. And we	

262 would be happy to meet with the Department to discuss 1 2 additional questions you may have. 3 MR. DAVIS: Thank you so much, Mr. Tharp. Mr. Berlau. 4 5 MR. BERLAU: Yes. If I may borrow your mic. Thank you. 6 7 I'd like to thank Assistant Secretary Borzi 8 and members of the panel for the opportunity to testify at this hearing regarding the proposed regulation 9 defining the term fiduciary in connection with the 10 provision of investment advice under ERISA. 11 12 My name is John Berlau. I am the Director of 13 the Center for Investors and Entrepreneurs at the 14 Competitive Enterprise Institute. The Competitive 15 Enterprise Institute is a nonprofit public policy organization dedicated to advancing the principles of 16 17 limited government free enterprise and individual 18 liberty. Founded in 1984, our mission is to promote 19 both freedom and opportunity. 20 We make the case for economic freedom because 21 we believe it is essential for entrepreneurship innovation and prosperity to flourish including 22

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1	prosperity for middle-class investors both in 401(ks)
2	and other pensions and IRAs and within individual
3	brokerage accounts.
4	In January, President Obama issued Executive
5	Order 13563 intended to reemphasize the principles of
6	President Clinton's Executive Order 12866 that governed
7	the regulatory development and review process.
8	Regarding his new Executive Order, the
9	President wrote: "We are seeking more affordable, less
10	intrusive means to achieve the same ends, giving
11	careful consideration to benefits and costs. This
12	means writing rules with more input from experts,
13	businesses and ordinary citizens. It means using
14	disclosure as a tool to inform consumers of their
15	choices rather than restricting those choices.
16	I am directing federal agencies to do more to
17	account for and reduce the burdens regulations may
18	place small businesses."
19	And unfortunately, and with all due respect,
20	the proposed regulation we are discussing today fails
21	to meet any of those objectives.
22	The proposal does not utilize in the

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1	President's words, "More affordable, less intrusive	
2	means." Instead, the proposal dramatically expands the	
3	applicability of the highest and most restrictive	
4	standard of fiduciary conduct in federal law to entire	
5	classes of market participants never before considered	
6	ERISA fiduciaries. In fact, the Department did not	
7	even consider less restrictive alternatives to the	
8	proposal in its economic analysis.	
9	The proposal does not, in the President's	
10	words, "give careful consideration to benefits and	
11	costs." In fact, the economic analysis does not	
12	quantify costs or benefits, it admits that both are	
13	subject to significant uncertainty and that the rule	
14	could have a large market impact. And it fails to	
15	consider any impact at all on the more than 4 trillion	
16	individual retirement account marketplace.	
17	The proposal does in the President's words,	
18	"use disclosure as a tool to inform consumers of their	
19	choices rather than restricting those choices." In	
20	fact, the proposal, we argue, would limit the choices	
21	of consumers especially in the IRA marketplace by	
22	making it difficult or impossible for consumers to keep	

the service agreements they now have with providers 1 2 they personally selected. 3 Furthermore, the Department recently completed regulations, the Service Provider Disclosure 4 Rules that will take effect next January, providing for 5 new disclosure tools for plans and participants which 6 could alleviate many of the concerns about hidden 7 8 conflicts of interest that are said to justify the 9 proposal we are discussing today. But the Department intends to finalize this more burdensome fiduciary rule 10 11 before these disclosure regulations may even take 12 effect. 13 The proposal does not, in the President's words, "account for and reduce the burdensome 14 15 regulations that may be placed on small business." Ιn fact, the Department decided it could not determine the 16 17 number of small entities affected by the proposal, 18 though the available hard data from the Form 5500 19 showed that 98 percent of service providers to plans 20 with 100 or more participants have total revenues 21 attributed -- attributable to ERISA plan clients that

22 are below the small entity threshold.

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1	Based on our review of this proposal and its	
2	economic justification, we are deeply concerned that	
3	the Department has failed to abide by the requirements	
4	of the regulatory process from conducting a thorough	
5	and required analysis of the impact of the regulation	
6	to denying the public a meaningful opportunity to	
7	comment on its contents.	
8	We are also very concerned that the effect of	
9	the proposal will be to reduce the availability of	
10	choice options and freedom to individual Americans who	
11	own IRAs, to employers offering workplace retirement	
12	plans and to workers participating in those plans.	
13	Individual choice is the hallmark of IRAs and	
14	defined contribution plans such as 401(k)s and we	
15	believe the proposal will make it more difficult for	
16	workers to get the information or advice they seek to	
17	make informed decisions.	
18	Plan sponsors and workers should be free to	
19	select service providers on a non-fiduciary basis to	
20	assist them in making their own decisions. We believe	
21	the likely effect of the proposal would be to limit the	
22	ability of plans and workers to make that choice.	

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1	As noted by other commenters, the proposal as
2	written will likely cause, under the may be considered
3	standard, attorneys, accountants and actuaries who
4	provide their services to plans to be defined as
5	fiduciaries. As a result, the cost of the new
6	liability of falling under this new definition as a
7	result of that, these professionals may sharply
8	increase their fees for these services or many may
9	decide it's simply not worth the cost to provide their
10	expertise to ERISA covered plans, concentrating instead
11	on segments of the financial market that serve only
12	wealthy investors.
13	Either way, middle-class workers with in
14	ERISA plans would lose out as they would either be
15	deprived of or pay much more for the skills of these
16	professionals.
17	Let me try to sum up in one sentence why we
18	are so concerned with the economic analysis in this
19	case.
20	The proposal would redefine one of the
21	fundamental concepts of an entire body of law governing
22	roughly 10 trillion in retirement savings for the

benefit of more than 100 million workers, retirees and 1 2 their families. 3 And in our view, when the Agency is proposing to make changes on this scale that would affect so many 4 individuals, it is incumbent on the Agency to 5 demonstrate that it has fully considered the impact of 6 7 the proposal and can, with some reasonable degree of 8 certainty, justify the transition and ongoing costs it 9 may impose. We do not believe the Agency has met this 10 burden. 11 Economic analysis is supposed to inform and shape regulatory policy, not serve as a rubber stamp 12 13 for a predetermined policy view. That's why we were 14 very troubled to read a report yesterday quoting an 15 Agency official saying that the testimony at these hearings asking the Department to go back to the 16 drawing board is not going to be well received. And at 17 18 the risk of not being well received, that is exactly 19 what we request. 20 We believe the Department must revise, 21 reanalyze and re-propose this rule for public comment. 22 Let me be clear, we support the Department's effort to

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1	review this regulation and we are open to the	
2	Department's concerns about the need to revise the	
3	current rule. However, we do not believe the proposal	
4	as written can be determined to achieve the	
5	Department's goals.	
6	In our formal comment letter we provided a	
7	number of comments for the Department to consider, but	
8	in the interest of time I will focus on a few concerns	
9	in my testimony today.	
10	The impact on IRAs. And we acknowledge that	
11	the Tax Code gives the Department the ability to	
12	interpret the prohibited transaction rules for IRAs;	
13	however, we do not believe it would be wise to apply	
14	the proposed fiduciary definitions to IRAs.	
15	First, as I already mentioned, the Department	
16	does not appear to have considered how this rule might	
17	impact IRAs. This alone causes concern because it is	
18	not at all clear the same cost considerations apply	
19	given the structural differences between IRAs and ERISA	
20	plans and also because IRAs hold more than 4 trillion	
21	in assets.	
22	Second, IRAs simply are fundamentally	

1	different from ERISA plans, they are individual
2	financial products, individual retirement accounts and
3	should be regulated as such. Department has recognized
4	these differences in the past as it has previously
5	addressed prohibited transaction issues differently for
6	plans and IRAs.
7	ERISA's fiduciary provisions serve to protect
8	workers from decisions made on their behalf by others.
9	It provides a standard of conduct and a series of
10	rights and remedies designed to ensure that the people
11	making decisions for you, the worker, do so in your
12	best interest.
13	In an IRA, however, the individual makes her
14	own decisions. She decides which service provider to
15	hire and how much to pay. There is no relationship
16	requiring ERISA fiduciary intervention to protect her
17	interest. In effect, the actual decision-making
18	process for the individual is the same as in a personal
19	brokerage account or similar non-ERISA vehicle.
20	Applying the proposal to IRAs would have the
21	affect of limiting her choices and second-guessing her
22	decisions. If her IRA provider can be a fiduciary for

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1	providing her with a buy/sell/hold recommendation from	
2	the research department the provider will stop	
3	providing her with information or change its business	
4	model to comply with prohibited transaction concerns.	
5	In either circumstances, the terms of the agreement she	
6	made with her provider are now being changed because	
7	the government has decided she was not capable of	
8	making her own decisions.	
9	We are also very concerned that the	
10	Department has relied on non-public data in developing	
11	and justifying the proposal. While the Department	
12	states that its enforcement experience leads it to take	
13	action and that the proposal is necessary to solve the	
14	Department's identified problems, the public has no way	
15	of evaluating these statements.	
16	For example, the Department did not consider	
17	any less restrictive alternative in its economic	
18	analysis. Why? Is it because literally nothing less	
19	than the full scope of the proposal will work? The	
20	answer is, we don't know. The public is limited in	
21	understanding and reviewing the proposal until it can	
22	see and evaluate the data on which the Department	

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1 relied.

2	Accordingly, we request that the Department
3	provide a summary of the violations and resolution of
4	each consultant and adviser's project investigation it
5	undertook. The Department, of course, should redact
6	the names of the parties involved as appropriate to
7	protect the subjects of the investigations. Only by
8	doing this can the public understand whether the
9	proposal is narrowly tailored to achieve the
10	Department's objectives based on its enforcement
11	experience.
12	The Department should also develop and
13	analyze new alternative regulations that narrow the
14	scope of the proposal to determine if these
15	alternatives would achieve the Department goals of less
16	cost or greater efficiency.
17	In our comment letter we express concern that
18	the Department appeared to be double counting the
19	benefit of its prior disclosure, the service provider
20	disclosure regulations. The concern is due to the fact
21	that the service provider and participant disclosure
22	regulations were never mentioned on the proposal and,

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1	in fact, on page 65365, the Preamble incorrectly states	
2	that non-fiduciary service providers, "need not	
3	disclose to the plan fiduciaries payments received from	
4	other parties without mentioning the new service	
5	provider disclosure rules going into effect."	
6	Further, such disclosure requirements have	
7	already been promulgated by any rules by the	
8	Department, the Department's economic analysis of these	
9	regulations claim their benefits would exceed their	
10	costs because disclosure would improve decision-making	
11	and deter inappropriate behavior.	
12	However, both these arguments are also	
13	claimed as benefits of the fiduciary proposal without	
14	regard to the other proposal. Thus, the Department	
15	should answer a question, what is the additional	
16	benefit of fiduciary status, if any, that exceeds the	
17	benefits of disclosure? This incremental benefit, if	
18	any, is highly relevant to the cost benefit analysis of	
19	the proposal.	
20	Conclusion. We believe the regulatory impact	
21	analysis accompanying the proposal overstates the	
22	proposal's benefits and understates its costs and does	

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1	not comply with the intent of President Obama's	
2	Executive Order 13563 or the previous Executive Order	
3	12866 or OMB Circular A4. This is especially	
4	significant because of the broad scope of the proposal.	
5	We need better information demonstrating we will not be	
6	making the current situation worse by	
7	MR. DAVIS: Mr. Berlau, are you almost	
8	finished? You're over your time.	
9	MR. BERLAU: I am. I'm sorry. I was	
10	listening was the buzzer I'm sorry about that.	
11	MR. DAVIS: About five minutes ago.	
12	MR. BERLAU: I'm sorry. Oh, I'm sorry. I'm	
13	terribly sorry.	
14	MR. DAVIS: Yeah.	
15	MR. BERLAU: I'll be happy to answer if there	
16	are any questions you may have.	
17	Thank you so much.	
18	MR. DAVIS: Thank you.	
19	So, Jeff.	
20	MR. MONHART: Thanks, Michael. I have a	
21	question for Ms. Eller.	
22	I understand your testimony to be that the	

		2
1	real estate appraisers are already regulated and that	
2	they're subject to the USPAP, which is reassuring but	
3	could you tell us is there an enforcement mechanism	
4	under USPAP specifically if an appraiser does not abide	
5	by one or more the standards, what are the implications	
6	for the appraiser?	
7	MS. ELLER: Sure. The enforcement is at the	
8	state level. All 50 states have appraiser licensing	
9	bodies. The appraisal standard Appraisal Institute	
10	and Appraisal Standards Boards coordinates that	
11	enforcement. They put out, for instance, guidelines	
12	that help the state regulatory bodies know what the	
13	other states are doing on enforcement for specific	
14	infractions and violations.	
15	So it's a state level enforcement but it is	
16	very also very well coordinated at the federal	
17	level.	
18	MR. MONHART: Okay. Thank you.	
19	MR. DAVIS: I really don't have any questions	
20	but I did want to just for the record, Mr. Berlau, the	
21	official you were referring to is not here to defend	
22	herself. The quote that you made, but just to be	

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1	clear, one of the reasons that we're having this	
2	hearing is to hear comments on all sides with respect	
3	to this regulation and we're open to all views no	
4	matter how much they may be in sync with what we have	
5	proposed. So just to be clear.	
6	MR. BERLAU: And I appreciate that. I hope	
7	you will consider my recommendations our	
8	recommendations to revise and re-propose the rule.	
9	MR. DAVIS: We'll certainly take that under	
10	consideration. Thank you.	
11	Mr. Strasfeld?	
12	MR. STRASFELD: Yes, sir.	
13	You had well, I maybe I'm	
14	misunderstanding but you had two positions that seemed	
15	to be seemed to be somewhat in conflict at least to my	
16	understanding. You said the reg is over broad, which I	
17	understood. You said the same thing. But then you	
18	focused more narrowly on these proxy votes advisery	
19	companies that service pension plans and other	
20	institutions who want to be given direction as to how	
21	to vote their proxies.	
22	So I understand that your the concerns you	

	2
1	expressed with respect to those institutions but
2	which is a kind of a narrow focus, but what is
3	what is your focus as to why the reg is over broad?
4	MR. THARP: Yeah. The our members who are
5	in the Center are also sponsors of ERISA plans and for
6	many of the reasons that have been indicated that it
7	would implicate people who just provide information and
8	nothing more, would be concerning fiduciaries. And the
9	fear is that it would increase the costs and let's say,
10	voluntary benefit system.
11	And, as you know, there are there's this
12	tension of wanting to make sure that we're providing
13	benefits but at the same time being conscious of cost.
14	The other is to have access to valuable
15	information and if it precludes the ability to access
16	people who heretofore have provided that information
17	but weren't deemed to be fiduciaries, it would probably
18	be to the disadvantage of firms trying to maintain
19	these plans.
20	MR. STRASFELD: Because the I think the
21	proposal goes to some extent to make it clear that
22	investment, education and that type of information will

continue to be non-fiduciary in nature. 1 2 So is there -- is there information you're concerned that -- that's sort of in between investment 3 advice? I mean, what would be an example of something 4 that seemed okay in the past but might be problematic 5 under this proposal? 6 7 MR. THARP: Yeah. When I actually served on 8 a pension committee when I was -- a board appointed pension committee when I was head of human resources in 9 a company, I would have various employees provide 10 11 information to me that would inform some of my voting and my decisions on the committee. And the questions 12 13 would be would those people now be considered to be fiduciaries if they're providing that information and 14 15 nothing more? 16 And you might imagine the implications of that for how we would treat not only potential 17 18 liability of employees and to cover them, but just the 19 -- the issue of who we could turn to get information without inadvertently pulling them into the coverage of 20 21 being a fiduciary. 22 MR. STRASFELD: Ms. Evans.

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1	MS. EVANS: Ms. Eller, with respect to your	
2	point about impartiality. If the reg made clear that	
3	appraisers aren't expected to slant their valuations or	
4	opinions one way or the other, would that allay some of	
5	your concerns about the reconciliation between being a	
6	fiduciary under ERISA and applying with some of the	
7	rules under the Code?	
8	MS. ELLER: I think it would help, but I	
9	think up to now appraisers have not been considered	
10	fiduciaries in part because their information is	
11	individualized as to the needs of the plan and doesn't	
12	take into account the sort of broader range of things	
13	that a fiduciary making a decision that's maybe based	
14	in part on an appraisal is has to take into account.	
15	So the objectivity piece would help but I	
16	think they'd still be concerned about co-fiduciary	
17	liability and they'd still be concerned with sort of	
18	the nuts and bolts of how you reconcile. Now I've got	
19	three things to reconcile, the USPAP standards, the	
20	kind of fiduciary light, objectivity is okay, if you're	
21	an appraiser type fiduciary and the standard 404 and	
22	406.	

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1	So I think it would be a step in the right	
2	direction but I'm not sure it would solve the concerns.	
3	MS. EVANS: And what is your understanding of	
4	the ability of a participant in a plan to be able to	
5	bring an action against an appraiser? Some previous	
6	witnesses said well, trustees can always bring an	
7	action in state court, there's already enforcement	
8	actions again appraisers. What's your understanding of	
9	a participant to be able to bring an action if they	
10	believe that an appraisal is inadequate or do you	
11	believe that participant should be able to bring	
12	actions in court if they believe that inadequate	
13	appraisals led to losses to plans?	
14	MS. ELLER: Well, I think the structure that	
15	ERISA has set up is that participants have the ability	
16	to bring an action against a fiduciary who's breached	
17	their duties. And the person who's responsible for	
18	keeping watch over the participants the	
19	participants' money is the fiduciary who's responsible	
20	for hiring the appraiser or purchasing the asset. So I	
21	think that's the structure that's been set up for	
22	participants.	

1 As to whether participants could bring an 2 action in state court directly against an appraiser for 3 a faulty appraisal, I think there might be some -- some difficulty in that given that the appraiser and the 4 participant don't have any direct relationship, but I 5 think there's an awfully good proxy for participants 6 who are concerned about a fiduciary having relied on a 7 8 poor appraisal. 9 MS. EVANS: So you think it will be appropriate for a participant to be able to bring an 10 action against appraiser in state court? 11 12 MS. ELLER: Well, I guess I don't know why 13 they'd need to. They've got a fiduciary in front of 14 them. MS. EVANS: Mr. Berlau, do you have any -- I 15 guess -- you kept saying that the reg constricts 16 17 choices for investors in the IRA market. Do vou --18 what's the basis of that statement? 19 MR. BERLAU: I think the basis is just if an IRA provider were a fiduciary and had to do the -- with 20 21 the definition of the highest standard of what is the -- I know it's slightly different from the SEC 22

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1	definition of single best interest there might be some
2	different types of products, things like that that may
3	not meet that standard that where the individual
4	would still want they might not be able to provide.
5	MR. PIACENTINI: Okay. I would like to thank
6	Mr. Berlau for helping highlight some of the areas
7	where we can strengthen the impact analysis that we've
8	undertaken so far. I do think that you've pointed some
9	places where we really would benefit the public by
10	further explaining some of our thinking and maybe
11	digging deeper in some places, so thank you for that.
12	I do want to get on the record by way of
13	observation that, you know, certainly it is our
14	intention to satisfy the requirements of the applicable
15	Executive Orders and other applicable requirements when
16	we do our analyses and I think we crossed that
17	threshold this time but that doesn't mean that there's
18	not always room for improvement. So I do thank you for
19	that.
20	You know, I think certainly for those who
21	have looked at the economic analysis, we do confess to
22	some uncertainty there, both with respect to cost and

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1	benefits of this proposed rule and, in fact, that's	
2	something we're supposed to do under the applicable	
3	requirements is point out where some of the	
4	uncertainties are. So to the extent that you or any of	
5	the others who we've heard from today can help us	
6	resolve some of those uncertainties, that's always,	
7	always helpful.	
8	So I guess I'll just I'll just highlight	
9	one dimension of that invitation, if you will, where I	
10	would like to encourage everybody who can to help us	
11	out. Certainly, you know, the question of that's	
12	being investigated now in behavioral economics and	
13	other strands of literature about how you deal with	
14	business relationships where one party has more	
15	expertise or more information than the other party.	
16	It's an area where our research is still evolving.	
17	There's some disagreement, I think, about how	
18	much disclosure by itself can protect a consumer when	
19	they're dealing with an expert. In fact, there's some	
20	research that I won't go into the details right	
21	here, but there's some research that suggests that	
22	disclosure science can be counter-productive. So	

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there's a lot to consider. 1 2 So that's what we're struggling with. Ι 3 think that we have drawn some reasonable conclusions based on the information available to us. But to the 4 extent we can have better information and draw firmer 5 conclusions, I'll be very happy. 6 So I'm sorry, that probably seemed more like 7 8 an observation than a question, but I do invite you if 9 there's anything that you'd like to share at this point to help us with that, that would be great. 10 11 MR. BERLAU: Well, thank you. And thank you and we will be happy to provide you some more 12 13 information and some more suggestions after the hearing if you'd like to hear from some more of us. 14 I would just say that a lot of this involves 15 -- involves disclosure, not just to the plan 16 participants but to the administrators, the sponsors of 17 18 what a broker/dealer or an attorney can -- accountant can provide there. And they're already the experts and 19 20 they have the fiduciary duty on behalf of the worker. 21 So maybe having something where the same 22 investor education exemption applies to the worker

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1	where it also applies on the level of the service	
2	providers to the plan administrator where if it's	
3	simply general education that could for the	
4	administrator as well as the worker and that in turn it	
5	gets passed on. That could that could help solve	
6	this problem and benefit the workers as well.	
7	MR. PIACENTINI: Thank you.	
8	MR. BERLAU: I think Great West Insurance	
9	Company suggested something along those lines in its	
10	comments.	
11	MR. PIACENTINI: Thank you.	
12	MR. WONG: I just have one follow-up question	
13	for Ms. Eller. It's sort of a follow-up to your	
14	earlier question about state law causes of action	
15	against an appraiser.	
16	My question is in the context of say the plan	
17	fiduciary who got the appraisal report and relied on	
18	it. What's the nature of the state law cause of	
19	action? For example, is it state some professional	
20	malpractice suit? Is it some contractual claim? And	
21	if so, would the appraiser be able to utilize something	
22	like a hold harmless clause to effectively have the	

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fiduciary waive any potential liability or cause of 1 2 action? 3 MS. ELLER: I think I got all that. Yes, I think there are contractual claims and 4 the equivalent of appraisal malpractice claims. There's 5 also the economic reality which is appraisers who don't 6 7 do a good job, don't get hired again, which is, I 8 think, a very much a factor that we should pay attention to. 9 10 And then the second part of your question 11 specific to the hold harmless clause, I mean, I think the Department's guidance to fiduciaries on 12 13 indemnification and disclaimers of liability when they're hiring non-fiduciary service providers would 14 15 hold true here. I think what that guidance says is there's nothing per se imprudent about hiring a non-16 17 fiduciary service provider and limiting their 18 liability; however, the standards under which they 19 should provide services that the disclaimer standards 20 shouldn't include things like gross negligence, fraud 21 and willful misconduct. 22 And I would say that would be a good guidance

287 here and is applicable. 1 2 MR. WONG: Okay. Thank you. 3 MR. DAVIS: Thank you. We'll call the last panel. Panel 13. Lucky 4 13 in this case. 5 The last panel includes Marta Bascom, with 6 the National Retiree Legislative Network. And Charles 7 Yocum and Justin Tomevi. 8 Panel 13, we appreciate your stamina. 9 And welcome to the Panel. So I think we'll start with Ms. 10 11 Bascom. 12 MS. BASCOM: Thank you. Thank you all very 13 much. This is a very important issue for the 14 retirees who are members of the National Retiree 15 Legislative Network. For those of you who aren't 16 17 familiar with the NRLN, it is a non-partisan grassroots 18 coalition representing over two million members, 19 retiree members from 30 retiree associations as well as 20 individual members. 21 Our members have retired from 125 U.S. 22 companies and public entities. They have

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1	grave concerns about present and future retirees'	
2	financial security with particular trepidation about	
3	the state of their pension plans now and in the future.	
4	The NRLN strongly supports EBSA's efforts to	
5	update the scope of ERISA's fiduciary duty protections	
6	and specifically the proposed rule on the definition of	
7	the term fiduciary.	
8	The changing marketplace has made several	
9	aspects of the current regulatory structure obsolete	
10	and ineffective. EBSA's proposed changes are necessary	
11	to provide needed protection for pension plan	
12	participants.	
13	The NRLN applauds these efforts and thanks	
14	the Assistant Secretary and the entire staff for moving	
15	forward on this issue. But the NRLN also remains	
16	hopeful that this proposed rulemaking process will take	
17	into consideration the increasing role of foreign	
18	fiduciaries in this global marketplace.	
19	The NRLN believes that the definition of the	
20	term fiduciary as proposed must be expanded in this	
21	proceeding or one in the near future to address	
22	situations where fiduciary duty is breached by a	

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1	foreign fiduciary and results in depleted plan assets.
2	Specifically, the NRLN recommends that the proposed
3	rule include a requirement that at a minimum, all named
4	fiduciaries under ERISA be subject to the jurisdiction
5	of U.S. District Courts with respect to the enforcement
6	of judgments for potential breaches of fiduciary duty.
7	In addition, named fiduciaries should be held
8	jointly liable for the fiduciary breaches of other
9	fiduciaries who they designate under section 405(c)(1)
10	and who they know or reasonably should have known are
11	not subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts for the
12	purpose of enforcing judgments under ERISA. Increasing
13	globalization dictates that this should be so. The
14	environment has changed dramatically since the rules
15	defining fiduciaries were originally established. In
16	the 1970s, the marketplace in the U.S. was still
17	largely comprised of U.S. based companies with assets
18	and fiduciaries in the U.S., all within the
19	jurisdiction of our courts.
20	The expansive globalization of the
21	marketplace was not envisioned then. Now,
22	globalization through mergers and acquisitions has

290 changed the makeup of fiduciaries charged with the care 1 2 taking of the pension plan assets of millions of 3 retirees in this country. We are increasingly seeing more and more 4 foreign companies merging with or acquiring U.S. 5 companies with pension plans and more will be 6 7 coming. 8 As part of a common business strategy, for 9 example, foreign entities often strategize to combine pension plans into similar businesses they acquire in 10 the U.S. in order to leverage the management of 11 12 combined assets. These actions magnify the potential 13 impact of an arm's length foreign fiduciary and thus the need to make named fiduciaries subject to U.S. 14 15 legal jurisdiction. Within the NRLN's membership, retirees have 16 seen this with the acquisition of Lucent Technologies 17 18 by France based Alcatel. In addition, there are numerous media accounts of foreign entities looking to 19 20 acquire U.S. companies in the technology sector and the 21 automotive industry just to name two. Those are just 22 examples from among the former employers of NRLN

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1	members. Examples of other U.S. companies that have	
2	been acquired over the last three decades are too	
3	numerous to name here.	
4	The fact is that the regulatory structure	
5	currently in place does not address the realities of	
6	the global marketplace nor the vulnerability of U.S.	
7	plan participants should there be a breach in	
8	the foreign fiduciaries duty. Unless our government	
9	examines the current regulatory structure with a	
10	proactive strategy, U.S. plan participants remain	
11	dangerously vulnerable due to the lack of legal	
12	recourse.	
13	Under these circumstances, it is an	
14	incomplete exercise to determine that an individual or	
15	a firm is an ERISA fiduciary and liable for breach of	
16	fiduciary duties if that party is not required to be	
17	subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. Liability	
18	for breach of fiduciary duty is a clear objective of	
19	ERISA. That objective is circumvented if a fiduciary	
20	is not subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.	
21	In addition, without enforceability in U.S.	
22	courts a foreign buyer of a U.S. entity with	

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1	pension obligations can circumvent ERISA's protections	
2	by simply locating beyond the reach of U.S. courts,	
3	thus insulating a bad actor from legal action. Without	
4	this additional protection foreign fiduciaries are able	
5	to participate in management decision to move fungible	
6	assets offshore, out of the reach of U.S. bankruptcy	
7	courts, thus making such assets unavailable to be	
8	liquidated and applied to highly under-funded U.S.	
9	defined pension plans.	
10	Including this requirement is not a far reach	
11	when considering the rationale Congress devised for	
12	establishing the regulatory framework for ERISA at its	
13	inception. The prospect of holding named foreign	
14	fiduciaries liable for missing assets due to a breach	
15	of fiduciary duty is consistent with the congressional	
16	intent of maintaining the indicia of plan asset	
17	ownership under the jurisdiction of Federal District	
18	Courts.	
19	As you know, section 404(b) of ERISA	
20	prohibits a fiduciary from maintaining plan assets	
21	beyond the reach of U.S. District Courts. While	
22	Congress in 1974 could not foresee a situation where	

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1	named fiduciaries could be foreign nationals beyond the	
2	reach of our courts it is highly likely that those same	
3	lawmakers would see the consistency in requiring all	
4	named fiduciaries to be subject to Federal Court	
5	jurisdiction.	
6	The goal of the two requirements would be the	
7	same, to have the law allow for both obtaining and	
8	enforcing judgments in all cases where a named	
9	fiduciary is found to be in breach of duty in order to	
10	protect plan participants.	
11	The U.S. government, through the Department	
12	of Labor and the PBGC needs to have the ability to rely	
13	on the jurisdiction of U.S. Courts to enforce judgments	
14	against breaching fiduciaries acting on behalf of a	
15	foreign entity. Specifically, they need the ability to	
16	both obtain and enforce judgment in an action for	
17	fiduciary breach against any fiduciary not just those	
18	that choose to maintain sufficient assets within the	
19	jurisdiction of U.S. Courts.	
20	Recent upward trends in foreign acquisitions	
21	and in spin-offs of divisions of U.S. based firms to	
22	foreign based investors will become more common and	

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1	plans arising after these transactions resulting in	
2	foreign fiduciaries will increase as well. That will	
3	pose a significant challenge to both the Department of	
4	Labor as well as the PBGC if they are unable to hold at	
5	least all named fiduciaries accountable in U.S. Courts.	
6	Perhaps most importantly for retirees, plan	
7	participants rely on the ability of U.S. courts and	
8	regulators to enforce judgments and to deter bad	
9	actors. This is an essential protection for plan	
10	participants. In fact, the Department of Labor website	
11	advises plan participants that they may bring a civil	
12	action in court to among other actions, attain	
13	appropriate relief from a breach of fiduciary duty.	
14	In general, this private right of action has	
15	greatly benefited plan participants in both providing	
16	access to U.S. Courts as well as in deterring potential	
17	bad actors. This private right of action should be	
18	available in cases of breaches of fiduciary duty	
19	against all named fiduciaries regardless of	
20	nationality.	
21	The global marketplace has created a new	
22	paradigm which calls for the U.S. government to	

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1	continue to provide the same standard of recourse and	
2	deterrence with a progressive framework to protect plan	
3	participants and indeed millions of retirees from	
4	losses that can have a devastating impact on their	
5	already fragile financial security.	
6	I thank you all very much for this	
7	opportunity and look forward to working with you and	
8	answer any questions you may have.	
9	MR. DAVIS: Thank you, Ms. Bascom.	
10	Mr. Yocum, Mr. Tomevi, is that the way to	
11	pronounce it?	
12	MR. TOMEVI: Right.	
13	MR. DAVIS: Is that correct?	
14	MR. TOMEVI: Yes.	
15	MR. DAVIS: Okay. Thanks.	
16	MR. YOCUM: Thank you for allowing us the	
17	opportunity to speak today. My name is Charles Yocum	
18	and I am here today with my classmate, Justin Tomevi.	
19	Both Justin and I are students at the Earle Mack School	
20	of Law at Drexel University.	
21	We share an interest in the issues related to	
22	employee benefits and are working on a research project	

on the meaning of fiduciary under ERISA. 1 2 Prior to law school, I spent eight years 3 working in the retirement services industry, seven of which with one of the nation's leading retirement 4 service providers, although we are testifying here on 5 our own behalf. 6 We'd like to use our allotted time to address 7 8 an issue raised by the Department in the Preamble of 9 the proposed regulations, that is, whether and to what extent the final regulation should define the provision 10 of investment advice to encompass recommendations 11 related to taking a plan distribution. 12 13 We believe the final regulation should treat 14 such recommendations as investment advice. Doing so 15 will further the Department's stated desire to protect participants from conflicts of interest and self-16 17 dealing. Furthermore, it may be important for the 18 Department to use its enforcement powers in this area because there may be limits to the effectiveness of 19 20 remedies that a participant can obtain a private civil 21 action under ERISA. 22 Recommending to a participant that he or she

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1	take a distribution from a plan could harm the	
2	participant's interest in a variety of ways. Most	
3	employer sponsored retirement plans provide payment	
4	options that would not be available to the participant	
5	outside of the plan. While it is true that the	
6	retirement community has drastically changed over the	
7	past 35 years the joint and survivor annuity remains	
8	the default payment option for all defined benefit and	
9	defined contribution money purchase plans.	
10	In addition, as of 2007, an additional 21	
11	percent of 401(k) plans also offer an annuity option to	
12	participants.	
13	Advising participants to forego an investment	
14	that would ensure them against longevity risk is a type	
15	of investment advice and should be treated as such.	
16	Another relevant consideration for some	
17	participants is that under Code section 72(t), a	
18	participant who has attained the age of 55 and has	
19	separated from service can avoid the 10 percent early	
20	withdrawal penalty, an option that would be unavailable	
21	if the same distribution was made from the IRA.	
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1	Another important change in the industry is	
2	that as the baby boom generation begins to retire,	
3	financial service companies are facing the prospect	
4	that more money will be paid out, employer plans need	
5	to be replaced by the inflow of new contributions from	
6	younger workers. For an industry that seeks to	
7	maximize assets under management, this shift has	
8	presented some service providers and some financial	
9	planners to encourage terminating participants to	
10	invest their accounts in proprietary assets.	
11	The Department has previously stated that	
12	when a non-fiduciary advises a plan participant to	
13	request an otherwise permissible plan distribution,	
14	such a recommendation does not constitute investment	
15	advice under the existing regulations. We think it	
16	appropriate that the Department revisit this position	
17	in light of the proposed regulation.	
18	Some may argue that advising a participant to	
19	roll over her retirement account balance to a like	
20	investment simply is not investment advice. Even	
21	assuming that the participant would not be forfeiting	
22	the annuity option or the plan by doing so, we would	

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1	suggest that in many cases, such recommendation should	
2	still be considered investment advice. In many cases	
3	the assets of an employer sponsored retirement plan	
4	might be invested in low fee institutional shares as	
5	opposed to relatively higher fee retail shares often	
6	found in an individual retirement account.	
7	In addition, the administrative costs related	
8	to assets left in the plan will often at least	
9	partially be subsidized by the employer. Others may	
10	argue that the that by providing distribution	
11	advice, serious providers can alleviate the problem of	
12	leakage by retaining retirement savings and a deferred	
13	tax deferred retirement account. Leakage is most	
14	pronounced when a participant's employment status	
15	changes and by intervening early, service providers are	
16	in a position to help the participant maintain their	
17	retirement savings in some kind of tax advantaged	
18	investment vehicle.	
19	While efforts to prevent pre-retirement cash	
20	distributions are laudatory, there is no reason why	
21	this cannot be accomplished through a program of	
22	rigorous investment education consistent with what the	

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1	Department outlined in Interpretive Bulletin 96-1.	
2	Moreover, we think that the Department could	
3	clarify through guidance or in the Preamble to the	
4	final regulations that advising an individual	
5	participant to consider retaining assets in a tax	
6	deferred solution when the participant plans to take a	
7	lump sum distribution without attempting to sell the	
8	participant on particular products is itself is in	
9	itself investment education rather than investment	
10	advice.	
11	We're not advocating that serious providers	
12	be prohibited from recommending that participant	
13	request an available distribution from his retirement	
14	plan or how those proceeds should be reinvested.	
15	However, we do believe that the final regulation should	
16	deem anyone providing such advice to be an ERISA	
17	fiduciary for purposes of the transaction. By doing	
18	so, the Department can encourage serious providers to	
19	provide distribution advice as prudent and in the	
20	interest of the participant.	
21	MR. TOMEVI: Hello, my name is Justin Tomevi.	
22	As Charles has explained, we urge the Department to	

regulate distribution advice as investment advice 1 2 because of the profound impact it has on retirement 3 security. A reclassification should be considered in 4 the context of judicial decisions that may make it 5 difficult for participants to obtain meaningful relief, 6 to redress harms caused by conflicted distribution 7 advice. 8 There are two obstacles to such relief. 9 First, once investment assets are moved from a plan to 10 an individual retirement account, they may no longer be 11 plan assets and thus, subsequent losses may not be 12 13 addressable under section 502(a)(2) of ERISA. 14 Indeed, this appears to have been the primary 15 basis for the Department's position in the Advisery Opinion 2005-23A in which it wrote that the proceeds of 16 17 a distribution would be advice with respect to funds 18 that are no longer assets of the plan. Second, it may also be difficult for a 19 participant to obtain meaningful equitable relief under 20 21 section 502(a)(3) to redress harms such as investment 22 loss or the higher cost of annuitization outside of a

1 plan.

2 We suggest that the Department in thinking through these remedial problems consider the thoughtful 3 District Court Opinion in Young v. Principal which is 4 cited at 54 -- 547 F.Supp. 2d, 965, a 2008 Iowa case. 5 In Young, retiring participants received a letter from 6 the Principal Financial Group instructing them to take 7 8 immediate action because changes in their employment status affected their retirement account. 9 The participants contacted the 800 number on the letter, 10 11 which directed them to sales counselors who were required to solicit the high fee plan which resulted in 12 13 plaintiffs earning less than if they maintained their original plans. 14 The District Court held that only appropriate 15 equitable relief was available to the participants. 16 So 17 participants could not receive compensation for their 18 lost opportunity or profits they would have achieved if 19 the funds remained with the original plan. However, the court took an important step by 20 holding that if the sales counselors were fiduciaries 21 22 and they breached their duty the participants could

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1	pursue disgorgement of Principal's profits and transfer	
2	their accounts back into the original plan.	
3	While this was an important step,	
4	participants may still not be made whole as a	
5	disgorgement remedy will not reach lost opportunity,	
6	just the financial service providers' fees. As a	
7	result distribution advisers still may not have	
8	significant incentives to halt strong and perhaps	
9	misleading sales pitches that target important sources	
10	of retirement income for participants and their	
11	spouses.	
12	Moreover, the remedy presumably would be	
13	available only in cases where a participant's plan is	
14	willing to accept back the participant's distribution,	
15	which can be particularly problematic in defined	
16	benefit plans. But the District Court's holding that	
17	disgorgement in a return of assets to the plan is a	
18	form of equitable relief may also have implications for	
19	the first question, whether the plan continued to	
20	constructively hold the assets and thus, the assets	
21	remained plan assets even after distribution.	
22	In any event, given the potential obstacles,	

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1	the courts fashion a meaningful relief for	
2	participants, we believe it is important for the	
3	Department to monitor this area and use its own	
4	enforcement powers when appropriate.	
5	I want to conclude by noting, as the Supreme	
6	Court recognized in LaRue and the Department of Labor	
7	recognized in the Preamble to these proposed	
8	regulations that the employee benefit landscape has	
9	changed from the 1974 enactment of ERISA and the rules	
10	should evolve to reflect those changes. The	
11	personalization of defined contribution plans and the	
12	power and risk shift to individual participants	
13	requires better and equally important unbiased advice.	
14	We urge the Department to take steps to	
15	ensure that distribution advice is treated as	
16	investment advice and to consider how the Department	
17	can ensure that participants do not have a right	
18	without a remedy.	
19	Thank you for giving us the opportunity to	
20	speak with you today and we'll be happy to answer any	
21	questions.	
22	MR. DAVIS: Thanks so much. We'll turn to	

the government panel starting with Jeff. 1 2 MR. MONHART: I have no questions. Thank you 3 for your testimony. MR. DAVIS: Okay. I just want to recognize 4 the students here. It's the first panel I've been a 5 part of where we've actually had students testify. 6 I just think it's terrific that you're willing to step 7 8 forward and express a point of view on the record as 9 students. I just think that's absolutely terrific. 10 Now, you said that the fiduciary definition is the topic that you're looking at as part of your 11 overall prac -- I'm just curious, how did you happen to 12 13 select that topic among other things that you could have looked at in this area? 14 15 MR. YOCUM: Well, I think for one it's I mean, it's -- these hearings were -- we're 16 topical. 17 in an employee benefits course together and we started 18 a month ago that this is in the news, it's something at 19 least, I mean, interested both of us. 20 MR. TOMEVI: Yeah, I think Charles -- some of 21 Charles' background working in one of these 22 organizations also kind of allowed him to see the other

side and see both sides in this case. 1 2 MR. DAVIS: Ms. Bascom, you focused primarily 3 on the foreign jurisdictional issues. Were there any other thoughts you had with respect to the Regs, any 4 other issues that we asked about up -- one of the areas 5 we asked comment around was this issue of this rollover 6 7 advice. Any perspective there as well? 8 MS. BASCOM: No, not at this time, but we are very supportive of the proposed rule and just again, 9 feel that it needs to be expanded to make sure that 10 plan participants are fully protected. 11 12 MR. DAVIS: Thanks. 13 MR. STRASFELD: I just have an observation 14 for Ms. Bascom. I'm in charge of the EBSA's Office of Exemptions and the issue you raised, which I think is a 15 great issue, has been relevant to our consideration of 16 17 a lot of exemptions where there are foreign affiliates. 18 And we've attempted in a number of instances, 19 especially we've provided 406(b) relief to make someone 20 responsible in the U.S.. 21 So, I mean, one possibility is we routinely 22 have the foreign entity agree to submit to jurisdiction

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1	of the U.S. Courts to be served here, but in instances	
2	where there's actually fiduciary issues we generally	
3	try to have someone who we could sue here or agrees	
4	that if there's liability, you know, the American	
5	affiliate will pay as a way of I guess the way we're	
6	looking at it the plan should not have to go overseas	
7	to sue. It works out a lot better obviously, you	
8	know, you have ERISA here in Federal Court so we try to	
9	structure an exemption where that happens and I think	
10	we've been successful in a number of cases.	
11	But you're right, it is an important issue.	
12	It's one we will consider in the future.	
13	MS. BASCOM: Thank you. We appreciate that.	
14	MR. STRASFELD: I appreciate you bringing it	
15	up.	
16	And great to see you too.	
17	MR. YOCUM: Thank you.	
18	MS. EVANS: Mr. Yocum and Mr. Tomevi, one of	
19	the witnesses from one of the financial institutions	
20	yesterday testified that they have a number of reps in	
21	these call centers and so a participant might call up	
22	and say, you know, what are my options? And it seems	

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1	like you too would support just generally being able to	
2	say these are your options, these are your tax	
3	consequences if you leave your money in the plan, if	
4	you roll it over. It seems like you all are saying	
5	that that should be investment advice. Is that	
6	correct?	
7	MR. YOCUM: That in I'm just going over	
8	the, you know, tax consequences what the process is,	
9	yeah, I would argue that is investment advice. But I	
10	still don't see why, I mean, again, we're not saying	
11	that they that they shouldn't be giving, you know,	
12	be steering these individuals into a product outside of	
13	their 401(k) plan if that's what they're looking for.	
14	It's just that you do it in a way that's prudent and in	
15	the interest of the participant.	
16	MS. EVANS: Right. So at the point when a	
17	rep at one of these call centers says, well, are you	
18	interested in learning more about how to take advantage	
19	of, sort of	
20	MR. YOCUM: X, Y	
21	MS. EVANS: rollover. At that point, you	
22	would say, well, that's crossing the line from	

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education to investment advice? 1 2 MR. YOCUM: Yes. 3 MS. EVANS: Thank you. MR. PIACENTINI: I have no questions. 4 5 MR. DAVIS: Anything else from the panel? Nothing? Well, thank you Panel 13, our last 6 Okay. 7 panel. And thank you for the audience for your 8 attention through the last two days of testimony. Just a few administrative announcements. 9 One is that we, the government panel, may 10 have additional questions for some of the witnesses, 11 which if we do we would submit for the record, get the 12 13 responses on the record. 14 And speaking of the record, the record will 15 be open an additional 15 days after the hearing so if there's supplemental materials, clarifications to 16 testimony that's been provided, you'll have 15 days to 17 18 do that. We are going to post the transcript of these 19 20 proceedings on our website and it should be up in about 21 two weeks. 22 So with that, we're going to conclude and

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1	thank you so much for your time.	
2	(Hearing concluded at 2:18 p.m.)	
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1	CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC	
2	I, NATALIA KORNILOVA, the officer before whom the	
3	foregoing meeting was taken, do hereby certify that the	
4	witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing pages	
5	was recorded by me and thereafter reduced to	
6	typewriting under my direction; that said hearing is a	
7	true record of the proceedings that I am neither	
8	counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the	
9	parties to the action in which this hearing was taken;	
10	and, further, that I am not a relative or employee of	
11	any counsel or attorney employed by the parties hereto,	
12	nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome	
13	of this action.	
14		
15		
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19	Natalia Kornilova	
20	Notary Public in and for the	
21	District of Columbia	
22	My commission expires: April 14, 2012	

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