

Effective Disclosures in Financial Decisionmaking

Final Report

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1. Introduction

In the financial services market, financial service providers often have better information about the quality, features, fees, risks, and benefits of their products or services than consumers. In a market with this type of asymmetric information, disclosure is an often-used policy tool designed to increase transparency and provide consumers with valuable information to make informed decisions. In this report, we define disclosure as a statement that provides relevant information to consumers for informed decisionmaking. A disclosure often reveals estimated costs and impacts to consumers, commitments of the relevant parties, existence of any conflicts of interest, and the nature of the relationship between parties.

Disclosures are ubiquitous in the financial industry. For example, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 requires investment advisers to disclose potential conflicts of interest to clients. The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) of 1968 requires disclosure of terms and costs of consumer credit to potential borrowers. Even though disclosure is a commonly used regulatory tool, it is an open question whether disclosures are effective in reducing information asymmetry and improving consumer decisions. In theory, once relevant information is disclosed to consumers, they can then make informed decisions. However, in practice, consumers may have limited attention or limited understanding of the disclosure. Furthermore, they may not have the ability to appropriately take the disclosed information into account as they make financial decisions.

In this report, we review the literature on consumer disclosures in the financial industry. The primary focus of the review is on disclosures of conflicts of interest, particularly with regard to financial advice, but we also examine use of disclosure associated with other common financial products or services, including credit cards, mortgages, and mutual funds. In particular, we are interested in the following questions:

1. Can disclosure be effective in
 - a. conveying desired information in a way that the recipient can understand it,
 - b. providing decision support, and
 - c. helping consumers make decisions aligned with their own interests?
2. In what instances is disclosure most effective?

The next chapter discusses use of disclosure on conflicts of interest in the U.S. financial advice market, as well as financial advice markets in other countries. Chapter 3 reviews the research literature on effectiveness of disclosure on conflicts of interest. Chapter 4 reviews the literature on other disclosures in the U.S. financial industry, such as mortgage, credit card, mutual fund, and payday loan disclosures. Chapter 5 reviews the literature on best practices for effective disclosures, and Chapter 6 concludes.

2. Use of Disclosures of Conflicts of Interest in the Financial Industry

Conflicts of interest in the financial industry have been a key policy issue, as evidenced by President Obama's February 2015 call for new regulatory action on the issue of conflicts of interest in retirement advice. Conflicts of interest in financial advising can arise when the adviser has incentives that are not necessarily aligned with the client's best interests. Common conflicts of interest include "dealing with affiliates, the receipt of compensation or other benefits from third parties that may affect the independence of the advice provided, an adviser's financial interest in a transaction (e.g., acting as principal), client referral arrangements and personal and proprietary trading by the investment adviser and its employees" (Klass, 2008).

Conflicts of interest can result in biased advice. For example, a conflicted adviser might be more likely to recommend certain financial products if she receives commissions or fees from selling them, or to encourage active trading if her compensation is positively related to the number of transactions, even if such behavior is not in the best interest of her client. Biased advice can have significant negative impacts on investors. The President's Council of Economic Advisers recently estimated that conflicted advice reduces returns to retirement savings by 1 percentage point, costing Americans an estimated \$17 billion per year based on an estimated \$1.7 trillion of IRA assets (Council of Economic Advisers, 2015).

In the United States, investment advisers and broker-dealers provide financial advice to retail investors. Despite the overlap in services, brokers and investment advisers are subject to different federal regulations¹. Because of the different regulatory regimes for investment advisers and broker-dealers, they are subject to different standards when providing investment advice. Broker-dealers are obligated to make suitable recommendations. That is, a broker-dealer making a recommendation to a retail customer must have grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for that customer with respect to his or her portfolio, financial situation, and needs. Broker-dealers may also have additional suitability requirements, depending on the products that they offer. Unlike broker-dealers, federally registered investment advisers owe a fiduciary obligation to their clients. These obligations require the adviser to act solely with the client's investment goals and interests in mind, free from any direct or indirect conflicts of interest that would tempt the adviser to make recommendations that would also benefit him or her. Furthermore, investment advisers are required to disclose any potential conflicts of interest.

¹ The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 881) regulates brokers and dealers, and they are also subject to oversight from FINRA, an independent self-regulatory organization. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the regulatory body for investment advisers, under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 847).

Disclosure in International Financial Advice Markets

As in the United States, disclosure is a key feature of regulatory regimes in financial advice markets around the globe. As part of its Retail Distribution Review (RDR), which banned financial advisers from receiving commission, the United Kingdom required “restricted” advisers (those who can recommend only certain products, product providers, or both) to disclose the nature of their restriction to clients (Burke and Hung, 2015). Financial advisers are also required to disclose to prospective clients up front how much the advice will cost and the form in which it will be paid.²

Similar to the RDR in the UK, Australia recently implemented legislation to harmonize adviser and advisee incentives by banning commission payments through its Future of Financial Advice (FoFA) reforms. A key provision of FoFA is the requirement that advisers provide clients who have entered into an ongoing fee arrangement with an annual fee disclosure statement which describes (1) “the amount of each ongoing fee paid by the client in the previous year,” (2) “information about the services that the client was entitled to receive in the previous year,” and (3) “information about the services that the client received in the previous year” (Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 2013).

Disclosure often takes on an even more central role in regulatory regimes where commission is still permitted. In Germany, for example, advisers are legally required to disclose to clients any inducements received.³ Advisers are also required to provide clients with a product information sheet for each investment the client is advised to purchase. The product information sheet should contain all the information required for an investor to make an informed comparison across financial instruments, including the nature of the recommended financial instrument, how it works, and its associated costs and risks. To improve readability, the information sheet must be no longer than two or three pages and written in a clear way. Importantly, the information sheet must be provided in a “timely manner” before a contract on a transaction is executed (Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, 2010)

Financial advisers in Singapore have similar disclosure requirements to those in Germany. In particular, financial advisers in Singapore must disclose to a client all compensation that the adviser will receive that is directly related to any product recommendations (or execution of recommended transactions) including any commission, fee, or other benefits. Advisers must also describe key features of any product that is recommended, including the nature of the product, the client segment for whom the product is intended, details on the product provider (including any relationship between the adviser and the provider), and the associated benefits, risk, and costs (Monetary Authority of Singapore, 2002).

² [Financial Conduct Authority \(FCA\), 2015.](#)

³ [BaFin, undated.](#)

While disclosure is an important component of many regulators' strategy to improve transparency in financial advice markets, advisers may not always follow those requirements. Following the introduction of the RDR, the U.K.'s FCA conducted a series of thematic reviews to investigate how firms were adapting to the new regulatory environment. The second of the three planned reviews focused on (1) whether firms describing themselves as independent were operating independently in practice, and (2) how firms were disclosing their service proposition and the associated charges to clients. Of the 88 firms reviewed that claimed to offer independent advice, the FCA identified two not acting independently in practice and had doubts about an additional 28 firms. FCA then reviewed 17 of the 28 firms in more depth and concluded that six were not operating independently; there were concerns that another four firms might not be acting independently, but FCA did not have sufficient evidence to determine this with certainty (FCA, 2014a). In regard to cost disclosure, the FCA found that a high proportion of firms were failing to correctly disclose to clients the cost of advice, the type of service offered, and the nature of any ongoing service. Of the firms surveyed, 73 percent failed to provide the required generic information regarding how they charge for advice and/or did not clearly convey the cost of advice to clients in a timely manner (FCA, 2014b). However, these inadequacies may have been largely due to uncertainty surrounding the recently imposed requirements. The FCA's third thematic review found that firms had made significant improvements in how costs and the scope and nature of services were disclosed, though concerns remained that some firms were failing to clearly disclose, in cash (pounds) terms, the ongoing fees clients would be charged for ongoing service (FCA, 2014c).

Relatedly, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) conducted an audit study in 2011 to examine the quality of financial advice provided by advisers and to investigate whether they were complying with regulation. MAS enlisted 126 mystery shoppers, who made 500 visits to 11 licensed banks and four registered insurance companies to receive financial advice. While advisers typically provided information on the nature and objective of the recommended product (93 percent of visits), the amount of fees and charges was not disclosed in 48 percent of visits, and the frequency of fees and charges was not disclosed in 58 percent of visits (MAS, 2012).

3. Effectiveness of Disclosures of Conflicts of Interest

This chapter reviews the literature on disclosure as a regulatory tool to increase transparency to help investors make informed decisions when facing advisers with conflicts of interest. We first review theoretical models on the impact of disclosure of conflicts of interest. We then review empirical studies examining the impact of disclosure of conflicts of interest on both consumers and advisers.

Theoretical Models on the Impact of Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest

Inderst and Ottaviani have developed a body of theoretical work on conflicts of interest in advising (Inderst and Ottaviani, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c).

They develop a model in which consumers receive advice about product suitability from advisers. A product is suitable for a consumer if it is the optimal choice to satisfy the consumer's specific needs. Advisers want to pair consumers with the appropriate product, either due to professional concerns, reputational cost, and/or fear of prosecution. However, in the model, advisers receive a commission⁴ if consumers purchase a particular product, and this product is not necessarily suitable for all consumers. Quality of the advice to consumers depends on both the potential bias (resulting from commission payment) and the effort level that the adviser expends to acquire information on the customer's specific circumstances and needs to help determine the suitability of the product.

In their basic model, there are two types of consumers, naïve and wary. Naïve consumers are not aware of commissions, or at least not aware of the potential impact of commissions on the quality of advice, while wary consumers are aware of commissions and take the adviser's incentives into account when evaluating advice. The model predicts that if there are only naïve consumers in the market, then consumers will not pay for advice directly but instead will pay for advice indirectly through higher product prices and receive biased advice. In this case, disclosure can turn naïve consumers into wary ones. The authors also compare mandatory disclosure with prohibiting or capping commissions and conclude that prohibiting commissions may have the unintended negative side effect of reducing the adviser's incentive to acquire information, while disclosure can protect naïve consumers and improve their welfare. Intuitively, when an adviser faces complex and specialized products, and effort is required to acquire information on which products suit the consumer's needs best, commission is an incentive to encourage the adviser to expend more effort to identify suitable products for the consumer.

⁴ In the model, advisers also receive a flat fee paid by the consumer as well as a fixed payment from the product provider.

Impact of Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest on Consumers

As described in the previous section, disclosure of conflicts of interest, in theory, can help investors make more informed judgments and decisions. However, there is concern from policymakers about how consumers react to disclosures of conflicts of interest. As articulated in the U.S. Department of Treasury's 2009 call for financial regulatory reform "Consumers, however, may retain faith that the intermediary is working for them and placing their interests above his or her own, even if the conflict of interest is disclosed. Accordingly, in some cases consumers may reasonably but mistakenly rely on advice from conflicted intermediaries." (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2009, p. 68).

The concern raised by the Treasury Department has been supported by empirical evidence. For example, Chater, Huck, and Inderst (2010) find, in an online experiment with 6,000 recent purchasers of retail financial services, that simply disclosing advisers' compensation schemes does not affect consumers' willingness to pay for or follow advice from advisers with a potential conflict of interest. Including a more strongly worded statement that the adviser's incentives might not be aligned with those of the consumer decreased willingness to pay for advice, but the vast majority of consumers still opted to pay for the potentially conflicted advice.

Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (2005) argue that there are several reasons disclosure of conflicts of interest may not be an effective policy tool. Firstly, the behavioral impacts of conflicts of interest on advice are a complex problem that most consumers do not understand, and therefore, it is easy for consumers to underestimate how advice will be affected by conflicts of interest. Secondly, they argue that people have a tendency to "be naturally trusting and credulous toward their own advisers" (p. 5). As an example, they cite research from Gibbons et al. (1998), who survey approximately 200 patients and find that 54 percent of respondents are aware of the existence of pharmaceutical gifts to doctors, but only 24 percent of the patients think that their own doctors accept such gifts. Lastly, Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (2005) argue that even if consumers understand that conflicts of interest may affect the advice that they receive, they typically don't make sufficient adjustments to their own behavior to offset the biased advice that they receive.

In experimental settings, Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (2005 and 2011) find evidence that even though advisees might discount advice disclosed to come from a conflicted source, advisees don't sufficiently discount the biased advice. In two different experiments, an adviser with private information provides advice to an advisee regarding the value of an object (a jar of coins in Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore, 2005, and sale prices of houses in Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore, 2011). The advisee's payoff depends on how accurately she estimates the value, but the adviser's payoff depends on the experimental treatment. In the no-conflict condition, the adviser's incentive is based on the advisee's accuracy. In two conflicted conditions, one in which the conflict is disclosed and one in which it is not, the adviser's incentive is based on the extent to which the advisee overestimates the value of the object (either the jar of money or the home

sale price). Both studies find that the difference between the advice given and the estimates made by the advisee was significantly greater when there was a disclosed conflict of interest than when there was an undisclosed conflict of interest or when interests are aligned, which suggests advisees do discount conflicted advice when the conflict is disclosed. In Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (2011), for example, when the conflict of interest is not disclosed, advisees discount the advice on the property value by \$11,000, or less than 5 percent of the adviser's recommendation, possibly because the advisees suspect a conflict of interest after receiving feedback on the actual values in the previous round. When the conflict of interest is disclosed, advisees discount their estimates, on average, by about \$25,000, or about 10 percent of the adviser's recommendation. However, both papers also find that advisees don't sufficiently discount the conflicted advice. For example, in Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (2011), advisers in the disclosed conflict condition inflate their advice by over \$51,000, on average. Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (2011) suggest two major reasons for the insufficient discounting. First, the conflicted advice can serve as an anchor that biases the decision toward the recommendation. Second, people are unlikely to know how to incorporate the disclosed information about the conflict of interest in their decision process and adjust their decisions appropriately. To do so, people need to possess "a wide range of subsidiary judgments, including the ethicality of the adviser, whether the adviser is a 'restrainer' or an 'exaggerator,' the cost of getting a second opinion, one's knowledge of the subject, and one's relationship with the adviser" (Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore, 2011). The existence of such a comprehensive information asymmetry between the adviser and advisee is unlikely to be sufficiently addressed by the disclosure alone.

Other experimental evidence suggests that disclosure of conflicts of interest may cause the unintended consequence of adherence to biased advice. For example, disclosure can lead to an increase in trust when interpreted as a sign of honesty (Pearson et al., 2006) or to a decrease in perceived risk when regarded as an indication of governmental protection that "they are being looked after, causing them to become less vigilant" (Green and Armstrong, 2012).

Sah, Loewenstein, and Cain (2013) describe a phenomenon that they refer to as "burden of disclosure," in which advisees feel increased pressure to adhere to advice once a conflict of interest is disclosed, even though they may distrust the advice. In an experimental setting, they find that 53 percent of advisees who receive bad advice from an adviser with an undisclosed conflict of interest follow the advice that they were given, but 81 percent follow the bad recommendation when the conflict of interest is disclosed. When advisers gave bad advice, advisees who received disclosure were significantly less happy with their choice and were more likely to report that the adviser put his own interests first. At the same time, advisees who received disclosure were significantly more likely to report that they felt pressure to help their adviser and that they were uncomfortable rejecting the advice. Loewenstein, Sah, and Cain (2011) argue that the burden of disclosure is driven by two mechanisms: insinuation anxiety, in which advisees don't want to reject advice for fear that the adviser will think that the advisee finds her to be corrupt; and the panhandler effect, in which advisees feel pressure to make a decision that

financially benefits the adviser once the adviser's compensation structure becomes common knowledge.

Unlike the studies above, one study found that disclosing advisers' incentives caused investors to be less likely to invest when they knew it would result in higher commissions for advisers. Chater, Huck, and Inderst (2010) conducted a laboratory experiment in which 484 participants from three European Union countries (Czech Republic, Germany, United Kingdom) play an investment game with advice either from a conflicted adviser or from a nonconflicted adviser. They find a significant impact of disclosing adviser incentives. In one task, advisees make a decision on how much they should invest in a risky investment. Advisees invest about 900 euros less when they have a conflicted adviser, paid based on their investment amount, than when their adviser is paid a flat fee. In another task, advisees need to allocate their funds to two investments, one superior to the other. When it is disclosed that their advisers have a conflict of interest, advisees trust the recommendations less, even when the recommendation is the optimal investment. Advisees invest almost 1,600 euros less in the optimal investment when a conflicted adviser recommends it than when a nonconflicted adviser recommends it.

Impact of Disclosure of Conflicts of Interests on Advisers

Up until now, we have been reviewing evidence on the impact of disclosure of conflicts of interest on consumer behavior. However, even if consumer behavior is unaffected by disclosure, consumer outcomes may be influenced if disclosure affects adviser behavior. Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (2011) propose three different behavioral responses by advisers to disclosure. An adviser who expects that his advice might be discounted may inflate or exaggerate his advice, a behavior that Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore refer to as *strategic exaggeration*. Alternatively, an adviser may engage in *strategic restraint*: If he anticipates that his biased advice will be rejected once his conflicts of interest are disclosed, he may rein in or steer away from biased advice. Lastly, another possible behavioral response is *moral licensing*, in which disclosure allows an adviser to adjust his moral or professional standards. Moral licensing might occur, for example, if an adviser feels that he can rationalize providing biased advice because his conflicts of interest have been fully disclosed.

Both strategic exaggeration and moral licensing are supported by evidence from experimental studies. In the Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (2005 and 2011) experiments described above, the authors find evidence that in the presence of disclosure, advisers with conflicted incentives provide more biased advice than in the absence of disclosure. Note that this inflated advice, together with insufficient discounting by advisees as described in the previous section, results in advisees being worse off (earning lower payoffs) when conflicts of interest are disclosed than when they are not disclosed. In another experiment in Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (2011), subjects rated the ethicality of offering biased advice as "somewhat unethical"

when the advisee is unaware of the conflict of interest, but rated biased advice as “somewhat ethical” when the conflict is disclosed.

While the discussion above generally indicates that disclosure increases, rather than reduces, bias in advice with unavoidable conflicts of interest (such as in the case of financial advisers, since the compensation structure cannot be easily altered by the adviser to avoid conflicts), research has shown that disclosure can be beneficial when the conflict is avoidable. In a laboratory experiment, Sah and Loewenstein (2014) find that because people are averse to being viewed as biased, disclosure (either mandatory or voluntary) can discourage advisers from accepting conflicts of interest when avoidable, thereby improving the quality of provided advice. An example of avoidable conflict of interest is doctors who can decide whether to accept gifts from pharmaceutical companies. A report by the Department of Health of the District of Columbia suggests that disclosing the speaking fees received by physicians may discourage the accumulation of those fees in the future. It is possible that “physicians voluntarily decrease financial relationships with companies after public disclosure” or “companies decrease financial relationships with doctors after public disclosure.” (George Washington University, 2012). The effectiveness of disclosure can also be improved if combined with other interventions. For example, Church and Kuang (2009) found that in an experimental setting where the investor had the ability (at a cost) to penalize bad advice in conjunction with disclosure, advisers offered less biased advice, and investor payoffs increased.

Discussion

In principle, disclosure can increase investor awareness of conflicts of interest, potentially mitigating their impacts. However, our review of existing studies indicates that disclosure of conflicts of interest may not improve outcomes for all consumers. When conflicts of interest are disclosed, many consumers do not know how to respond appropriately due to various factors, such as lack of a way to accurately estimate the adviser’s bias in a recommendation, or the cost of searching for a second opinion. Many consumers fail to adjust their behavior sufficiently, if at all, when conflicts are disclosed. Disclosure can also cause unintended consequences: Consumers may feel a “burden of disclosure” to follow the advice, and advisers may respond to the disclosure by providing even more biased advice, resulting in decreased welfare for consumers.

We would like to include a word of caution on the results reported here. The majority of existing research reviewed is based on either theoretical modeling or controlled experiment results. The external validity of the conclusions drawn from this research is an open question. For example, the monetary incentive, the cognitive load, and the decision environment are very different when people are estimating the value of a jar of coins as opposed to when they are making a financial decision regarding retirement.

In addition, many important questions remain unanswered. What percentage of investors actually read disclosures of conflicts of interest? To what degree do investors understand disclosures and the impact of conflicts of interest on adviser behavior? Are there systematic individual differences? In other words, can we characterize consumers least likely to understand disclosures of conflicts of interest? Additional research, with more diversified data sources and methods (such as in-depth interviews, focus groups, case studies, and field experiments), is needed to more fully evaluate the effectiveness of disclosure as a policy intervention to protect customers. However, there is considerable evidence suggesting that disclosure of conflicts of interest in isolation may not improve welfare for all consumers.

4. Effectiveness of Other Disclosures in the Financial Services Industry

In this section, we review literature on other disclosures used in the financial services industry, especially disclosures on fees, and how those disclosures impact consumer behavior and outcomes. In particular, we focus on disclosures associated with mortgages, credit cards, and mutual funds.

Consumer Mortgage Disclosures

Consumers who are shopping for mortgages are faced with a complex decision problem that many of them, particularly first-time buyers, are unfamiliar with. To help individuals make better choices, terms and costs of credit must be disclosed to consumers to provide them with timely information during the loan application process.⁵

There are three primary disclosure documents for mortgage loans in the United States. The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) of 1968 requires that consumers be provided with a Truth-in-Lending disclosure. An initial TILA disclosure is required within three business days of loan application, and a final TILA disclosure is required at loan closing. The TILA statement discloses key terms and costs of the loan, including annual percentage rate (APR), finance charge, the total amount financed, and the total of payments. It also includes information on payment schedule, late payment fees, and prepayment penalties.

The second disclosure document is the Good Faith Estimate (GFE) required under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA). The GFE is “the lender’s best estimate in ‘good faith’ of closing costs—that is, the one-time fees for services related to the completion of mortgage transaction” (Collins, 2011). The estimate must include an itemized list of fees and costs such as legal fees, title search fees, and document fees, and must be provided within three business days of the borrower’s application.

The third disclosure document is the HUD-1 (or HUD-1a in refinancing) Settlement Statement, which is a companion to the GFE: GFE provides the estimated closing costs, and HUD-1 Statement lists the actual final closing costs. A preliminary copy of a HUD-1 Settlement Statement is required if the borrower requests it 24 hours before closing.

Lacko and Pappalardo (2007, 2010) find that mortgage borrowers display a lack of understanding of key terms in the TILA statement and GFE form, in part because of the design

⁵ While conflicts of interest may arise in the mortgage industry, we discuss consumer mortgages in this section rather than the previous sections because the research literature on disclosure in the mortgage industry focuses on disclosure of fees and costs rather than disclosure of conflicts of interest.

of those disclosures. The authors conduct in-person interviews with 36 mortgage borrowers who obtained a loan in the past four months. They also conduct an experiment with over 800 mortgage borrowers who obtained a loan in the past two and a half years. The experiment was designed to compare consumer understanding of the current TILA and GFE disclosures with prototype disclosures of the authors' design. They find that the TILA statement and GFE do not properly convey important information about loan terms and costs to consumers. From the interviews, they find that many respondents are confused by the disclosures and do not understand key terms such as the APR, amount financed, and discount fees. In fact, many respondents also do not understand the costs and terms of their own recently obtained mortgages. Experiment results confirmed the interview findings. For example, about a fifth of experiment subjects cannot identify the loan APR, the amount of cash due at closing, or the monthly payment. About one-third cannot identify the interest rate or which of two loans is less expensive. Two-thirds are unaware of the prepayment penalty. Almost nine-tenths cannot identify the total amount of up-front charges. The authors argue that consumers do have the capability to understand the loan terms and costs, but the current forms are poorly designed. They find that consumers who received the prototype disclosures display significantly greater understanding of the key terms and costs than those who received the current disclosures.

In a survey of 102 mortgage brokers, Sovern (2010, 2014) finds that the lack of impact of disclosures on borrower behavior might be due to limited attention to the disclosures. Two-thirds of the brokers report that less than 30 percent of their borrowers spend more than a minute reviewing disclosures. The brokers unanimously report that borrowers never withdraw from a loan after reading the final disclosures at the closing, and never use the disclosures for comparison shopping.

In July 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted and transferred rulemaking authority under both TILA and RESPA to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). Under the mandate from the Dodd-Frank Act, CFPB issued proposed integrated disclosure forms and rules for public comment in July of 2012. The new disclosure forms were shown to perform significantly better than the current disclosure forms in terms of improving consumer understanding, allowing better comparison shopping, and avoiding costly surprises at the closing table, according to CFPB studies conducted with 858 consumers in 20 locations ("Integrated Mortgage Disclosures Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z)," 2013; CFPB, 2013a). On December 31, 2013, the 2013 TILA-RESPA Final Rule was published and is expected to take effect on October 3, 2015. The new Loan Estimate form combines the current early TILA statement and GFE and is required to be provided within three days of application, and the new Closing Disclosure form combines the current HUD-1 and final TILA statement and is required to be provided three days before closing.

Credit Card Disclosures

Credit card usage is ubiquitous in the United States. In 2009, there were 156 million credit cardholders with a total purchase volume of \$1.94 trillion (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). The Federal Reserve's Survey of Consumer Payment Choice (Foster et al., 2011) reports that 72 percent of U.S. consumers are credit card holders.

Credit card disclosure is regulated under the Truth in Lending Act of 1968 and the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003 (FACT), among others. The laws regulate the contents, format, and timing of the credit card disclosures to ensure that consumers can understand the credit terms and shop for credit more readily and knowledgeably (CFPB, 2013b).

Durkin (2006) conducted surveys to explore consumers' knowledge about their credit card accounts, the perception and usage of credit card disclosures, and consumers' preferences regarding information to be conveyed by credit card disclosure. Almost 500 respondents were asked about disclosures included in credit card periodic statements. The majority of the consumers (62 percent) report that they check the APRs regularly (at least four times a year), but 66 percent of consumers read the disclosures on the back of the statements fewer than four or five times a year. Consumers who report a credit card balance of more than \$4,500 are more likely to check both the APRs and the back material frequently than those who carry a smaller balance or no balance at all. Approximately 40 percent of the respondents report that either the APR or the finance charge has affected their card use decisions. The survey also finds that for those who have opened a new account in the past year, about three-quarters think that the information provided in the account-opening disclosures is useful. Among those who do not think the disclosures useful, most report that there is too much information or it is too confusing or legalistic.

In 2009, the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act was launched to bring tighter regulation to all consumer credit cards with the purpose of increasing transparency and fairness in credit card contracts. One of the requirements of the CARD Act is that credit card statements need to show how long it will take cardholders to pay off their balances and how much consumers will pay in total if they pay the minimum payment only, in comparison to the total cost if they pay off the entire balance in 36 months. In its CARD Act Review report (CFPB, 2013c), CFPB states that a small minority of card issuers reports a reduction in the percentage of customers making only the minimum payment. This reported change is confirmed by Agarwal et al. (2014), in which the authors use a difference-in-difference approach to estimate changes in repayment behavior between January 2008 and December 2012 for consumer credit cards, which are subject to the CARD Act, and small business credit cards, which are not subject to the regulations. The results from the panel data of 160 million credit card accounts show that the new disclosure requirements have had a small but significant effect on borrowers' repayment behavior. The number of customers who pay at a rate to repay the balance within 36 months increased from 5.3 percent to 5.7 percent. The authors estimate that the

upper bound impact from the new disclosure requirements is \$57 million in annualized interest saving.

Jones, Loibl, and Tennyson (2012) estimate the impact of disclosure changes mandated by the CARD Act on consumers' repayment decisions based on monthly survey data from 300–500 households per month between June 2006 and December 2011. The authors find that the likelihood of a household paying off its most recent credit card bill in full significantly increased (with a magnitude between 3.8 percent and 4.8 percent) after the new disclosure. The probability of skipping a payment is estimated to be about 1 percent to 1.5 percent smaller after the CARD disclosure. However, they find minimal evidence on debt repayment behavior among those who continue to carry debts.

In another study, Salisbury (2014) examines the impact of minimum payment warnings on repayment behavior. She finds that disclosing information on the costs of paying only the minimum payment (both interest costs and long payoff duration) has no impact on repayment behavior for most respondents. However, when minimum payment information is accompanied by information on an alternative course of repayment that would pay off the balance in three years, consumers are significantly more likely to repay an amount close to the three-year repayment amount. However, she also identifies a possible “backfire effect” where people who would have paid more than the three-year amount are less likely to do so when the three-year amount is present. Both Navarro-Martinez et al. (2011) and Stewart (2009) find supporting evidence of this backfire effect. They find that people make larger credit card payments in the absence of minimum payment information on credit card statements.

There has been some suggestive evidence that the new statement requirements may have helped consumers better understand credit card terms. For example, one study from Soll, Keeney, and Larrick (2013) finds that in an online survey with 543 participants, without the minimum payment warning, less numerate people tend to underestimate the monthly payment required to pay off a debt in 36 months, whereas more numerate people tend to overestimate the monthly payment. When subjects were provided with the minimum payment warning, both over- and underestimation were substantially reduced. The authors do point out, however, that even though the minimum payment warning statement is clear that the amounts given assume no further activity, subjects, particularly those with lower numeracy, still underestimate the size of required payment to pay off the loan in three years in the event that there is further activity. Another study by the authors also identifies additional confusion from the new statements. When asked how long it takes to pay off a balance if the consumer always pays only the current minimum payment in the new statement, only 7 percent of the respondents give the correct answer, while 49 percent of them answer the same question correctly with the old statement.

One reason for the relatively small effect of the minimum payment warning may be limited comprehension. J.D. Power's 2013 Credit Card Satisfaction Survey reports that only 47 percent of cardholders say they “completely” understand their credit card terms. Among those who do not fully understand the terms, 73 percent of them indicate confusion over interest rates, and 31

percent of them do not understand the late fee. Another reason may be that required disclosures are included with paper credit card statements, but more and more credit cardholders pay their bills online and may not be exposed to the disclosures. The CFPB (2013b) finds that no issuers provide the minimum payment warning on the payment screen in their online account websites, but issuers who track customer online payment behavior report that 38 percent of customers made at least one payment online, and only 26 percent of consumers opened their statements before paying online.

Lastly, even though payday⁶ loans are a different type of short-term loan from credit cards, research on payday loan disclosures provides some insight. Bertrand and Morse (2011) ran a randomized field experiment to test how payday loan borrowers reacted to disclosures. Customers who entered 77 stores in 11 states over a period of 2 weeks were given one of three carefully designed disclosures. The disclosure that compared the dollar cost of repeated borrowings via payday loans versus credit cards was the most effective in changing consumer behavior. When this disclosure was compared to a disclosure that displayed only the dollar cost of repeated payday loans the take-up of future payday loans was reduced by 11 percent in the subsequent four months. Accompanying survey data suggest that the effect of the disclosures was stronger for customers who did not have a college degree and had higher self-control (on two self-reported measures).

Mutual Fund Disclosures

Mutual funds play an important role in U.S. household finances and retirement planning. According to the Investment Company Institute (ICI), 28 percent of U.S. retirement funds are invested in mutual funds. The U.S. mutual fund industry held \$15 trillion in assets at the end of 2013, accounting for 22 percent of household financial assets (ICI, 2015).

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulates mutual funds and requires mutual fund companies to provide a fund's prospectus to all shareholders. The prospectus includes information on the fund's investment objectives or goals, investment strategies, risks, fees and expenses, past performance, and the fund's investment managers and advisers. It's a very challenging task for an average investor to navigate through the statutory prospectuses mutual funds distribute. The SEC commented that "the language of prospectuses is complex and legalistic, and the presentation formats make little use of graphic design techniques that would contribute to readability." (SEC, 2007).

A series of GAO reports and testimony in front of the House and Senate noted that disclosures pertaining to mutual funds often exceed those provided for other financial products, and acknowledged that additional disclosure would incur additional costs; nevertheless,

⁶ Payday loans are small-dollar, short-term, unsecured lending to borrowers typically experiencing cash flow difficulties (FDIC, 2003).

increased transparency is necessary if investors are to understand the potential conflicts of interest that their financial advisers face and be able to make informed decisions about how to invest their money, particularly when navigating complex and changing schedules of fees. GAO also notes that more transparency could promote greater price competition in the industry (GAO, 2003a; GAO, 2003b; GAO, 2004). In 2004, the GAO recommended further regulatory action by the SEC on mutual funds, though some in the industry and press expressed concern about potential overregulation (if some reforms created costs without clear benefits) and unequal treatment of mutual funds compared with other financial instruments (“A Rash of Rules,” 2004).

On December 14, 2007, the SEC adopted the “Summary Prospectus Rules” aiming to simplify mutual fund prospectuses and “improve investors’ ability to make informed investment decisions and, therefore, lead to increased efficiency and competitiveness of the U.S. capital markets” (SEC, 2007, Release No. 33-8861). With the new rules, the mutual funds have the option to send investors a three- or four-page⁷-long Summary Prospectus.

Beshears et al. (2011) examined differences in investor behavior between those who received the Summary Prospectus and those who received the longer statutory prospectus. They conducted a randomized experiment in which 186 subjects were asked to allocate two portfolios: one among four actively managed equity mutual funds, and one among four actively managed bond mutual funds. Participants were paid depending on how well their portfolios actually performed in the subsequent one-month or one-year period after the experimental session. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: one group received the funds’ statutory prospectuses only, one group received the funds’ Summary Prospectuses only, and the third group received the funds’ Summary Prospectuses but with the option to request the statutory prospectuses. They found that participants who received the Summary Prospectus spent less time on investment decisions than those who received the statutory prospectus, but the authors found no significant differences in portfolio choices across treatments. Likewise, they didn’t find any significant differences across treatments in the loads, expense ratios, fees, and historical performance of the funds that participants chose.

In 2014, The SEC issued a Guidance Update on the Summary Prospectus, because it found that even though some funds’ prospectuses are clear and concise, there are “a significant number of prospectuses, however, in which disclosure remains complex, technical and duplicative” (SEC, 2014). The new guidance highlights certain rules such as using plain English, focusing on the key information, and avoiding cross-references.

Haslem (2006) argues that another challenge for effective disclosure in the mutual fund industry is that readily disclosed fees do not necessarily reflect the true costs associated with the fund. Managerial fees are included in the benchmark “expense ratio,” but other costs to the fund,

⁷ The statutory prospectus can run hundreds of pages long.

including brokerage commissions and some other implicit costs of trading,⁸ are not included. Haslem argues that reasonable estimates for these additional costs, using portfolio turnover to calculate expected values for the “other” costs, would give a potentially more useful “total expense ratio”; he shows how Vanguard’s 500 Index fund (with relatively high rate of return and comparatively low turnover) performs particularly well when its rate of return is compared with its total expense ratio. He argues that higher total expense ratios of other funds should seem unreasonable to investors unless they are producing significantly higher returns, which is rare. Similar points were raised in a report by Zero Alpha Group (described in “Analysis Finds Fees Disclosed,” 2004), showing that the highest-turnover funds may have hidden trading costs more than twice as high as published expense ratios, and that passively managed index funds (with low turnover and fees) will often outperform actively managed funds. For a sample of ten high-turnover funds, the implicit trading costs averaged 1.91 percent; in one of the most egregious cases, the PBHG Large Cap Fund had an estimated implicit cost (due to turnover) of 4.27 percent and brokerage commissions of 3.16 percent, while publishing an expense ratio of only 1.16 percent. A recent study conducted by the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) found a wide disparity in how fees were disclosed and concluded that disclosures may lose their effectiveness when hidden in small print, incorporated in lengthy account opening documents, or remaining opaque about the services provided (NASAA, 2014)⁹.

While mandatory disclosure could provide (at some cost) a greater amount of information and transparency for investors, this may not be a full solution if investors do not understand or use this information correctly. Tkac (2004) believes that a lack of voluntary disclosure in the mutual fund industry may be a sign that investors do not value the information enough to be willing to pay for it. Palmiter and Taha (2008) survey academic literature and find that investors do not have a grasp of the data available to them, paying insufficient attention to data on expenses, risk profiles, and basic characteristics of funds, and instead focus most of their attention on historical rates of return (a strategy for which there is minimal empirical support). They conclude that disclosure may not be enough, and that regulators should pay more attention to research on the characteristics and capabilities of investors when formulating policy.

One special case of mutual fund disclosure is the purchase of mutual funds through banks. As banks are usually associated with fund security through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insurance, the “Interagency Statement on Retail Sales of Nondeposit Investment Products” (1994) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999) require banks that sell mutual funds to disclose to investors that such funds are not guaranteed by the FDIC nor any government agency. There is limited and mixed evidence on the effectiveness of this disclosure.

⁸ In particular, Haslem draws attention to the effect of bid-ask spreads in trading—if the ‘true’ value of a particular asset is the midpoint between the bid and ask prices, then the distance between the trade price and that midpoint is an implicit cost of trading

⁹ The study also found that in the outgoing transfer fees context, markups were routinely in the 100 percent to 280 percent range, perhaps in part due to consumer confusion about the fees being charged.

An AARP survey (1994) found that most bank consumers were unaware of the risks and fees of the uninsured investments sold by the banks. However, a Consumer Bankers Association (1994) survey reported that few customers held the misconception that bank issued mutual funds were insured by the FDIC (Alexander, Jones, and Nigro, 2001).

Discussion

In the financial decisionmaking areas that we focus on in this section—mortgages, credit cards and payday loans, and mutual funds—recent regulation of disclosure has all focused on simplifying disclosures. Research has shown that the longer, more detailed disclosure documents have not been effective at helping consumers make informed choices in selecting mortgages, credit cards, and mutual funds, due to either limited attention or limited understanding of the material itself.

Simpler disclosures, particularly for mortgages and credit cards, have shown promise in helping consumers make informed decisions, but research shows that even these simplified disclosures may still be too lengthy and complex for the average consumer. In preliminary research, the new Loan Estimate forms for mortgages have been shown to be easier for consumers to understand. However, because the new Loan Estimate forms have not yet been implemented, the impact of the forms on mortgage borrowers has not been fully evaluated. Simplified credit card disclosures as mandated by the CARD Act have been shown to influence credit card borrower behavior and understanding. In particular, the minimum payment warning has been shown to have a small impact on repayment behavior. One possible explanation for the small impacts on behavior is that the disclosures don't reach consumers—the disclosures are provided with the paper credit card statement, but more and more consumers pay their credit card bills online—and even when they do reach consumers, the financial terminology is difficult for consumers to understand. Summary Prospectuses for mutual funds have been shown to reduce the decision time, but not significantly affect consumer choice. This may be because although simplified, they are still relatively lengthy and do not present complex information, such as information on fees, in a uniform, straightforward manner.

5. Best Practices in Designing Effective Disclosures

In this section, we review best practices in designing effective financial disclosures. We draw from research on disclosures in other fields as well, especially when they address issues common to designing all disclosures, such as reading level or length.

Guidelines from Regulations

The Clear and Conspicuous Standards of the Federal Trade Commissions

In 1970, concerned with the lack of adequate and accurate information in commercials, the Federal Trade Commissions (FTC) issued the Clear and Conspicuous standard for advertising disclosure, including financial product advertising, such as credit card commercials.

The FTC proposed eight standards to improve disclosure quality, including presenting the disclosure in dual modes and using sufficient font size and readability level. The relevance of each standard depends on the particular product or service, and the context in which the disclosure is presented.

Results from tests of the impact of the FTC's standards on consumer comprehension have been mixed. In an online experiment in Thomas, Fowler, and Kolbe (2011), 505 college students read one of 12 versions of a credit card advertisement containing disclosure information. The experiment is designed so that three FTC standards are tested. Subjects were presented with disclosures in one of two modes: In the single modality condition, the disclosure is presented visually only, whereas in the dual modality condition, the disclosure is presented visually while a male voice reads it aloud. Students also received disclosures with one of two readability levels, either with jargon, or jargon free, and with one of three distraction levels, either a blank white background, a still image as background, or a background with dynamic music and scene changes. Their results suggest that dual modality and easy readability improve subjects' comprehension only when there is minimum distraction. In other words, when there is background distraction, as there often is in advertising, jargon-free disclosures presented in dual modes do not increase comprehension when compared to single-mode disclosures with jargon.

SEC's Plain English Initiative

In 1998, the SEC published "A Plain English Handbook: How to Create Clear SEC Disclosure Documents." (SEC, 1998). The 83-page guideline was designed to urge disclosers to generate simpler and clearer documents for investors. The handbook suggests that in order to design effective disclosure, the issuers need to understand both audience and content, assemble experienced drafters to weigh the length of the planned document, and adopt certain effective

writing styles (e.g. use active voice, simple words, short sentences, and common terms). The handbook also provides tips and suggestions on procedures to follow when designing disclosures, evaluation methods to evaluate the disclosures, and useful tools such as a readability formula and style checker.

FTC's .Com Disclosure Guidelines

Many policies and guidelines were designed based on paper disclosures, while people increasingly make decisions online. In 2013, the FTC published an online advertising disclosure guideline in which the agency proposed 16 suggestions on how to make a disclosure clear and conspicuous¹⁰ (FTC 2013, pp. ii–iii). Several suggestions are specific to internet disclosures: Take account of the various devices and platforms on which the disclosures are viewed; make use of obvious and well-labeled links in a consistent hyperlink style for disclosures that cannot be incorporated in a space-constrained ad; monitor click-through rates of disclosure links; avoid scrolling or use visual cues to prompt scrolling; repeat disclosure at different decision points and on different web pages; and prominently display disclosures and limit distraction from other elements on the web page.

Regulatory Guideline on the Timing of Disclosure

There are regulatory guidelines on the timing of disclosure to ensure that customers receive the information in a timely fashion and have enough time to process it. For example, in mortgage disclosures, the GFE Statement is required within three business days of the borrower's application, and a preliminary copy of a HUD-1 Settlement Statement is required if the borrower requests it 24 hours before closing. The 2009 CARD Act requires that credit card bills be due on the same date each month, and the statement be provided at least 21 days before the due date. However, it remains largely unknown whether disclosure provided in advance is more effective in influencing decisions than disclosure provided at the moment a financial decision is being made.

Lessons Learned from Effective and Ineffective Disclosures

Disclosure is effective only when the receivers pay attention to the information, have the capacity to interpret it, and are willing to incorporate it in their decisionmaking process. However, many customers do not read or pay little attention to the disclosures (Nash, 2009), lack the basic financial literacy to understand the terms (J. D. Powers, 2013), and fail to include the disclosed information at the decision point (Sovern, 2010). It is challenging to convey complex and unfamiliar financial and legal concepts to an average American consumer. In this section, we

¹⁰ The FTC.com Disclosure also provides guidelines on other perspectives besides how to make clear and conspicuous disclosures, such as “the same consumer protection laws that apply to commercial activities in other media apply online, including activities in the mobile marketplace,” etc.

draw upon lessons learned from both successful and unsuccessful disclosure practice in the finance industry as well as other decisionmaking domains.

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA) required financial institutions to provide a privacy notice to all their customers. The disclosures sent by the financial institutions subsequently were “lengthy, confusing, written in a highly legalistic style and generally incomprehensible”(Garrison et al., 2012). In response to the frustration and critique of consumers, media, and members of Congress, six federal agencies launched a consumer research project that had two phases: using qualitative methods to iteratively develop a new prototype notice, and a quantitative study to evaluate the prototype notice in comparison with other privacy notices. Garrison et al. (2012) identified a list of lessons learned from the research project to develop disclosures that consumers pay attention to, understand, and use in their decisionmaking:

- Use plain English
- Provide a context for concepts unfamiliar to consumers
- Presenting information in tables can be helpful, but not all disclosed information is better presented in tables
- Pay attention to design features: contextual framing, visual hierarchy, information sequencing, font choice, white space, etc.
- Layer information carefully: Identify key pieces of information and locate them together in a highly visible place and format; people pay more attention to information on the first page
- Be consumer driven: Study and understand consumers, involve consumers in development of disclosures, be clear about the goal (whether to inform or to encourage actions), provide additional education and supplementary material if necessary
- Involve responsible policy staff
- Use both qualitative and quantitative methods when developing the disclosures
- Exploit synergies: Prioritize information in an accessible format; seek resolution within the confines of the laws and regulations.

Fung, Graham, and Weil (2007) provide in-depth assessment of eight mandatory disclosure policies. Based on empirical evidence of numerous studies to evaluate the eight kinds of disclosures, the authors conclude that some policies (corporate financial, mortgage lending, and restaurant hygiene disclosures) are effective, some policies (patient safety and plant closing) have failed, while other policies (nutritional labeling, toxic releases, and work hazard disclosures) may be moderately effective. The authors identify ten principles for policymakers in crafting effective policies:

- Provide easy-to-use information: Information needs to be able to be conveniently embedded in the normal decision process
- Strengthen user groups, such as labor unions or consumer groups, as they can help to monitor, maintain, and improve disclosures
- Help disclosers understand how customer behavior can be impacted by disclosure
- Design disclosures so that disclosers perceive benefits from transparency
- Standardize metrics for information accuracy and product comparability;

- Match information content and formats to users' levels of attention and comprehension
- Provide periodic analysis, feedback, and revision to avoid outdated systems
- Impose sanctions on disclosers for noncompliance
- Strengthen enforcement of compliance with disclosure rules
- Leverage other regulatory systems besides disclosure policies.

Lastly, evidence from the medical field suggests that advances in technology may provide new opportunities to effectively provide disclosures. Madathil et al. (2013) find that presenting informed consent forms on iPads instead of paper can improve patient understanding of the content of the forms. Tait et al. (2012) ran a lab study in which participants were randomized to view risk/benefit information of a medication on an iPad in one of four formats: text, pie chart, bar graph, and pictograph. The authors found that when participants viewed the information in the format they prefer, their understanding and satisfaction were significantly better than if there wasn't a match between the preferred format and the view format. An implication is that tailoring may be an important factor in improving disclosure effectiveness and can be implemented by human-computer interaction at the disclosure point. That is, instead of the traditional "one solution fits all" messages, computers can help issuers customize disclosures.

Discussion

One common factor in discussion of effective disclosures is simplicity—namely, using plain English and keeping technical jargon to a minimum. Generally, however, what is effective may be specific to the decision at hand. Using tables and graphs may aid in understanding, but the suitability of using them depends on the topic as well as the audience. New technology, such as tablet computers and other mobile devices, may become an important tool in helping design more effective disclosures that can be customized to individual customers.

Fung, Graham, and Weil (2007) suggest that disclosure can be an effective policy tool when there is an information gap that disclosure can fill. For example, warning people about a particular risk that they would otherwise not be aware of can help them make more informed decisions and take appropriate actions when facing the risk. On the other hand, if there is no defined information gap meriting government intervention, disclosure is less effective. One such example is the case of international labeling of genetically modified goods, because nations do not agree about whether genetic engineering creates a public safety problem. Fung, Graham, and Weil also suggest that disclosure is more effective when the decision arena is not too complex to communicate. In the example of disclosing of workplace hazards, the complexity of risk exposure information was a major barrier for the policy's effectiveness. Another condition for the disclosure to be effective is that consumers have the desire and capability to improve their decisions. Information will be ignored unless the consumers have more desire to incorporate it when making decisions. For example, public information is available on the likelihood of natural disasters by city, but residents rarely incorporate such information when considering a move.

Lastly, the extent to which disclosure can positively affect the discloser's behavior is contingent on the discloser's capacity to reduce risks or improve performance. For example, environmental or nutritional labeling may not affect a producer's behavior, as the ability to reduce toxic pollution or remove harmful fats from foods depends on the availability of substitutes and related technology.

6. Summary

In theory, consumer disclosures can reduce the information asymmetries present in the financial services market. Disclosures can provide investors with valuable information so that they can make informed decisions. In this report, we reviewed the literature on consumer disclosures in the financial industry, focusing on research on the effectiveness of disclosure in providing decision support to investors. Our review of existing studies indicates that disclosure, particularly disclosure used in isolation, may not provide sufficient support in helping investors make more informed decisions.

Disclosure is a key component of the regulatory regime in the U.S. financial advice market as well as in many financial advice markets around the globe. In markets in which advisers are permitted to receive commission, advisers are frequently required to disclose the nature and amount of compensation they receive as a result of the advice provided. In markets in which commissions are banned, advisers are still frequently required to explicitly disclose all costs related to the advice provided and whether it considers all available products.

In Chapter 3, we reviewed literature on the impact of disclosures on conflicts of interest. The available research suggests that when conflicts of interest in financial advice are disclosed, many consumers fail to adjust their behavior sufficiently, if at all. Furthermore, disclosure may in fact have the opposite effect: Consumers may feel a “burden of disclosure” to follow the advice, and advisers may respond to the disclosure by providing even more biased advice, resulting in decreased welfare for consumers. In other areas of financial decisionmaking such as mortgages, credit cards and payday loans, and mutual funds, disclosure has long been used as a policy tool. The trends in regulation on disclosure in these areas have all focused on simplifying disclosures. Research has shown that the longer, more detailed disclosure documents have not been effective at helping consumers make informed choices in selecting mortgages, credit cards, and mutual funds, due to either limited attention or limited understanding of the material itself. Simpler disclosures, particularly for mortgages and credit cards, have shown promise in helping consumers make informed decisions, but research shows that even these simplified disclosures may still be too lengthy and complex for average consumers.

In Chapter 5, we examined the instances in which disclosure can be most effective. Simplicity in disclosures is a necessary but not sufficient condition in designing effective disclosure. Disclosure tends to be more effective when the decision arena is not too complex to communicate, and when consumers have the desire and capability to improve their decisions. However, research indicates that disclosure alone, even simplified disclosure, may not be effective at improving financial decisionmaking. Given that many consumers have low levels of financial capability, disclosure is likely to be most effective when used in conjunction with other policy tools.

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