

**Participant Direction
in Defined Contribution Plans**

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Abstract

During the 1990s, many pension plans shifted the responsibility for directing the investment of pension plan assets to the employee. This study examines the rapid growth of the participant directed pension plans using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, the Survey of Income and Program Participation, and IRS Form 5500. Several relevant questions are addressed. First, what types of workers are most likely to be in a participant directed plan and what types of employers are most likely to offer such plans? Second, how does participant direction affect the allocation of assets and the risk/return performance of the pension? The study has two important findings. First, participant direction has a significant effect on asset allocation in pension plans, shifting pensions away from employer stock and towards other types of stock. Second, based on risk-adjusted rates of return, participant directed plans actually outperform employer directed plans.

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I. Introduction.

Over the past 15 years, defined contribution (DC) plans have shifted the control over investment decisions to employees. Among employees with DC plans, the percentage who control at least some portion of the assets rose from 29.1 to 73.2 between 1990 and 1998. Unpublished statistics provided by the Employee Benefits Security Administration reveal that the trend has continued, with 82 percent of employees having at least some control over asset allocation in 2002.

Since workers may differ in terms of their risk preferences and desired pension portfolio, the ability to tailor the pension portfolio to one's own preferences may represent a major improvement relative to plans with a single portfolio for all employees. Participant direction may also improve pension fund performance by placing the investment decisions in the hands of those who stand to win or lose from those decisions. A professional fund manager may make decisions that are not in the best interests of the employees, but may enhance their own compensation. On the other hand, as evidenced by recent scandals in the mutual fund industry, employees may be damaged by also be caught unaware of conflicts of interest in the either the selection of funds offered in the pension plan or management of pension funds and be overcharged for financial services.¹

A concern with the shift to participant directed accounts is that many workers may lack the financial sophistication to make wise decisions. Numerous studies document the lack of financial sophistication in large segments of the U.S. population and some of the adverse consequences for savings rates and portfolio choices. Moreover, while giving the employee the control over investment decisions may eliminate some conflicts of interest, individual workers

¹ See Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, Securities and Exchange Commission (2005) for information on the wide range of conflicts of interest in the management of pension funds.

may be caught unaware of conflicts of interest that may shape the investment options provided in the pension, or the conflicts of interest that lead to mismanagement of mutual funds.²

This study investigates several issues related to the shift to participant directed accounts in the United States. Section 2 reviews some of the explanations for the rapid growth in participant directed accounts and the existing literature on the consequences of participant direction. We describe the data sources used in our analysis of participant directed accounts and provide summary statistics on trends in participant direction in section 3. The factors that influence whether a pension is likely to be participant directed are examined in section 4. The final piece of empirical analysis, provided in section 5, investigates the effect of participant direction on a pension plan's asset allocation, risk and return.

II. Background.

Among DC plans, the percentage giving employees control over asset allocation increased sharply in the 1990s. Tabulations of IRS Form 5500 data reveal that the percent of DC plans with 100 or more participants that have employee-directed accounts rose from 20 percent in 1990 to 69 percent in 1998.³ Some of this growth in employee-direction can be attributed to the growth of 401(k) plans, but this is not the entire story. Among 401(k) plans, the percentage of plans reporting employee-directed accounts grew from 32 to 86 percent between 1990 and 1998. Among non-401(k) plans, employee-direction is much less common, but the percent of plans reporting the option grew from 6 to 23 percent between 1990 and 1998.

There are at least three possible explanations for the rapid growth in participant direction. First, finalization of section 404(c) of ERISA in 1992 made it clearer to firms how to avoid

² The Economist (2003) reports on mismanagement in the U.S. mutual fund industry whereby some traders were given special trading privileges that increased administrative costs for others.

³ The percent of plan assets in employee-directed accounts rose from 31 to 73 percent over the same period.

liability for losses resulting from participant control over assets. Papke (2003, 2004) suggests that this clarification may have encouraged employers to shift liability away from their own investment managers to employees by switching to participant direction.

A second possible stimulus for the growing popularity of participant direction is that technological advances lowered the administrative costs of managing separate accounts for each employee and simultaneously allowed daily trading and daily valuation [Kaplan 2003]. The concurrent growth of mutual funds that provided low cost methods for diversifying, even with small asset holdings, provided yet another reason to shift towards participant direction.

The existing research on the effects of participant direction on pension plan outcomes is quite limited. One line of research investigates how a shift to participant direction will affect asset allocation decisions. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey or Health and/or the Health and Retirement Study, Papke (1998, 2003, 2004) reports that participant direction increases the share of assets invested in equities. On the other hand, Sunden and Surette (1998) report that in the Survey of Consumer Finances, participant direction is not associated with any significant change in the allocation of assets.

The effect of a switch to participant direction could differ across people. In employer directed accounts, all plan participants have the same asset allocation. If workers differ in their preferred allocation, a switch to participant direction may cause some to increase and others to decrease the share of assets invested in equities. For example, Holden and VanDerhei (2001) show that the percentage of assets invested in equities falls as a worker ages. Consequently, a shift to participant direction could cause younger workers to hold a larger share of assets in equities, but older workers to hold a smaller share.

If workers would prefer to direct their own pension investments, a switch to participant direction could lead to increased contributions. In support of this premise, Papke (2003, 2004) finds that participant direction increases the chance that a worker will participate in a firm's pension plan and also increases the share of salary contributed.

Weisbenner (1999) finds that participant direction has spillover effects and increases the chance that workers hold equities outside of their pension portfolio. The rationale provided for this behavior is that participant direction forces workers to improve their financial knowledge to manage pension assets. Once the financial knowledge is acquired, workers are more willing to invest in equities with their nonpension savings.

While participant direction potentially improves the match between employee preferences and pension asset allocation, numerous analysts question the ability of some workers to make wise decisions about pension saving. For example, some studies examine whether workers have sufficient financial knowledge to determine the appropriate level of pension saving and find that financial education significantly increases employee pension saving rates, particularly among low income and less educated workers.⁴ Other studies question the wisdom of investment allocation decisions made by participants in pension plans. There is some evidence that when a company provides matching contributions in the form of their own stock, employees compound the nondiversification problem by buying the same stock with their own contributions.⁵ There is also some support for the premise that some workers pursue a naive "1/n" diversification strategy and invest equal shares in all the investment options offered by the pension plan.⁶ Other studies point out that workers rarely reallocate their investments and may

⁴ See, for example, Bayer, Bernheim and Scholz (1996), Bernheim and Garrett (1996), and Clark and Sylvester (1998).

⁵ See Benartzi (2001), Liang and Weisbrenner (2002), and Brown et al. (2004).

⁶ Benartzi and Thaler (2001) and Agnew (2001) both find evidence of 1/n investment behavior. Huberman and Jiang, (2004) find that investors do not exhibit 1/n behavior.

overreact to recent stock performance when making investment decisions.⁷ Finally, some observers suggest that workers invest too little in equities and that women may be too conservative.⁸

While a good deal has been learned about the determinants of employee behavior in self-directed plans, there is little direct evidence on what types of workers are most likely to have employee-directed accounts, or direct evidence on the consequences of participant direction on the risk and return characteristics of pension portfolios. This study attempts to provide evidence on these two points.

In deciding whether to give employee's control over the allocation of pension assets, an employer should consider several factors. For example, if employees prefer control over the pension assets, the firm is able to attract and retain workers at a lower total cost. Employees may prefer a self-directed plan over professional administration of a common pool of assets since it would allow them to tailor the investments to their own time-horizon, risk tolerance, and tax situation. There are some disadvantages to employee control, however. First, firms may prefer that workers hold some of the employer's stock to tie employee compensation to firm performance. Without employer direction, there may be little or no money invested in employer stock and these incentive effects would be absent. Second, firms (or the workers themselves) may view the workers as financially unsophisticated and incapable of making prudent investment decisions. While the firm may legally insulate itself from fiduciary responsibility for its employees' investment decisions, it may still be concerned about repercussions if workers become unhappy with the performance of their pension plan. Finally, depending upon the

⁷ Benartzi (2001) and Sengmuller (2002) discuss the effect of recent stock performance on investment behavior; Samuelson and Zechkhauser (1988) and Americks and Zeldes (2001) show that portfolio rebalancing is infrequent.

⁸ See Papke (1998), Hinz et al. (1997), and Sunden (1998). These studies provide conflicting evidence on whether women are more conservative investors.

nature of scale economies, a switch to participant directed accounts could either increase or decrease administrative expenses. This point will be addressed in greater detail below.

III. Data and Methodology.

This study empirically examines two broad questions. First, what factors influence whether a worker covered by a DC pension is offered a participant-directed account? Second, how does participant direction affect asset allocation and the resulting return and risk of pension investments?

To determine which factors influence the likelihood that a worker is offered a participant-directed account, we use data from several sources: the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF); the 1998 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) Pension Module; and 1990 to 1998 IRS Form 5500 data. The SIPP and SCF provide individual level data indicating whether a worker has control over the investment of pension assets. The participant direction question in the SIPP is: “Are you able to choose how any of the money in the plan is invested?” For the SCF, the participant direction question is: “Do you have any choices about how the money is invested?”

This participant direction information will be combined with information about the employee to determine whether, among workers offered a pension plan, firms are more likely to provide self-directed pensions when the work force is dominated by workers with particular attributes. For example, it is possible to test whether more educated workers are more likely to be offered self-directed plans. Also, we will test whether firm characteristics affect the likelihood that a participant directed plan is offered.

Form 5500 data are examined to determine which factors influence whether a participant-directed plan is offered. Unfortunately, beyond the number of employees in the plan, there is relatively little information about the work force in the Form 5500 data. Work force characteristics will be estimated for the plan sponsor's industry and firm size using data from the Current Population Survey for pension covered workers.

The SCF, SIPP and Form 5500 data are also used to determine how a shift to self-directed plans affects asset allocations and the risk and return on assets. In the SCF and SIPP, the asset allocation questions relate to broad asset categories (i.e., stocks versus bonds) for a given worker's pension plan. In the Form 5500 data, there is much greater detail on the different types of assets held, but the data are aggregated at the plan level and many plans pool funds into a single account. For the plans that pool funds, there is no direct information on asset choices.

The study also uses Form 5500 data for the years 1990 through 1998 to form a panel of pension plans. The panel data are used to compare the risk and return features of pension plans depending on whether they are participant directed or not.

IV. Determinants of Participant Direction.

The measure of participant direction differs across the SCF and SIPP. In the SCF, respondents are asked whether they are covered by a pension plan. If they are covered by a pension plan, information is gathered on up to three distinct plans. For each plan, the participant is asked whether it is a defined benefit or a defined contribution plan. For each of the defined contribution plans, workers are asked whether they have control over the assets. Using answers

to the above questions, we restrict the sample to workers with at least one DC plan and create a dummy variable that indicates whether at least one DC plan is participant directed.

The question sequence in the SIPP is slightly different. As with the SCF, the SIPP asks workers whether they are covered by any pension plans. If they are covered by a plan, information is gathered on as many as three distinct plans. The question about participant direction, however, is limited to the “most important plan” (as determined by respondent). For the SIPP analysis, we restrict the sample to workers who report that their most important pension plan is a DC.

It is important to note that our measure of participant direction in the SCF and SIPP does not account for the extent of control over assets. For example, a worker who directs only a fraction of the contributions to the plan is recorded as having participant direction. Using the National Compensation Survey, Wiatrowski (2000) finds that 87 percent of workers in savings and thrift plans could choose how their funds were invested, but only 65 percent could choose how employer matching contributions were invested. Consequently, many of the workers that we record as having participant direction may have control over only some fraction of the assets in their pension plan.

In the Form 5500 data, participant direction is measured at the plan level. Since the Form 5500 data also provide the number of active participants in each plan, it is straightforward to calculate the percentage of workers with DC plans that are participant directed. The Form 5500 data do not allow us to adjust for the fact that some workers could be covered by multiple DC plans. Consequently, there is the possibility of double-counting some workers. Also, as with the SCF and SIPP data, the Form 5500 data do not indicate whether employees in participant directed plans direct all of the assets, or just some portion of them.⁹

⁹ Beginning with the 1999 Form 5500 data, it will be possible to determine whether the employee directs all of the

Table 1 presents a summary of the estimated percentage of DC workers with participant directed plans. The Form 5500 data show the pronounced increase in participant direction in the 1990s, starting at 29.1 percent in 1990 and rising to 73.2 percent by 1998. The SIPP data imply that 70.6 percent of DC workers were in participant-directed plans in 1998. The SCF data indicate that the percentage with participant direction rose from 77.6 to 81.5 percent between 1998 and 2001. The SCF estimates for 1998 are somewhat lower than the estimate for 1997 in Wiatrowski (2000) who finds that 87 percent of workers in savings and thrift plans could direct the investment of their own contributions (65 percent could direct their employers' contributions). On the other hand, Papke (2003) finds that 62 percent of DC covered workers in the 1992 National Longitudinal Survey of Mature women had participant direction; whereas 59 percent had participant directed plans in the 1992 Health and Retirement Survey. The fact that the estimates vary across surveys is not entirely surprising given the different sample restrictions in terms of full-time status, age, gender, and type of DC plan.

The first question we address is whether access to participant direction varies depending upon worker characteristics. In particular, is an employer's decision to shift responsibility for direction of plan assets sensitive to the characteristics of the workers? For example, if educational attainment improves financial sophistication, more educated workers may have a greater desire to control their own assets. Consequently, in a workplace with a disproportionately large share of highly educated workers, one might expect that participant direction would be more common. Similar logic could be extended for the effects of other personal characteristics (e.g., age, gender, race).

To empirically examine the effect of personal characteristics, we use the sample of DC covered workers drawn from the SCF and SIPP and estimate probit models of whether they have assets, or only some portion of them.

a participant-directed plan. The results of the probit model are provided in table 2. The coefficient estimates represent the estimated effect of a one-unit change in the explanatory variable on the probability that the person has a participant directed plan. The estimates are calculated at the sample mean for all the variables.¹⁰

The control variables in the probit models include a range of characteristics describing the worker and the employer. Characteristics describing the worker include education, age, race, ethnicity marital status. Characteristics describing the employer or job include union coverage, number of employees at the firm, monthly salary, and the share of contributions to the pension that are made by the employee. In the case of the SCF, we also include a dummy variable indicating whether the worker has a DB plan in addition to the DC and whether the data are drawn from the 1998 or 2001 survey.¹¹

In both the SCF and SIPP data, the type of pension plan and/or participant direction is imputed when there are missing data. For the regression analysis below, observations with imputed data for either pension type or participant direction are deleted from the sample. We eliminate imputed data because they add noise to the variables of interest and could potentially mask the true relationship between variables of interest.

In the SCF, each observation is replicated five times to reflect the potential variation in imputed variables. While we eliminate observations with imputations for plan type or participant direction, some of the control variables are imputed. The coefficient estimates and

¹⁰ For dichotomous explanatory variables (i.e. dummy variables), the marginal probability effects are estimated by holding other variables at their sample means and calculating the change in the probability of participant direction by alternating the dummy variable between a value of 0 and 1.

¹¹ We do not include the DB control in the SIPP because the participant direction variable relates only to the “primary” plan. Consequently, the DB variable in the SIPP for workers whose primary pension is a DC plan would indicate that they have a secondary DB plan.

standard errors are corrected to reflect the consequences of imputation. Also, we allow for correlation of the errors across people within the same household.¹²

The probit results for the SCF and SIPP models are fairly similar in some respects, but differ in others. Both suggest that participant direction is more likely for more educated workers and higher paid workers. It is also more common when employee contributions are a larger share of total contributions and when a union is not present.¹³ The effects of age, marital status, race and ethnicity are either statistically insignificant or differ across the two data sets.

The second question we address is whether participant direction affects the manner in which assets are invested. The nature of the information provided on this point differs considerably across the SIPP, SCF and Form 5500 data.

In the SIPP, there are two sets of questions that provide information on asset allocation. The first set of questions asks workers whether the pension holds any of 8 different types of investments. The second set of questions asks which of the 8 different types of investments represents the largest share of assets.

To examine the effect of participant direction on asset allocation, we compare the responses to the asset allocation questions according to whether the worker has a participant directed plan. We also estimate probit models to estimate the effect of participant direction on asset allocation decisions after controlling for the explanatory variables used in table 3. All observations with data imputed for the asset share questions are deleted for the analysis.¹⁴

A summary of the effects of participant direction on asset allocation is presented in table 3. The eight investment categories are company stock; stock funds; bond funds; long term

¹² The 2001 codebook for the SCF provides the steps for properly estimating the coefficients and standard errors.

¹³ Papke (2004) suggests that participant direction may cause increased employee contributions, not vice versa. Consequently, it is possible that the employee contribution variable is endogenous in the participant direction equation and the coefficient is biased upward.

¹⁴ This causes the sample size to drop from 3,675 to 2,731.

interest bearing securities; diverse fund; government securities; money market account; and other securities. Both the probit analysis and a comparison of sample means imply that the main effect of participant direction is to reduce the chance that company stock is held in the pension and increase the chance that some other type of stock fund is held. A similar result emerges from the analysis of the information on the largest asset held in the plan. Participant direction increases the chances that the largest asset held is a stock fund (.053), diverse fund (.049), or money market fund (.033), but reduces the chance that company stock is the largest asset held (.124 decrease). The fact that participant direction tends to lead to a shift away from employer stock into other stock may make employers reluctant to give employees control over the assets.

The SCF data on asset allocation are based on a question asking whether a person's pension is invested mostly in stocks, mostly in bonds, or a mixture of the two. To estimate the effect of participant direction on asset allocation, an ordinal probit model is used with mostly bonds coded as zero, a mixture of stocks and bonds as one, and mostly stocks coded as 2.¹⁵ The ordinal probit model is used because the asset share measure provides only an ordinal (not cardinal) ranking of asset allocations.

The results from the ordinal probit, presented in table 4, imply that participant direction has a statistically insignificant effect (at the .05 level) on the mixture of stocks and bonds. Upon first inspection, this might be surprising given the results from the SIPP data. However, if the effect of participant direction is to cause a shift from company stock to stock funds, the net effect on the mix of stocks and bonds could be zero. This result is at odds with the analysis of the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women in Papke (2003) where it is reported that participant direction increases the share of assets invested in equities. We do not have a good

¹⁵ Since the three categories have a natural ordering, ordinal probit was chosen over multinomial logit. Multinomial logit is appropriate when the choice categories have no natural ordering.

explanation for the conflicting results. However, the effects of several other variables are consistent with other studies. Consistent with Papke (2004) and Holden and VanDerhei (2001), the SCF implies that older workers invest less in equities. Also, consistent with Papke (2004), there is no statistically significant difference in equity investments between men and women.

The ordinal probit model of equity share also includes controls for risk preferences and planning horizon. The controls for risk preferences are drawn from a question in both the 1998 and 2001 SCF asking about the amount of financial risk that a person is willing to take when saving or making investments. The 4 possible answers range from “not willing to take any financial risks” to “willing to take substantial financial risk expecting to earn substantial returns.” The controls for planning horizon are drawn from a question asking about the time period which is most important to a person when making spending and saving decisions. The 5 possible answers range from “next few months” to “longer than 10 years”.

The coefficients on the dummy variables for the risk preferences reveal that workers who are willing to take greater risks invest substantially more in equities. The planning horizon variables, however, do not have statistically significant explanatory power for the equity share.

The Form 5500 data provide values of 32 different assets holdings at the beginning and end of the plan year. We collapse the asset information into 10 categories: cash; debt; company stock; other stock; trusts; property; buildings used in administration of pension; investments with registered investment companies; and investments with insurance companies.¹⁶

¹⁶ The specific asset categories are as follows. Cash = non-interest bearing cash + interest-bearing cash. Debt = certificates of deposit + government securities + preferred corporate debt + other corporate debt + residential mortgages + commercial mortgages + mortgage loans to participants + other loans to participants + other loans. Stock = preferred stock + common stock (excluding employer securities). Trusts = common/collective trusts + pooled separate accounts + master trusts + 103-12 investment entities. Property = income producing real estate + non-income producing real estate + employer real property. Buildings = buildings and other property used in pension plan operation. Investment Company = assets with registered investment companies. Insurance Company = investments in an insurance company general account. Other = total receivables + partnerships or joint ventures

Table 5a reports on the mean share of assets in the 10 categories according to whether the plan is participant directed and the statistical significance of the differences.¹⁷ The estimates of mean asset shares are weighted by total plan assets and averaged across the 9 years of Form 5500 data (1990-1998). In addition, t-statistics are provided for a test of whether there are significant differences between asset allocations according to participant direction.

The results indicate that participant directed plans are significantly more likely to hold assets with registered investment companies, insurance companies, or in trusts. The percentage of assets held in registered investment companies, insurance companies or trusts is 66.1 percent for participant directed plans and 45.1 percent for employer directed plans.

While the above asset shares give a sense of the relevant importance of what we refer to as “pooled investment accounts” (i.e., the registered investment companies, general accounts of insurance companies, or common/collective, pooled or master trusts and 103-12 investment entities), averaging across plans may obscure extreme behavior. In table 5b, the percentage of plans with different levels of asset holdings in the external investments is reported. For plans that are not participant directed, 44.5 percent have less than 10 percent of their assets in pooled investments. For plans that are participant directed, only 10.5 have less than 10 percent of their assets in pooled investments. On the other extreme, the percentage of plans with 80 percent or more of assets in pooled accounts is 35.5 for employer directed plans and 71.1 for participant directed plans. This greater tendency among participant directed plans to hold significant investments in pooled accounts could be important in controlling the potential increase in administrative costs from individually managed investments.

+ other investments.

¹⁷ The t-statistics are adjusted for clustering to account for multiple observations on each pension plan.

Table 5b provides the distribution of pooled account holdings split into three groupings: (1) common/collective, pooled or master trusts and 103-12 investment entities; (2) investments with registered investment companies; and (3) contracts with insurance companies. The results suggest participant direction is associated with an increased chance of holding a significant share (more than one-half of assets) in the first two categories, but only a small difference in the chance of holding insurance company contracts.

Given the large share of assets that are held in pooled accounts, the Form 5500 data do not provide a good indication of how assets are divided between stocks and bonds. A special version of the 1996 Form 5500 data available from the Employee Benefits and Security Administration, however, provides details of the asset allocation of several of the pooled accounts. The Direct Filing Entity (DFE) coding project linked filings on the asset holdings of master trusts, common and collective trusts, pooled separate accounts, and 103-12 entities to pension plans in the Form 5500 data. A DFE reports to the IRS and describes its asset holdings (e.g., stocks, bonds) and the pension funds that has investments with the DFE. Merging the DFE data with the corresponding pension funds allows the assets held in several of the pooled accounts to be spread into broad asset categories such as stock, employer securities, bonds, and so on. Henceforth, this special version of the data will be referred to as the “1996 Form 5500 spread data”. Unfortunately, the assets in registered investment companies and insurance contracts are not broken into their components in this special data set because these investments are not associated with a DFE.

As seen in table 5c, the 1996 Form 5500 spread data reveal that participant direction is associated with lower holdings of employer stock (7.4 percentage points) and stock (6.3 percentage points), but larger holdings with registered investment companies. Since registered

investment companies can hold a mix of stocks or bonds, it is difficult to draw any strong conclusions from this comparison.

The bottom panel of table 5c restricts the sample to pension plans with no holdings in registered investment companies or insurance contracts. In this subsample, participant directed plans have much lower holdings of employer securities (34.4 percentage points) and greater holdings of stock (18.2 percentage points), debt instruments (5.8 percentage points), cash (3.9 percentage points) and other holdings (6.7 percentage points).

Since the participant directed status of a pension could be correlated with other plan characteristics that influence asset allocation, the raw differences in means cited above could be either an under- or overstatement of the impact of participant direction on asset allocation. In table 6, we address this concern by estimating a separate regression for each asset category and including controls for several variables that could have an effect: the age and educational distribution of the pension plan participants, an indicator whether the pension plan is collectively bargained, total plan assets, the number of plan participants, and whether the firm sponsoring the pension also offers a defined benefit plan.¹⁸

The first two columns of table 6 present the coefficient and corresponding t-statistic on the participant direction dummy variable drawn from each asset share regression. The coefficients on the other control variables are not presented for the sake of brevity. The results are very similar to those found in the univariate analysis. Participant directed plans are more likely to have investments in pooled accounts (trusts, registered investment companies, and contracts with insurance companies). The analysis of the 1996 spread data confirms the earlier

¹⁸ The age and educational distribution for pension covered workers are drawn from the 1989 through 1999 March Current Population Surveys and merged to pension plans on the basis of 3-digit industry.

finding that participant direction reduces the share of assets invested in employer securities and increases the share invested in stock, debt instruments and cash.

V. The Effect of Participant Direction on Portfolio Performance.

While it is apparent that participant direction influences the allocation of assets in pension plans, the more important question is how it affects the performance of the portfolio. Participant direction can influence return performance in several ways.

A switch to participant direction changes the manner in which assets are invested. This could either improve or worsen plan performance. On the one hand, one might argue that an employer directed fund managed by a professional would outperform the participant directed fund because many employees do not have the requisite skills for making sound investment decisions. On the other hand, some have argued that pension fund managers may be faced with incentives that cause them to make investments that are not in the best interests of the employee. For example, pension funds are typically advised by pension fund consultants on investment decisions, but these consultants often have conflicts of interests. More specifically, some consultants get substantial revenues from the money managers and broker-dealers whom they recommend to the pension fund. For example, money managers often hire pension consultants to perform such services such as strategic planning, marketing strategy development, and client servicing development.¹⁹

A switch to participant direction could also affect both the pension plan's administrative and investment costs. Earlier research has documented the existence of scale economies in both

¹⁹ For more information on these conflicts of interests among pension fund consultants, see Silk and Tountas (2004).

the administration of pension plans (e.g. the accounting and reporting functions) and investment transactions costs (e.g. the purchase and sale of stocks or bonds).²⁰ A switch to participant direction could drive up administrative expenses since assets must be tracked separately for each participant. Also, since participant direction could lead to smaller (and perhaps more frequent) trades, a switch to participant direction could drive up transaction costs. As noted earlier, the advance of computing technology has undoubtedly made a switch to participant direction less expensive.

In summary, the combination of the aforementioned effects makes it impossible to predict whether participant directed plans would improve or worsen pension performance. Participant direction has the advantage of putting the investment decisions in the hands of the owners (the employees) and eliminating principal-agent problems, but may simultaneously shift the decision making into the hands of less qualified investors and/or drive up the costs of operating the fund.

To examine the effect of participant direction on pension fund performance, we examine risk-adjusted return performance for pension plans. If two pension portfolios have identical expected returns but one plan has less risk, the plan with lower risk is preferred. Alternatively, if two plans have identical risk in returns but differ in terms of expected returns, the plan with higher expected return is preferred.

To examine the risk-return features of pension plans, we restrict our sample to the set of pension plans that can be found at least four times in the 1990-1998 sample of the Form 5500 data. We use the approach described in McCarthy and Turner (1989) to construct estimates of the rate of return on pension assets from the Form 5500 data. Essentially, the rate of return is calculated as investment income (dividends, interest, and both realized and unrealized capital

²⁰ See, for example, Mitchell and Andrews (1981), Ghilarducci and Terry (1998), and Whitehead et al (2003).

gains) computed as a percentage of assets at the beginning of the year.²¹ The rate of return estimates will be net of any expenses that are charged to any externally managed accounts (e.g. master trusts, registered investment companies, or investments with insurance companies). The rate of return estimates do not, however, adjust for plan expenses reported by the plan itself. Others (e.g., Mitchell and Andrews 1983, Turner and Dorsey 1990) have argued that such expenses are only rarely reported in single-employer plans because the firm absorbs those costs as part of their everyday operations. The results that follow, however, are insensitive to the inclusion of these expenses in the rate of return calculations.

Averaging across pension plans, the mean real return over the 1990-1998 time period was 9.6 percent and the average plan had a standard deviation of real returns of 10.3 percent over the time period.²² Since some plans are not participant directed for the entire sample period, we break pension plans into three groups: Not participant directed; participant directed; and switchers. Plans in the switcher category report participant direction in at least one but not all of the years. Over the sample period, 29.8 percent of plans switch to participant direction, whereas 6.7 percent report a switch away from participant direction.²³

As reported in table 7, participant directed plans have a higher mean return and a lower standard deviation of returns than employer directed plans. The mean returns are 10.2 and 9.7 percent for participant directed and employer directed plans. The standard deviation of returns for the respective plans are 8.4 and 13.6 percent.

²¹ To be precise, the annual rate of return is calculated as net income from assets divided by invested assets. The net income from invested assets is defined as the sum of interest, dividends, rents, royalties, net realized gain or loss on sale or exchange of assets, other income, unrealized appreciation or depreciation of assets, and net investment gain from trusts minus unrealized appreciation or depreciation of buildings and depreciable property used in plan operations. Investible assets are defined to reflect assets at the beginning of the year plus additional purchases of assets through the year with the assumption that all purchases are made midyear.

²² The standard deviation of returns is calculated across time for each plan. The standard deviation reported in table 7 is the average of the plan-specific standard deviations.

²³ A small percentage of plans (1.3 %) report adding then dropping (or vice versa) the participant direction option.

The plans in the switcher category have a lower mean return than plans in either of the two extremes (i.e., those included in the participant directed or employer directed category for all years) and a standard deviation of returns that lies between the two extremes.

Comparing the two extreme cases, participant directed plans achieved a higher average return with a lower standard deviation of returns. This suggests that, on average, participant direction is associated with improved return performance.

There are several reasons to question the result that participant directed plans are more efficient. First, since the stock market performed better in the late 1990s than in the early 1990s, it is possible that differences in return performance by plan type are driven by the fact that participant direction was increasing in popularity during the 1990s. This would mean that the participant directed plans would have a disproportionate share of returns drawn from the years with higher returns.

Another potential problem with the univariate analysis is that participant direction could be correlated with other factors that influence return performance. For example, if there are scale economies in the administration of pension plans and larger plans are more likely to be participant directed, univariate analysis could incorrectly support the conclusion that participant direction improves performance.

To control for these other influences, we employ multivariate regression methods. First, we collapse the data set for each pension plan that meets our earlier criterion of being included in the sample for at least 4 years. For each pension plan, we compute the average return, the standard deviation of returns, the share of assets invested in employer securities, collective bargaining status, and the years of schooling for employees. We then regress the mean return for each plan on its standard deviation of returns and the other control variables. We also

include dummy variables indicating the years that the pension plan was included in the sample (with the 1990 dummy as the omitted dummy).

The regression results are included in table 8. Four specifications are presented to reveal the effect of additional controls and sample restrictions on the estimated effects of participant direction.

The most parsimonious specification regresses a pension plan's average return over the sample period on two dummy variables indicating participant directed status (switcher, always participant directed) and the standard deviation of that plans' returns over the period. The positive coefficient (.417) on the standard deviation of returns is consistent with the Capital Asset Pricing Model prediction that, if a portfolio is managed efficiently, higher risk is rewarded with a higher expected return. A 10 percentage point increase in the standard deviation of returns is estimated to increase the average return by 4.2 percentage points. The coefficients on the participant directed dummy variables imply that, controlling for risk, participant directed plans earn a 2.7 percentage point higher rate of return than employer directed funds. Plans that switched participant direction status over the sample period earn a 1.3 percentage point higher rate of return than those that were not participant directed throughout.

Dummy variables representing the years that a pension plan is included in the sample have statistically significant explanatory power. The pattern of the year effects is consistent with the higher average stock market returns in the latter half of the 1990s. In fact, the correlation coefficient between the year effects and the annual return on the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio is .64.

Controlling for year effects leaves the estimated effect of risk on return unaltered, but reduces the estimated effect of participant direction on return performance from a 2.7 percentage

point premium to 1.8 percentage points. The estimated premium for switchers is reduced from 1.3 to 1.2 percentage points. The reduction in the estimated effect of participant direction is likely due to the fact that participant direction was rising in popularity and market returns were higher in the latter half of the 1990s. With the combination of these two trends, a failure to control for year effects would create an upward bias in the estimated effect of participant direction on return performance.

The third specifications adds controls for the size of the plan (plan assets in billions of \$), collective bargaining status and the average number of years of education of workers in the plan sponsor's industry. If there are scale economies, plans with greater asset holdings should have higher return performance.

Collectively bargained plans could place pressure on fund managers to pursue "social investing" that would promote investments in companies that pursue pro-union stands (e.g., invest in heavily unionized firms; avoid investments in firms that have been identified as antiunion). Dorsey and Turner (1990) investigate whether attempts by unions reduces fund performance, but found little evidence of such effects during the 1980s.

The educational attainment of the work force may influence the investment behavior of fund managers. In the case of participant directed plans, a more educated work force may be more financially sophisticated and better at managing the assets. In the case of employer directed plans, a more educated work force may be more capable of monitoring the performance of the fund manager and detect behavior that is inconsistent with maximizing performance for the employees.

The results of the third specification imply that there are scale economies in the management of pension plans. The size of these effects is quite small, however. The

difference in predicted returns for a plan at the 10th percentile in terms of asset holdings (approximately \$835,000 in assets) with a plan at the 90th percentile (\$30 million) is only about 8 basis points. Increasing plan size from the 90th to the 95th percentile (from \$30 m. to \$68 m.) increases returns by another 10 basis points. The scale effects become largest when assets rise from the 95th to the 99th percentile (\$68m. to \$405 million) where mean returns are estimated to increase 82 basis points. Consequently, scale effects are not large until plan assets rise to the very top of the distribution.

Collectively bargained plans are estimated to have average returns that are 4 basis points lower. While statistically significant, quantitatively this is a very small effect. This is consistent with the findings of Dorsey and Turner (1990).

Perhaps reflecting a greater ability of more educated workers to make wise financial decisions, a more highly educated work force improves returns. A one year increase in the average education of workers in the industry improves returns by 4 basis points. One might expect that the effect of education on return performance would be greater when the participants direct the accounts. We will address this question later.

As noted earlier, participant direction affects how assets are allocated. A potentially important effect is on the share of assets invested in employer securities. While a firm may prefer investments in employer stock because of the incentive effects it creates for workers, tax advantages, or the protection it provides against a hostile takeover, it can adversely affect the efficiency of the portfolio. Even and Macpherson (2004) review the literature on this point and provide empirical evidence that employer stock holdings worsen the performance of pension plans.

Since many pension funds invest in pooled accounts which do not report on holdings of employer securities in the standard Form 5500 data, we merge information on employer securities holdings from the 1996 Form 5500 spread data for those with pooled accounts. Approximately 10 percent of the pension plans with pooled funds cannot be matched with the 1996 spread data. These plans are dropped from the sample to estimate the fourth specification that adds the employer stock share as a control.

Employer stock holdings have a statistically significant effect on return performance. A 10 percentage point increase in the share of assets invested in employer stock is estimated to reduce returns by 47 basis points, holding risk and other factors constant.

Controlling for the share of assets invested in employer stock reduces the estimated effect of participant direction on return performance from 1.8 to 1.1 percentage points.²⁴ This result underscores the fact that the decision makers in employer directed plans may have different objectives than the employees. Moreover, this result may understate the true importance of participant direction since participant directed plans may have only some fraction of the assets directed by the employees. Some of the participant directed plans may, in fact, hold employer securities because the employer mandates that employer contributions be invested in their own stock.²⁵

In the fifth specification, median regression is used instead of ordinary least squares to reduce the weight placed on outliers and provide a check of whether the results are driven by outliers.²⁶ Using the median regression, participant direction is estimated to improve

²⁴ The reduced effect of participant direction on returns is not driven by the elimination of observations without employer stock share information. The estimated effect of participant direction is virtually unchanged by the sample restriction when employer stock share is excluded from the regression.

²⁵ We also estimated the rate of return regressions with additional controls for the share of assets in broad asset categories (stocks, bonds, cash, etc.). The estimated effects of participant direction changed only slightly.

²⁶ To provide some sense of the importance of outliers, 0.3 percent of plans have an estimated rate of return exceeding 100 percent in a given year, and .02 percent had a rate of return estimate of less than -100 percent. For plans with a rate of return of less than -100 percent, we assigned a value of -100 percent. The 99 percentile of

performance by 80 basis points. This is smaller than suggested by the OLS regressions, but remains statistically and economically significant.²⁷

It is important to recognize that the rate of return measure is net of expenses incurred by external fund managers. Because of the tendency for firms to absorb administrative expenses and not report them on the Form 5500, we did not net out those expenses. However, a separate analysis of the rate of return with reported administrative expenses netted out has virtually no effect on the estimated relative performance of participant directed plans.

Participant direction could alter the relationship between plan size or employee characteristics and plan performance. To investigate this possibility, the return regressions are re-estimated by participant directed status. Any pension plan that switched to or from participant direction over the sample period (the “switchers”) are eliminated from the analysis. The results are presented in table 9.

There is a statistically significant difference in the rate of return regressions across the two samples of pension plans.²⁸ A comparison of regression coefficients suggests that scale economies are much more important for the employer directed funds. Comparing funds with the 95th and median level of assets (\$68 million and \$3.9 million), the larger plan has a 27 basis point advantage among employer directed funds, but only a 7 basis point advantage among participant directed plans.

To understand this result, it is useful to consider the likely sources of scale economies in pension plan administration. First, there are potential scale economies from executing trades in larger dollar amounts. That is, doubling the amount of stocks purchased will result in less than a

returns was 33.3 percent and the bottom percentile of returns was -3.5 percent.

²⁷ The estimated effect of participant direction in the median regression is virtually identical to that obtained from OLS when the top and bottom one percent of returns are omitted from the sample.

²⁸ The null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are identical for employer and participant directed plans is rejected by an F-test at the .01 level of significance.

doubling of brokerage fees. Second, there are potential scale economies in the administration of the plan itself. A plan with twice the assets may not incur twice the expense for accounting and professional investment advice.

The fact that scale economies are more important in employer directed funds could result from the manner in which trading would take place. With employer directed plans, trades are made for the entire plan and would be relatively large in value. Consequently, doubling the number of assets and participants in a employer directed plan could benefit from the scale economies of making larger trades. In participant directed accounts, this advantage disappears because trades are made at by individual investors. Another important reason that participant directed accounts may benefit less from scale economies is their greater tendency to use external contractors (e.g., registered investment entities) to manage the funds. In this case, the scale economies may be more closely tied to the number of clients with the external manager rather than the number of participants in any one of the pension plans it manages. That is, even a small firm could reap some of the scale economies of administrating individual accounts if they contract with a larger investment company to manage the accounts.

Another important difference between participant directed and employer directed accounts is that collective bargaining reduces return performance for the employer directed plans (1.3 percentage points), but has a negligible effect on participant directed plans. This would be consistent with collective bargaining having an ability to influence the investment behavior of a employer directed fund, but having little influence on the decisions of their own members.

Pension fund holdings of employer stock reduce pension performance for employer directed plans, but actually have a modest positive effect on participant directed plans. Whereas a 10 percentage point increase in the share of assets invested in employer stock is estimated to

reduce fund performance by 71 basis points in employer directed funds, it improves performance by 9 basis points in participant directed accounts. The fact that employer stock has a negative effect on fund performance in the employer directed plans is consistent with the idea that employer directed funds are willing to sacrifice fund performance for other benefits of investing in employer stock (e.g., aligning worker incentives with firm's, anti-takeover defense, etc.).

The result that increased investments in employer stock improve fund performance among participant directed accounts is somewhat surprising. This might reflect lower transaction costs associated with the purchase of employer stock in participant directed accounts, combined with an avoidance of high-risk/low-return stocks on the part of participants. In fact, in our earlier work [Even and Macpherson (2004)], we find that pension funds tend to invest less in employer stock when “nondiversification costs” are high. An alternative interpretation is that, by chance, participant directed accounts invested heavily in employer stocks that fared especially well in the 1990s (e.g. the technology sector).

Investments in employer stock are much less common in participant directed plans. Whereas 21.7 percent of employer directed pensions hold some employer stock, only 7.5 percent of participant directed plans do the same.²⁹ Moreover, among the plans that hold some employer stock, the average percentage of assets invested in employer stock is 67.1 percent for employer directed plans but 24.2 percent for participant directed plans. The heavy concentrations of employer stock held in many of the employer directed plans could be particularly costly in terms of fund performance.

²⁹ This is based upon the merger of the 1990-1998 data where employer stock investments were merged from the 1996 spread data for plans with pooled funds. Those plans which had less than 1 percent employer stock were assigned 0 percent employer stock. Dropping ESOP plans from the data set causes slight changes for participant directed plans. The percentage of plans with some employer stocks falls to 6.6 percent and the average share of assets invested in employer stock drops to 21.21 percent. For employer directed plans, the effect is much more substantial. The percentage of plans with some employer stocks falls to 7.5 percent and the average share of assets invested in employer stock drops to 32.1 percent.

Overall, the evidence suggests that participant direction improves pension fund performance. However, it is important to note that this performance is measured at the fund level. It is entirely possible that individual employees in the participant directed plan are holding a mix of assets that are inefficient. To understand this point, suppose that a mix of stocks that matches the market portfolio is efficient. It is possible that no individual investor holds the market portfolio, but the aggregation of investments across employees matches the market portfolio. It is possible that the aggregate holdings of the workers is efficient, whereas individual holdings are not. While this possibility exists, one might question why a professional fund manager could not mimic the behavior of these independent investors and at least match their investment performance. The professional fund manager has the advantage of coordinating trades to help reduce transactions costs and does not have the high expenses associated with maintaining separate account records for the trades of each investor.

Because of the aggregation problem in the Form 5500 data, we cannot be certain that participant directed accounts are more efficient for the individual investor. Such a conclusion requires data on returns at the level of the individual investor. It is worth noting, however, that most participant directed accounts rely upon external fund managers and typically include several highly diversified stock and bond funds. The switch to participant direction shifts many of the asset allocation decisions to external managers who may be influenced less by incentives that may be at odds with maximizing returns for the investor.

The result that participant direction improves pension performance could be sensitive to the time period. In particular, the unusually strong stock market performance of the 1990s could have resulted in superior performance for participant directed plans given evidence that such plans are less likely to rebalance portfolios.³⁰ Without rebalancing, the share of funds invested

³⁰ See Choi et al (2002).

in equities would rise during the sustained bull market and result in improved performance. The failure to rebalance would reduce performance when equity markets begin to underperform relative to other investments (e.g. in 2001-2003). Our analysis of the Form 5500 data does not support this hypothesis, however. In particular, participant directed plans did not exhibit a more rapid growth in the share of assets invested in equities (or employer stock) during the 1990s.³¹

VI. Summary and Conclusions.

This study shows that the shift to participant direction may have significant effects on pension plans and that the trend toward participant direction has not been uniform across the working population. High income workers and more educated workers are more likely to have a participant directed plan. Also, the chance of participant direction is higher in plans where employees make a larger share of contributions and in a nonunion environment, though this conclusion could be reflect reverse causation whereby employees contribute more to their pensions when given control over their own investments. We did not find any consistent relationship between age, marital status, race or ethnicity and participant directed status.

Participant directed plans alter the mixture of assets in the pension plan. In two separate data sets, we find that participant directed plans tend to hold more equities, but less employer stock. The fact that employees shift away from employer stock may give some employers pause when considering whether to give their workers control. Participant direction is also associated with an increased chance that pension funds are invested through a master trust or registered investment company.

³¹ This result is independent of whether ESOPs are excluded from the sample when comparing the trends.

Despite concerns many have expressed about the lack of financial sophistication among many employees, participant direction is found to improve pension fund performance. A simple comparison of mean returns reveals that participant directed plans have a higher mean return and a lower standard deviation of returns over the 1990-1998 time period. However, this result may be driven by the fact that participant directed plans were becomingly increasingly common over the 1990s and returns in financial markets were simultaneously rising.

To better understand why participant directed plans have higher returns with lower risk, multivariate approaches were used to estimate the risk-return tradeoff. After controlling for the growth of participant direction over time, we find that the participant directed plans had a risk-adjusted return that was 1.8 percentage points higher than employer directed plans. A good share of this improved performance is due to the fact that participant directed plans hold significantly less employer stock. After controlling for employer stock holdings, participant directed plans outperform employer directed plans by 1.2 percentage points.

Participant direction also has an effect on the impact of plan characteristics on performance. For example, our evidence suggests that scale economies are less significant in participant directed plans. This result may occur because participant directed plans tend to be managed by registered investment companies who are capable of capturing scale economies for larger numbers of small firms. We also find that holdings of employer stock have a strong negative effect on performance in employer directed plans, but a modest positive effect in participant directed plans. This result might emerge because of the tendency of employer directed plans to have heavy investments of employer stock that can make it difficult to diversify away the risk. Also, employers may be more willing to invest in the stock even if there is a high

level of nondiversification cost resulting in the employees being subjected to high risk without a commensurate increase in returns.

Overall, our results paint a fairly optimistic view of the investment performance in participant directed plans. At the level of the pension plan, participant direction appears to actually improve performance. There is an important caveat, however. Our results apply to the aggregation of individual accounts within a pension plan. It is possible that individual participants have portfolios that have poor risk/return tradeoffs, but the aggregation across individuals to the plan level diversifies away the risk and leads to improved performance. Even if this were the case, however, there is still the question of why this aggregation of portfolios across individuals would outperform the employer directed plan. Put in other terms, what prevents a professional pension fund manager from matching the performance of an aggregation of individual investors who are not coordinating their investment decisions?

One possible explanation for the superior performance in participant directed plans is that a principal-agent problem is reduced by participant direction. Employees may have fewer conflicts of interest in choosing funds than a professional fund manager. Another possibility is that the greater use of registered investment companies and mutual fund managers by participant directed plans leads to improved performance because of greater access to scale economies.

Future research on this topic would benefit from data on pension performance at the participant-level. Such data would make it possible to determine whether the superior performance of participant directed plans is the result of aggregation across plan participants. It would also make it possible to determine whether subgroups of the population gain while others lose from participant direction. For example, it is conceivable that financial sophistication would affect rate of return performance. Consequently, it is possible that participant direction

reduces pension performance for less educated workers, but improves performance for more educated workers.

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Table 1. Percentage of DC Plan Participants with Participant Direction of Assets.

Year	Form 5500	SCF	SIPP
1990	29.1%		
1991	35.0%		
1992	44.4%		
1993	51.8%		
1994	57.0%		
1995	61.9%		
1996	66.2%		
1997	69.0%		
1998	73.2%	77.6%	70.6%
1999			
2000			
2001		81.5%	
No. of Workers with DC Plans.	28,573,830	2,757	6,349
No. of DC Plans	303,807	--	--

Note: In the SCF/SIPP, an individual with multiple DC plans is counted as having a participant directed plan if he or she has asset control on any DC plan. In the Form 5500, participant direction is measured at the plan level and workers with multiple DC plans would be double-counted.

Table 2. Probit Model of Whether Participant has Asset Allocation Choice.^a

	<u>1998/2001 SCF^b</u>		<u>SIPP</u>	
	Marginal probability effect ^c	t-statistic	Marginal probability effect	t-statistic
Education:				
High School Grad	0.089	3.28	0.082	1.94
Some College	0.106	4.01	0.106	2.52
College	0.098	3.41	0.100	2.32
Graduate School	0.106	3.78	0.089	1.94
Union coverage	-0.146	6.03	-0.095	3.91
Female	-0.030	1.85	0.014	0.83
Covered by DB plan	0.090	5.21	--	--
Public Administration	-0.056	1.56	-0.150	4.28
Employer has 100 or more employees	0.076	3.34	-0.033	1.54
Race (white omitted)				
Black	-0.086	2.65	-0.023	0.67
Other	-0.065	1.28	0.050	1.25
Hispanic	-0.068	1.51	-0.036	0.97
Age				
25 to 34	0.076	2.23	0.074	1.57
35 to 44	0.091	2.47	0.033	0.68
45 to 54	0.084	2.35	0.039	0.8
55 to 64	0.059	1.62	-0.018	0.33
65 to 99	-0.023	0.33	-0.040	0.43
Marital Status				
Married	-0.006	0.24	-0.019	0.83
Spouse Absent	0.006	0.18	0.002	0.06
Log-monthly earnings	0.045	3.30	0.058	3.87
Monthly Earnings (in \$1000s) squared				
Employee Share of Contributions	0.158	5.43	0.304	5.81
Year 2001	0.046	2.94	--	--
Sample size	2,396		3,675	

^a The samples are restricted to people who are participants in a defined contribution plan.

^b The SCF sample has 5 replicates of each observation to reflect the variation in imputed values. The reported standard errors have been corrected to reflect this. The reported sample size is the number of unique observations prior to replications.

^c The marginal probability effects represent the estimated effect of a one unit change in the explanatory variable on the probability that the worker has a participant directed plan evaluated at the sample mean. For dummy variables, the marginal probability effect is estimated as the change in the probability of participant direction from switching the dummy variable from zero to one with all other variables evaluated at the sample mean.

Table 3 Effect of Participant Direction on Probability of Holding Different Asset Classes in SIPP.^a

	Sample Means			Marginal probability effect of participant direction ^b	t-statistic
	Participant directed plans	Employer directed plans	Difference		
<u>Any assets held as:</u>					
Company Stock	19.7%	29.2%	-9.6%	-10.8%	4.71
Stock Fund	54.9%	38.1%	16.9%	15.8%	5.75
Bond Fund	10.9%	8.1%	2.7%	2.5%	1.59
Long Term Interest Bearing Securities	6.9%	8.6%	-1.7%	-1.2%	0.91
Diverse Fund	30.2%	24.9%	5.3%	3.3%	1.34
Government Securities	8.3%	6.7%	1.6%	2.1%	1.52
Money Market	27.0%	22.2%	4.9%	4.3%	1.84
Other Securities	19.3%	20.6%	-1.4%	-0.3%	0.16
<u>Largest Asset is:</u>					
Company Stock	4.6%	17.0%	-12.4%	-10.9%	7.82
Stock Fund	25.1%	19.8%	5.3%	50.0%	2.19
Bond Fund	2.6%	2.2%	0.4%	0.3%	0.36
Long Term Interest Bearing Securities	1.8%	2.6%	-0.8%	-0.5%	0.83
Diverse Fund	20.2%	15.3%	4.9%	3.5%	1.67
Government Securities	3.7%	3.0%	0.7%	0.6%	0.72
Money Market	22.9%	19.6%	3.3%	3.2%	1.43
Other Securities	19.3%	20.6%	-1.4%	-0.3%	0.16
Sample Size	2,266	465			

^aThe sample is restricted to workers included in a defined contribution in the SIPP.

^bThe probit estimates represent the estimated effect of participant direction on the probability that a person holds invests any (or most) of their funds in the designated asset category in their pension plan after controlling for education, gender, union coverage, coverage by a defined benefit plan, employment in public administration, firm size, race, age, marital status, monthly earnings, and the employee's share of total contributions. The marginal effects are estimated at the sample mean of the explanatory variables.

Table 4. Effect of Participant Direction on Equity Share of Assets in SCF.^{a, b}

Variable	Coefficient ^c	t-statistic	Coefficient	t-statistic
Participant Direction	0.111	1.7	0.042	0.61
Union			-0.086	-1.34
Female			0.009	0.17
Also covered by a DB plan			0.062	0.94
Public Administration			-0.129	-1.21
Firm size > 100 employees			-0.070	-1.04
Race (reference group = white)				
Black			-0.015	-0.16
Other			0.119	0.77
Hispanic			-0.123	-0.95
Age (reference group <25)				
25 to 34			-0.342	-1.72
35 to 44			-0.425	-2.14
45 to 54			-0.369	-1.81
55 to 64			-0.438	-2.12
65 to 99			-0.612	-2.31
Marital Status (reference group never married)				
Married			0.094	1.02
Spouse Absent			0.041	0.36
Monthly Earnings (in \$1000s)			0.024	0.61
Education (reference group < 12 years education)				
High School Graduate			-0.126	-0.98
Some College			-0.231	-1.77
College			-0.009	-0.07
Graduate School			-0.069	-0.50
Employee Share of Contributions			0.019	0.32
Risk Preference (reference group = willing to take substantial risk).				
Take Above Average Risk			-0.248	-2.35
Take Average Risk			-0.389	-3.75
Not Willing to take any risk			-0.484	-4.15
Planning Horizon (reference group = next few months)				
Next Year			0.011	0.10
Next Few Years			-0.100	-1.11
Next 5-10 Years			-0.031	-0.34
Longer than 10 years			0.025	0.27
Year 2001			0.085	1.68
Sample Size	2,031		2,031	

^a Coefficients are estimated from an ordinal probit model of investment behavior which fits into one of three categories: Mostly bonds, a mix of stocks and bonds, or mostly stocks.

^b The SCF sample has 5 replicates of each observation to reflect the variation in imputed values. The reported standard errors have been corrected to reflect this. The reported sample size is the number of unique observations prior to replications.

^c Variables with a positive coefficient increase the probability that the variable increases the chance that a person will invest mostly in stocks.

Table 5a. Asset Shares for Employer and Participant Directed Plans in 1990-1998 Form 5500 Data.^a

	Participant Directed	Employer directed	Difference	t-statistic
Cash	3.0%	3.3%	-0.3%	-1.19
Debt	4.8%	7.3%	-2.5%	-4.87
Stock	6.7%	15.0%	-8.3%	-3.09
Property	0.1%	0.3%	-0.2%	-1.89
Other	5.4%	7.2%	-1.8%	-3.48
Building	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	-1.75
Employer Security	14.0%	21.8%	-7.8%	-4.54
Registered Investment Co.	21.3%	9.8%	11.5%	11.41
Insurance Co.	9.6%	8.0%	1.6%	2.05
Trusts	35.1%	27.3%	7.8%	3.47
Pooled Accounts	66.1%	45.1%	21.0%	
Number of Plans	180,857	144,945		

^aThe data source for the calculations is Form 5500 data on defined contribution plans for 1990 through 1998. Asset shares are calculated with weighting by plan assets. Sample is restricted to DC plans.

Table 5b. The Extent of Investments in Pooled Accounts by Participant Directed Status. ^a

Share of Assets ^b	Pooled accounts ^b		Trusts ^c		Registered investment companies		General Accounts of Insurance Companies	
	Employer directed	Participant directed	Employer directed	Participant directed	Employer directed	Participant directed	Employer directed	Participant directed
0-9.99%	44.5	10.5	70.4	48.4	79.3	56.1	82.6	70.1
10-19.99%	2.8	1.5	3.3	5.7	2.1	1.9	1.9	5.5
20-29.99%	2.5	1.6	2.8	4.9	1.9	2.1	1.6	5.0
30-39.99%	2.4	1.8	2.4	4.5	1.7	2.3	1.6	4.4
40-49.99%	2.6	2.1	2.0	4.4	1.7	2.6	1.7	3.8
50-59.99%	2.7	2.6	1.8	4.4	1.6	3.2	1.7	3.4
60-69.99%	3.0	3.5	1.8	4.7	1.8	3.9	1.6	2.7
70-79.99%	4.0	5.3	2.0	4.8	2.1	5.4	1.6	2.1
80-89.99%	7.6	12.5	3.1	5.5	2.8	8.4	1.6	1.4
90-100%	27.9	58.6	10.5	12.7	4.9	14.1	3.9	1.5
50-100%	45.2	82.5	19.2	32.1	13.3	34.9	10.4	11.1
80-100%	35.5	71.1	13.6	18.2	7.8	22.5	5.5	2.9
Number of Plans	148,156	185,350						

^a The data source for the calculations is Form 5500 data on defined contribution plans for 1990 through 1998.

^b The reported statistics indicate the percentage of pension plans that hold various shares of assets in pooled accounts. For example, the first two data points at the left hand side of the first row in the table indicate that 44.5 percent of employer directed plans and 10.5 percent of participant directed plans have less than 10 percent of their assets invested in pooled accounts.

^b Pooled accounts include investments held in trusts, registered investment companies, or general accounts of insurance companies.

^b Trust accounts include investments held in common/collective trusts, pooled separate accounts, master trusts, and 103-12 investment entities.

Table 5c. Asset Shares for Employer- and Participant-Directed Plans using 1996 Form 5500 Spread Data.^a

	1996 Form 5500 Spread Data			
	Participant directed	Employer directed	Difference	t-statistic
Cash	4.7%	3.9%	0.8%	1.90
Debt	9.3%	10.6%	-1.3%	-1.32
Stock	24.1%	30.4%	-6.3%	-1.60
Property	0.1%	0.2%	-0.1%	-1.04
Other	6.4%	6.1%	0.3%	0.39
Building	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	-0.25
Employer Security	16.8%	24.2%	-7.4%	-3.25
Registered Investment Co.	26.3%	14.7%	11.6%	7.37
Insurance Co. ^b	12.2%	9.7%	2.4%	1.26
Trusts	--	--	--	--
Number of Plans	28,045	13,736	41,781	

1996 Form 5500 Spread Data Excluding Plans with Holdings in Registered Investment or Insurance Companies.

	1996 Form 5500 Spread Data Excluding Plans with Holdings in Registered Investment or Insurance Companies.			
	Participant directed	Employer directed	Difference	t-statistic
Cash	8.0%	4.1%	3.9%	3.60
Debt	17.0%	11.2%	5.8%	2.43
Stock	47.1%	28.9%	18.2%	3.45
Property	0.3%	0.5%	-0.2%	-0.55
Other	15.0%	8.3%	6.7%	2.43
Building	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	-1.09
Employer Security	12.7%	47.0%	-34.4%	-6.82
Registered Investment Co.	--	--	--	--
Insurance Co.	--	--	--	--
Trusts	--	--	--	--
Number of Plans	2,072	5,179	7,251	

^a Sample is restricted to defined contribution plans in the 1996 Form 5500 spread data. See text for a description of the special spread data for 1996.

^b In the spread data, all assets held in trusts are spread to the other asset categories.

Table 6. OLS Estimates of the Effect of Participant Direction on Asset Allocation.^a

	1990-1998 Form 5500 Data		1996 Form 5500 Spread Data		1996 Form 5500 Excl. Plans with Investments in Reg. Investment or Insurance Companies	
	Coefficient	t-statistic	Coefficient	t-statistic	Coefficient	t-statistic
Cash	-0.002	-0.88	0.007	1.90	0.055	6.21
Debt	-0.022	-4.96	-0.011	-1.26	0.04	1.78
Stock	-0.078	-4.69	-0.042	-1.99	0.089	1.82
Property	-0.002	-2.03	-0.001	-1.42	0.002	0.42
Other	-0.016	-3.13	0.004	0.52	0.125	5.48
Building	0.000	-1.71	0.000	-0.22	0.000	-1.06
Employer						
Security	-0.090	-6.00	-0.093	-4.80	-0.310	-5.63
Registered						
Investment Co.	0.129	14.88	0.113	8.49	--	--
Insurance Co.	0.017	2.27	0.023	1.50	--	--
Trusts	0.064	3.2	--	--	--	--
Sample Size	325,802		41,781		7,251	

^aThe coefficients represent the estimated effect of participant direction on the share of assets invested in the various asset categories obtained from a separate OLS regression for each asset type with controls the work force age and education distribution, collective bargaining status of the plan, plan assets, number of participants, and whether the plan sponsor also offers a defined benefit plan.

Table 7. Rates of Return on Pension Funds by Participant Directed Status.^a

	Mean	Standard Deviation ^b	Number of Pension Plans
All Plans	9.6%	10.3%	35,181
Employer Directed	9.7%	13.6%	10,594
Mixture of Employer and Participant Directed	9.1%	9.2%	13,585
Participant Directed	10.2%	8.4%	11,002

^a The sample is restricted to defined contribution plans that appear at least 4 times in the 1990-1998 Form 5500.

^b The standard deviation of returns is calculated by computing the average of the plan-specific standard deviation of returns.

Table 8. Regression Estimates of Determinants of Mean Pension Returns: 1990-1998.^a

	Ordinary Least Squares						(4) ^b		Median Regression.	
	(1)		(2)		(3)				(5)	
	Coeffic.	t-statistic	Coeffic.	t-statistic	Coeffic.	t-statistic	Coeffic.	t-statistic	Coeffic.	t-statistic
Intercept	0.040	53.51	0.047	24.37	-0.008	-1.17	-0.003	-0.51	0.031	14.48
Standard deviation of plan returns	0.417	739.05	0.417	756.40	0.417	721.75	0.418	727.54	0.439	2478.77
Plan switched to/from participant direction	0.013	13.12	0.012	12.45	0.012	11.42	0.005	4.78	0.003	8.25
Plan participant directed for sample period.	0.027	25.12	0.018	16.56	0.018	14.66	0.011	8.60	0.008	21.08
Year dummies (1990 omitted)										
1991			-0.006	-5.76	-0.006	-5.80	-0.006	-5.09	-0.003	-9.07
1992			-0.006	-5.42	-0.006	-5.18	-0.006	-5.08	-0.006	-17.01
1993			-0.008	-6.82	-0.008	-6.36	-0.008	-6.66	-0.007	-18.55
1994			-0.026	-20.98	-0.027	-19.34	-0.027	-19.18	-0.025	-63.68
1995			0.014	11.27	0.015	10.41	0.014	10.04	0.010	22.99
1996			0.006	4.40	0.010	5.31	0.009	5.02	0.006	11.10
1997			0.011	8.37	0.013	8.53	0.012	8.19	0.011	24.42
1998			0.008	6.93	0.009	6.92	0.009	7.02	0.008	20.62
Plan assets (in billions)					0.014	3.50	0.026	6.60	0.020	15.56
Plan assets (in billions) squared					-0.001	-2.32	-0.003	-4.68	-0.003	-13.25
Collectively bargained pension					-0.004	-2.24	-0.005	-2.46	-0.002	-3.22
Average years of schooling					0.004	7.85	0.004	8.59	0.002	12.24
Share of assets in employer stock							-0.047	-22.39	-0.039	-57.36
Sample size	35181		35181		35181		31212		31212	

^a Dependent variable in regression is mean rate of return earned by pension plan over the sample period. Sample is restricted to defined contribution plans that appear at least 4 years in the 1990 through 1998 Form 5500 data.

^b Sample size drops in specifications (4) and (5) because sample is restricted to plans that have information on employer stock share either directly from Form 5500 data or from a merger with the 1996 Form 5500 spread data.

Table 9. Regression Estimates of Determinants of Mean Pension Returns by Participant Directed Status.^a

	Employer Directed		Participant Directed	
	coefficient	t-statistic	coefficient	t-statistic
Intercept	-0.062	-4.760	0.040	8.97
Standard deviation of plan returns	0.490	600.4	0.391	326.560
Year dummies (1990 omitted)				
1991	-0.008	-3.800	-0.005	-7.15
1992	0.001	0.660	-0.007	-9.23
1993	-0.008	-3.340	-0.008	-10.06
1994	-0.018	-6.590	-0.036	-43.6
1995	0.017	6.680	0.013	13.35
1996	0.017	5.460	0.006	3.86
1997	0.015	5.290	0.013	11.93
1998	0.011	4.900	0.007	8.65
Plan assets (in billions)	0.043	4.850	0.011	3.96
Plan assets (in billions) squared	-0.004	-3.930	-0.002	-3.31
Collectively bargained pension	-0.013	-3.600	-0.002	-1.82
Average years of schooling	0.006	6.630	0.003	8.69
Share of assets in employer stock	-0.071	-29.140	0.009	2.69
	19,283		10,113	

^a Dependent variable in regression is mean rate of return earned by pension plan over the sample period. Sample is restricted to defined contribution plans that appear at least 4 years in the 1990 through 1998 Form 5500 data. Plans that change participant directed status over the sample period are omitted from the analysis.