



International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC)



International
Labour
Office

IPEC Evaluation

**“Contribution to the prevention and elimination of the commercial sexual exploitation of girls, boys and adolescents in Central America, Panama and the Dominican Republic“
(Phase One)**

RLA 02/P51/USA

P26008200050

An independent final evaluation by a team of external consultants

March 2006

NOTE ON THE EVALUATION PROCESS AND REPORT

This independent evaluation was managed by ILO-IPEC's Design, Evaluation and Documentation Section (DED) following a consultative and participatory approach. DED has ensured that all major stakeholders were consulted and informed throughout the evaluation and that the evaluation was carried out to highest degree of credibility and independence and in line with established evaluation standards.

The evaluation was carried out a team of external consultants¹. The field mission took place in March 2006. The opinions and recommendations included in this report are those of the authors and as such serve as an important contribution to learning and planning without necessarily constituting the perspective of the ILO or any other organization involved in the project.

Funding for this project evaluation was provided by the United States Department of Labor. This report does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Department of Labor nor does mention of trade names, commercial products, or organizations imply endorsement by the United States Government.

¹ Dwight Ordoñez, Ana Badilla

TABLE OF CONTENTS

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS.....	ii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	3
1. INTRODUCTION	5
1.1 The problem.....	5
1.2 The project’s general guidelines	6
1.3 Methodology used in the assessment.....	8
2. Validity of the design.....	10
3. FINDINGS.....	15
3.1 Implementation	15
3.2 The project’s achievements and challenges-.....	19
3.3 Perspectives of Sustainability	41
4. CONCLUSIONS.....	44
5. RECOMMENDATIONS.....	47
6. LESSONS LEARNED.....	53
7. GOOD PRACTICE.....	55
ANNEXES.....	57
Annex 1: Methodological Design	57
Annex 2: Connection of those interviewed.....	68

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ANDE:	Asociación Nacional de Educadores (National Teachers' Association)
ATP:	Asesora Técnica Principal (Chief Technical Advisor)
BGA:	Boys, Girls and Adolescents
CCSS	Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social (Costa Rican Department of Social Security)
CONACOES:	Comisión Nacional contra la Explotación Sexual Comercial (Costa Rica) (National Commission against Commercial Sexual Exploitation (Costa Rica))
CONAPINA	Comisión Nacional de Atención y Protección Integral a la Niñez y la Adolescencia (National Commission for the General Care and Protection of Children and Adolescents)
CSE:	Commercial Sexual Exploitation
DCL	Domestic Child Labour
ECPAT:	End Child Prostitution, Pornography and Trafficking of Children for Sexual Purposes
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMAS	Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social (Costa Rica) (Mixed Institute of Social Aid (Costa Rica))
INHFA	Instituto Hondureño de la Familia (Honduran Family Institute)
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPEC:	International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour
ISDEMU	Instituto de la Mujer (El Salvador) (Women's Institute (El Salvador))
ISNA	Instituto Salvadoreño de la Niñez y Adolescencia (Salvadorean Children and Adolescents' Institute)
MEP	Ministerio de Educación Pública (Costa Rica) (Ministry of Public Education (Costa Rica))
MIFAMILIA	Ministerio de la Familia (Nicaragua) (Ministry of the Family (Nicaragua))
NGOs	Non-government organizations
PHO	Pan-American Health Organization
PANI:	Patronato Nacional de la Infancia (Costa Rica) (Costa Rican child welfare authority)
PASCA:	Programa Acción Sida en Centroamérica (AIDS Action Programme in Central America)
PRODOC:	Project Document
PTJ	Policía Técnica Judicial (Panamá) (Judicial Technical Police (Panama))
SBS:	Secretaría de Bienestar Social (Guatemala) (Social Welfare Secretariat (Guatemala))
SPIF:	Strategic Programme Impact Framework
TBP:	Time Bound Programme
UNICEF:	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID:	United States Development Agency
USDOL	United States Department of Labour

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report is the result of the independent assessment of the project entitled “Contribution to the Prevention and Elimination of the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Girls and Boys in Central America, Panama and the Dominican Republic” (RLA 02/P51/USA), implemented from July 2002 to April 2006 in 7 countries by the International Labour Organization’s International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC-ILO), with the financial support of the Government of the United States.

The evaluation, carried out in February and March of 2006, was of a cumulative and participative nature. As its main themes the assessment covered the following aspects: the validity of the project’s design and the appropriateness of the strategy, challenges and achievements, implementation and sustainability.

The project’s general objective was to “contribute to the prevention and elimination of CSE” in the countries chosen, and its immediate goals focused on achieving results in the following 3 areas:

- Achieve greater cooperation and greater shared knowledge between the countries in the region for the prevention and elimination of commercial sexual exploitation in the region;
- Establish national legislation, policies and programmes drawn up to this effect in each of the chosen countries;
- Promote increased community and individual actions to prevent commercial sexual exploitation and care for the victims in the region.

As a general conclusion to the assessment, it may be said that the project’s achievement of its general objective has been very satisfactory and that it has achieved the majority of its specific objectives. The project’s implementation has shown considerable strengths and has, overall, been very efficient.

The project had a very clear understanding of the problem of CSE as a crime to be punished, and the multiple axes of the intervention strategies implemented (legislative reform, public awareness, the articulation and strengthening of institutions, prevention and direct care for the victims of CSE, etc.) constituted an all-encompassing response to the many aspects of the problem. The team that implemented the project showed great commitment, organization, and technical ability and implementation skills, both at the regional and national level. There have been clear and successful efforts at integration regarding the work of other cooperation agencies, thus avoiding duplication.

At the regional level the project has managed to place the issue of CSE firmly within the region’s public agenda, in coordination with the efforts of other international agencies and it has set up an important framework for parallel cooperation between countries, developing a substantial exchange of information at the regional and national level.

The project has promoted important legislative modifications in several countries in the region, by which legal frameworks that make the fight against CSE viable and sustainable can be established, and it has also promoted the setting up of inter-institutional coordination authorities in each country regarding the issue of CSE, which have, in the majority of the countries, generated proposals for national policies/plans of action.

On legitimizing and articulating the activities of a wide range of public and private inter-institutional and international agencies, the project's response to the problem of CSE in the region has been far-reaching, making the spaces for inter-institutional coordination an important element for organizing efforts to combat CSE. Networking has allowed the performance and the sense of ownership of the actions of a broad range of institutional participants to be strengthened.

The project has trained a very large group of technicians and staff from different public and private institutions and from different sectors (i.e. legal workers, the State Prosecutor, the police, migration officers, child protection institutions, journalists, members of NGOs, teachers, health workers, legislators, artists and social communicators) to develop actions against CSE and in favour of the victims.

The project's most significant weaknesses are: the limited and barely sustainable insertion of the care model for the victims of CSE within the work of public institutions which should be strengthened in order that they may take charge of its implementation independently; and the limited effectiveness of the phase-out actions over time, in view of the fact that – according to reports made by the authorities in charge of implementation- only around a third of the victims who had originally been reported by the project as having “withdrawn” remained in that condition at the time this assessment was carried out.

Finally, the assessment report sets out twenty-nine recommendations in relation to the above mentioned issues, including the reduction of certain goals during the project's second phase/Addendum and systematizes ten “lessons learned” of the same, as well as thirteen good practices that could be potentially useful and repeated in other IPEC-ILO projects on this issue.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 *The problem*

In Central America many boys and girls live in conditions that greatly hinder their healthy and ideal development. Poverty affects up to 75% of families in some countries, forcing them to seek an economic means of support any way they can. Thus, poverty exposes the boys and girls to huge risks such as malnutrition, health problems, a lack of education and economic exploitation from an early age. Poverty combined with adverse family situations such as drug addiction, alcoholism and violence within the family unit makes the boys and girls vulnerable and turns them into easy targets for unscrupulous adults who subject the boys and girls to sexual activities by promising them payment in return. A large number of girls and boys are thus lured into situations of commercial sexual exploitation. (IPEC: PRODOC: 4). The commercial sexual exploitation of children is a violation of the human rights of the region's BGA, similar to that of work in conditions of slavery, and one in which power and unequal gender relations result in the social tolerance of the problem and the fact that the majority of the victims are girls and female adolescents.

Commercial sexual exploitation has serious physical consequences (unwanted pregnancies, sexually transmitted diseases, effects of physical violence), psychological repercussions (loss of self-esteem, mistrust, sadness) and social consequences (marginalization, humiliation, social exclusion and problems with verbal and written communication) for the victims. Those directly responsible for this problem are the exploiters – mainly local men, although occasionally they are tourists and, in some cases, women. Commercial sexual exploitation is a problem that the people of the countries participating in this project are very familiar with, but it is also a problem that has been handled with a certain amount of indifference both on the part of the local communities and the authorities. (IPEC: PRODOC: 4)

Commercial sexual exploitation is a widespread problem in Central America. However, it is impossible to obtain detailed information on the number of victims or the number of adults involved in the child sex trade because using underage persons in sexual activities is illegal. Despite this, NGOs and child protection institutions that work with boys/girls at risk, such as street children, point out that every day there are more boy and girl victims of commercial sexual exploitation. Moreover, the general public appears to have some knowledge of situations of commercial sexual exploitation, for example, out of 1200 adults interviewed in the “Rapid Assessment” studies carried out in the region by IPEC in 2001, three out of every four adults interviewed said that they knew or had seen an underage person in a situation of commercial sexual exploitation in their community. The number of people who knew sexually exploited boys and girls did not vary considerably from one country to another. (IPEC: PRODOC: 7)

Despite the fact that the problem is present in both rural and urban areas, some regions claim certain conditions increase the risk of commercial sexual exploitation such as: large urban areas, high rates of poverty, high unemployment, high levels of mobilization within the countries

(motorways, border areas, ports), tourist zones, many nightlife spots (casinos, bars, discos, among others). (IPEC:PRODOC: 7)

1.2 The project's general guidelines

The project entitled "Contribution to the Prevention and Elimination of Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Girls and Boys in Central America, Panama and the Dominican Republic" (RLA 02/P51/USA) is implemented by the International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) and began its activities in July 2002. It has a budget of US\$ 3,795,285.00 as well as local donations, and is set to finish at the end of April 2006.

The aim of the project is to contribute to the prevention and elimination of the commercial sexual exploitation of boys/girls in Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic. It is a project that opens the way for placing the issue of commercial sexual exploitation on the national public agenda and it is innovative because it will provide parallel collaboration between the countries in the region in order that these may be in a position to help each other to put an end to the problem. The project will help the countries themselves to have better conditions, in the future, for preventing the problem, providing care for the victims and punishing the exploiters, since this is the only way of ensuring the actions are sustained.

During the three years of implementation, the project aims to increase national capacities by means of training workshops and technical assistance for improving legislation and for drawing up and implementing public policies and plans of action. The project will start three pilot models aimed at eliminating the commercial sexual exploitation of boys and girls and providing direct care for the victims of these communities. The project will also secure an environment of social intolerance towards the exploitation by means of communication campaigns and awareness. Finally, it will endeavour to establish regional parallel cooperation between the countries through sub-regional workshops and the exchange of information to help the countries to progress more rapidly in the fight against this social scourge by sharing experiences, lessons learned and the best practices for eliminating commercial sexual exploitation.

In order to achieve its objectives three basic strategies were proposed, to each of which corresponded several types of activities that make up the project's components, according to the information in the following table².

² In the case of El Salvador and the Dominican Republic where there are Limited Duration Programmes against Child Labour (TBPs) that include the issue of CSE, the Project only developed actions related to strategies 1 and 3.

Main strategies/project components	Main activities
1. Regional exchange of experiences and lessons	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Shared educational materials - Sub-regional Training Workshops - Setting up an institutional regional network - Internship for the exchange of experiences and lessons learned (to teach and learn) - Circulating information
2. Institutional strengthening: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. Support for National Plans, improvements to legislation, training B. Development of Prevention, Elimination and Direct Care Pilot models for protecting children from commercial sexual exploitation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Technical assistance for drawing up National Plans and putting them into practice - Technical assistance and support for modifying legislation - Training workshops - Educational materials - Setting up a model for community prevention and care for the victims in: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limon, Costa Rica • Managua, Nicaragua • Border between Guatemala and México
3. Sensitization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Information campaigns - Workshops for sensitizing key actors

By the end of the project we expect to have achieved the following results:

- Greater cooperation and shared knowledge between the countries of the region for the prevention and elimination of commercial sexual exploitation in the region;
- National legislation, policies and programmes drawn up to this effect in each of the selected countries;
- Increase in community and individual actions to prevent commercial sexual exploitation and care for the victims in the region.

Contribution to the prevention and elimination of the commercial sexual exploitation of girls, boys and adolescents in Central America, Panama and the Dominican Republic“ (Phase One)

1.3 Methodology used in the assessment

1.3.1 Type of assessment

The project's interim assessment, which was carried out during the months of February and April 2006, has the following aims:

To examine the validity of the design/strategy, including its relevance within the regional context and to the countries. In this sense the assessment will provide input for the implementation of the project's second phase which was designed in 2005.

1. Review the project's implementation to date and consider necessary changes to the strategy based on emerging experiences.
2. Review existing institutional structure and implementation capacity.
3. Review existing and potential links between the ILO/IPEC project, ILO staff members, the agencies implementing the project and review the cooperation strategies.
4. Analyze the project's achievement in terms of its sustainability and the factors that can help to achieve that sustainability during the second phase of the project.

The assessment's terms of reference are made up of 64 questions, which can be applied to 149 indicators in accordance with the following 7 thematic focal points of analysis:

- Validity of the design (19 indicators)
- Implementation (37 indicators)
- Relevance (10 indicators)
- Effectiveness (42 indicators)
- Efficiency (14 indicators)
- Sustainability (21 indicators)
- Unanticipated effects (6 indicators)

1.3.2. Types of Analysis

The assessment of the results was based on 4 aspects, the aim of which was to measure the project's performance. The feasible and relevant aspects for measuring by means of these indicators were: the validity of the design, effectiveness, efficiency (achievements) and sustainability.

Each of these concepts is described below:

a) Validity of the design: The assessment of the design consists of the analysis on the organization and consistency of the project (including the addendum), taking into account its objectives, components, activities and the premise on which it was based. The above includes

the programme's initial justification and how these elements of diagnosis have developed. An assessment is made of the degree of relevance of the proposed solutions to the environments, the characteristics of the target population and the nature and magnitude of the problem or identified need. This includes an analysis of the relations between the different levels of objectives and the development of applicable goods and/or services and of the relation between objectives, goals and indicators. The key questions regarding this aspect are centred on measuring the appropriateness of the design.

b) Implementation: The assessment of the implementation is based mainly on management factors. The assessment of the management is the analysis of the main institutional aspects the project operates within, as well as the main processes, coordination authorities and instruments available to it for developing its activities and fulfilling its objective. An analysis is made of aspects such as the following: the project's decision-making process, its organizational structure, the assigning of responsibilities, the use of assessment and monitoring mechanisms, criteria for selecting beneficiaries, terms and capacities generated at the local institutional level. Furthermore, it includes an analysis of efficiency based on the investment made and the benefits obtained. It also analyzes how the programme's resources are handled, that is, the management's ability to administer the budget resources appropriately and to raise funds from other sources. The key questions regarding this aspect tend to measure aspects of the project's organization, management and coordination.

c) Achievements: This refers to the degree of fulfilment of the proposed goals, in other words, the assessment of the measure in which the project as a whole has achieved its objectives, coverage and expected results. Success factors and bottlenecks encountered during implementation, as well as unforeseen aspects, are identified in this analysis. It includes –where appropriate – an analysis of the quality³ of the services offered and their attributes, such as: timeliness, accessibility and continuity. This is accompanied by an analysis on the degree of satisfaction of the beneficiaries and of their perception in receiving benefits on the part of the project. The main queries of this aspect tend to measure the effectiveness of the services delivered by the project.

d) Sustainability: This analyzes all the conditions that allow the project to continue operating, as well as the appropriateness of the phase-out strategy. The social and financial conditions that would allow for the continuity of the project are analyzed here: (i) organizational aspects such as the commitment of the authorities, the setting up of national and local structures to support the project, opportunities for inter-institutional coordination; (ii) existing capacities such as professional capacities, resource funding, availability of financing for a relevant period; and (iii) assessment of actors outside the institution or programme such as legitimacy from the point of view of the beneficiaries and credibility on the part of political and social actors. The main questions of this aspect tend to measure factors that ensure the sustainability of the benefits generated.

³ The quality is a specific aspect of the concept of effectiveness, which refers to the ability to respond to the needs of the users or beneficiaries.

2. Validity of the design

Summary: The project's conceptual design was fairly adequate; however, the ambitious approach of certain goals, the limited time period for the implementation of these and the existence of insufficient suppositions limited the sustainable achievement of certain objectives.

The project had a very clear understanding of the problem, clear-cut strategies, divided into sections according to the target population. A distinctive feature of this initiative, compared with other ILO projects, is that it is based on a human rights approach – an important conceptual contribution that is useful for dealing with CSE in projects of this kind. The emphasis this project places on highlighting the violation of the human rights of BGA on presenting the CSE issue and on attempting to modify the discourse of professional and institutional sectors and the media – endeavouring to eliminate definitions and terms that imply the victims are responsible – seems clearer and more consolidated than in other projects. Likewise, adopting a gender-based perspective constitutes a very relevant approach in these types of projects.

Using a Human Rights approach stresses the particular attention placed, in this project, on the search for legal changes that constitute the cornerstone for ensuring those very rights can then be claimed by the victims, respected by society and protected by the authorities responsible for social order. Likewise, it confers a particular legalistic aspect on the communication campaigns, raising awareness of the existence of the rights of children and of punishment for the exploiters. Two of the project's main concerns emerge from this: actively promoting the reporting of crimes against boys, girls and adolescents and ensuring the overall protection of the boy, girl and adolescent victims or those at risk.

The multi-faceted nature of the intervention strategies (legislative reform, public awareness, institutional articulation and strengthening, prevention, direct care for victims of CSE, etc.) likewise constitutes a wide-ranging response to the many sides of the problem. Tackling the legal aspect of CSE, the reform of national legislation and the improvement of mechanisms for its implementation from the start was a wise decision as it allows for a clearer understanding of the problem from the point of view of the violation of the rights of BGA and crime, and means it can be better understood by the public, allowing efforts in this regard to be galvanized into action.

The choice of geographical area, which is of a regional nature, was satisfactory. The project's regional nature is the correct response to the regional nature of the problem, including the multi-national nature of the trafficking networks. The regional nature of the project is aimed, likewise, at allowing the countries to exchange knowledge and experiences whilst, at the same time, contributing to raising awareness within the region and comparing national achievements regarding this problem. However, despite its regional character, the project has focused considerable attention on regional, national and local efforts related to CSE. Thus, the project's design and strategies are relevant to the political situation and specific characteristics of CSE in the different countries in the region. Similarly, the project is relevant to the national strategies for

the reduction of poverty, the elimination of gender-based violence, child protection and education that exist in some of the countries.

One of the overall difficulties in the project's design was that it did not allocate sufficient time for reaching certain objectives in a sustainable manner (e.g. 2B and, in some countries, 2A). By and large, institutional changes on the scale proposed by the project could take considerably longer than it had anticipated. This meant the project's team had a substantial additional workload and forced it to double its efforts to compensate for the limitations on the time available for reaching the goals. In this framework, despite the fact that the project's design had arranged the countries into 3 groups and proposed some distinction between goals in accordance with that arrangement, it is evident that deep down it assumed that, in the majority of cases, there would be more political will, a higher level of organization and institutional capacities and a faster pace of goal implementation than there actually was in many of the countries' State institutions in the region. Therefore, among the assumptions made by the project, it failed to assess the political and cultural resistance to making certain changes – which would delay legislative reform in some countries – or the institutional limitations to the sustainable (allocation of human and material resources for this purpose) implementation of the multi-institutional platform care model for victims proposed by the project⁴.

Some of these factors were beyond the project's control and others, such as the allocation of sufficient resources for incorporating the new methodology of care for the victims of CSE within the children's institutes in each country, would have required anticipating some variations in the implementation of the programmes of action, since the mere persuasion or proposals of the NGOs who supported the project at the technical level were apparently not enough to generate structural modifications and those related to the allocation of resources in the said institutions, which (in contrast to those responsible for pursuing crimes – State Prosecutor, Police – who carried out their role in a more straightforward manner) show greater weaknesses in undertaking rapid changes for acting, incorporating new methodological approaches and fulfilling their tasks in an efficient manner.

Thus, while the nature of components 1 (Parallel cooperation and exchange of information), 2 A (Institutional strengthening) and 3 (Awareness) present a certain degree of intrinsic sustainability once their actions have been undertaken, the project design lacks a clear phase-out strategy (activities and terms for the effective transferral of responsibilities to stakeholders), to ensure the sustainability of the actions of component 2. B. In order to ensure the institutional sustainability of this component during the following phase/Addendum of the project (as proposed but not achieved in its first phase) the design of the project would need to foresee greater "official" involvement of IPEC-ILO in the implementation of the PAs, making agreements with the States on the complementary allocation of human and material resources of a stable nature on the part of the latter, as a prerequisite for the implementation of the programmes of action that are to be jointly financed by IPEC-ILO. In this framework, it would be convenient for IPEC-ILO to carry

⁴ These institutional limitations, which are part of the context the project is working with, should be tackled by the same, in order to positively influence them or, alternatively, to establish a type and number of goals that can be realistically achieved in a sustainable manner in each country for the duration of the project. This is more important still insofar as, according to so-called critics, the limitations of the context may act as "killer assumptions" in relation to some of the project's goals.

out a prior assessment of the real operational capacities of the State institutions that will be in charge of care for the victims (normally child protection institutes), in order to carry out this project in such a way that the agreements include a specific plan of institutional strengthening to which both parties would contribute.

In a similar manner, and before the direct care actions begin, it is important to plan a period of time in which each state institution that is to be an “articulator” of the programme can prepare itself for setting up the inter-institutional care platform in each area and training the staff of the articulating institution. Along with maintaining a certain level of specialization in the State institutions’ work teams that will carry out the programmes of action in each country (in order that the said teams are not overloaded with other tasks that hinder their availability to deal with CSE), this should help to provide the PAs with greater institutional sustainability.

It is only based on this minimum framework of previous commitments between the States and the ILO that the action of the NGOs (as “companions” and transferors of innovative methodologies) will be fruitful in terms of **building sustainable institutional capacities *within the State***.

On the other hand, taking into account the complexity of the problem at hand, the innovative nature of the care approach proposed and the limitations regarding implementation at the institutional level, it could be said that the specific phase-out goals foreseen in the PRODOC were overestimated and hard to reach, in particular if the aim is an effective withdrawal of the BGA of CSE that is sustainable over time. According to information provided by the NGOs that implemented the different PAs, at the time of the assessment only 172 of the 500 victims (34.4%) reported at any time as “retired” by the project remained in that situation⁵. It is, therefore, necessary to consider that the phase-out processes are exactly that: a process and that it could take an extended period of time for the results to reach a certain level of permanence. That is why, in future designs, it is important to anticipate the **inclusion of a longer phase of accompaniment in the cases dealt with**, to include specific support and social rehabilitation activities for the victims in order to ensure a more sustainable withdrawal of the victims from CSE⁶.

In light of the above, the addition of the Addendum with respect to the objective of the withdrawal of victims in countries in which, during the first phase, achieving a phase-out component of the victims in an opportune and sustainable manner seemed unfeasible, even more so if the need to provide complementary care to persons who were officially withdrawn during the first phase but who probably remain in a situation of vulnerability and require additional follow-up is taken into account. This is why it would be wise, as suggested in the

⁵ Since CSE is a problem in which human rights are violated with serious consequences for the victims, it is not very consistent to register a case as “phased-out” less than a month after the “phase-out” has taken place, in view of the fact that many victims are lured back into CSE during the subsequent period. Some suggestions are included under the “Recommendations” section on a more prolonged and possibly more reliable way of measuring the results of each case supported by the project.

⁶ See a precise estimate regarding this point in section 3.2.2.2 of this report under the Achievements heading.

recommendations further on, to **review (reduce) the goals in the project's Addendum at this point**⁷.

In view of the subsequent pace of expenses and time periods in which the project was implemented, the budget allocated it appeared insufficient for achieving its objectives. However, funds should ideally have been allocated in order to have a communications specialist and a monitoring expert at hand, which would have eased the excessive tasks of the project's team and benefited both aspects of the implementation. In general, the project covers a wide range of activities in very diverse areas, resulting in an extra workload for the staff.

The project has made some alterations to the indicators used in the first phase, with respect to those it plans to use in the second phase. However, some of these still show certain weaknesses for following up on the project's effectiveness, and they should, therefore, be improved upon while others need to be added to measure the impact in certain areas. The proposals are the following:

Proposal for the improvement of indicators in the project's Addendum (2nd phase):

A. Add to IO/2 indicators:

(1) "Number of offenders and intermediaries punished for CSEC..."

/(out of) "*Number of offenders accused by the Police/ District Attorney*"

(2) "Number of specialized units for combating CSE set up by the Police, District Attorney and Judiciary in each country"

B. Make the written document more precise and divide the indicator related to both prevention and the withdrawal of victims into two separate indicators:

(1) "Number of children **withdrawn** after a one-year assessment period⁸.... by the pilot models..." add: /(out of) "*number of child victims of CSE that receive support from the project*"

(2) "Number of children **prevented** ... by the pilot models..." add: /(out of) "*number of children at risk of CSE that receive support from the project*"

C. Modify the indicator:

"Number of proposals for legislation reform **passed** by Parliaments..." add:

/(out of) "*number of proposals for legislation reform supported by the project and discussed by Parliaments*"

D. Add to IO/2 indicator:

"Number of child victims of CSE withdrawn during previous periods **who benefit from a one-year follow-up/support period**"

E. Add to IO/3 indicator:

"Number of people who recognize ESC as a serious problem that should be prevented and / or punished" (means of verification: periodic opinion poll)

⁷ This is even more strongly recommended if it is taken into account that national strategies and institutional capacities regarding the reduction of poverty, the elimination of gender-based violence, child protection and education in the different countries are under-financed and in some cases not applied, which could affect the sustainability of some of the project's actions. This option should not be viewed as a weakness that is exclusive to the project, but as a reasonable option when confronted with adverse institutional conditions and unfavourable contexts. For example, in 2004 the TBP in El Salvador reduced its goal regarding the number of persons in CSE set to receive direct care from 200 to 100, since it estimated that there was insufficient institutional capacity for reaching this goal, and it decided to opt to strengthen State structures. Despite this, by February 2006 only 32 persons were taking part in a care process. This figure shows how difficult it is to work with this population (for example, the *Medicos del Mundo-España* institution managed to successfully withdraw some 25 BGA with a continuous care average of between 1 and 2 years out of a total of approximately 120 cases dealt with in the centre of San Salvador). Given all of the above, in this project's case, and bearing in mind that this is precisely the area with the highest level of difficulty – particularly with respect to the sustainability of the results – it is estimated that it will be very hard to reach the withdrawal goals per country proposed for the second phase (100 BGA in Belize, 540 in Guatemala, 240 in Honduras, 580 in Nicaragua, 530 in Costa Rica and 230 in Panama).

⁸ See workability of this measure further on, in section 5, recommendation 15.

Although the suppositions proposed in the first phase document were, overall, accurate and referred to the role of the different actors' political will for carrying out actions of a legal nature and others essential to the project's progress, as well as the level of participation required for its success, the suppositions were formulated in very general terms and without anticipating measures that would allow for the non-fulfillment of the same to be tackled.

In contrast, the suppositions adopted for the second phase of the project are more specific in most cases, but, moreover, the second phase document links each supposition with the immediate objectives it would have a greater impact on and indicates specific accompaniment/response strategies that would be necessary for reducing this eventual impact. This points to the incorporation of certain institutional lessons and a greater degree of anticipation on the part of IPEC-ILO, even if, as mentioned previously, the victim withdrawal goals in the second phase are over-estimated and should be reviewed.

Finally, with regard to the involvement of employer organizations – essential and indispensable actors for ILO – in the project, it is worth noting that despite the fact they were mentioned in two immediate objectives, no precise expected results or specific activities were mentioned in relation to this sector, which is particularly relevant to the sex tourism industry. However, during the course of the project's implementation and having been pointed out in the mid-term assessment, important actions were carried out in conjunction with this sector, which partially compensated for that gap in some of the countries.

3. FINDINGS

Below is a list of the main findings for the following aspects: Achievements (effectiveness and quality), Implementation (management and efficiency) and Sustainability of the project.

3.1 Implementation

Summary: The implementation of the project shows considerable strengths and has, overall, been very efficient.

The team implementing the project, both regional and national, has, in general, shown great commitment, organization, technical skill, implementation capacity and goal fulfillment. Both at the regional level as well as in each of the different countries there has been excellent integration and complementing of the work of other cooperation agencies, avoiding doubling efforts and undertaking joint or complementary activities. For example, with UNICEF and IOM lobbying has been strengthened, as well as awareness, legislative reform, training and/or the repatriation of victims; ECPAT and *Casa Alianza* have contributed to direct care; work has been carried out together with PASCA-USAID and international NGOs in inter-institutional coordination spaces in each country; etc. In general, the staff within the countries consider the relation and communication between the regional coordination and the countries to be adequate. They feel support and flexibility at the sub-regional level and consider that the response to their needs and queries is timely⁹.

The project was based on legitimizing and articulating the activities of a wide range of public and private institutional actors and international agencies, providing a multi-dimensional response to the problem of CSE in the region, turning inter-institutional spaces for articulation into an important element for debate and the organization of efforts against CSE. Networking has allowed the actions of a wide range of institutional spokespersons to be promoted and, in many cases, has boosted adequate institutional ownership of the intervention strategies.

The project has carried out work of great importance and impact regarding the training of members of staff of public authorities and executing agencies including training in the issue of CSE, strategies for eliminating CSE, national and international legislation and how to incorporate the respect for human rights in the programmes for protecting BGA. The project has been very successful in involving parliaments, the police and state prosecutors in the elimination

⁹ However, in some cases, certain difficulties of a personal nature temporarily affected the running of the project. For example, in the case of Guatemala, the first national consultant's inter-institutional coordination difficulties provoked a delay in establishing positive inter-institutional coordination. From there on the fact that there was no national consultant handling everyday work caused difficulties for the rapid implementation of certain strategies and products. In Panama there were communication problems between the consultant and the rest of the IPEC staff, which resulted in her resigning from the project. This constitutes an important loss since the person in question had been working well.

of CSE. The project's staff, the organizations that implement it and other key organizations have a clear understanding of the concept of CSE. The use of SPIF methodology for reviewing and following up on the project's implementation has been a useful tool for facilitating communication and clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of the different institutions and actors, as well as for identifying factors that affect how CSE is maintained. SPIF methodology has been employed both at the level of national exercises for comprehending the problem and planning actions in each country, as well as the designing of some aspects of the second phase of the project (i.e. direct care component) at a regional systematization of information workshop held in Heredia, Costa Rica in April 2005. This last exercise was important since it allowed for an overall outlook of the progress made and difficulties in the different areas of the project to be established in the different countries, as well as the re-rationalizing of the actors involved in these. However, the assessment team did not find evidence of a systematic, periodic and generalized use of the SPIF as a tool for monitoring the different countries.

The project has generated a very productive synergy between levels of action (regional/national/local), its objectives and strategies (prevention/care/punishment). The regional nature of part of the activities has had a positive effect on its cost/benefit: for example, in dealing with the regional dimension of the trafficking issue and in establishing common minimum criminal records for the gradual standardization of legislation. Likewise, the existence of a pool of regional trainers in different areas favoured homogenization and the repetition of quality content.

The coordination between the Project staff and that of the time-bound programmes (TBP) in Costa Rica, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic has been excellent, since they took mutual advantage of the synergies to achieve the objectives of each project in each country. Communication between the Sub-regional Office, Geneva and the donor has been effective; requests for approval and reviewing of the project have been developed within reasonable periods and the donor has been periodically and systematically informed of the project's progress. The Geneva headquarters have, overall, responded promptly to the project Coordination's requests. The Geneva headquarters have not made major technical contributions to the project; these have only been made in a sporadic fashion. The support provided by the ILO's Regional Office in Lima has been limited, in accordance with the needs of the Sub-Regional and project's own Coordination.

The project seems, likewise, to have capitalized on the advantages of applying experiences and products from other similar initiatives, such as inter-institutional networking (present in several IPEC-ILO projects), the implementation of codes of conduct for companies (in the case of sex tourism, which ECPAT has promoted considerably), or the development of instruments for orienting the content and presentation of the media's news reports on CSE (IPEC-ILO's *Triple Frontera* project had a similar orientation). In this sense, the project's design and implementation are closely linked to the guidelines of the Stockholm Declaration of 1996 and the Yokohama Global Commitment of 2001.

The project's management processes have been fairly efficient. The financial information is well-organized and up to date. Detailed financial control on the part of the project's Coordinator has been a great help for efficient management. Despite the above, the complexity of the ILO's

institutional management procedures has meant an extra workload for the project's staff, although this aspect gradually improved in 2005¹⁰.

The project has dealt with a substantial part of the recommendations of the intermediate assessment (articulation of components, taking the project out of the capital cities, including the trafficking issue, carrying out regional level internships, closer coordination with other international agencies, promoting the construction of a new type of masculinity, proposal for the implementation of a second phase, etc.)

The selection of implementation agencies was adequate since these had experience working with BGA at risk and in CSE in particular. The NGOs that developed direct care processes for the victims have been extremely committed to the BGA and have the technical capacity for providing this care and for eventually transferring it to government employees.

However, despite the efforts carried out by both the NGOs and the project's staff, the project has not secured a sustainable commitment from the government child protection institutions in formal agreements or commitments for allocating specific financial and human resources, which ensure the continuity of the prevention and withdrawal actions carried out in conjunction with PANI (Costa Rica), *Mi Familia* (Nicaragua) and the SBS (Guatemala). In 2005, when the first major PAs concluded, these institutions did not take on the actions that the NGOs had initiated with them and most of the services for the BGA and their families would have been suspended had it not been for the mediation, in the case of Guatemala and Costa Rica, small 3-month projects of ECPAT and the UCR, supported by the project, which have given hope for a certain continuity of the institutional work with the State.

This problem does not appear to have been counteracted by the response strategies planned regarding the suppositions, in the second phase document. The probability of insufficient input of human and material resources on the part of the States of certain countries for the implementation of care systems, which would affect the performance and sustainability of these, should be a top priority issue for the project's team in this second phase. Moreover, it is recommended that due diligence type studies are carried out to assess how the CSE issue would be incorporated into the institutional context of certain State organizations, as well as the actual existing capacities of the latter and the real feasibility of their contributions (human resources and others), in order to establish the perspectives of the institutional sustainability of the actions **before** committing funds/implementing projects in conjunction with these institutions. The timely and/or parallel development (when the care projects are being implemented) of more realistic institutional strengthening for the said government entities could eventually be considered. For example, the registration system for victims cared for should have been strengthened and be operational as a permanent institutional capacity belonging to the same (and not to the NGO that supports it) from the outset or even before the programmes of action are implemented.

¹⁰ In addition, the overlapping of the closure of the first phase with the start of the project's second phase has meant a heavier extra workload and the definition of goals for this second phase appears to have been carried out without taking into account the sustainability of some of the results verified in the first phase.

On the other hand, and despite what has, by and large, been a very efficient implementation, one of the main weaknesses of the project is that the workability of its “withdrawal” concept (single measurement, one month after withdrawing from CSE) does not ensure an effective withdrawal of the victims from CSE or the sustainable protection of their human rights.

Another weakness in the project’s first phase of implementation is related to not having worked enough on or achieved the commitment of the workers and employees to supporting the project. This limitation is being dealt with directly within the design of the Addendum/second phase.

Finally, the following table shows the sum invested (expenses up to December 2005/plan of balance committed up to April 2006) in direct expenses of each of the project’s (sub) components, in addition to the assessment of the financial effectiveness according to the percentage of goal fulfilment.

Assessment of the Effectiveness of the Project Components <i>(link between investment and achievement of results)</i>			
Component	Sum invested *	% of project’s total direct costs	Assessment **
1. Parallel Cooperation	306.550	14 %	A
2.A. Institutional strengthening	502.347	22 %	A
2.B. Pilot Direct Care Models	782.481	35 %	C
3. Sensitization	472.378	21 %	A
4. Technical assistance ***	164.952	8%	
<i>Total</i>	2.282.708	100%	(Direct costs)

* This table does not include the sum that corresponds to the regional team’s fees and other general costs

** Assessment scale is based on qualitative summary of fulfilment as given in section 3.2 with A meaning the highest indicated fulfilment

*** This point is not a component (it was included in component 2-A in the budget) but has been separated in this table because the consultants have supported all the project’s components.

Although just over a third of the direct expenses have been assigned to the sub-component of care for victims, this component has had less impact due to the fact that the number of direct

beneficiaries had to be reduced, given that, on the other hand, the level of **real** goal fulfilment (that is, sustainable results) has been less than 50%.

3.2 The project's achievements and challenges-

The following analysis of the achievements and difficulties of the project aims to assess both the fulfilment of its immediate objectives (effectiveness) and how rational the allocation of the funds invested has been (efficiency) by identifying factors that contribute to its success such as the bottlenecks found during the implementation of the actions.

Due to the complexity of this project's actions and products developed in three countries, the analysis focuses on the organization in 3 components and various products contained in the project's original document.

The following table includes the assessor's preliminary evaluation regarding this project's "general result".

Thus, with respect to the fulfilment of the project's GENERAL objective: "*To contribute to the prevention and elimination of the commercial sexual exploitation of children in Central America, Panama and the Dominican Republic*", it is possible to confirm that ***the project has achieved its General Objective in a very successful manner.***

3. 2.1 Component 1: Parallel Cooperation and exchange of information

Immediate objective 1: "*By the end of the project there will be increased shared knowledge and greater cooperation between the countries in the region for the prevention and elimination of CSE.*"

Summary of results: *The project has, in a very satisfactory manner, fulfilled its objective and products related to parallel cooperation between countries and the exchange of information at the regional level, including the transfer of methodologies, training qualified human resources in the fight against CSE and providing support materials for this purpose.*

The products of this component are:

1.1 120 staff members of public and private institutions trained in: police investigation, design of local programmes for the prevention of the problem and care for the victims, as well as legislative reform.

1.2 Information (articles, reports and other documents) on experiences and lessons learned in different countries, which have been circulated throughout the region

1.3 Regional informative material drawn up and circulated.

3.2.1.1 Product 1.1 120 staff members of public and private institutions trained in: police investigation, design of local programmes for the prevention of the problem and care for the victims, as well as legislative reform.

The project's regional component has acted as an important catalyst for the development of actions at the national and regional level.

The project has far exceeded the fulfilment of its proposed goal, benefiting over 7,000 people, including legislators, district attorneys, migration officials, police and journalists, through courses and internships. The effects of the training activities, sharing experiences and circulating the information throughout the region, have had a considerable and positive impact on improving the capacity for action related to the CSE issue in sectors such as the police, migration, justice administration and communications.

The drawing up of regional material (video and radio spots, research, intervention guides and training and circulation material (posters and others), with a view to their use and eventual adaptation to each country, made an important contribution to highlighting the CSE issue in the region.

The sharing of experiences between countries and institutions has been very beneficial; the State prosecutor's research model used in Costa Rica and circulated throughout the region has been almost immediately implemented in several countries (Honduras, Panama, the Dominican Republic and partially in El Salvador). Internships have been carried out with district attorneys and police.

Various exchanges at the regional and national level, on experiences acquired by the institutions regarding care for the victims, have also been carried out.

Equally, work undertaken in conjunction with migration authorities and staff in the different countries, in coordination with the IOM, have had a considerable impact on the institutional capacity of these organizations and on the issue of the repatriation of the victims.

However, in contrast to that observed in the migration and justice administration sectors of some countries, this has not resulted in the proactive or sustainable incorporation of care methodologies in Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Guatemala (e.g. PANI, *Mi Familia* and the Social Welfare Secretariat)

3.2.1.2. Product 1.2 Information (articles, reports and other documents) on experiences and lessons learned drawn up in the different countries and circulated throughout the region

The technical material drawn up for institutional staff members are of a very high quality with regard to their content and presentation and have been widely circulated throughout the region, resulting in their being extremely useful for institutional agents.

The circulation of the results of regional studies such as the initial diagnosis and the study on masculinities has had a considerable impact on raising awareness in key sectors.

However, the production of popular material or popular educational material (popular versions) for BGA, their families and members of the community has been scarce; and some of the little prevention material that has been produced for children or the general public has included too much text, which hinders its easy assimilation.

3.2.1.3. Product 1.3 Regional informative material drawn up and circulated.

A vast selection of research, sensitization, training, methodological systematization and other material for supporting the work of a wide range of professional categories (district attorneys, police, journalists, migration agents, those in charge of prevention and care programmes, the health sector, education) has been produced, and constitutes a priceless contribution to the actions carried out at the national level.

3.2.2 COMPONENT 2: INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING AND DIRECT CARE

Immediate objective 2: *“By the end of the project national legislation, policies and programmes will have been drawn up and being implemented in the chosen countries”.*

Summary of Results: *The project has, in most cases, fulfilled this component’s objectives in a satisfactory manner, with the exception of the effectiveness and sustainability of the prevention and direct care actions (under the sub-component 2B).*

Component 2 includes two sub-components, analyzed below:

2a – Institutional strengthening regarding legislation (includes its application), policies and inter-institutional coordination.

2b – Implementation of models of care for the victims of CSE.

3.2.2.1 Sub-component 2a: Institutional strengthening at the national level

The sub-component 2^a proposes the following as its sub-objective: “Inter-institutional coordination authorities (commissions, committees, implementation units) operational in each country (child protection institutes, Health Ministry, Labour Ministry, Education Ministry, Tourism sector, Judicial Power, NGOs, trade unions, employers, international agencies).”

Summary of results: The project has fulfilled its sub-objective in a satisfactory manner, as well as products of this sub-component in the majority of the countries. Inter-institutional coordination authorities have been established in each country as have policies and programmes and legal reform in most countries. Similarly, a considerable number of technicians and staff from different public and private institutions have been trained.

The products of this Sub-component include:

2.a.1 Drawing up and circulating policy and programme proposals, as well as proposals for improving legislation for protecting children against sexual exploitation and trafficking, and punishing offenders.

2.a.2 Technicians and staff members of public and private institutions trained in the following issues: detection of cases of CSE and trafficking for the sex trade; police investigation; institutional and individual responsibilities of staff members in key sectors; press lobbying; others.

3.2.2.1.1 Product 2.a.1 Drawing up and circulating policy and programme proposals, as well as proposals for improving legislation for protecting children against sexual exploitation and trafficking, and punishing offenders.

In regard to legislation, and with the help of technical assistance, the project has played a key role in promoting the approval of reforms to penal codes related to CSE in Honduras¹¹, Panama¹² and El Salvador¹³, and has contributed to drawing up legislative proposals awaiting approval in

¹¹ Even though it is not the project’s responsibility, it must be pointed out that in regard to the recently approved penal reform in Honduras, which punishes CSE, sexual relations with adolescents were partially penalized (art. 142:

Contribution to the prevention and elimination of the commercial sexual exploitation of girls, boys and adolescents in Central America, Panama and the Dominican Republic“ (Phase One)

Guatemala and Nicaragua, having established minimum criminal sentences throughout the region and sensitizing members of congress in each country with the participation of legislators from different countries.

Proposals for the protection of victims and for penalizing CSE have been drawn up.

In Guatemala, in February 2005 the crime of people trafficking was typified (art. 194 of the P.C.) and by February 2006 there is a proposal approved by consensus for modifying the Penal Code (initiative 2630) that will allow for the introduction of new legal standards and more effective penalization of CSE¹⁴.

In Nicaragua's case, due to the hostile internal climate the Penal Code reform for punishing CSE has not been approved. Other factors such as abuse or corruption, which are insufficient for penalizing the different types of CSE, are currently used as a reference.

With regard to **policies**, there are national plans or policy guidelines that have been approved by most countries and are in the process of being approved in two of these (Honduras and Panama). The use of participative methods (SPIF) for comprehending the phenomenon and establishing priorities has proved very appropriate.

In regard to the **inter-institutional coordination mechanisms**: the technical assistance and support provided by the project in the different commissions, inter-institutional committees, Articulation Group, and other coordination mechanisms has allowed these to continue functioning and consolidate their progress. With respect to Costa Rica, for example, the Child and Adolescent Council has granted CONACOES the status of permanent National Commission and its members hold regular meetings. In Guatemala there is an articulation group for the National Plan, comprised of GOs, NGOs, and IOs as a forum for debate and for promoting awareness of the CSE issue. El Salvador has a Work Committee against CSEBGA, coordinated by the PNC in which 11 public and international institutions coordinate their efforts. In Nicaragua CONAPINA plays an important role in articulating an Inter-institutional Commission on the CSE issue.

The concepts of a substantial number of the institutional operators have been standardized (district attorneys, judges, migration officials, children's institutions concerned with CSE in each

rape "abusing trust"). The latter contradicts the regional proposal of minimum contents (p.44). Furthermore, it should be noted that in some cases the penalties are not proportional to the crimes in some concepts related to CSE.

¹² Substantial support was provided to this country for the approval of Law 16 on CSE.

¹³ In the case of El Salvador and in order to progress in the fight against CSE it is necessary to double efforts to improve the justice administration system, since, despite the existence of a criminal law with differentiated types, the improper application of the law and, ultimately, corruption resulted in the dismissal (acquitted due to lack of evidence) of all of the 13 cases of victims of CSE reported by the State prosecutor for Trafficking in 2004 (with 26 exploiters arrested), and in 2005, of 25 cases of victims of CSE (with 56 exploiters detained), 50% have been dismissed and 50% are pending public hearing.

¹⁴ The Guatemalan legislation on sex crimes is weak and favours impunity, since it does not take into account issues such as pornography and others and replaces effective prison sentences with fines of Q500 to Q5,000. For example, in 2004, 8 sentences for aggravated procurement were passed, but the penalties were fined approximately Q3,000 (US\$400). In one case a judge even gave custody of a girl to the procurer's lawyer.

country (rights and gender approach, legal standards, dealing with the crime, avoiding re-victimization). For example, in Guatemala, in November 2005 the SBS promoted the signing of a commitment to set up an inter-institutional network for the prevention, protection and care for BGA victims (general framework).

An external factor to the project but one that should be mentioned as it will have an important impact on the applicability of the **national plans** is the fact that the States have not allocated specific financial resources for implementing their respective national plans, which limits their effectiveness and the fulfilment of their commitments. With regard to Costa Rica, the National Plan has not been put into practice as annual plans and it does not have a specific institutional budget for its implementation, instead, each institution uses their own entries that are not specifically assigned for these purposes. Furthermore, there is no monitoring system for the plan's goal fulfilment or a joint database and there are problems for keeping this type of system operational. In El Salvador, the National Plan on Child Labour (2006) pending approval by the National Committee for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, has a chapter on CSE. In Guatemala there is a "National Plan of Action against the CSE of BGA" approved in 2001 and based on which the Articulation Group has established a Strategic Plan 2005-2006. However, the non-fulfilment of some of the project's critical suppositions (e.g. a clear political will for the reform and implementation of actions) has hindered its implementation and the many changes of posts within the Social Welfare Secretariat have limited progress regarding the government's commitment. During the period 2002-2004 and most of 2005 there was no progress made in the working and implementation of the National Plan approved in 2001. A similar situation occurred in Honduras where there has been a high rotation of staff members in the CISESC and the IHNFA has not taken on the role that corresponds to it within the latter's framework. Many representatives lack the political power for decision-making. In Nicaragua the project provided support for establishing the National Plan against CSE and the progress made by the CONAPREDES in this respect in Panama has been supported¹⁵.

On the other hand, it should also be pointed out that in the majority of the **countries local government authorities, community grassroots associations, business associations and trade unions** have not been sufficiently briefed on the fight against CSE.

In this regard, one of the few experiences of working with the business sector – a very valuable and outstanding one – is that of Nicaragua and the tourist sector. In this country a Code of Conduct for the protection of BGA against CSE was signed (in conjunction with UNICEF) by the Nicaraguan tourist sector, including the Chamber of Tourism, hotel associations, tour operators, vehicle rentals, restaurants, travel agencies, small and medium size businesses and tourist micro-businesses.

With regard to the trade unions it is important to point out that within the immediate objective 3 of the second phase proposal the following is included as a result: "*Employers' and workers' organizations informed as to how to prevent CSEC (including sex tourism) and trafficking*".

¹⁵ Regardless of the non-existence of a formal "National Plan", the CONAPREDES has initiated important CSE prevention activities such as the communication campaign it began in 2005 together with the National Journalism Council.

This fills the gap that emerged in the design of the first phase regarding the participation of worker organizations.

3.2.2.1.2 Product 2.a.2 Technicians and staff of public and private institutions trained in the following: detection of cases of CSE and trafficking for the sex trade; police investigation; institutional and individual responsibilities of staff members of key sector; press lobbying; others.

The development of numerous strategic alliances in each country and at the regional level with other international organization has allowed for the issue to be included in national agendas and promoted at the institutional level. In this framework, the development of spaces for sharing experiences among the institutions of each country and at the regional level and the development of training processes aimed at raising awareness and standardizing concepts has contributed to the inclusion of the issue on the institutional agenda of the legislator, justice administration, police and migration sectors in the majority of the countries. The project has trained more people than it established in its goals¹⁶. The participants in the training workshops came from areas where the direct care Programmes of action operate and where there is a greater risk of CSE.

The training of technicians and members of staff of public institutions in the countries where legal reform has taken place (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic) has resulted in a swift and decisive organization of specialized research units that investigate crimes related to CSE as acts of organized crime and that coordinate their actions¹⁷.

Within the framework of sub-regional coordination between district attorneys the “Treaty of legal mutual assistance in criminal matters between the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama”, approved in 1993, was reintroduced to apply it to the CSE issue.

The training and internships of district attorneys throughout the entire sub-region have been very useful, highly valued by the participants and of a very high technical standard. As a result of the project’s support and this training important achievements have been made worth highlighting such as that of the State Prosecutor in the Dominican Republic, which has a training school that includes CSE within its curriculum in the Additional Training Programme. Moreover, this school is, on its own funding, inviting district attorneys to Costa Rica to give training to 161 members of the State Prosecutor.

¹⁶ However, the goals established reflect a low proportion with respect to the number of people working in the different sectors such as health and education. For example, in Costa Rica 95 teachers who were members of trade unions (ANDE and SEC) were trained in different regions within the country. The same was true of the health sector; very few people participated (10 workshops with 10 to 20 people each); the cultural sector (51 people trained) and the Judicial Power (between 100 and 120 people trained). In all these cases, moreover, there has been no follow-up to the training. It is not known whether these staff members have detected and reported cases or if they have carried out any other action related to CSE.

¹⁷ In Costa Rica the Sex Crimes Unit existed before the project began but it became an important ally for the latter.

Despite the progress in the overall number of people trained, the work with teaching staff in the education sector is still limited and CSE prevention has not been included in the school curriculum. Work on sensitizing the staff in local governments and trade unions is still limited. In this regard, it should be pointed out that despite the fact the project's proposal mentions setting up local models of prevention and care, there are no proposals for action aimed at strengthening the role of local governments in this respect. This is probably the reason why PAs were not carried out in this type of institution. The limited levels of effective de-centralization of power and existing resources in certain countries may also have influenced the option of favouring work relations with national organizations rather than local governments. However, the implementation of the project showed that the latter play a vital role and this was also pointed out in the mid-term assessment.

Factors related to context have a limiting effect that influences some of the project's suppositions. For example, there is an overall weakness in the region with respect to the real capacities of implementation, the professional standards of human resources and the financial means of the majority of national institutions in charge of child care. In Guatemala, for example, even though training processes for government employees were carried out in order to identify institutional capabilities and courses of action, these have not generated a care platform since those who participated did not always possess decision-making power. Even though it constitutes important progress in the region, the direct training of human resources has, by and large, had limited scope with respect to the number of participants in each of the activities undertaken, considering the vast number of staff in public institutions. The need to reach an increasing number of people is a matter that will continue to be dealt with in the project's Addendum.

3.2.2.2 Sub- component 2b: *Direct Care Pilot Models: Community models for the prevention and elimination of exploitation and direct care for BGA for their protection from CSE*

The Sub-component 2b proposes the following as its sub-objective: *Pilot models in 3 communities (Limon, Managua, Guatemala/Mexico border) for prevention, elimination and care for victims."*

Summary of Results: *The project has promoted the implementation of an innovative and relevant model based on a human rights and gender approach, but its application has had a limited impact and little sustainability during the first phase. The implementation of preventive schemes aimed at the grassroots level in high risk CSE areas has also been limited.*

The following are the products of this component:

2.b.1 Local model of prevention and care for sexually exploited children in Limon, Costa Rica in operation and 150 children in care.

2.b.2 Local model of prevention and care for sexually exploited children in Nicaragua in operation and 200 children in care.

2.b.3 Local model of prevention and care for sexually exploited children in the Guatemala/Mexico border area in operation and 150 children in care.

3.2.2.2.1 Analysis of the elements common to the 3 products of sub-component 2b

The cyclical care model of articulated responses promoted by the project, and that is based on a human rights approach, constitutes an important methodological contribution to dealing with cases of CSE. The project has mobilized and set in motion the commitment and expertise of a wide range of private institutions (*Fundacion Rahab, UCR, Casa Alianza, ECPAT, Quincho Barrilete*) in favour of the victims of CSE, which has allowed for the implementation, under distinct guises, of the principles of the care model and has enriched the countries' institutional experience. Within this framework, and despite the fact that capacities for dealing with the problem in a sustainable manner within State institutions have not yet been generated and a clear financial or staff commitment on the part of the latter¹⁸ has still not been made, the project has allowed for the provisional increase in care for the target population by private organizations.

On the other hand, the efforts of the different institutional actors helped the project to achieve the effective withdrawal (by September 2005) of 172 victims of CSE in Guatemala, Costa Rica and Nicaragua, which is equivalent to 36% of the total number of victims (475 cases) in the programme's care and this success rate ranks average compared with other care programmes in the region (45% in *Casa Alianza Honduras* and 20% in El Salvador's *Medicos del Mundo*). The

¹⁸ Technical and material limitations and a lack of commitment and time on the part of the State counterparts for allocating human and material resources to care programmes prevented the NGOs from steadily transferring care methodologies to the latter and the work of both from being articulated efficiently. Once the work of the NGOs concluded in Limon, Guatemala and Managua, the continuity of these was not independently undertaken by the State institutions. Within this framework, it would be interesting for the project to consider alternative work methods among its possible options - where necessary and possible - based on State institutions specializing in violence against women and experienced in dealing with family-related matters. This could constitute an alternative for reinforcing the viability of the project's prevention/withdrawal component when the outlook of sustainable work with the receptor institution in child-related matters is not sustainable (as is the case, for example, with the TBP in El Salvador where the withdrawal programme is carried out directly with the ISDEMU, instead of with the ISNA). For example, in light of an eventual implementation of the Direct Action component in Honduras, information from different local institutional actors was collected given that the IHNFA would be lacking in technical skills, and financial and material resources for implementing a proposal such as that of the programme (the institution has been undergoing re-structuring for over a year, 95% of the institutional budget is spent on wages, and there are labour inflexibilities that conspire against its efficiency). Moreover, in Honduras' case it is worth bearing in mind that the issues of CSE and trafficking are incorporated in the National Plan of Opportunities for Children and the Strategy for the Reduction of Poverty, which is why articulation with the State institutions that handle these matters should be pursued.

said figure is equivalent to 34.4% of the project's original withdrawal goal – 500 cases in the 3 countries. The programme's real level of effectiveness (sustainable withdrawal, see figure for each country) is equivalent – as in other programmes – to 30 to 40% of the total number of cases in care from the start. In view of this situation, the overall victim withdrawal goals were overestimated in the first phase of the project and are extremely overestimated in the second phase.

The period estimated for the implementation of the PAs is insufficient given the complexity of the problems faced by the victims and the limited period assigned for reaching sustainable withdrawal. The PAs underestimate this space (which could entail over a year) and prematurely register as “withdrawal” processes that began hardly a month before that require a more prolonged period of observation and support to ensure the sustainable and effective protection of the BGA's rights. Similarly, when the PAs are of a short duration (as in the UCR cases and the ECPAT project at *El Ferrocarril*) this generates cohorts of victims who are provided with temporary care by the programme without any assurance of subsequent sustainability or follow-up. In section 5, recommendation number 15 of this report, there are suggestions as to an alternative method of measurement in 3 stages of the results of withdrawal, which could prove more appropriate for ensuring both the sustainability of the processes of withdrawal and the effective protection of the rights of BGA victims of CSE¹⁹.

There is no work model for prevention focusing on high risk urban areas and based on the strengthening of community structures. The majority of preventive interventions implemented, which centre mainly on the victims' siblings, do not deal with vulnerability factors of a social nature. In practice the problem is handled almost exclusively in many PAs in NGOs and government organizations, without incorporating local governments or community agents. It is possible, however, that recent prevention/care projects, such as that implemented in Jutiapa, contribute to changing that tendency²⁰.

The development of a database programme constitutes progress with a view to monitoring the programmes' implementation. However, the delayed installation and adjustment of the database programme (until July 2006) meant it could not be used opportunely for monitoring the programmes. It is advisable that the database system, as well as being used for establishing general statistics regarding the population, should also be used as feedback for the individual care processes allowing for individual files to be drawn up for each case and the monitoring of the individual care plans²¹.

¹⁹ Within this framework, promoting the sharing of other experiences (Unicef-Nicaragua / Chimali model, Institute of the Family in the Dominican Republic, and with other institutions) is also recommended in order to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of different care models and for making recommendations that will allow the sustainability of the interventions to be consolidated.

²⁰ In the future it would be advisable to extend the concept of “preventive” for those who receive care within the programme to all the Pas, to include children in areas of risk (e.g. as ECPAT does, for example, in the *El Ferrocarril* area or as CONAMUS does within the framework of the TBP in El Salvador).

²¹ For example, it would be interesting if the database could identify and strengthen the condition of each BGA in the process (e.g. abandonment, undergoing process of withdrawal, stable withdrawal – one year or more no longer in CSE), break down the reports into care types (e.g. immediate reinsertion, temporary institutionalization, independent

No specific risks were detected regarding access to the information in the database that could directly affect the beneficiaries. However, the project should clearly indicate to the staff of the authorities in charge the need for a professional handling of the information and the obligation of confidentiality that access to the database entails, since it is precisely this last aspect – that of the improper use of the information – that could unnecessarily reveal the identity of the victims to third parties and lead to stigmatization at school or in the community.

3.2.2.2.1.1 Product 2.b.1 – Local model of prevention and care for sexually exploited children in Limon, Costa Rica, operational and 150 children in care

The *Fundacion Rahab*, the first institution in charge of the implementation of this objective, has raised awareness of the problem with a considerable number of local institutional actors and established a platform for the protection of the rights of CSE victims. From the time of the implementation of the project's model up until mid 2005 Rahab had partially fulfilled the goal set by the project. Out of 135 cases in care only 34 had dropped out early, and of the remaining 101 at least half remained in withdrawal each semester, and of these approximately 40 cases (30%) were still in withdrawal after one year. The problem of the sustainability of the results, however, remained since continuous follow-up and support could not be guaranteed in the majority of cases after the end of the PA. The following up by the UCR of some cases withdrawn by Rahab shows a limited effective sustainability of the results (3 out of 7 that were designated withdrawn are not any longer).

The implementation of the programme by Rahab awakened expectations regarding welfare on the part of the beneficiaries. The local institutional network meetings began late (May 2004). The geographical area covered by the programme implemented by Rahab (several cantons and in a radius of many kilometres, in a rural area) was too extensive for the human resources available. Moreover, the team's move to Guapiles in the first term of 2005 affected the running of the institutional network in Limon. In the second semester of 2005, on taking over the implementation of the project in Limon, the UCR introduced the signing of "family contracts", which implied a conditioning of the use of subsidies in the PA's implementation that would constitute a positive element for avoiding the reliance on welfare and for strengthening the promotion of family achievements.

Training in the development of productive activities by the *Fundacion Mujer* faced many difficulties related to the life conditions of the participants (5 youths of legal age and 9 mothers). The difficulties were: health problems, domestic violence and a lack of concentration. There has

life, in substitute home, repatriated, etc.). It would be equally advisable to add a "window" in the first part of the individual file allowing for a specific description of the acts considered CSE since this information is currently "lost" amongst the files or is not always explained clearly, which could ultimately create confusion between cases of sexual abuse and CSE. Likewise, it is suggested that the database always include macros that will allow work on the database to be carried out on several machines at once and will standardize the information of several programmes or at the regional level.

been no follow-up in which one may know for certain how many of the productive activities begun by them (selling clothes, perfumes, jewellery and making fast foods) continue.

The implementation of the PA in Limon was affected by the excessive bureaucracy of some government employees (a similar situation occurred in regard to the handling of cases of sexual abuse referred by MINED). The current PANI authorities in Limon prefer to maintain a supervisory role and that the programme should continue to be implemented by the NGOs or the University (PANI's entire technical staff in Limon consists of 7 people for all the institution's duties, while that of the CSE project – Rahab – was 6 persons) since the staff's time is taken up in management tasks.

The training, provided by the UCR, of PANI's staff on the care model constituted an important contribution and a basis for promoting a degree of sustainability to the technical resources/knowledge incorporated by the institution. Nonetheless, PANI still lacks the technical and financial capacity, as well as that of human resources, to carry on the implementation of the care model independently with an inter-institutional platform for the protection of rights.

PANI's participation in the PA's implementation has been limited and the lack of coordination between institutions early on hindered the project's implementation. For example, the IMAS did not contribute to developing the institutional platform, limiting the potential sustainability of the programme's achievements. There has been no articulation of the welfare system with the needs of a care project that would have to be continued by PANI. The articulation with institutions for maintaining the institutional platform is weak and its power to convene rests on the efforts of the NGOs. The operational weaknesses of Limon's State Prosecutor (the post of District Attorney specializing in sex crimes is vacant) did not allow all the reports made to be investigated and duly processed as such. The end of the PA implemented by Rahab has prevented the continued support of and follow-up to the majority of cases.

3.2.2.2.1.2. Product 2.b.2 – Local model for the prevention and care of sexually exploited children in Nicaragua operational and 200 children in care

According to the *Asociacion Quincho Barrilete* (AQB), of 213 cases dealt with, 112 were of victims and 101 were "risk" cases (=siblings and similar to victims). The AQB estimates that out of the 112 victims, 40% (approximately 45 cases) were withdrawn, which, as mentioned above, means it is within the average success rate reached by other institutions in other countries²². The girl beneficiaries interviewed viewed the programme in a positive light. They

²² For example, in Honduras *Casa Alianza* operated a programme for 20 to 25 girls coming from withdrawal by IHNFA, the State Prosecutor, street work itself and/or demands of beneficiaries or induction by friends (e.g. "snowball effect"). Research carried out by *Casa Alianza* on the scale of the problem in Honduras identified some 1,100 cases throughout the country, 4% were male). The *Casa Alianza* programme retains 60% of beneficiaries who enter the institution (this permanence is voluntary); of these approximately half (30% of the total received at the start) are reintegrated into their home or that of relatives (with the rest work is focused towards independent adult life). 10% of those reintegrated into their family are lured back into CSE. Some girls and adolescents spend over a year in the reinsertion process.

consider their lives to have changed since they entered it. What they most value is that there is someone who listens to them in the programme and someone who is concerned about them. Moreover, they believe they can speak more openly at home than they could before. An unexpected result of the project was the registration at the Registry Office of the BGA who were not previously registered. The non-registration is, furthermore, a problem in relation to trafficking since when they are not registered, some BGA in CSE are considered of legal age.

Despite the achievements regarding implementation, AQB believes the care model is not yet fully “perfected” and needs to be improved. The period for detection or training is very brief and insufficient for carrying out an adequate diagnosis of the BGA’s situation. Similarly, work on creating local institutional skills and community support networks was insufficient, and work at the community level should, therefore, be strengthened, together with all the key actors – both institutional and NGOs – and community authorities. The institutions’ staff have a high rotation, which makes follow-up actions that boost the project more difficult. No decisions have been made on how to integrate BGA recreation into the model.

Despite the fact that the model promoted by the project considers institutionalization to be a potential violation of the BGA’s right to family life, AQB believes that in some cases there should be a temporary separation from the family and inclusion of BGA in institutions. The model is not clear about how specific situations combined with CSE such as drug addition, HIV/AIDS and mental handicaps are to be dealt with. The handling of the reporting process is still re-victimization and is hardly effective. Very few of the cases reported go to trial or result in prosecution.

In order to decide on the scope of action of the Family Ministry, its legal competence for providing care and its institutional capacities for doing so should be discussed in detail together with the Family Ministry, including the staff appointed for this purpose, given that there are tax restrictions that do not allow for more staff to be appointed in public institutions and that *Mi Familia* is, first and foremost, a child policy Governing body and secondly an executor of specific programmes. The Family Ministry currently registers cases of CSEI; this typology was not handled in the country in the past, and is thus an achievement. Nonetheless, the contents of the follow-up files in cases dealt with by the Family Ministry, which show considerable information gaps, need to be improved upon. A greater degree of coordination was achieved with the institution at the local level than at the central level, which means ties with the local institution’s staff need to be strengthened.

The AQB staff believe there was an imbalance in the budget. For example, many resources were allocated to education and few were assigned to prevention, health, communication and sensitization. Likewise, it considers that no limitations have been placed on the care provided by the staff and they have not received support, which has been emotionally draining.

3.2.2.1.3. Product 2.b.3 – Local model for the prevention and care of sexually exploited children in the Guatemala/Mexico border area operational and 150 children in care

The project underwent an early change in the town where this product was originally going to be implemented (Tecum Uman), due to limited security and existing institutional weaknesses in the said town.

The selection of private counterparts with sound experience in the CSE issue and/or care for victims was one of the strengths of the project. Despite the fact that, due to the manner in which the GBA Courts in Guatemala operate the project was based on a temporary institutionalization system²³, the expertise of local NGOs and the commitment of its staff allowed for a certain degree of effectiveness in its withdrawal goals:

- *Casa Alianza*: Of 145 cases in care 53 (36%) were withdrawn (39 were reintroduced into their family, 10 to independent life, 4 repatriated), 43 (30%) were undergoing an institutional care process, 2% had died and only 48 (33%) dropped out of the process. The 53 who were withdrawn represent 70% of *Casa Alianza*'s goal (75 cases). Moreover, this institution contributed to the implementation of the project through the active participation of its report and legal follow-up of cases service, which forms part of its intervention methodology.
- *Mi Hogar, with the support of ECPATstaff*: Of 83 cases in care, 34 (41%) were withdrawn and reintroduced into their family, 15 (18%) were repatriated, 15 (18%) were undergoing a process of institutional care and 19 (23%) had dropped out of the programme. Of those withdrawn, 17 continued living with their family, 8 lived with their partner, 1 was lured back into CSE and 8 were at risk of being lured back into CSE due to an increase in risk in the family or community into which they were reintroduced.

According to *Casa Alianza*, the reference to problems of severe drug dependence in populations with experience in "street life" is over 50%, which weakens the programme's implementation due to the absence of sufficient treatment options. Likewise, according to ECPAT the extreme poverty of some families makes the BGA situation uncertain regarding the way in which aid is perceived and makes withdrawal less sustainable in the short term. The relative lack of education and health services in some of the areas the victims are from and the long distances from their homes is a factor that makes the work of reinsertion into the family more difficult.

The project allowed the operational capacities of private institutions (ECPAT/*Casa Alianza*) to increase temporarily; for example, *Casa Alianza-Guatemala* went from providing care for 20 cases of CSE prior to the project to 145 during its course, and ECPAT developed services

²³ Both *Casa Alianza* and *Mi Hogar* have an institutionalization component that, given its duration, seems excessive in a considerable number of cases and is not in keeping with the model the project proposes.

(family reinsertion, repatriation, follow-up of cases, others) that allowed for the weaknesses of *Mi Hogar* to be provisionally compensated. Both ECPAT and *Casa Alianza* carried out adequate monitoring of the results, including keeping files in order and completed²⁴.

However, the state authority did not take significant advantage of the methodological assets generated by the project, and should have incorporated the project's methodology into the heart of the institution (the Social Welfare Secretariat – SBS – via the *Mi Hogar*, or *Manchen* institution for girls) in a steady manner. The SBS has, overall, lacked the operational capacity to develop the programme independently and in a sustainable fashion. *Mi Hogar* (“*Manchen*”) lacks specific CSE care methodology; the human resources are limited and the level of training is insufficient. It was impossible to establish efficient networking between *Casa Alianza* and *Mi Hogar*, since the authorities on duty did not accept this possibility (an offer was even made to support them with the reintegration to the family). Despite the fact that several beneficiaries took part in both programmes, *Casa Alianza* and *Mi Hogar* did not exchange information. In regard to the State, there has been a lack of stability in the adults involved in the programme. The internal changes of operators in the *Mi Hogar* institution (into a religious order) affected the results of these.

In general, in the case of Guatemala, it is important that the programmes incorporate specific alternatives within the care model for dealing with the problem of the large number of CSE victims in Guatemala from other countries (trafficking)²⁵.

Some distinct characteristics of the implementation in the country may be useful and could be repeated in other experiences, such as the search for specific commitments on the part of the family, which was implemented by ECPAT in the family reinsertion processes undertaken by *Mi Hogar*, or the temporary informal alternatives (“substitute home”) in which an attempt was made to compensate for the crisis generated regarding the care provided by *Mi Hogar* during 2005 (girls being transferred and escaping). The usefulness and effectiveness of these alternatives deserves to be explored in the future, since it will contribute to enriching the model. Within this same framework, the recent fusion of the First Lady's Social Secretariat (SOSEP) and the Social Welfare Secretariat (SBS) will allow the incorporation of complementary options that could enrich the care platform and that constitute alternatives to institutionalization (substitute homes, communal homes, programmes for women who are victims of violence, which can be extended to the different regions within the country, etc.) to be explored.

Finally, in 2005 some interesting prevention alternatives have been implemented in Guatemala, on which it is still too early to make any definitive assessment:

²⁴ However, the project's database is operated/updated by ECPAT, not by the institutions that directly implement care for the victims (*Casa Alianza* has its own information handling programme). The late inclusion of information in the database had to be undertaken several times, due to repeated corrections made to the system.

²⁵ The institutions do not always respond in a timely manner to the issue of foreign/trafficked population. During the last police operation supported by Casa Alianza 112 foreigners under 23 years of age were detected, many of whom were illegal immigrants and underage, which is why they are simply left at the border. Likewise, according to this institution, corruption present in certain authorities conspires against the effectiveness of the report and rescue operations system.

- For example, *Fe y Alegria* has been undertaking a prevention programme in schools, by training teachers, which, if it is adopted as a widespread strategy in other educational centres, could have a considerable multiplier effect.
- Likewise, the experience with the Attorneys' Association in Jutiapa is an attempt to decentralize the implementation of the care platform, by involving the local government child and adolescents' commission, school boards, judicial authorities and other local institutions for the prevention and care for victims of CSE.
- Similarly, ECPAT is initiating a prevention programme with a population in an area with a high risk of adult prostitution and CSE in Guatemala City (called "El Ferrocarril").

3.2.3. COMPONENT 3

Immediate objective 3: *"Increase knowledge and awareness among key sectors of the population regarding the CSE issue and the trafficking of children for sexual purposes (police investigation, health, education, child protection institutions, churches, businesses, among others)".*

Summary of Results: *The project has fulfilled the objectives and products of this component satisfactorily, although not in a very organic manner, having firmly placed the issue of CSE on the region's public agenda. It is, however, deemed necessary to promote CSE communication actions more decisively through mass media campaigns.*

The following are products of this component:

- 3.1 Journalists and personnel in the media and other sectors trained in the CSE issue.
- 3.2 Key sectors informed by awareness campaigns in the media and forums.

3.2.3.1 Product 3.1 Journalists and personnel in the media and other sectors trained in the CSE issue

The project has been clear in that communication is an essential element for raising awareness in the target populations and allocated a large number of resources to this. Activities with journalists, follow-up to the work of the press and widespread coverage of the project has contributed significantly to clarifying and circulating the concepts related to CSE and to gradually eradicate re-victimizing expressions from institutional language and that of the media. For example, the project has succeeded in achieving the change in the term used when the issue

is mentioned in the media from “child prostitution” to “CSE” and increase the frequency of information on the topic (over 2,200 press articles published in 3 years between all the countries).

The effort has been vast and fruitful, and a considerable number of members of the press have been trained in the different countries. Work has been carried out, in general, mainly with journalists, more than with media owners or directors or editors-in-chief. The problem with this is that journalists sometimes change posts, which thus limits the impact of the training, and, on the other hand, it tends to be the directors or editors-in-chief (or even the newspaper “headliners”) who decide on the importance, slant and permanence of certain issues, which is why it is advisable to increase efforts at sensitizing these specific press groups.

Work has not been carried out systematically with employer organizations, but, rather, only with tourist businesses in some countries, where incipient and promising efforts are being made with the Tourist sector for establishing codes of conduct, a task in which the project can work together fruitfully with Unicef and other sub-regional institutions. Limited work has, likewise, been carried out with trade unions, namely the National Teachers Association in Costa Rica and the National Trade Union Commissioner in Honduras.

Both aspects are being tackled more resolutely in the activities set out in the project’s Addendum.

Product 3.2 Key sectors informed by awareness campaigns in the media and forums.

The project has decisively contributed to placing the CSE issue firmly on the region’s public agenda. It seems that an excessively broad-ranging strategy was drawn up at the beginning of the project, which was not viable. This was not subsequently used or readjusted and for some time the project lacked a strategy for clearly defining its objectives, the media and audiences of its communication actions aimed at the general public, although it did carry out some specific mass media campaigns in Costa Rica. In 2005 an attempt was made to carry out the mid-term assessment recommendation of improving the articulation of different communication actions and identifying key target groups.

Thus, as of 2005 a new regional strategy was set up, and its objectives were:

- a) To improve the visibility and handling of the CSE issue in the mass media²⁶ (an objective covered by the project’s product 3.1);
- b) To inform and sensitize the staff of public and private organizations in regard to the responsibilities each sector has in the fight against commercial sexual exploitation²⁷ (an objective that entails complementary actions or support of those developed in product 2.a.2); and

²⁶ This objective focused on producing materials for circulation, training journalists and members of key organizations in order to place the issue on the news agenda; moreover, follow-up to the issue was carried out in the national press.

c) To inform the general public of the repercussion of commercial sexual exploitation, particularly of the legal consequences the penalties for this kind of criminal activity have for the “client-exploiters”.

This strategy was set down in a Regional Communication Plan (December 2004 – December 2005).

Prior to this Plan and until well into the year 2005, while the project acted decisively and profusely in regard to the first two objectives mentioned, devoting considerable efforts to the attending to the latter, it appears to have acted with excessive caution with respect to the third objective – related to the mass media’s sensitization of the general public. This caution seems to have been provoked by the fear of generating (through greater visibility of CSE in the different countries) “a demand for dealing with reports and victims, which local institutions may not be in a position to handle (which would have caused a negative impact and made the public lose their motivation).

This assumption seems to have been unfounded, not only because at the mass media level the project has merged with the sensitization efforts developed by other institutions, both international (Unicef, IOM) and local (Tourist board – ICT in Costa Rica – department of migration, local and international NGOs – *Vision Mundial* – etc.²⁸), but because, given the high level of social tolerance regarding the CSE issue, no effort should be considered too much or counterproductive with a view to raising public awareness of the need to openly reject this cultural practice which, for a long time, has been considered “normal”. Furthermore, the reporting of cases could be viewed as not the sole issue-axis around which a mass media campaign could be centred, given that the project itself had, previously, even developed and made some broadcasts on the issue of CSE and the rights of BGA²⁹. For example, the campaigns

²⁷ The production of materials and resources for communication has been creative, innovative and prolific, even though, on certain occasions, it seemed the communications strategy had constituted a response, above all, to a range of specific demands, which could have caused considerable dispersal regarding target audiences, communication resources and media, with very different contents and approaches, but this did not stop the overall efforts from being constituted as a final organic product (for example, the regional TV broadcasts on girls playing with a ball are very general and the radio broadcasts in Honduras are very fatalistic as they talk of death). There are three-paged leaflets, folders, posters, thematic bulletins, a web page, a wide range of documents, awareness-raising videos, research summaries, legislation summaries, guides for service providers, institutional directories, kits for migration officials, teachers’ guides, brochures for journalists, etc. For some groups in this objective, such as teachers, police and men, CAPs and research were designed before the messages and communication materials were produced. In the countries in which the necessary penal reforms for punishing the crime had not been carried out, the communication actions were aimed at reinforcing the sense of urgency that exists for making legal modifications and punishing these crimes.

²⁸ For example, the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (ICT) together with other public institutions in this country, developed a campaign for informing tourists of the existence of legislation regarding CSE and promoted the reporting of these crimes by means of posters at airports and bus-stops, mobile billboards on buses, printed pamphlets, etc. while the Costa Rican Tour Operators’ Association together with Paniamor, Vision Mundial and other private organizations developed a campaign for informing the public of the existence of the national tourist sector’s Code of Conduct and warn tourists of the legal consequences of CSE (posters at airports and in hotels, speakers at the airport, notices on hotel counters, roadside billboards, etc.)

²⁹ We were informed that, in Costa Rica, negotiations with the media resulted in the placement of a campaign paid by the media themselves at a cost of over one hundred million colones.

could develop contents that raise the alarm in BGA vulnerable to CSE³⁰, preventive contents for mothers and fathers, in order to promote the organization of communities in the fight against this scourge, etc.

Due to the above, the project has generated few mass products of a preventive nature regarding CSE and aimed at children and adolescents, as well as the general public, in view of the fact that the majority of mass products focus on the subject of reporting cases and punishing the exploiters. It is, therefore, believed that the project could benefit from attempting to seek a greater impact on communications by conducting mass media campaigns based on a more varied range of messages regarding CSE³¹.

In this respect, it will be important for IPEC-ILO to negotiate – together with public and private institutions – adequate criteria to be followed in free media broadcasts for radio and television, during the second phase of the project, in order to create a more organic and permanent presence in the media campaigns, aimed at reporting CSE as a crime. One experience of this kind successfully developed by a communications campaign on CSE was implemented by CONAPREDES, the State Prosecutor and the National Journalism Council. The support of the National Journalism Council – which resulted in the parallel sensitization of a substantial number of journalists and the signing of a commitment to support the fight against CSE – meant messages were published in the press free of charge in addition to radio and TV broadcasts.

The awareness-raising mass media activities developed during the first phase were not preceded by an assessment of the public's knowledge and attitudes towards CSE in each country. For example, despite the fact that the study on masculinities provided essential input for the messages' general orientation in the mass media (e.g. associating CSE with "years in jail"), this study cannot, for technical reasons, in itself be adopted as equivalent to a study on public opinion with stratified samples. Neither do the CAP studies on specific groups replace this type of measurement. Therefore, in spite of the fact that in the last part of the project's first phase public opinion regarding CSE was measured (CID-Gallup survey), this measurement does not allow for the real impact of the first phase's communication campaigns to be assessed since no similar measurement was made at the beginning of the project. However, the 2005 CID-Gallup survey represents an important lesson in the project's implementation, and its results will be useful as a baseline in respect of the results of subsequent mass media communication activities developed in the second phase.

On the other hand, the project has set in motion an original sensitization strategy on the subject of the relation between the patriarchal construct of sexuality and CSE. The circulation of the results of the study on the impact of the construction of masculine identities on CSE and the debate on this topic in a more personalized form in workshops, has been innovative, and , overall, very well received in the region. The project worked with men (skilled, unskilled,

³⁰ For example, some of the radio broadcasts developed by CONAMUS within the framework of the TBP in El Salvador constitute an example of mass products with clear objectives and a specific audience (e.g. they deal with the topic of prevention of the risk of being lured into CSE, informing the BGA of circumstances in which, by means of deceit and promises, the trafficking of underage persons occurs.

³¹ This proposal seems more pertinent still in Guatemala's case, where the visibility and social relevance of the CSE issue is still limited.

professional, legislators, government employees) who have been trained in and are sensitive enough to the issue to incorporate it into their institutional duties, and the subject is also being incorporated into the realm of the university. Similarly, a commitment against CSE has been signed by men in most countries and a Central American men's network against CSE has been set up. Based on the above, the work carried out with men and the promotion of a critical view of masculinity's cultural determining factors, as well as an alternative concept of these, have awakened considerable interest in academic and institutional circles, leading to an increase in the number of people trained in the subject and the number of members of the men's network in the different countries³².

However, due to the inherent characteristics of direct training, the men's workshops on the construction of masculine identities have had a limited impact in terms of the number of men trained. Therefore, and with a view to taking better advantage of the potential of this work axis, it is advisable, on the one hand, to attempt to transversalize this issue and incorporate it into the school curriculum in order to influence young people's future development. Similarly, with the aim of increasing the potential impact of this type of methodology, an attempt should be made to give these workshops priority both in key sectors in which government employees deal directly with CSE, as well as for professional groups whose members are more exposed to incurring in CSE mainly in risk groups (transport workers, tourist sector staff, taxi drivers, police).

It would, likewise, be interesting to find new ways of increasing the circulation and impact of the original and innovative forms of dealing with the problem of CSE from the communications perspective, developed by the project in Costa Rica, in other words: develop an innovative awareness-raising experience through art, by means of a dance performance, that reached an audience of over seven thousand people (e.g. "*Digalo*" ("Say it")) and the presentation of a video-clip in Hip Hop (e.g. "Hey you").

3.2.4. UNEXPECTED EFFECTS (POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE) AND MULTIPLYING EFFECTS OF THE PROJECT

- a. Among the **unexpected positive effects** of the project the following may be highlighted:

³² The issue has, likewise, been presented by the project's team at various IPEC and ILO meetings, and has attracted considerable interest. For example, the project's coordinator has given presentations on the subject at various international meetings, at which it has attracted attention due to the fact that it is not being dealt with by other projects; this contribution has, therefore, been valuable in raising awareness of the importance of dealing with this issue in other projects. Considerable interest has also been generated by the study on masculinities and CSE within and outside the region, and it is one of the 20 most popular documents on the IPEC web page (8,945 downloads in 2005).

The CSE project has provided technical assistance and input for the TBP and other projects, and has undertaken an important task of conceptual construction that it has contributed to IPEC-ILO's Vulnerable Groups Unit. The work generated by the project, in particular the research carried out on the subject of masculinities and CSE, has attracted much attention within and outside IPEC-ILO, and this has been circulated throughout and outside the region.

The CSE issue has, however, awakened considerable interest on the part of experts among the public, and the page on CSE is the IPEC website's most visited (5,051 visits out of a total of 19,969 to this page). In second place is the issue of child domestic labour with 3,877 visits.

The project has had an impact on other regions through coordinated action mainly with the IPEC-ILO vulnerable populations group. In Mexico it has provided technical assistance and reviewed legislation, and the project's members have contributed input to programmes and events in Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago and Cartagena. The project's conceptual contributions have helped to modernize concepts within IPEC-ILO itself, encouraging the use of the term CSE instead of "worst forms of child labour" or "child sex workers".

- b. **No harmful effect whatsoever** was established in relation to the project's actions.

However, it should be noted that there are some aspects that could be cause for concern, and that the project's team should deal with in greater depth in the second phase, in order to avoid generalizations and erroneous external appraisals. For example, the opinion that the mother is the best source of support for the withdrawal of the girl or boy in CSE should be analyzed in each case in particular since, in some of the cases dealt with directly in the assessment (interviews and focal groups) it was revealed that alcoholism, abandonment, indifference or violence on the mother's part constitute an integral part of the problem. Thus, in many cases the boy or girl was already separated from the mother or had to be separated in order to begin the withdrawal. The same is true of the view that the family is the best resource. This opinion is based on the valid criticism of the institutionalization of girls and boys, in conditions of confinement; however, it must also be pointed out – as already indicated – that in many cases the severe deterioration of the family is precisely what causes the problem.

The most attention, awareness and enthusiasm awakened by the project in regard to the need to protect the freedom and sexuality of adolescent with respect to the risk of exploitation, converged, in some countries, with repressive views of adolescent sexuality, which has led to the presentation or approval of legal modification proposals in which all sexual contact with adolescents is punished, beyond CSE itself. This is not an effect of the project and comes into conflict with the latter's philosophy.

Similarly, it is necessary, as indicated elsewhere in this report, to prevent other commercial or political interests that are contrary to the aim of combating CSE to become caught up in the legal reform processes. In some countries – namely Panama and Nicaragua – this risk is very high since reform proposals that contradict the "spirit" of the regional proposal of minimum standards – drawn up by the project – have been presented.

c. Concerning the **multiplying effects of the project:**

The interest the project has awakened in public institutions regarding the need to combat CSE has led the public institutions themselves to generate a very wide range of actions on their own initiative and with their own resources, creating a multiplying effect in the project's workload.

Thus, for example, the training provided by the Costa Rican Foreign Affairs Ministry to their ambassadors and other foreign affairs staff in Europe is an important and outstanding example of a multiplying effect.

In effect, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave a 3-day course on promotion (including tourism and foreign trade), based on the material the Project produced, and one of those three days was devoted specifically to the issue of CSE. The Foreign Minister and the Minister of Tourism – among others – participated in the course as speakers, and representatives from the Chamber of Tourism, private organizations and members of parliament from the European Union were also present. The number of participants totaled 70, and they were shown the video “The shadow of the region”; brochures, posters and protocols prepared to this effect were distributed among them.

The Foreign Ministry intends to continue carrying out these kinds of events in the United States and Canada, which is where the majority of the exploiters come from, according to a report issued by the U.S. State Department.

Another example of the multiplying effect is the inclusion of CSE in the curriculum of the State Prosecutor School's Special Schooling Programme in the Dominican Republic. At this School training is provided for all those who aspire to the post of district attorney in this country. The topic was also included in the Judicial Police's training programme. The School is currently using its own funds to negotiate the hiring of Costa Rican district attorneys, in order to provide training on this subject in that country.

3.3 Perspectives of Sustainability

This section deals with four types of sustainability: technical, social, institutional and financial.

***Summary:** The project currently presents certain sustainability perspectives at the social and technical levels, and should make improving on and tackling certain aspects of institutional and financial sustainability a priority. Overall, the project needs to strengthen institutional commitments in order to achieve the sustainability of the results.*

3.3.1. AT THE TECHNICAL SUSTAINABILITY LEVEL

The project shows important sustainability perspectives from a technical point of view.

The approval of criminal laws that punish CSE in five of the seven countries in the sub-region and the setting up of specialized police or state prosecution units in some of these makes research, processing and reporting in this regard possible.

Establishing cooperation mechanisms between “equal institutions” in the countries (migration organizations, state prosecutors and specialized police units, among others) ensures a certain degree of sustainability for part of the actions developed under this component. Generating knowledge, specialized material and the sharing of experiences contributes, likewise, to promoting a sustainable impact on the institutional capacities developed in the different countries.

Similarly, the existence of inter-institutional coordination platforms in each country, as well as national plans and public policies on CSE in the different countries, constitutes an instrument for sustainability provided that the allocation of State resources for the implementation of their activities is ensured.

Equally, the development of institutional staff training processes entail an incipient transferal of knowledge and potential capacities for developing prevention actions, punishing exploiters and withdrawing victims. Some institutions have already incorporated CSE as a typology for institutional performance, something which was previously non-existent.

The implementation of the model for direct care for victims needs to be improved upon and it should be completed to ensure the sustainability of the victim withdrawal achievements and the independent replication of the actions by State institutions.

3.3.2 AT THE SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY LEVEL

The processes of sensitization generated by the project’s different communication activities have contributed to increasing the visibility of the CSE issue in the region. However, the social tolerance that exists among the general public in regard to the CSE of adolescents is still very high. In view of this fact, efforts should be doubled during the second phase of the project in

order for the issue to be better positioned in regard to public opinion, with the help of mass media campaigns.

In order to achieve certain sustainability of the impact of mass media campaigns³³ on public opinion, a communication strategy needs to be defined with messages aimed at different target audiences within the general public, and negotiations with media directors need to be strengthened in order to broadcast mass campaigns over a more prolonged period.

On the other hand, it is necessary to develop a strategy for securing the support of the private sector and employer and worker organizations, beyond the commitments made with the tourism sector and the partial support of the media. The project's Addendum contains actions in this regard.

3.3.3 AT THE INSTITUTIONAL SUSTAINABILITY LEVEL

Establishing cooperation mechanisms between "equal institutions" in the countries (migration organizations, state prosecutors and specialized police units, among others) ensures a certain degree of institutional sustainability for part of the actions developed under this component.

It is advisable to seek alliances and maintain coordination with other cooperation agencies in order to join the efforts being made in this respect and make cooperation related to this objective more efficient.

The effective institutional sustainability of the actions is taking place mainly at the police and judicial system actions level, which, based on a more adequate legal framework promoted by the project and the training received, have begun to develop independent actions in the fight against CSE, in which the inclusion of these in all the specialized entities in each country remains pending.

However, in the field of prevention and direct care for victims, the institutions called upon to protect children and that have been considered partners in the project, do not necessarily have the financial and human resources for providing adequate protection for BGA with regard to CSE. Some of these also lack the political will to do so, even though child protection institutions are, by and large, weak institutions within the region's State system.

This is why, despite the fact that IPEC-ILO have developed important training processes for staff, and NGO partners have developed important processes of care for victims, the process of transferring key responsibilities for ensuring the continuity of benefits and services provided is still very weak (if not non-existent).

One human rights protection model based on the offer of a services platform works insofar as the services are timely, efficient, good quality and provided in a pleasant manner; if they are

³³ In the absence of a baseline study (stratified survey of initial opinion), it is not possible to measure the impact and sustainability of the majority of the communication actions that were aimed at the general public during the first phase.

collapsed or saturated, as is the case in some countries, the work encounters serious limitations or is impeded³⁴.

The ILO thus needs to promote the signing of agreements with state institutions and other actions that will effectively commit it to allocate human and financial resources for CSE prevention and care.

At the same time, the most appropriate institution for providing care for BGA must be identified in each country. This will not necessarily be the children's institution, if there is another in some of the countries that has shown the will and has better conditions/sustainability to do so. In this sense, an alternative option could be considered as was the case with the TBP in El Salvador, which chose to operate the care platform from a state institution that specialized in care for victims (women) of violence, rather than a specialized institution in the children's sector.

Furthermore, insofar as the sustainability of the care model for victims is subject to the weaknesses of each State, IPEC-ILO should study the possibility of creating an option in each country (and discussing it once again with the donor), between countries in which, being viable in the mid-term, the sustainability of the care programme is sought, and countries in which withdrawal actions that are not institutionally sustainable as a long-term scheme, but that are necessary and urgent, will be implemented for humanitarian reasons (existence of victims who require support). This analysis and its consequences should be discussed with the donor, and the subject of the real sustainability of certain goals in certain countries should be reconsidered.

3.3.4 AT THE FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY LEVEL

The growing interest of the international cooperation agencies in Human Rights issues, commercial sexual exploitation, trafficking, care for underprivileged children sectors and other related topics has meant a sustained income of certain financial resources, over the past 3 years, for the development of programmes combating CSE and trafficking in the region³⁵, which will probably continue at least until the year 2009 (the year when the second phase of the project ends).

However, in order to ensure a real financial sustainability of the actions against CSE, the project will need to double its efforts in attempting to ensure the States tangibly and steadily increase their contributions to the fight against CSE. Some positive steps in this direction have been made by the fact that, although several of the countries do not have their own resources for undertaking the regional exchanges and other training events at the national level, some state institutions have committed considerable sums from their own resources for training their staff and have expressed their commitment to continue doing so (for example, the Costa Rican Ministry of Foreign Affairs contributed 40 thousand dollars for training ambassadors and consuls in Europe and the State Prosecutor's School in the Dominican Republic is paying the costs of training for Costa Rican district attorneys).

³⁴ It is based on this appraisal of the local situation and of the difficulties encountered and results achieved in the implementation of the pilot care models during the first phase, that the team assessing the project considered the goals proposed in this point for the second phase to be excessive and unrealistic, and that they should thus be reduced, as suggested in section 5, recommendation number 16.

4. CONCLUSIONS

4.1 OVERALL IT MAY BE SAID THAT:

The project has fulfilled its general objective in a satisfactory manner and has achieved the majority of its specific objectives. The implementation of the project shows significant strengths and has, in general, been very efficient.

The project had a very clear understanding of the CSE issue as a crime that must be punished, and the multi-faceted nature of the intervention strategies implemented (legislative reform, public awareness, institutional articulation and strengthening, prevention, direct care for victims of CSE, etc.) constituted a comprehensive response to the many aspects of the problem. The team in charge of implementing the project, both at the regional and national level, showed great commitment, organization, technical excellence and implementation capacity. There have been clear and successful efforts at integration regarding the work of other cooperation agencies in the different fields and at the project's different levels, thus avoiding duplication.

On legitimizing and articulating the activities of various public and private institutional actors and international agencies, the project has given a wide-ranging response to the problem of CSE in the region, making the inter-institutional articulation opportunities an important element in the discussion on and organization of the efforts against CSE. Networking has allowed for the action of a broad range of institutional speakers as well as the sense of ownership of the actions, to be promoted.

With respect to the views of the girls and boys involved in CSE and the target of the project's actions; it is important to mention that, based on the interviews and focal groups carried out with them, they viewed the project as a space where they were listened to, where they received support and where they could envisage a different life. Although not all of them admitted having been victims of CSE, they did say that their involvement in the programme had caused significant changes in their lives and, in general, they have a positive opinion of the support organizations (*Fundacion Quincho Barrilete*, for example). The majority of those interviewed said they wished to continue receiving support from these organizations and expressed their dismay that the aid had been suspended (at the end of the first phase).

4.2 THE PROJECT'S MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS ARE:

- a. Having clearly placed the CSE issue on the region's public agenda in coordination with the efforts of other international agencies.
- b. Having established an important framework for parallel cooperation between countries and having developed significant information exchange at the regional and national level, including the transfer of methodologies, the training of human resources qualified in the fight

against CSE and the supply of a broad range of quality specialized support material (printed and audiovisual) for this purpose.

- c. Promoting important legislative modifications in several countries in the region, in order to establish legal frameworks that make the fight against CSE viable and sustainable. In cases in which the legal modifications have not yet been carried out, legislative proposals are in the process of being analyzed by the countries' Legislative Assemblies.
- d. The project has encouraged and promoted the setting up of inter-institutional coordination authorities in each country on the CSE issue, in which policy proposals/national plans of action have been set in motion in most of the countries. In those in which these have not yet been approved, they are in the process of being drawn up or discussed.
- e. The project has trained a very significant number of technicians and staff from certain public institutions, for example, justice workers, district attorneys, police and migration officials, in the development of actions that combat CSE and favour the victims. The training of these actors has been of a very high standard and very relevant; there is evidence that it has contributed to generating intervention procedures regarding CSE. This trained staff represents an important asset for the future development of actions for combating CSE in the sub-region. With regard to specialized research and punishing exploiters, the training processes have led to exploiters been brought to trial and sentenced.
- f. The project has resolutely supported the development of actions for protecting the victims of CSE, promoting the implementation of an appropriate and innovative model in the region with a human rights and gender-based approach.

4.3 THE MAIN WEAKNESSES OF THE PROJECT ARE:

- a. The limited and barely sustainable incorporation of the model for care for the victims of CSE in the running of the public institutions that should be strengthened in order that they may take on the implementation of these in an independent manner. Towards the end of the first phase, no steady commitment had been secured **in practice** by the project from the state institution counterparts for the assigning – in a stable and exclusive manner – of a set number of human resources to the implementation of the project's methodology, and for these institutions (PANI, SBS, MIDES, *Mi Familia*) to efficiently and steadily develop their role as articulating authorities of the care platform. The monitoring of results system (database), likewise, needs to be improved and promoted for its full use by state institutions.
- b. The limited effectiveness of the withdrawal actions over time, given that – according to reports made by the implementing authorities – only approximately one third of the victims that had originally been reported by the project as “withdrawn” remained in that condition at the time of this assessment. The reasons for this are related to the complexity of the problem itself, which means different programmes and institutions working for years on the issue show similar levels of effectiveness, with an inadequate system for measuring results (only once and at the beginning of the withdrawal), and with the need to provided the victims with

more continuous support once the initial withdrawal period has been realized. Some recommendations on the above are made in the corresponding section. In light of these results, and with the benefit of hindsight, it is possible that, from the point of view of the design, the time required for achieving sustainable results in the withdrawal of victims was underestimated and that the goal (figure) regarding persons to be withdrawn in a sustainable manner was overestimated.

- a. The still limited implementation of community-based focal prevention schemes in geographic areas with a high risk or greater concentration of CSE.
- b. The intermittent presence of structured mass media campaigns. This weakness is being dealt with increasingly since 2005.
- c. The still limited involvement of the business and trade union sectors in the fight against CSE. It is equally necessary to secure more extensive involvement on the part of local governments and other local government authorities in combating CSE. These weaknesses are being dealt with in the second phase.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 FOR IPEC AND USDOL

1. Reformulate the system for measuring the concept of “withdrawal” (from CSE) used in the project, taking into consideration that at the time of assessment the implementing agencies have confirmed that many BGA (over 60% of them) reported as “withdrawn” in accordance with how the project had been measuring this fact (one measurement only, normally one month after it is confirmed), had become involved in CSE once again some months after having been reported as “withdrawn”. It is recommended that a period much longer than one month is established, as is currently the case, in order to enter the withdrawal (see specific proposal below). They should bear in mind that CSE is a human rights problem and, therefore, in each case, the **sustainable** solution to this rights violation should be the objective of all “withdrawals”, defined in a realistic and responsible manner.
2. Review and reduce the goal (figure) of withdrawal in the project’s Addendum, taking into account the experience of the first phase and the criteria of the implementing agencies, in order to achieve a more wide-ranging and prolonged intervention that contributes to a more sustained withdrawal. The reduction of the Addendum’s withdrawal goals should include a partial substitution of these (up to 20%) by a longer period of follow-up and support for cases that were withdrawn in the first phase and that have not been lured back into CSE (see specific proposal below, in recommendation number 16). The financial balance resulting from this reduction of goals should be reapplied precisely to strengthen the institutional sustainability of the care platform promoted by the project and the state institutions’ capacities for action.

5.2 FOR IPEC AND THE CSE PROJECT’S TEAM

3. Readjust the proposal and take the necessary administrative steps to allocate the resources required for hiring full-time national consultants in each country. The complexity and volume of the task at hand requires substantial involvement on the part of the appointed staff in all the countries, in order to provide continual follow-up on the work of third parties for the success of the project.

5.3 FOR THE CSE PROJECT’S TEAM

5.3.1 *In relation to formulating legislation, national policies and inter-institutional coordination mechanisms:*

4. In several of the countries it is necessary to strengthen **inter-institutional coordination mechanisms** (commissions, committees, coordination groups, etc.), in order to make them

legally formal. In all of the countries it is recommended that the project link its actions to those of the National Plans against CSE that are available. It is important for the project to promote the annual workability of the actions of the said plans on the part of the institutions that participate in the inter-institutional coordination authorities in each country, with a view to securing unequivocal commitments from the latter (and in particular those of the State) and ones that have fixed terms with respect to the different goals of the national plans (who does what, where and when, and which resources it will allocate for the said purpose).

5. It should persevere in its efforts to achieve substantial modifications to national legislation on CSE (penal code reform) in Guatemala and Nicaragua.
6. In general, the awareness of the legal workers (and of the judges in particular) at the national level and their efficient coordination with other authorities within the legal system (State Prosecutor, police) with a view to achieving a high ratio of clients-exploiters prosecuted, represents an important area of work for the project during its second phase. Within this framework, it is recommended that the training processes in reform for judges, district attorneys and police at the national level are continued, and it is important to also promote visits carried out by the legal authorities on monitoring, the reporting of cases and how cases are dealt with in the State Prosecutor's offices located outside the countries' capital cities. Similarly, it is advisable to support the setting up of a "telephone hotline for reporting cases" for programmes in countries where there is none. In some countries, such as Guatemala and El Salvador, the project may have to contribute to strengthening the justice administration mechanisms, by supporting the mobilization of public opinion trends and inter-institutional actions in favour of the strict fulfilment of the law on the part of the judges, with a view to reducing the impact of possible attempts at corruption in this sphere.
7. It is advisable to promote the active linking of the project's actions against CSE to other existing national strategies, such as exploring potential and supporting the synergetic efforts of state institutions and others between state and private institutions that could favour the fight against CSE. For example, in Honduras it is important to promote the coordination of the work of the CISESC with the work of the new government's social cabinet in order that the CSE issue actions be coordinated with those of the ERP strategy for the reduction of poverty (in which it is already considered) and it can be integrated into other programmes, such as PRAF (family allowance programme – direct benefits) in support for the fulfilment of the National Plan against CSE. In Guatemala's case, it is important to promote a more proactive role on the part of the SBS in the Coordination Group and the drawing up of and follow-up to the implementation of policies, as well as the implementation of prevention and care programmes for the victims of CSE. Within this same framework, it is advisable to carry out a diagnosis of pre-existing institutional SOSEP and SBS programmes, which could, in the SBS's new organic structure, be used to establish a service platform for care for the victims of CSE (e.g. community home, substitute families, etc.).

5.3.2 In regard to the training processes:

8. Improve the selection criteria for staff training, giving priority to sectors that are more closely linked to handling the CSE issue with public institutions and areas that have a higher incidence or greater risk of CSE.

9. Establish follow-up mechanisms for allowing the results of the training process to be measured.
10. Strengthen the production of popular educational material on CSE, aimed at community actors and BGA and their families. This awareness material should be more straightforward than that currently available and should employ language that is adapted to the educational level, characteristics and context of high risk groups (e.g. aimed at young people and families in vulnerable situations in each country).

5.3.3 In regard to direct care for prevention and the withdrawal of victims:

11. During the second phase of the project, it is recommended that the design of CSE community prevention systems be studied in more depth and aimed at communities or areas in which CSE originated or those at greater risk, as well as promoting increased involvement on the part of the local governments in different aspects of prevention and care for victims. The inclusion of a local plan against CSE within the local government plans could also be promoted, with the aim of encouraging these authorities to allocate some resources and staff time to it. Moreover, coordination between state institutions and civil society within the local sphere is fundamental for ensuring the success of the prevention actions and combating CSE. In this sense, it is essential that the methodology used be highly participative and include all the key actors, and that non-traditional actors that could contribute to the process be identified. Within this framework, it is important to complement the preventive work of an institutional nature and that of care provided for the siblings of the victims with focused preventive programmes in risk areas – as is the case in the TBP in El Salvador³⁶ or the Attorneys' Association in Jutiapa – as well as setting up a model of community awareness and mobilization, and of coordination of community and institutional efforts, with a view to making communities alert and propositive³⁷. It would be necessary to draw up communication plans and campaigns using local resources and low cost media for this purpose. Likewise, it would be useful to promote inter-institutional learning to stimulate this type of experience by favouring contact between entities implementing these kinds of programmes.

³⁶ For example, it is supporting an interesting community prevention proposal developed by CONAMUS in San Salvador's district II (high risk area), through IPEC's TBP in El Salvador, with children who work on the streets and children of sex workers. Similarly, an interesting preventive initiative – within the framework of the CSE programme – is being developed in the El Ferrocarril area in Guatemala through ECPAT.

³⁷ For example, in Honduras schemes of this kind could be developed in Comaguela and El Chiverito, and in Costa Rica the direct care work in Limon could be complemented with focused preventive programmes in high risk communities (e.g. Los Linos, Pacuare, Atlantida, Viña del Mar), as well as promoting the development of direct awareness and prevention work related to potential client-exploiters, in land close to the port (container depots) where lorry drivers from the area go. Likewise, in Costa Rica it would be advisable to promote the development a community prevention model that actively, and in a replicable manner, involves the Local Protection Systems (Protection Committees, Guardian Committees) in the fight against CSE. In the same way and from the point of view of prevention, it is recommended that the issue of CSE be included on the institutional agenda of the Youth Council.

12. It is important that, prior to the implementation of the direct care programmes, a diagnosis of the offer of public institutions dealing with CSE in the area in which it will be implemented, always be carried out, in addition to that of real availabilities and a specific reinforcement plan for these. In order to ensure the quality of the processes of transferring capabilities of NGOs responsible for implementing direct action PAs to state entities and the ultimate sustainability of the actions, it is necessary, before beginning any care project, for IPEC-ILO to negotiate with the state counterpart its clear commitment to allocate specific and ideal human and material resources to the project in a permanently stable and exclusive manner. It is advisable to consider that before the start of a care project a period of at least 4 months is required to install it institutionally and train staff. Within this same framework, it is important to promote the development of commitments of the stability of key employees in key institutions on the part of the State to ensure the adequate continuity of the programmes.
13. It is suggested that the changes and improvements made to the preparation of indicators proposed in the section “validity of the design” of this report (p. 10) be incorporated.
14. It is recommended that the registration of the cases withdrawn be made in three successive stages and over a more prolonged period of observation than that in effect in order to increase their probabilities of sustainability: one month from withdrawal, six months from the same and one year from the first time withdrawal from CSE was registered (should it be detected that the case in question has been lured back into CSE, the latter will be subject to a new count “from point 0”). To this effect, it is important to establish clear criteria for “leaving” the programme. Similarly, this implies that the interventions and follow-up of the cases will last longer; however, there will be a higher and more reasonable assurance of the sustainability of the achievements. In order to compensate for ensuring the implementation of this type of intervention is carried out in a responsible fashion, it is suggested that the goal regarding the number of cases to be “withdrawn” be reduced in the Project’s Addendum (see below).
15. It is recommended that an agreement be made with the donor for reducing the goal of BGA withdrawn within the direct care component by 20% (the goal is currently 863 cases, which would be unfeasible as a sustainable goal given that this is equivalent to 5 times the effective goal in the first phase). Similarly, it is suggested that an additional 20% be applied to the proposed goal (172 cases) of following up on a substantial part of the cases successfully withdrawn during the first phase of the project, in order to promote the sustainability of the accomplishments. Thus, a review of the Addendum would lead to a proposed withdrawal of 518 victims of CSE throughout the 6 countries during the 42-month duration of the project, as well as providing additional follow-up and direct support to 172 victims withdrawn during the first phase of the project (thus contributing to the sustainability of these processes),

totaling 690 beneficiaries (between old and new) instead of the 863 “new” ones proposed in the Addendum.

16. It is suggested that the care model be studied in greater depth, and a tree of decisions with temporary intervention alternatives be added to it for dealing with different risk situations that may require intense initial backing or delay immediate reintegration into the family, and that are registered frequently in several countries (e.g. aggressiveness and persistence of anti-social behaviour associated with prolonged periods of street life, risk of severe depression/isolation, self-destructive crises/suicide, stigmatization by the family, school or community, mental handicap, loss of control of sexuality (has replaced affection), need for acceptance of a pregnancy on the part of the adolescent, originally from another region or country, presence of exploiters, abuse, drug trafficking or alcoholism within the family). The option of substitute families (e.g. Guatemala) or community homes could prove interesting as an alternative to institutionalization in extreme cases.
17. Another recommendation is that the care platform should include, where possible, the direct work of familiarization and contact with the CSE population in risk areas. The platform’s coordination should, in all programmes, ensure certain basic needs of the family are covered temporarily including, where necessary, the conditional transfer of resources to substitute income from CSE, the productive training of families or adolescents and support schemes for generating family incomes that promote a degree of sustainability in the reduction of vulnerability factors and the withdrawal achievements. Likewise, it is advisable to assess the inclusion within the alternatives platform of employment agencies for victims aged 16 or over.
18. It is important to study the problems of the male victims of CSE with homosexual preferences in greater detail and design strategies that ensure this topic is dealt with specifically, including the prevention of the risk of HIV infection in the masculine population (given that a significant percentage of males in CSE that are participating in care programmes in Nicaragua – *Quincho Barrilete*-, Guatemala – *Casa Alianza*- and El Salvador – *Medicos del Mundo*, in contrast to the majority of the female population in these programmes, are HIV positive.
19. The project should create regular opportunities, in each country, for inter-institutional exchange between organizations dealing with care for victims, including those that are not directly involved in the project, with a view to promoting greater cooperation between institutions that have similar objectives, and inter-learning regarding care methodologies, as well as promoting specific debate on issues that are still pending further study in the care model, such as handling BGA addictions in CSE, mental handicaps and HIV/AIDS in this population, dealing with homosexual BGA in CSE; new alternatives to institutionalization when temporary separation of BGA from their family is required; the role of the community and others.
20. It is recommended that research be developed based on the casuistry dealt with and other groups, to allow for the analysis of the cases’ positive and negative prediction factors, and to determine the elements of the institutional response (specificity, variety and duration of the interventions) that are more important for promoting a sustainable withdrawal of the victims

of CSE and establish protection factors in families without CSE but subjected to high risk contexts.

5.3.4 In regard to awareness:

21. It is recommended that efforts directed at the second phase, the production of mass materials and the negotiation of its guideline, be increased by means of campaigns supported by the media itself and by the private sector.
22. As regards the second phase, it is necessary to draw up a **mass** media strategy that clearly defines the actions' objectives, content, means and target populations. Mass media campaigns should be based on a division of the public into segments with specific messages. For instance: content on reporting CSE for the general public, content to alert BGA vulnerable to CSE, preventive content for mothers and fathers, for promoting the organization of communities against this scourge, of information on punishing the crime (aimed at potential client-exploiters), etc.
23. Regular and systematic (ultimately every 18 months) pre- and post- measurements of knowledge and attitudes of the population for ascertaining the impact of mass media awareness campaigns are recommended.
24. Boosting access to a wide range of alternative mass media with a view to increasing the impact of the project's communication actions is recommended. For example, the use of state banks' and hospitals' closed circuits for broadcasts (they would reach between 20 and 50% of the national population free).
25. It is strongly recommended that an attempt be made to introduce the subject of the patriarchal concept of masculinity and how it effects relations between genders, male sexuality and CSE to the level of public education curricula in the different countries. This would lead to the development of sustainable long-term preventive action on the issue in the different countries, and would influence young people's development at an early stage.
26. Likewise, with a view to strengthening its impact on high risk target audiences and optimizing the interventions' cost-effectiveness, it is important to focus primarily on the direct actions of the work undertaken face to face with men ("masculinity workshops"), not only in key government employee sectors directly related to the problem of CSE (from the legal system and others) and NGOs, but mainly with target populations/ professions at a higher risk of becoming involved in CSE, such as transport workers, tourist sector employees, taxi drivers, police and others).
27. It is important to extend the work of raising awareness to media directors, editors-in-chief and other senior media staff who influence the placement of news/ information and how it is handled. It would be advisable to widen the scope of awareness on the issue of CSE by promoting its incorporation in the curricula of schools of journalism and communication at public and private universities, as well as impressing the work of awareness-raising on the middle management of the main media corporations, and on local media in the direct

intervention and high risk areas. In the same manner, other strategies to motivate journalists could be included, such as those used by Unicef in some countries to promote competitions for placing certain issues firmly on the public agenda and raising awareness on them.

28. It is essential to develop a strategy with continuous actions to ensure the involvement and support of employer and worker organizations in the fight against CSE (this work axis can be seen to have been adopted in the second phase of the project).
29. With regard to awareness-raising and training material of a regional nature, it is advisable to consult the countries in the process of producing and designing such material to ensure it has a more regional outlook and includes the different countries' experiences (despite the fact they consider them satisfactory, some staff point out that they have never been consulted in this respect and that some of the material mainly reflects Costa Rica's experience).

6. LESSONS LEARNED

1. The project's multi-faceted strategy is very appropriate since it allows the different spheres in which the problem of CSE is present to be dealt with in a wide-ranging fashion. However, much caution should be taken to prioritize the target populations properly, especially in relation to training and communication, in order to avoid dispersing time, efforts and resources in areas where it will not be possible to subsequently follow-up on and gauge the impact achieved.
2. The complexity of handling a project with the characteristics of that assessed may produce an excessive additional workload for the project's team. Dealing with a considerable number of goals of large scale importance; complex administrative procedures; managing a large budget; limited human resources in charge of the project, etc., are factors that could be reviewed with the aim of finding a balance between input and expected results, to avoid overloading the team and reducing their effectiveness during the second phase of the project.
3. The weakness of public institutions in the region's social public sector (and child protection, in particular) is an unavoidable regular feature of the context in which the project is developed. A slow institutional response, as well as a lack of political will or awareness of the problem in many cases results in the need to reconsider the terms and goals of all aspects of the strengthening of institutional capacities. The mere implementation of programmes supported by NGOs is not always enough to incorporate the methodologies and models proposed for dealing with CSE within state institution actions.
4. Although the project is effectively contributing to creating conditions that facilitate the withdrawal of BGA from CSE, the "formal" measurement of the concept of withdrawal employed by the project is insufficient for ensuring a real and sustainable withdrawal of BGA from CSE. This problem has considerable ethical connotations since it affects the protection of the basic human rights of BGA in CSE.

5. It is necessary to make a detailed and, at the same time, realistic analysis, together with the implementing agencies, of some of the model's assumptions: for example, the view that mothers are the best allies for providing support for BGA or that institutionalization is "per se" a violation of the rights of BGA, particularly of their right to live with their family. It is necessary not to create dogmas in this respect, as, according to the experience of implementing agencies, in many cases it is the deterioration of the family or the mother that is itself a central component of the vulnerability that leads to CSE, and the family or mother is not always, therefore, the best option for ensuring withdrawal and undertaking the intervention. The same is true of institutionalization. Some of the implementing agencies believe that a temporary withdrawal of BGA from their family is necessary, in some cases at least, in order to strengthen both, before reintegrating them.
6. The legal reform processes aimed at penalizing CSE may involuntarily be accompanied by a variety of interests and could be dragging other legal reforms along with it which, far from strengthening the framework of protection against and the penalizing of CSE, are contrary to the principles or minimum prison sentences agreed upon by a wide range of authorities in the region and supported by the project.
7. It is important to plan complementary actions that could have an impact on the efficiency with which the justice administration authorities apply legislation on CSE and the reforms to penal codes in the future. In some countries, the mere existence of laws does not ensure their proper and impartial application.
8. Strategies that allow for wider coverage in innovative fields and that attract attention – such as the analysis of masculinities – should be formulated. It is not enough to simply work with small groups of men without working with the key actors – as has already been the case – but, at the same time, deal with the issue through the mass media or other means that have greater scope.
9. The production of quality technical materials, aimed at members of staff of institutions, should be accompanied by popular materials for the target population, mainly for BGA and their families, as well as for local actors in communities in which there is direct intervention, or those that have a high rate or are at risk of CSE.
10. The actions at the mass media level should be carried out periodically and in accordance with a more permanent guideline, with a view to making a significant impact. In order to be valid and reliable, the measuring of the impact related to awareness should be based on public opinion studies rather than other types of indirect measurement.

7. GOOD PRACTICE

The following may be considered “Good Practice” in the fight against CSE that may be applied to other projects in this field.

1. The drawing up of the project in regional terms, with a significant coverage and technical assistance component at this level (including parallel cooperation between countries), which has allowed for the stimulation of the perception of CSE as a regional problem that should be confronted jointly by all the Central American countries.
2. The multi-faceted nature of the project, which acts at different levels on different aspects of the problem (legislation, inter-institutional coordination, awareness, prevention and withdrawal of victims, etc.), is a good methodological tactic.
3. The initial rapid assessments (RAS) of CSE prior to the beginning of the project in all the countries allowed for a useful database to be set up for comprehending the problem and raising awareness of key actors and the population on the characteristics of the problem.
4. Having proposed the definition of the CSE issue as a crime that is, at the same time, a violation of the rights of BGA which is primarily characterized by uneven power relationships between genders. This has clarified the approach and made the methodological component for dealing with the problem more resolute.
5. The search, from the outset, for modifications to the countries’ criminal laws, with a view to presenting CSE as a crime that leads to effective punishment.
6. The setting up of State Prosecutor and Police units specializing in ESCI.
7. The important work of coordinating public and private institution actors, carried out by means of inter-institutional coordination mechanisms against CSE in each country, and the setting up joint action platforms – such as the national plans – against this scourge.
8. Training and the production of materials aimed at different types of social actors (district attorneys, police, migration officials, journalists, teachers, those in charge of direct care

programmes, etc.), with a view to raising their awareness of CSE and their institutional role in the fight against it.

9. The cyclical care model of coordinated responses promoted by the project for care for the victims of CSE, and its systematization.
10. The development of a database programme as technical support for the institutions in registering cases of victims being provided with care.
11. Having sought to subtly influence society's perception of the problem through specific training activities aimed at opinion-makers (journalists) in order to encourage the media to handle the CSE issue correctly.
12. Having integrated the results of the study on CSE and masculinities into the mass media campaign of 2005, and adjusting the latter's message to coincide with the former.
13. The signing of a Code of Ethics with the Tourist Sector in Nicaragua constitutes good practice that may be repeated in other countries since it promotes the commitment of a key sector in the fight against CSEI.

ANNEXES

Annex 1: Methodological Design

The project entitled "Contribution to the Prevention and Elimination of the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in Central America, Panama and the Dominican Republic" is implemented by the International Programme for the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) and began its activities in July 2002. The project has a budget of US\$ 3,795,285, in addition to local donations, and it plans to conclude at the end of April 2006.

By the end of the project the following achievements are expected:

- Greater cooperation and shared knowledge between the countries in the region for the prevention and elimination of commercial sexual exploitation throughout the region;
- National legislation, policies and programmes drawn up to this effect in each of the chosen countries;
- An increase in community and individual actions for preventing commercial sexual exploitation and providing care for the victims in the region.

The aims of the project's interim assessment, which was carried out between February and April 2006, were the following:

1. To study the validity of the design/strategy, including its relevance within the regional context and that of each of the countries. In this sense the assessment will provide input for the implementation of the second phase of the project, which was designed in 2005.
2. Review the implementation of the project to date and consider what changes are required in the strategy based on emerging experiences.
3. Review the existing institutional structure and implementation capacity.
4. Assess the existing and potential links between the project and ILO/IPEC, ILO members, the agencies implementing the project and review cooperation strategies.
5. Analysis of the project's achievements in terms of its sustainability, and the factors that could contribute to maintaining this sustainability during the second phase of the project.

1. Components of assessment analysis and main indicators for each component

The assessment had seven subject analysis components:

1. Validity of the original design and reviews
2. Implementation
3. Relevance
4. Effectiveness
5. Efficiency
6. Sustainability
7. Unforeseen effects

Below is a table that contains the assessment's work components and the respective indicators for each component.

Subject components of analysis	Indicators	Area of performance of programme assessed
Validity of original design and reviews (17 indicators)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Logical design drawn up in concise terms - Design focused on the problems, needs and strategies already in effect detected in each country - Design determines the strategy to be followed for resolving the problems and needs detected and is articulated or does not duplicate strategies already in effect - Design incorporates a regional strategy differentiated from local strategies - Design clearly describe the beneficiary population and the way in which it will obtain benefits - Design places the project within the appropriate institutional framework - Design establishes roles and responsibilities of the main project coordinators - Design defines clear objectives and achievement indicators for measuring the changes the project should achieve - Design proposes objectives, goals and realistic periods of implementation - Design describes the main products, activities and input required for achieving the objectives - Design incorporates specific strategies in keeping with the gender needs - Design establishes valid assumptions regarding the main external factors that influence the project's implementation and performance - Relevance of the external factors considered in the project's design - Design indicates prior obligations that should be fulfilled by the main coordinators - Design determines relevant achievement indicators and means of verification - Use of indicators in following up on and measuring impact - Link between addendum and original project; justification and rationale of project's extension 	Design / management
Implementation (36 indicators)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Adaptation of the process of changing input, by means of activities, into products - Quantity, quality and timeliness of the products provided - Adaptation of the technical and administrative orientations and support provided by the project's staff and IPEC and ILO units involved (the regional 	Management/ local operations Services Beneficiaries

Contribution to the prevention and elimination of the commercial sexual exploitation of girls, boys and adolescents in Central America, Panama and the Dominican Republic" (Phase One)

Subject components of analysis	Indicators	Area of performance of programme assessed
	<p>office and the headquarters) to the joint participant organizations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Influence of internal or external factors on the results of the project - Adaptation of the project's response to external factors - Administrative strengths of implementing agencies - Technical strengths of implementing agencies - Financial strengths of implementing agencies - Administrative weaknesses of implementing agencies - Technical weaknesses of implementing agencies - Financial weaknesses of implementing agencies - The project's contribution to building on capacities of implementing agencies for developing effective actions against ESCI - The project's contribution to building on capacities of other parties involved for developing effective actions against ESCI - Existence of tripartite support structure for the project - Contribution of tripartite support structure to running /implementation of the project - Existence of national or state support structure for the project - Contribution of national or state support structures for to the running /implementation of the project - Existence of local support structure for the project - Contribution of local support structures for the running /implementation of the project - Level of participation of key actors in the tripartite committee - Level of participation of key actors supporting the project at the national level (Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, trade unions, employer organizations, NGOs, etc.) - Level of participation of key actors supporting the project at the local level (Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, trade unions, employer organizations, NGOs, etc.) - Effect of the participation of key actors on the results of the project - Existence of exchanges between the countries' initiatives for identifying, circulating and incorporating lessons learned. - Benefits of the exchanges between the countries' initiatives on the implementation of the project - Actions undertaken by the project for obtaining additional resources - Usefulness of the procedures established for 	

Contribution to the prevention and elimination of the commercial sexual exploitation of girls, boys and adolescents in Central America, Panama and the Dominican Republic" (Phase One)

Subject components of analysis	Indicators	Area of performance of programme assessed
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> identifying and cooperating with other initiatives and organizations - Existence and adaptation of a common understanding of the definition of prevented child between the project's staff, implementing agencies and other parties involved - Existence and adaptation of a common understanding of the definition of withdrawn child between the project's staff, implementing agencies and other parties involved - Level of participation of the beneficiaries in the design/ management of the project - Level of participation of the beneficiaries in the implementation of the project - Level of participation of the existing networks in the design/ management of the project - Level of participation of the existing networks in the implementation of the project - Evidence of inclusion of intermediate assessment's recommendations in the project's implementation - Type and quality of follow-up of direct beneficiaries - Effectiveness of capacities for care for needs of beneficiaries (children and families) taking into account gender differences 	
Relevance (10 indicators)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Existence of new needs to be dealt with by the project following possible changes in its context or circumstances - Validity of the objectives following possible changes in circumstances and context and after the implementation of the activities themselves - Relevance of the project in relation to the heartfelt needs of target groups - Relevance of the project in relation to national capacities for responding to the needs of the target groups - Relevance of the project in relation to local capacities for responding to the needs of the target groups - Relevance of the project in relation to current policies and national programmes - Real benefits versus expected benefits in the project's design - Inclusion of the population's most excluded groups - Level of connection and synergy between the project and other child interventions implemented by IPEC or by other international organizations in the country - Existence of synergies in the national and/or local context 	Design / handling Administration / local management

Contribution to the prevention and elimination of the commercial sexual exploitation of girls, boys and adolescents in Central America, Panama and the Dominican Republic" (Phase One)

Subject components of analysis	Indicators	Area of performance of programme assessed
Effectiveness (22 indicators, in addition to 2 special issues with 7 additional indicators)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Degree to which the project has reached its immediate objectives - Coverage of project with regard to the target population - Punctuality of product delivery - Number of products generated by the project - Quality of the products generated by the project - Contribution of the different Programmes of Action to the project's immediate objectives - Replicable potential of the lessons learned generated by the programmes of action (includes those related to education, health and alternative economies) - Support of the project for initiatives of replicating the lessons learned - Contribution of the Tripartite Committee to generating national and local capacities for combating CSEI - Degree of consolidation of local institutional networks and their contribution to generating national, regional and local capacities for combating CSEI - Capacities acquired and level of commitment of participating institutions; pending needs of institutional strengthening - Contribution of Local Child Labour Committees to the sustainability of the national programme - Relevance of the development of knowledge component to the process of eliminating CSEI - Efficiency and relevance of awareness component to the process of eliminating CSEI - Efficiency and relevance of institutional strengthening component to the process of eliminating CSEI - Efficiency and relevance of legislation component to the process of eliminating CSEI - Efficiency and relevance of direct action component to the process of eliminating CSEI - Sustainability perspective of development of knowledge component - Sustainability perspective of awareness component - Sustainability perspective of institutional strengthening component - Sustainability perspective of legislation component - Sustainability perspective of direct action component <p>Special issues:</p> <p><u>Handling strategies according to age:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inclusion of diagnostic studies of an analysis 	Management / local management

Contribution to the prevention and elimination of the commercial sexual exploitation of girls, boys and adolescents in Central America, Panama and the Dominican Republic" (Phase One)

Subject components of analysis	Indicators	Area of performance of programme assessed
	<p>according to age, differentiating children from adolescents in CSEI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Existence of specific strategies for dealing with children, different from those used with adolescents - Adaptation of strategies for each key age group implemented <p><u>Applying a gender approach:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inclusion of an analysis based on a gender approach in diagnostic studies - Existence of planning that included the strategic and practical needs identified by the men and women in the beneficiary population - Existence of specific strategies for dealing with the strategic and practical needs identified for the groups of men and women - Adaptation of gender strategies implemented - Equality in the delivery of benefits to the men and women of the beneficiary population - Link between the resources invested and the results obtained 	
Efficiency (19 indicators)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Adaptation of the investments made by the project to the results obtained - Analysis of cost per beneficiary and usefulness of these costs for planning new projects - Fulfilment of work plan - Fulfilment of project's budget implementation - Relevance of the changes made to the original budget - Flow of communication between the local offices in 3 cities and the project's coordination, national offices, regional office and Headquarters. - Relevance of the criteria for identifying the Programmes of Action - Relevance of the criteria for identifying the implementing agencies - Timeliness of the Programmes of Action's approval process - Existence of a system of information on the project's progress - Existence of systems of feedback at the local, national and sub-regional level - Existence of strategies for monitoring CSEI - Adaptation of strategies for monitoring CSEI - Existence of strategies for ensuring the project's sustainability - Adaptation of the project's sustainability strategies 	Management / local management

Contribution to the prevention and elimination of the commercial sexual exploitation of girls, boys and adolescents in Central America, Panama and the Dominican Republic" (Phase One)

Subject components of analysis	Indicators	Area of performance of programme assessed
Sustainability (21 indicators)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Existence of strategies for ensuring the sustainability of the Programmes of Action - Adaptation of sustainability strategies of the Programmes of Action - Institutional sustainability factor identified - Socio-cultural sustainability factors identified - Technological sustainability factors identified - Environmental sustainability factors identified - Economic and financial sustainability factors identified - Sustainability factors of gender strategies implemented - Degree of Governmental commitment for supporting the project - Changes in actions of public institutions for eliminating CSEI - Integration of trade unions in the efforts to eliminate CSEI - Integration of employers in the efforts to eliminate CSEI - Integration of non-traditional actors in the efforts to eliminate CSEI - Level of appropriation in the local sphere for sustaining the project's activities - Existence of a strategy of gradual transferral - Articulation of gradual transferral strategy - Degree of long-term commitment of local/national institutions to continuing the activities and delivering the services adequately - Technical capacity of local/national institutions for continuing the activities and delivering the services adequately - Financial capacity of local/national institutions for continuing the activities and delivering services adequately - Degree of influence of external factors on the project's implementation - Degree of influence of external factors on the goal achievement - Degree of influence of changes of personnel in the project's key counterparts - Impact of changes of government on the project's goal achievement 	Management / local management Beneficiaries
Unforeseen effects (6 indicators)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unforeseen multiplying effects - Unforeseen harmful effects 	Beneficiaries

Contribution to the prevention and elimination of the commercial sexual exploitation of girls, boys and adolescents in Central America, Panama and the Dominican Republic" (Phase One)

2. Information-gathering techniques, sources of information and instruments

The following techniques will be used for gathering information:

- Reviewing of documentation
- Semi-structured interviews
- In-depth interviews
- Focus groups

Given the variety of information that is to be gathered and on the basis of the instruments applied in previous child labour project assessment experiences, different types of instruments were produced. Thus, the different indicators of the analysis components were broken down into variables and transferred to a wide range of instruments that can be used as a guide for the gathering of information. These instruments were the following:

- Systematization of financial information and of the project's beneficiaries template
- Analysis of the validity of the design and measurement of indicators template
- Template on goals and coverage of Direct Action PAs
- Focus group guide for child and adolescent beneficiaries
- Focus group guide for fathers/mothers of beneficiaries
- In-depth interview on the project's management for IPEC/ILO staff
- In-depth interview on the project's management for implementing agencies
- In-depth interview on the characteristics of the products generated by the project, for implementing agencies
- Semi-structured interview for the project's partner institutions
- Semi-structured interview for institutions that are not the project's partners

The following represent sources of information:

- Project documents: Prodoc and Addendum, Programmes of Action, financial reports, progress reports, material to be circulated, preventive-promotional material and material on the training generated by the project, press articles, annual reports, systematizations, studies, etc.
- Direct beneficiaries of the project: children and adolescents in CSEI and parents
- Indirect beneficiaries of the project: teachers, community leaders and others.
- Members of staff of the implementing agencies of the Programmes of Action (both those underway and those which have ended)
- Project staff from IPEC/ILO in each city.
- Management staff from IPEC/ILO in San Jose: Project Coordinator and key personnel supporting the same.
- Representatives of the project's partner institutions: government counterparts, national and local committees, Tripartite Committee, organizations implementing mini-programmes, representatives of trade unions and the media.

- Representatives of institutions that are not the project's direct partners but that develop programmes related to children and adolescents or similar issues.

The coordination between analysis components, information-gathering techniques and sources of information was undertaken in the following manner:

Analysis component	Information-gathering techniques	Sources of information
1. Validity of the design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reviewing of documentation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project planning documents
2. Implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In-depth interviews • Semi-structured interviews • Focus groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programme's beneficiaries (children and adolescent and parents) • Teachers, journalists and other indirect beneficiaries of the programme • Staff of Agencies implementing the Programmes of Action and mini-programmes • The project's local and management IPEC staff • Representatives of the project's partner organizations
3. Relevance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reviewing of documentation • In-depth interviews • Focus groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project's planning and monitoring documents • Records and databases of the implementing agencies • Beneficiaries of the programme • Staff of Agencies implementing Programmes of Action and mini-programmes • Project's local and management IPEC staff
4. Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Systematization of the programmes' documentation • Focus groups • Semi-structured interviews 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programme's planning, monitoring, assessment and systematization documents • Records and databases of implementing agencies • Beneficiaries of the programme • Teachers, journalists and other indirect beneficiaries of the programme • Staff of Agencies implementing the Programmes of Action and mini-programmes • The project's local and management IPEC staff • Representatives of the project's partner institutions • Representatives of the project's non-partner organizations
5. Efficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Systematization of financial information and information on beneficiaries • Reviewing of documentation • Semi-structured interviews • In-depth interviews 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project's budgets and financial reports • Staff of Agencies implementing the Programmes of Action and mini-programmes • The project's local and management IPEC staff
6. Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Semi-structured interviews • In-depth interviews 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Staff of Agencies implementing the Programmes of Action and mini-programmes • Representatives of the project's partner institutions • Representatives of the project's non-partner institutions
7. Unforeseen effects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Semi-structured interviews • In-depth interviews 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Staff of Agencies implementing the Programmes of Action and mini-programmes • Representatives of the project's partner institutions • Representatives of the project's non-partner institutions • The project's local and management IPEC staff

3. Connection between “samples” and instruments

The people selected to provide the information the assessment was based on correspond to the different types of actor who came into contact with the project either directly or indirectly. An instrument-type was applied to each one of these groups resulting in a type of “sample” for each country as shown below:

Population	Instrument
Children and adolescents in CSEI who are currently beneficiaries of the programme	Focus group guide for child and adolescent beneficiaries
Parent beneficiaries of the programme	Focus group guide parent beneficiaries
Members of local and management staff	Interview on project management for IPEC members
Management staff and work teams of agencies implementing the programmes of action	Interview on project management for implementing agencies and interview on characteristics of products generated by the project
Representatives of public and private institutions and trade unions who coordinate joint actions with the programme (includes some mini-programmes)	Interview with the project's partner institutions Interview for the project's partner institutions
Representatives of institutions that work on related issues but that do not coordinate actions directly with the programme	Interview for the project's non-partner institutions

4. Assessment schedule

The interim assessment was carried out between the months of February and April 2006, according to the following calendar:

Date	Activity
6 – 10 February	Deskwork (documentation analysis and preliminary work)
12 February	Meeting of assessment team
13 February	Meeting with IPEC team
14 February	Interviews with regional counterparts
15 February	Interviews with national counterparts, Costa Rica
16 – 23 February	Simultaneous assessment visits to: a) Nicaragua, Panama and the Dominican Republic and b) Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala.
24 February	Interviews with national counterparts in Costa Rica and meeting with CSE Project team
25 –27 February	Consolidation of results
28 February	Workshop on Returning preliminary results with counterparts and IPEC / San Jose team
29 February – 9 March	Preparation of draft of assessment report
10 March	Handing in of report draft
14 April	Handing in of final report

Below are the details of the daily work from 12 – 28 February, the dates on which fieldwork and a return workshop was held.

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday 12
						DO: travel to San Jose
Monday 13	Tuesday 14	Wednesday 15	Thursday 16	Friday 17	Saturday 18	Sunday 19
AEB and DO: Meeting with IPEC/San Jose team	AEB and DO: Interviews with regional counterparts / San Jose	AEB: Meetings with counterparts / San Jose and Limon DO: Meetings with counterparts / San Jose and Limon	AEB: Travel to Costa Rica – Nicaragua (a.m) Meetings with counterparts / Managua DO: Travel to Costa Rica – Honduras(a.m) Meetings with counterparts / Tegucigalpa	AEB: Meetings with counterparts / Managua DO: Meetings with counterparts / Tegucigalpa	AEB: Travel to Nicaragua – Costa Rica (am) DO: Travel to Honduras – El Salvador (am)	AEB and DO: Rest
Monday 20	Tuesday 21	Wednesday 22	Thursday 23	Friday 24	Saturday 25	Sunday 26
AEB: Travel to Costa Rica – Panamá (am) Interviews with counterparts / C. de Panama DO: Interviews with counterparts / San Salvador	AEB: Interviews with counterparts / Panama City DO: Interviews with counterparts / San Salvador Viaja El Salvador – Guatemala (pm)	AEB: Travel to Panama – Dominican Rep. (am) Rep./ Sto. Domingo DO: Rep./ Guatemala city	AEB: Interviews with counterparts travel to Dominican Rep. – Costa Rica (pm) DO: Interviews with counterparts / Guatemala City	AEB: Interviews with counterparts / San Jose DO: travel to Guatemala – Costa Rica (am) Interviews with counterparts / San Jose AEB and DO: Meeting with CSE project team/ San Jose	AEB and DO: Consolidation of results	AEB and DO: Rest
Monday 27	Tuesday 28					
AEB and DO: Consolidation of results	Workshop on Returning preliminary results with counterparts and IPEC tema/ San Jose					

Contribution to the prevention and elimination of the commercial sexual exploitation of girls, boys and adolescents in Central America, Panama and the Dominican Republic“ (Phase One)