Skip to page content
Employee Benefits Security Administration

Information Letter

August 11, 1994

Ms. Judith A. McCormick
Federal Counsel, American Bankers Association
1120 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Ms. McCormick:

Thank you for the invitation to respond to an editorial entitled "Special Analysis, Perspectives on the `Float' Issue," which appeared in the American Banker's Association January 1994 edition of the Trust Letter. We appreciate this opportunity to clear up an apparent misunderstanding in the editorial regarding prohibited self-dealing by banks that serve as fiduciaries to employee benefit plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).

The focus of the editorial is an ERISA advisory opinion, A.O. 93-24A (Sept. 13, 1993), which concluded that a bank trustee's unilateral exercise of discretion to earn income for its own account from the "float" attributable to outstanding benefit checks constitutes prohibited fiduciary self-dealing under ERISA. The editorial questions whether the analysis in A.O. 93-24 is limited to its facts -- which involved the use of accounts and repurchase agreements with a third-party national bank to earn income for the bank trustee during the period of the float -- or whether the opinion has broader implications for the procedures banks commonly utilize in issuing benefit checks. Although advisory opinions apply only to the specific factual situations that they describe, (ERISA Procedure 76-1, § 10, 41 Fed. Reg. 36281, 36282 (Aug. 27, 1976)), the essential analysis of A.O. 93-24 is not unique to its facts.

The editorial notes that, in contrast to the facts presented in A.O. 93-24, banks commonly issue benefit checks drawn on a disbursement account within the same institution. The editorial points out that, as a technical matter depending upon the type of account used, the actual amounts in such disbursement accounts may no longer be considered plan assets. From this, the editorial concludes, in our view erroneously, that "[i]f these balances are no longer plan assets once transferred to such an account, then no prohibited transaction occurs." This conclusion misses the fundamental principle of A.O. 93-24 that, without regard to the status of the funds after they are placed in a disbursement or other account, a bank fiduciary's unilateral decision to handle plan assets in such a way as to benefit itself constitutes prohibited self-dealing.

We also take issue with the suggestion in the editorial that section 408(b)(6) of ERISA exempts such fiduciary self-dealing. That section affords conditional relief from the prohibitions on self-dealing for the providing of "ancillary" services by a bank to a plan for which it is a fiduciary if, among other requirements, the services are provided for no more than reasonable compensation. The legislative history of this section indicates that "in determining whether a plan pays more than reasonable compensation for its checking account services, the interest available on an alternate use of the funds is to be considered." H.R. Conf. Rept. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) at 315. Given the widespread technological advances in cash management during the twenty years since ERISA was enacted, it is by now generally recognized that banks have the capability of investing daily all but small amounts of cash in trust-quality investment vehicles at competitive market rates. (See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System letter to Stephen R. Steinbrink, Deputy Comptroller, Office of Comptroller of the Currency dated May 17, 1991). Accordingly, section 408(b)(6) does not provide relief for a bank trustee who maintains cash balances in a zero-interest disbursing account within the same institution to the extent that it is reasonably possible to earn net returns for the plan on those monies. Nor would such an exercise of discretion that is intended to benefit the bank at the expense of the plan's interests comport with the requirements of section 404(a)(1)(A) of ERISA that fiduciaries act prudently and solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries.

Of course, if a bank fiduciary has openly negotiated with an independent plan fiduciary to retain earnings on the float attributable to outstanding benefit checks as part of its overall compensation, then the bank's use of the float would not be self-dealing because the bank would not be exercising its fiduciary authority or control for its own benefit. Therefore, to avoid problems, banks should, as part of their fee negotiations, provide full and fair disclosure regarding the use of float on outstanding benefit checks.

Again, thank you for opening a dialogue on this important matter. We hope that this exchange will help to clarify any misunderstanding concerning the "float" issue.

Robert J. Doyle
Director of Regulations and Interpretations