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                                 BRB No. 98-0782 
                                 and 98-0782A

ARTHUR J.  ROBINSON                 )
                                                                      )
          Claimant-Respondent      )
          Cross-Petitioner                   )
                                )    
     v.                             )
                         )
NORFOLK SHIPBUILDING AND      )    DATE  ISSUED:                  
      
DRY DOCK CORPORATION               ) 
                         )
     and                           )
                         )
RICHARD-FLAGSHIP SERVICES,         )
INCORPORATED                       )         
                         )
          Employer/Carrier-             )
          Petitioners                   )
          Cross-Respondents             )    DECISION and ORDER

     Appeals of  the Decision and Order Awarding Benefits of Richard K. 
     Malamphy, Administrative Law Judge, United States Department of Labor.

     John H.  Klein (Rutter & Montagne, L.L.P.), Norfolk, Virginia, for
     claimant.

     Bradford C. Jacob (Taylor & Walker, P.C.), Norfolk, Virginia, for
     employer/ carrier.  

     Before: SMITH, and McGRANERY, Administrative Appeals Judges, and NELSON,
     Acting Administrative Appeals Judge. 

     PER CURIAM:

     Employer appeals and claimant cross-appeals the Decision and Order Awarding
Benefits (95-LHC-1535, 95-LHC-2015) of Administrative Law Judge Richard K. Malamphy
rendered on a claim filed pursuant to the provisions of the Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §901 et seq.(the Act). 
We must affirm the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the administrative
law judge which are rational, supported by substantial evidence, and in accordance
with law. O'Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Associates, Inc., 380 U.S.
359 (1965); 33 U.S.C. §921(b)(3).  

     The facts in this case are largely undisputed.  Claimant, a shipfitter,[1]  alleged that he injured his right knee while
installing angle braces on a barge for employer on an incline on October 27, 1994.  He did not report his injury
that day, but the next day he  informed his supervisor that he had injured his knee and requested  medical attention. 
Claimant was sent to the shipyard clinic which referred him to the Sentara Little Creek Medical Center. Claimant
was told he was to remain off work from Friday, October 28, 1994, until Tuesday, November 1, 1994,  at which
time he was to return to full duty.  After leaving the Sentara clinic, claimant returned to the shipyard to provide
employer with  the above information. On Tuesday, claimant was referred to
employer's carrier, where he provided a contractually - mandated urine sample,[2]  and was asked by carrier's claims adjuster to
fill out various worker's compensation papers.  When claimant  refused to do so
unless he was provided with an opportunity to review the documents, he was told
that he could not work and returned home.  At that time, claimant informed carrier
that he was choosing Dr. Morales as his initial, free choice of  treating
physician.

     Claimant remained out of work between November 1, 1994, and November 8, 1994, 
allegedly without calling or contacting employer.   On November 9, 1994, claimant
reported to work with a medical excuse from  Dr.  Morales.  Because of his alleged
failure to comply with  the "5-day rule," claimant received a notice of termination
from employer on November 10, 1994.  An MRI performed on November  9, 1994,
revealed a  medial meniscus tear, which Dr. Morales corrected surgically in
December 1994.  Claimant remained on a non-work status until March 10, 1995, when 
Dr. Morales released him for light duty work.  Meanwhile, claimant pursued a
grievance regarding his termination, and in October 1996, employer agreed to
reinstate claimant. See Tr.  at 147, 151.  Claimant was informed that he
would be contacted by employer regarding his returning to work once  the parties'
agreement was reduced to writing.  Tr.  at 147.  In the interim, claimant allegedly 
attempted to obtain  employment with various employers he identified on his own,
as well as those   identified in labor market surveys conducted by employer's
vocational experts, Ms. Yonke and Ms. Davis, in December 1996 and January and 
February 1997.  CX-23; EXS-A 22-31, 34-37; Tr.  at 190.  Through Ms. Yonke,
claimant ultimately obtained a job with Goodwill Industries as a stocker.  He 
performed this job from January 27, 1997, until February 10, 1997, when he
allegedly quit because of  problems with his knee.  On February 11, 1997, employer
contacted claimant  regarding his reinstatement,  but his actual  reinstatement was
delayed until May 20, 1997, because his pre-reinstatement physical revealed that he  needed cataract
surgery and had uncontrolled diabetes. Claimant performed light duty work for employer from May 20, 1997, until
June 4, 1997, when he was informed by employer that it had no further work available within his restrictions. 
Claimant  sought total disability compensation under the Act from October 28, 1994, until May 19, 1997,
permanent partial disability compensation from May 20, 1997, until June 4, 1997, and permanent total disability
thereafter.  In addition, based on the results of an audiogram performed in May 1993, claimant filed a claim for
occupational hearing loss benefits against employer in July 1993.  

     In his Decision and Order, with regard to the knee injury, the administrative law judge determined
that as claimant introduced evidence sufficient to entitle him to invocation of the Section 20(a), 33
U.S.C. §920(a), presumption, and employer did not introduce evidence sufficient to rebut,
claimant established that he sustained a work-related injury to his knee on October 27, 1994.  The
administrative law judge further determined that  this injury reached maximum medical improvement
on February 12, 1996, and awarded claimant the following benefits:  temporary
total disability compensation from October 29, 1994 until  November 1,
1994, and November 9, 1994 until February 13, 1996; permanent total
disability compensation from February 14, 1996 until January 26, 1997, and
February 11, 1997 until May 19, 1997; and permanent partial disability
compensation for a 10 percent impairment under the schedule, 33 U.S.C.
§908(c)(2),(19), commencing June 5, 1997.[3]   The administrative law judge, however, denied the claim for
hearing loss benefits, finding that claimant failed to establish that his
loss of  hearing was work-related.

     Employer appeals the administrative law judge's determination that
claimant sustained a knee injury arising out of his employment on October
27, 1994.  In the alternative, employer argues that the administrative law
judge should have found that claimant's knee reached maximum medical
improvement on May 5, 1995, based on Dr. Burns's impairment rating of that
date, rather than on February 12, 1996, based on  Dr.  Morale's subsequent
rating.  Finally, employer contends that  after May 8, 1995, claimant
should have been limited to his scheduled recovery.  Claimant responds,
urging affirmance of the administrative law judge's award of benefits with
regard to his knee.  Claimant, however, cross-appeals the denial of his
hearing loss claim, arguing that the administrative law judge's causation
analysis does not comply with the requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §557(c)(3)(A) (APA).  Employer responds,
urging affirmance of the denial of the hearing loss claim.

     Initially, we find no merit to claimant's argument on cross-appeal
that the administrative law judge's analysis of the cause of his hearing
loss does not comport with the APA.[4]  
After considering the relevant evidence, the administrative law judge
properly invoked the Section 20(a) presumption, as he found that claimant
suffered a harm, specifically a loss of  hearing, and that exposure to
work-related noise could have caused that harm. See generally Merrill v.
Todd Pacific Shipyards Corp., 25 BRBS 140 (1991).  Upon invocation of
the presumption, the burden shifted to employer to rebut it with
substantial evidence that claimant's condition was not caused or aggravated
by his employment. Swinton v. J. Frank Kelly, Inc., 554 F.2d 1075,
4 BRBS 466 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 820 (1976); Devine
v. Atlantic Container Lines, G.I.E., 23 BRBS 279 (1990).  Once the
Section 20(a) presumption has been rebutted, it is incumbent upon the
administrative law judge to weigh all of the evidence of record and resolve
the causation issue based on the record as a whole. See Hughes v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 17 BRBS 153 (1985); see also Director, OWCP
v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 28 BRBS 43 (CRT)(1994).

     On appeal, claimant does not challenge the administrative law judge's
determination that employer rebutted the Section 20(a) presumption. 
Rather, claimant argues that in evaluating the record evidence as a whole,
the administrative law judge abdicated his role as a trier-of-fact and
failed to comply with the requirements of the APA:  to consider the import
of claimant's testimony regarding his noise exposure, to evaluate fully the
conflicting evidence, to identify the evidence he was crediting and explain
his reasons.  We disagree.   Having set forth the relevant evidence in
detail previously when addressing invocation of Section 20(a), the
administrative law judge summarized this evidence, noting that while Dr.
Berrett suggested that exposure to noise may have increased claimant's
hearing loss in the higher frequencies and Dr. Jackson stated that noise
exposure could not be totally ruled out as a factor, Drs. Roper and
Sataloff ruled out noise exposure as a causative factor in claimant's
hearing loss.[5]   He then concluded that
while the physicians and/or audiologists were divided on the question of
aggravation by noise exposure, the weight appeared to  tip toward a
conclusion of non-aggravation.  Decision and Order at 20.  The weighing of
the evidence lies solely within the administrative law judge's
authority, see generally John W.  McGrath Corp.  v.  Hughes, 289
F.2d 403 (2d Cir.  1961), and the medical opinion of Dr. Sataloff, as
corroborated by that of Dr. Roper, provides substantial evidence to support
a finding that claimant's hearing loss was not work-related.  Inasmuch as
the administrative law judge addressed all of the relevant evidence,
including claimant's testimony, and it is apparent from his discussion that
he considered the evidence which favored claimant's position, but found
other evidence disproving causation to be more persuasive,  his analysis
comports with the requirements of the APA.  As claimant has not established
reversible error in the administrative law judge's weighing of the
conflicting evidence, his  denial of the claim for occupational hearing
loss benefits is affirmed.[6] 

     We next direct our attention to employer's arguments.  Employer argues
initially that in finding that claimant sustained a knee injury arising out
of his work on October 27, 1994,  the administrative law judge erred in
affording claimant the benefit of the Section 20(a),  33  U.S.C. 920(a),
presumption.  Employer does not dispute  that  claimant demonstrated a
physical harm to his knee.  Rather, it challenges the administrative law
judge's determination that claimant established the existence of an
accident or working conditions which could have caused this knee condition.

     It is well-established that in order to be entitled to the Section
20(a) presumption, claimant bears the burden of proving the existence of an
injury or harm and that a work-related accident occurred or that working
conditions existed which could have caused the harm, in order to establish
his prima facie case. See Bolden v. G.A.T.X. Terminals Corp.,
30 BRBS 71 (1996); Obert v. John T. Clark and Son of Maryland, 23
BRBS 157 (1990).  It is claimant's burden to establish each element of his
prima facie case by affirmative proof. See Kooley v. Marine
Industries Northwest, 22 BRBS 142 (1989); see also Greenwich
Collieries, 512 U.S. at 267, 28 BRBS at 43 (CRT).

     The administrative law judge's determination that claimant satisfied
the second element of his prima case with regard to the knee injury
is affirmed.  Employer argues that the administrative law judge's finding
in this regard is  not supported by substantial evidence because claimant
failed to demonstrate that he slipped, tripped, or fell on the date of the
alleged accident or  to describe any condition of the workplace which could
have caused his injury. We disagree.  Claimant testified that  while
working for employer  installing ankle braces on a barge on October 27,
1994,  he felt his knee pop when he turned with one foot positioned higher
than the other.  Based on this testimony and notations contained in
clinical records which attributed claimant's knee problems to the work
experience, the administrative law judge in the present case rationally
found that claimant established the existence of working conditions which
could have caused his knee injury. See generally Hampton v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 24 BRBS 141 (1990).   Although employer argues
that the fact that claimant did not notice any problem with his knee until
after he went home demonstrates that he did not injure his knee at work,
the administrative law judge specifically considered but  rejected
employer's argument in this regard; he found claimant's  consistent
statements to the contrary credible. Decision and Order at 9.

     It is well-established that, in arriving at his decision, the
administrative law judge is entitled to evaluate the credibility of all
witnesses and to draw his own inferences and conclusions from the evidence.
See Calbeck v. Strachan Shipping Co., 306 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 954 (1963); Todd Shipyards Corp. v.
Donovan, 300 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1962).  Inasmuch as it cannot be said
on the basis of the record before us that the administrative law judge's
crediting of this testimony is either inherently incredible or patently
unreasonable, or otherwise involved an abuse of his authority, his
determination that claimant established his prima facie case and his
consequent invocation of the Section 20(a) presumption are affirmed. 
See Cordero v. Triple A Machine Shop, 580 F.2d 1331, 8 BRBS 744 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 911 (1979); Quinones v.  H.B.
Zachery, Inc., 32 BRBS 6 (1998).  As claimant is entitled to the
Section 20(a) presumption and  employer does not contest the administrative
law judge's determination that it failed to introduce evidence sufficient
to establish rebuttal, his finding that claimant established a work-related
knee injury arising out of his work for employer on October 27, 1994, is
affirmed.[7]    See generally
Peterson v. General Dynamics Corp., 25 BRBS 71 (1991), aff'd sub
nom. Ins. Co. of N. America v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 969 F.2d 1400, 26
BRBS 14 (CRT) (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied,    U.S.   , 113 S.Ct.
1253 (1993).

     Employer's argument that the administrative law judge erred in
determining the date of  maximum medical improvement is also rejected.  An
employee is considered permanently disabled when he has any residual
disability following maximum medical improvement, see Devine, 23
BRBS at 279, the date of which is determined solely by medical evidence.
Sketoe v. Dolphin Titan International, 28 BRBS 212, 221
(1994)(Smith, J., dissenting on other grounds); see also Trask v.
Lockheed Shipbuilding & Construction Co., 17 BRBS 56, 61 (1985). 
Employer argues on appeal that the administrative law judge erred in
failing to find that claimant's knee condition reached maximum medical
improvement on May 5, 1995, based on Dr. Burns's 10 percent impairment
rating of  that date, rather than on  February 12, 1996, based on Dr.  Morales's
subsequent  rating, as claimant's condition did not change in the interim
and Dr. Morales ultimately agreed with Dr. Burns that claimant had a
residual 10 percent disability.  As the administrative law judge noted,
however,  Dr. Burns actually stated at that time that claimant "probably"
had reached maximum medical improvement and that he believed  Dr. Morales
would "probably" give him  a 10 percent rating.  Decision and Order at 12;
EX-A 15, p. 15-1.  Inasmuch as Dr. Morales performed claimant's knee
surgery and it was not until his February 12, 1996, report that he
definitively rated claimant's disability, the administrative law judge
rationally found that claimant's condition reached maximum medical improvement on February 13, 1996, 
based on his crediting of this testimony.  See generally Sinclair v. United Food
& Commercial Workers, 23 BRBS 148 (1989).

     Finally, we address employer's assertion that the administrative law
judge erred in failing to limit claimant to his scheduled recovery under
Section 8(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. §908(c)(2) after May 8, 1995.  Employer
initially contends that the administrative law judge erred in finding that
claimant established his prima facie case of total disability after
this date because  claimant informed Dr. Burns on that date that he could work as a shipfitter within Dr.
Morale's restrictions, and Dr. Morales approved claimant's pre-injury job description.  We disagree. 
To establish a prima facie case of total disability, claimant must
prove that he is unable to perform the employment which he was performing
at the time of his injury. Manigault v. Stevens Shipping Co., 22
BRBS 332 (1989); Blake v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 21 BRBS 49 (1988). 
Contrary to employer's assertions, the record reflects that on May 8, 1995,
claimant did not tell Dr. Burns that he could do his usual work as
shipfitter, but rather that he could perform light duty work within Dr.
Morales's restrictions, CX-8(c), (d).   Moreover, Dr. Morales did not
release claimant to perform his prior work, but rather imposed permanent
restrictions regarding squatting, kneeling, vertical climbing, and lifting
more than 30-40 pounds.  EX A 21, 39.  Inasmuch as the factual premise on
which employer relies is not supported by the evidence, we reject
employer's argument and affirm the administrative law judge's determination
that  claimant succeeded in establishing his prima facie case.

     Employer argues alternatively that claimant should have been limited
to his scheduled recovery as of May 8, 1995, because it produced undisputed
evidence of suitable alternate employment.  Where, as here, claimant had
established a prima facie case of total disability, the burden
shifts to the employer to establish the availability of suitable alternate
employment. Caudill v. Sea Tac Alaska Shipbuilding, 25 BRBS 92
(1991), aff'd mem. sub nom. Sea Tac Alaska Shipbuilding v. Director,
OWCP, 8 F.3d 29 (9th Cir. 1993).  To do so, the employer must show the
existence of realistic job opportunities which the claimant is capable of
performing, considering his age, education, work experience, and physical
restrictions. New Orleans (Gulfwide) Stevedores v. Turner, 661 F.2d
1031, 14 BRBS 156 (5th Cir. 1981).  If the employer satisfies its burden,
then the claimant, is at most, partially disabled. See, e.g., Container
Stevedoring Co. v. Director, OWCP, 935 F.2d 1544, 24 BRBS 213 (CRT)
(9th Cir. 1991); Dove v. Southwest Marine of San Francisco, Inc., 18
BRBS 139 (1986).  If an employee who has suffered an injury falling under
the schedule is only partially disabled, upon reaching maximum medical
improvement his recovery is limited to that provided for in the
schedule.  Potomac Electric Power Co.  v. Director, OWCP,  449 U.S.
268  (1980).  Claimant, however, can rebut employer's showing of the
availability of suitable alternate employment, and retain eligibility for
total disability benefits,  if he demonstrates that he diligently sought
but was unable to secure, alternate work. Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co. v. Tann, 841 F.2d 540, 21 BRBS 10 (CRT) (4th Cir. 1988);
Roger's Terminal & Shipping Corp. v. Director, OWCP, 784 F.2d 687,
18 BRBS 79 (CRT) (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 826 (1986).

     In awarding claimant total disability compensation after May 8, 1995,
the administrative law judge noted initially that between March and
September 1995, claimant had contacted a multitude of  firms, that
additional contacts were made in December 1995 and January 1996, and that
thereafter claimant subsequently contacted many of the employers identified
by employer's vocational experts in early 1997.  Decision and Order  at 14.  The
administrative law judge further noted that employer had not argued that suitable alternate employment was
available prior to February 1996.  In addition, he determined that employer  demonstrated the availability of
suitable alternate employment about the time claimant went to work for Goodwill in January 1997, a job which
was not suitable,[8]  and that shortly thereafter employer offered to
reinstate claimant. Id.  Based on claimant's job search efforts, and his recognition that claimant's job
status remained in limbo between employer's  February 11, 1997, offer of employment
and his May 19, 1997, reinstatement, the administrative law essentially
determined that claimant was entitled to total disability compensation
during the contested period because claimant had rebutted any showing of
suitable alternate employment by demonstrating  that, despite his diligent
efforts, he was unable to secure alternate work.

     On appeal, employer argues that inasmuch as its worker's compensation
coordinator, Mr. Walker,  provided testimony that suitable alternate
employment was available at its facility as early as March 1995, and 
employer's  vocational expert, Ms. Davis,  identified suitable alternate 
job opportunities in labor market surveys performed in late 1996  and 
early  1997,  EX-A 34; Tr. at 210-221,  the administrative law judge's  award of  total
disability compensation subsequent to May 8, 1995  is contrary to PEPCO.  This argument is
rejected.
Employer's assertions that it demonstrated the availability of suitable
alternate employment need not be addressed, as any error in this regard is
harmless since the administrative law judge rationally found that claimant
exhibited due diligence but was unable to secure alternate work during the
period at issue.[9]   This finding is
supported by substantial evidence, i.e., claimant's testimony and
the documentation of his job search, CX-23.  While employer also argues on
appeal that the administrative law judge erred in finding that claimant exhibited due diligence  because he 
made no effort to find alternate work between October  28, 1994, and March 21, 1995, or  between July 11, 1995,
and June 4, 1997, this argument is also rejected.  The record reflects  that claimant was on a non-work status
during the former interval, see, e.g., CX 2-15, and as discussed previously, the administrative law judge found
claimant's testimony regarding his attempts at obtaining alternate work during the later interval credible.  Finally, 
employer asserts that the documentation of claimant's job search attempts contained in CX-23 is a sham for
various reasons and that claimant did not attempt to secure alternate work
during any of the other periods at issue.  Such matters of credibility,
however, lie solely  within the administrative law judge's discretionary
authority. Simonds v. Pittman Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 27 BRBS
120 (1993), aff'd sub nom. Pittman  Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v.
Director, OWCP, 35 F.3d 122, 28 BRBS 89 (CRT) (4th Cir. 1994). 
Inasmuch as the administrative law judge's finding that claimant diligently
sought work is rational and supported by substantial evidence, and employer
has failed to demonstrate any reversible error, his award of temporary
total and permanent total disability compensation for various periods after
May 8, 1995, is affirmed. See generally Livingston v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 32 BRBS 122 (1998); Ion v.  Duluth, Missabe &
Iron Range Rwy. Co., 32 BRBS 268 (1998).

     Accordingly, the administrative law judge's Decision and Order is
affirmed.

     SO ORDERED. 



                                                                    
            
                         ROY P. SMITH
                         Administrative Appeals Judge




                                                            
                         REGINA C. McGRANERY
                         Administrative Appeals Judge




                                                            
                         MALCOLM D. NELSON, Acting
                         Administrative Appeals Judge

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Footnotes.


1)Claimant performed shipfitting for various maritime employers dating back to 1965. Back to Text
2)Injured employees are apparently required to undergo drug testing. Tr. at 42, 35- 46. Back to Text
3)The administrative law judge further determined that although employer's termination of claimant had been improper, its actions did not constitute a violation of Section 49, 33 U.S.C. §948a. Back to Text
4)The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires that every adjudicatory decision be accompanied by a statement of "findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefore, on all the material issues of fact, law or discretion presented on the record." 5 U.S.C. §557(c)(3)(A). An administrative law judge must independently analyze and discuss the evidence; and must adequately detail the rationale behind his decision and specify the evidence upon which he relied. Ballesteros v. Willamette Western Corp., 20 BRBS 184 (1988); Williams v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 17 BRBS 61 (1985). Back to Text
5)Contrary to the administrative law judge's determination, only Dr. Sataloff actually stated that it is impossible for claimant's hearing loss to be the result of his present occupation. EX-B 6-20. Dr. Roper opined that noise exposure made little or no contribution to claimant's hearing loss, that its stable progress over the past 20 years appeared compatible with the aging process rather than significant noise exposure, and that external noise exposure had not played a significant role in his hearing loss. EX-B 9-3-3. This opinion thus does not affirmatively state that noise exposure played no contributory role. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Fishel, 694 F.2d 327, 15 BRBS 52 (CRT)(4th Cir. 1982). Inasmuch, however, as the overall gist of Dr. Roper's opinion is that claimant's hearing loss is primarily due to aging, it is not inconsistent with Dr. Sataloff's view. See Phillips v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 22 BRBS 94 (1988). Back to Text
6)In light of our affirmance of the administrative law judge's denial of claimant's hearing loss claim, we need not address the arguments raised in employer's response brief that claimant is not entitled to these benefits, in any event, because he failed to provide employer with timely notice, and that if benefits are due, it is entitled to relief under Section 8(f), 33 U.S.C. §908(f). Back to Text
7)Employer also suggests that in concluding that claimant sustained a compensable knee injury while working for employer in October 1994, the administrative law judge erroneously assumed that claimant's prior 1991 knee injury was asymptomatic as of the time of the alleged October 1994 knee injury. See Decision and Order at 9. Any error made by the administrative law judge in this regard is harmless on the facts presented because it is undisputed that claimant sustained the 1991 knee injury while working for employer and the aggravation rule would apply. See generally Care v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 21 BRBS 248 (1988). Back to Text
8)This finding is not contested on appeal. Back to Text
9)We note, moreover, that Mr. Walker testified that he made no attempt to place claimant in alternate work available at employer's facility at any time prior to May 20, 1997, because of claimant's status as a non-active employee based on the termination. Tr. at 156-157. Thus, Mr. Walker's testimony regarding light duty work is insufficient to satisfy employer's burden of establishing suitable alternate employment as a matter of law because it demonstrates that work at employer's facility were not realistically available to claimant in light of the termination. Although employer may meet its burden of establishing the availability of suitable alternate employment by offering claimant a job in its facility, the job must be actually available to claimant. See Mendez v. National Steel & Shipbuilding Co., 21 BRBS 22 (1988). Back to Text

NOTE: This is an UNPUBLISHED LHCA Document.

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