Independent Final Evaluation of the Combating Child Labor Through Education in Bolivia Project: PETIM

CARE
Cooperative Agreement Number: E-9-K-2-0067
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LIST OF ACRONYMS

CEPROMIN  Centro de Promoción Minera
CEPTI National Commission on Eradication of Child Labor
CGM Community Management and Mobilization Committee
CCT Conditioned cash transfer
FEDECOMIN Departmental Federation of Mining Cooperatives, at Potosí
FERECOMIN-Norpo Regional Federation of Mining Cooperatives—Northern Potosí, at Llallagua
GPRA Government Performance and Results Act
ICLP International Child Labor Program
ILAB Bureau of International Labor Affairs
ILO International Labour Organization
INFOCAL Vocational Training Center at Potosí
INSEA School Teachers’ Professional Training Center
IPEC International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour
LTT Local Technical Team
NGO Nongovernmental Organization
PETIM Proyecto de Eradicación del Trabajo Infantil en Minería
PMP Performance Monitoring Plan
SEDUCA Servicio Departamental de Educación
SENTEC Vocational Training Center at Oruro
TPR Technical Progress Report
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
USDOL United States Department of Labor
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Main Findings of the Evaluation

CARE Bolivia’s Project to Combat Child Labor Through Education (Proyecto de Eradicación del Trabajo Infantil en Minería or PETIM), Cooperative Agreement Number E-9-K-2-0067, has made a major contribution to the improvement of the quality of school education in Potosí and Llallagua, as well as in raising awareness among the population of these mining cities (e.g., among children, parents, teachers, institutions) about the risks and hazards of child labor. In this sense, it has had a clear preventative effect, and in a limited number of cases it has contributed to the reduction of the time that children spend in mining activities. However, project effects on the definitive withdrawal of children from mining labor have been minimal, in part because of several factors that have an effect on child labor (aside from education issues), but that were not specifically targeted by this project. Thus, with regards to the eradication of child labor, the PETIM project played a useful although insufficient role. Notwithstanding the project staff’s relevant effort in this field, the objective of raising awareness at the national level and putting the subject of child labor clearly into public and private institutions’ agenda was hampered by Bolivia’s extremely unstable political situation.

The monitoring system and tools used by the project to measure children’s participation in project activities are of comprehensive, technically sound, and are a good practice that may be replicated by other projects. The project successfully worked at the local and national level. It established a synergic relationship with other institutions to design proposals, implement actions, or co-fund investments for the benefit of the target groups of schools, families, and child laborers. CARE Bolivia and the National Commission on Eradication of Child Labor (CEPTI) established a good working relationship and exchange of information with other agencies, such as the International Labour Organization’s (ILO’s) International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and others represented at CEPROMIN, where CARE Bolivia chaired the sub-commission on mining labor. However, communication was insufficient between CARE Bolivia, the United States Department of Labor (USDOL), and the consulting agencies that the USDOL contracted to provide support to the recipient.

PETIM was successful in leveraging funds from other sources, particularly by enlisting municipalities and other institutions to invest in the improvement school infrastructures. The project’s infrastructure and equipment contributions to schools were matched with parents’ contributions in cash and/or in kind.

The sustainability of the activities carried out under the “improvement of education quality” and the “awareness raising on child labor” components seems likely because of the involvement and buy in of various local institutions. Institutional support of the direct services’ component needs to be identified to ensure sustainability.
I  INTRODUCTION

CARE Bolivia’s Project to Combat Child Labor Through Education (Proyecto de Eradicación del Trabajo Infantil en Minería or PETIM) under Cooperative Agreement Number E-9-K-2-0067 is a four-year, USDOL-funded initiative that directs resources toward two provinces in Bolivia’s silver mining districts (Llallagua and Potosí) to reduce children’s involvement in mining labor. The project aims to prevent children’s participation in dangerous activities by improving the quality of and access to education in the communities.

The project is implemented by CARE Bolivia in Potosí and by CEPROMIN, a local and experienced nongovernmental organization (NGO), in Llallagua.

The project goal is the progressive elimination and prevention of child labor in the mining communities of Cerro Rico de Potosi and Llallagua.

The project purpose is to educate children and adolescents between the ages of 6 and 17 involved in mining activities in an improved and high-quality educational system.

The project specific objectives/outputs are the following:

  **Output 1:** Educational quality and relevance improved in project intervention areas

  **Output 2:** Mining families are aware of child labor in the mines and recognize the importance of education as a means of preventing it

  **Output 3:** Mining families are informed of alternative income generating opportunities to improve family income

  **Output 4:** Theme of child labor established in public policy decisionmakers’ agenda

The target population of the project was estimated to be 6,025 children of families/parents working in the mines and living in the mining districts of Potosi and Llallagua. A large percentage of this population is involved in mining-related labor, a high-risk activity with several health- and security-related hazards. The number of target schools at both Llallagua and Potosí is 33.

A shift of emphasis in project implementation was requested by the USDOL in 2005, and thus, by March 2005, an additional output/set of activities, regarding the provision of various direct services (i.e., vocational training for children and others) to approximately 360 children, as well as a close monitoring of the process of withdrawal of the latter from child labor, was included as a main project concern.

As part of Bureau of International Labor Affairs’ International Child Labor Program’s (ILAB-ICLP) regular procedures, it was necessary to implement an independent final evaluation of the PETIM project. This report describes the results of the evaluation.

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1 CARE. 2004. Memorandum CARE-INT 60.
II EVALUATION OBJECTIVES

The evaluation objectives were as follows:

1. Assess the overall impact of the project, reviewing its outcomes with regards to its objectives and how the project fit into a national strategy on the issue of child labor and particularly on the issue of child labor in the mining sector.

2. Assess the effect that the change of emphasis in project activities and indicators (i.e., direct services) had on the overall project outcome.

3. Identify areas of good performance and areas in need of improvement.

4. Identify lessons learned and knowledge generated in relevant strategic areas and the applicability of these to future projects.

5. Assess the long-term sustainability of project’s achievements and provide recommendations for future action.
### 3.1 Key Issues Addressed in the Evaluation

The evaluation had a participatory character, in that a wide range of project stakeholders and members of other institutions were considered as key informants (see Annex 1 for a list of key informants).

Table 1 describes the main areas of evaluation and the key issue included within each of them.

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<th>Area of Evaluation</th>
<th>Key Issues</th>
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| Validity of project design | • Consistency of logical framework and project document; links between goal, objectives, strategies, activities, outputs, indicators, and means of verification.  
• Consistency between original objectives and new activities and indicators.  
• Relevance of project indicators and means of verification. |
| Relevance of the strategy | • Qualitative analysis of the pertinence of the different strategic components of the project in relation to cultural and political variables and the characteristics of child labor in the mining sector of Bolivia.  
• Rationale by which changes in "education quality and students attendance, increase of family income alternatives, provision of services to families, and vocational training of youth, as well as other direct services" may or may not have an effect on the reduction of child labor in the mining sector. |
| Project implementation   | • Analysis of the process of implementation and the way in which the project inserted itself in the local and national level inter-institutional context through specific partnerships and activities (including community organizations, government agencies, international cooperation agencies, NGOs, mining cooperatives, schools and other). Impact of political events on project implementation. Assessment of the relationship between implementing partners in Llallagua and Potosí.  
• Assessment of the extent to which there is a common understanding among stakeholders of the concepts of "child labor prevention" and "child labor withdrawal."  
• Assessment of project’s monitoring systems and tools and criteria for identifying and tracking beneficiaries.  
• Highlight of good practices and innovative approaches derived from project implementation. |
### Area of Evaluation | Key Issues
--- | ---
**Effectiveness** | • Degree of achievement of project’s goal and purpose and review of project results.  
• Effect of project activities in: (1) withdrawing and preventing children from child labor; (2) improving quality of education and raising enrollment and students’ outcomes in school; (3) raising community and family awareness on child labor; (4) enabling families to look for alternative income options; and (5) influencing national and local official policy on child labor.  
• Assessment of the specific effect of different project interventions (e.g., boarding school, SENTEC, vocational training programs, tutoring, teachers training) on the above issues.

**Efficiency** | • Assessment of performance of management systems.  
• Assessment of communications with donor and subcontractors from the grantee point of view.  
• Review of the pertinence and timeliness of project investments.

**Unexpected effects** | • Assessment of external variables that had a positive or negative effect on project implementation and of project outcomes that had a similar unexpected effect on project-related issues or the wider context.

**Sustainability** | • Sustainability of results and of general outcome at the following levels:  
  - Social (e.g., ownership and/or institutional commitment by different kinds of stakeholders)  
  - Technical (e.g., increase of permanent changes in the way of doing things by stakeholders)  
  - Financial (e.g., additional fund-raising carried out by the grantee for the project, alternative sources for continuation of project activities).

### 3.2 **MEANS AND INSTRUMENTS OF EVALUATION**

Field work in Bolivia was carried out on the following dates:

- **June 5, 2006:** Data collection at La Paz
- **June 6–8, 2006:** Data collection at Potosí
- **June 9, 2006:** Presentation of initial findings to stakeholders at Potosí
- **June 12–14, 2006:** Data collection at Llallagua
- **June 16, 2006:** Presentation of initial findings to stakeholders at La Paz

The evaluation methodology, which had been previously applied in other program evaluations in several South and Central American countries, involved collecting and cross-referencing information from different types of relevant sources.
The following instruments/activities were used to collect information from key stakeholders:

- Various questionnaires/interview guides for project management teams, partner institutions, and non-partner institutions
- Focus-group guidelines for child laborers, parents, and teachers
- A matrix on the consistency of the project logical framework
- A matrix on project expenditures per component under original and revised project activities
- Review of technical documentation on the project (e.g., cooperative agreement, project document, technical progress reports [TPRs], partners’ annual work plans, and final reports or drafts of studies implemented)
- Review of baseline study and of other, comparative studies carried out by the project
- Review of the performance monitoring plan (PMP) and data, for both indirect and direct services’ phases of the project
- Focus-group guidelines for child laborers
- Review of infrastructure, diversified curricula, school educational projects, training material for teachers, educational material, and other improvements introduced at schools
- Visits to families, schools, and other educational institutions, including attending school classes
- Review children’s/families’ files (direct services)
- Telephone interview with USDOL staff

The consultant conducted two stakeholders’ meetings (one at Potosí and another at La Paz) to present and discuss the initial findings of the evaluation.


IV SPECIFIC ISSUES AND FINDINGS PER PROGRAM EVALUATION AREA

4.1 PROGRAM DESIGN

1. Is the project design logical and coherent? Do the project activities and objectives support the overall purpose of the project?

Though the initial project document may seem appropriate for its general goal, a closer look at the project’s logical framework shows that the link between the project’s goal (i.e., the progressive elimination and prevention of child labor) and the project’s purpose (i.e., children and adolescents age 6–17 involved in mining activities are educated in an educational system with improved quality) is insufficient, in that the latter may not lead to the prevention or elimination of child labor.

The same applies to the original project document’s four objectives/outputs, which were not enough to attain the project’s goal (i.e., Output 1: Improvement of school education; Output 2: Awareness raising for families on the risks of mining labor; Output 3: Information to families on alternative income opportunities; and Output 4: Advocacy to promote a more effective public response to the issue of child labor).

In particular, Output 3 (“Mining families are enabled to seek alternative income generating opportunities in order to improve family income”) was inadequately formulated (motivation is not enough of a condition to increase family income) and its related activities were insufficient to attain such an objective (e.g., providing information to parents on how to commercialize mining products and on security measures in mining, and later providing short-training to mothers on various handicrafts/trades). Likewise, Output 4 (“Theme of child labor established in public policy decision maker’s agenda”) was formulated in a vague way that does not promote easy follow up of effective deliveries on this subject. In fact, from a political point of view many things are put in the “decisionmaker’s agenda” in Latin American countries (e.g., agreements, declarations) that are never acted upon.

Though the improvement of the quality of school education and the promotion of awareness raising among families, communities and the government may have an indirect effect on the prevention and/or withdrawal of child labor, these project strategies may not be enough to accomplish project goals if they are not accompanied by other efforts, such as the following:

- The application of rule of law by government authorities, through the active interdiction of child labor at mining sites. Compliance with such laws will not only be lead by awareness-raising efforts, it will also be supported by active law enforcement. The project’s vague

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2 This was the rationale for USDOL’s Child Labor Education Initiative, which was to complement other USDOL-funded initiatives, such as ILO-IPEC’s regional project on the prevention and elimination of child labor in the mining sector in South America (Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador). The second phase of this latter project was still being implemented in Bolivia at the moment in which PETIM project started (September 2002), so the donor hoped to avoid duplicating outputs and activities similar to IPEC’s project by asking CARE-CEPROMIN to focus strictly on educational activities. It was thought that one project will complement the other one.
definition of this issue (e.g., theme of child labor established in public policy
decisionmakers’ agendas) did not help to focus on the concrete actions that could and
should be carried out by governments with regards to one of the worst forms of child labor.

- Substitution of labor-intensive production processes by semi-mechanized work in the
  artisan mining sector. This kind of intervention tends to improve productivity and reduce
  the demand of child labor from the mining sector.

- Substitution of income generated by children working in the mining sector with an
  increase of family or adolescents’ income generated through other activities. Seventy
  percent of the population of Potosí depends on the mining-related economy, which shows
  that alternative sources of income are limited. Thus, parents’ or adolescents’ vocational
  training (as proposed by the project) might not be enough to ensure this goal.

- Strategies to compensate mining families’ that have lost an adult provider. Twenty-one
  percent of the project’s direct beneficiaries—children—at Llallagua are orphans, because of
  this, there is an increased pressure on children to get involved in labor after the loss of a
  parent. This should be considered as a specific influence on child labor in the mining sector.

- Strategies to cope with the issue of massive migration in and out of mining zones
  (e.g., Llallagua and Potosí) resulting from the changes in the price of metals. During the
  project’s lifetime, Potosí received a massive influx of people coming to work in the
  mining sector, while Llallagua, whose mining productivity is in decline, steadily lost part
  of its population because of families’ migration to other mining sites, such as neighboring
  Huanuni. This sole factor had an impact on school enrollment, which increased
  significantly in the past year at Potosí and decreased at Llallagua, making it difficult to
  assess the project’s effect through this indicator.

Because of the particular vulnerability of children working in the mining sector (e.g., death and
injury), it would have been helpful to introduce a health and nutrition component as a project
strategies. CARE Bolivia and CEPROMIN have compensated for this deficiency by supporting
the distribution of breakfast meals at schools by the local government authorities. Also, given the
high number of unwanted pregnancies among adolescents, sexual and reproductive health
activities should have been included among project strategies, because early and unwanted
pregnancies can force children into labor out of necessity.

Though most of the project’s strategies and indicators are relevant for the improvement of school
quality and for the long-term prevention of child labor, such strategies are not sufficient for the
elimination of child labor in the mining sector, which means that some of the project’s strategies
must be reconsidered for there to be lasting changes in child labor.
2. *Was the project as originally designed, with a focus on improving the quality of schooling in the region, relevant to the local situation concerning the educational needs of the children engaged in the exploitative child labor in mining and for those at risk of entering such work?*

The project, as originally designed, was relevant to the educational needs of children engaged in or at risk of mining labor. Before the start of the project, teachers were poorly trained to teach courses and cope with the particular needs/social situations of their pupils. Teachers mistreated working children because of their economic condition. The curricula used at schools did not adapt to the characteristics of the region, and information related to children’s and families’ social context was absent from education. Scarce or no attention was given to local culture issues or local production-related issues and the fact that most children worked in the mines and the risks involved in this for both children and their families were often ignored by teachers and courses. The schools’ physical condition and equipment (e.g., schoolrooms) were insufficient, lacking pedagogic materials and an ambiance conducive or enticing enough for learning. Parents were insufficiently involved in their children’s educational needs, so most children lacked pedagogic support at home, and school management lacked the needed support and supervision from parents.

All of these issues, together with the level of consciousness of children, parents, and teachers with regards to the fatal risks related to child labor in the mining sector, experienced a positive change thanks to the project’s input. By making school’s more attractive, the project kept many children at school where they completed their education cycle, thereby fulfilling the project’s preventative aim with regards to child labor. The project’s efforts also had a significant effect on raising enrolment rates at project-supported schools, compared with the rate of increase observed at control-group schools.³

3 Unfortunately, because of a massive increase in school attendance in Potosí related to the increased amount of migration, the enrolment rate at school became an insufficient indicator of project success.

3 While the original project outputs aimed to produce effects on the educational quality of schools and on a gross and unspecific group of beneficiaries, the new strategy added output aimed to produce some specific changes in a limited number of beneficiaries, to be monitored in an individual and constant manner. The two different logics that underlined these objectives were not harmonized through project implementation and in some cases staff felt that the implementation of some new activities reduced significantly their ability to attend other previous project activities.

4 The late incorporation of a new set of related activities (i.e., direct services) seems to have been aimed at improving the limited relationship between the goal (elimination of child labor) and purpose (improvement of school education), by more closely monitoring a cohort of children (in fact, many children attended school while they continued to support their parents in mining chores). However, this new strategy was introduced in a seemingly unconnected manner with regards to the other activities/outputs delivered by the project, a fact that generated tension and difficulties among the implementing agencies in their attempt to adapt to the new project context.⁴

4
Though the activities introduced by the amended project seemed more clearly aimed at strengthening school attendance (e.g., tutoring classes, supporting the cost of children’s educational materials), promoting children’s personal and social development through specific coaching and activities, and providing children/families with alternatives to substitute income from child labor (e.g., vocational training for children and/or their mothers), all these activities are not necessarily sufficient to attain the withdrawal of children from labor in a short time and do not necessarily have an extended effect on all beneficiaries. The project’s agreed upon definition of “withdrawal” from mining labor (i.e., works less than 14 hours/week in light chores) is difficult to track because of the particularities/complexity of mining labor in Potosí and Llallagua, so the means of verification introduced for this output (i.e., number of children withdrawn from child labor) need to be reassessed, particularly in Potosí.

The implementing agency felt that the introduction of a new set of activities (direct services) was done with not enough time (18 months) remaining in the project to attain sustainable results with regards to children’s withdrawal from mining labor.

4. How relevant are project indicators and means of verification? Please assess the usefulness of the indicators for monitoring (through the Performance Monitoring Plan) and measuring impact.

The main indicators related to the project’s purpose, considered in the original project document (i.e., school enrollment, persistence, and completion rates) are appropriate to assess the quality and effectiveness of an educational system/process, but are not necessarily linked to the final goal of “removing” child workers from the mining sector. In fact, while the latter had no formal definition or method for verification specified within the original PMP, in practice a child may be involved in educational and labor activities at the same time.

Various unexpected factors outside the control of the project (e.g., massive migration of families promoted by changes in the price of mining products) affected school enrollment in both Potosí (increase) and Llallagua (decrease of 4 percent in project-supported schools in 2006\(^5\)). These factors lessened the indicator’s (rate of school enrollment) ability to measure the effect of the project on the selected schools. However, such an effect may be measured more clearly on the basis of persistence and completion rates at schools and other subsidiary indicators.

The subsidiary indicators related to the measurement of Output 1 (improvement of school education) and Output 2 (families aware of the importance of education and the adverse effects of child labor) seem appropriate, though it would have been beneficial to introduce an additional indicator regarding children’s school performance among indicators related to Output 1.

The indicators related to the measurement of Output 3 do not adequately measure the objective of promoting improvements in income generation. Indicator 3.1 provides information that does not necessarily lead to the attainment of Output 3, and Indicator 3.2 does not measure whether a significant increase of income has been attained. By 2005, the phrasing of the indicators related to this output was changed to be applied to families of children receiving direct services.

\(^5\) According to the District’s Director of Education, the annual reduction in the enrollment rate for all schools in Llallagua (urban and rural zones) is between 7 and 8 percent.
Because the indicators related to Output 4, which relate to institutional awareness raising, formulating agreements, and carry out advocacy activities, do not necessarily reflect what institutions will effectively do about child labor, they unsuccessfully measure specific commitment and deeds. In some countries, the existence of an agreement or of a public declaration against child labor is a reasonable “first step” for action, but not necessarily a good predictor of public priorities within the public agenda or that any effective action will follow. This is particularly true with frequent changes in political authority, such as in Bolivia in recent years, where such changes have hindered a steady and stable application of policies.

Given that the project’s initial objectives and activities continued throughout its lifetime, the “refocusing” of the project in 2005 to incorporate GPRA targets and the introduction of a monitoring system of the withdrawal of specific children from labor implied the establishment of a “double set” of indicators to be followed up from there on. Not without some difficulty, project staff complied with USDOL’s request and the resulting amended PMP is being used for tracking project results. However, these changes in the logic of the project have meant that some of the project’s initial efforts have to be put aside to prioritize the new (added) objective. For example, the initial baseline study carried out by the project that was meant to allow for a measurement of the projects’ other results and the evolution of the population at Llallagua and Potosí will not be reapplied at the end of the project. Thus, this initial time- and money-consuming investment was lost under the project new logic.

5. How well did the project design/strategy fit into other efforts already underway in Bolivia (by the government as well as NGOs) to address child labor and provide education for all? Has the project proven to be relevant for filling gaps in governmental programs and other services for child laborers in the targeted regions?

The project strategy fit adeptly within the major gaps existent in government and NGO investments in the targeted regions, particularly regarding education. Project inputs related to the improvement of infrastructure compensated the lack of investment, or complemented and leveraged additional investments from municipal and prefecture authorities and contributions in labor and kind from parents. Project inputs regarding teachers training and equipping schools with pedagogic material filled in the relative vacuum of public and private investment in both aspects, and provided a significant contribution to the quality of education in the targeted regions. The teachers training strategy was implemented with government training programs, so teachers would receive official accreditation for their participation in project-promoted training activities. The elaboration of a diversified educational curriculum at Llallagua, adapted to the regional needs, was closely coordinated with the education regional authorities. CARE Bolivia obtained support from government authorities, which provided teachers for the Education Center La Plata and the metal-mechanics workshop at Sagarnaga School, funded by the project at Potosí. The professional support of other institutions, such as universities, technical institutes, and a teacher formation center were incorporated into the project early on, a fact that contributed to the project’s success in the area of educational and in establishing a basis for the sustainability of its actions.

Regarding child labor, the project promoted institutional synergies toward a consensus agenda at the National Commission for the Eradication of Child Labor and organized several forums on this subject. The project exchanged information with USDOL-funded, ILO-IPEC’s regional
project on child labor in the mining sector, while the latter was in operation. Project staff participated in exchanges with staff of other regional projects and visited ILO-IPEC’s project sites in Peru. Educational material produced under the ILO-IPEC’s project is used within the PETIM project. When ILO-IPEC’s initiative at Llallagua ended, part of the caseload of that project was included by CEPROMIN (which was an ILO-IPEC former implementing agency) as beneficiary of the direct services component of PETIM project.

4.2 PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION (EFFECTIVENESS)

1. Did the project meet the purpose, targets, and the four immediate objectives/outputs as stated in the project document? Specifically, evaluate the project’s success in improving the quality of education, raising awareness about the problem, enabling families to seek alternative economic opportunities, and working for policy reform in regard to child labor in mining. What specific factors contributed to difficulties in meeting these objectives and how might these be addressed in future projects?

Assessment of Project’s Success per Objective/Output

Output 1: Educational quality and relevance improved in project intervention areas

The project made a major contribution to the improvement of the quality and relevance of education in Potosí and Llallagua. The design of the project’s educational component was relevant to the local context and had an integral approach that allowed it to introduce multiple important changes in the educational process at beneficiary schools in both cities. Although the usefulness of some indicators (and particularly school enrollment rates) may have been affected by recent demographic changes in both cities and do not necessarily reflect specific changes with regards to the status of child labor, a specific comparative study carried out by the project shows that the project’s beneficiary schools have significantly better results than control-group schools with regards to the increase in enrollment, students’ persistence, and the completion of the school cycle. Likewise, the project shows a lesser rate of relocation of teachers (to other schools within or outside each city) among its target schools than the average rate for both cities. Therefore, the difference between PETIM and non-PETIM schools may be greater. For example, while 28 percent of teachers (Llallagua’s and Potosí’s total number of teachers) were relocated since the beginning of the project, and in the case of Llallagua, 17 percent of teachers were relocated, in the case of this latter city only 10.5 percent of PETIM project-related schools were relocated.

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6 During the evaluation, it was observed that several children may enroll, persist, or complete their education at school while they continue working part-time in (sometimes hazardous labor) at the mines. Likewise, PMP data shows that there is an important difference between girls and boys who complete the second cycle of primary school (94 and 86 percent, respectively). Given that boys are involved in a greater number in mining activities and the most hazardous ones, much remains to be done to ensure that child labor does not limit education opportunities for children.

7 Notwithstanding the above, it may still be necessary to assess if the difference in the increase in schools’ capacity between PETIM’s and control-group schools was because of a greater increase of classroom building among the former during the last two years. This information was unavailable at the moment of the evaluation.

8 This indicator, not included among the PMP, is a useful source to evaluate teachers satisfaction with their jobs, particularly in the context of rural or relatively distant/isolated areas (as is the case of this project), where a greater rate of relocation of teachers is expectable. Likewise, the indicator provides complementary information on the eventual sustainability of the outcome of educational projects’ efforts in teacher training.
In the 33 PETIM-related schools, a total of 15,000 children have benefited from the project, of which more than 6,000 have parents or relatives that are involved in mining activities. Likewise, more than 400 teachers have been trained in diverse innovative pedagogic methodologies. All PETIM-related schools now have a Local Technical Team (LTT) that guarantees the sustainability of the improvement of the educational quality process.

The PETIM project has shown a high rate of effectiveness with regards to the objective of improving the quality of education offered at schools at Potosí and Llallagua. The diverse components of the integral intervention scheme applied by the project have had a complementary and synergic effect in the improvement of educational quality. Some of the project interventions stand out as particularly relevant, such as the following:

- The training to teachers in pedagogic techniques and in providing a warm, affectionate treatment of their students.\(^9\) (by year 4 of the project 53.5 percent of the teachers were using the methodologies learned at the training courses).\(^10\)

- The organization of LTTs at schools to ensure the sustainability of inputs (by year 4, 82 percent of schools showed active LTTs).

- The support provided to parents’ school boards for their coordination with school headmasters and their involvement in specific actions in support of project investments and activities in schools (by year 4 of the project, all schools had established parents’ boards).

- The improvement of pedagogic equipment at schools, particularly with the establishment of a “multi-active classroom”\(^11\) and the investment (or attracting public investment to the same) in infrastructure (by year 4 of the project, 87 percent of schools showed some significant improvement).

- The development of an “educational project” (institutional plan) for each school.

- A teachers knowledge and skills actualization plan and a diversified educational curriculum at Llallagua.

- The introduction of remedial and/or educational tutoring services for children within schools and at the La Plata Center.

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\(^9\) Whereas the project efforts in teacher training were unanimously praised by both school headmasters and teachers, some teachers noted that courses could have been organized in a more frequent and periodic manner. In the case of Potosí, this impression may have been related to teachers’ strikes, so frequent in years 2003–2004, but in the case of Llallagua, the frequency and acceptance of teacher training courses was influenced by the change of the consultant in charge of this activity.

\(^10\) Teacher training courses and the application of new pedagogic methodologies met some resistance from secondary-school-level teachers, which was progressively overcome by the project.

\(^11\) At Potosí, some headmasters/teachers complained about the timeliness with which pedagogic material (printed material and other) was distributed at schools.
The introduction of awareness-raising activities for students, teachers, and parents on the risks and hazards of child labor in the mining sector, including the incorporation of the theme of child labor prevention and eradication among most subjects of the educational curricula (e.g., tranversalización).

In this last intervention, the project has contributed in a decisive manner to make “visible” the existence of child mining laborers among the education community, contributing both to change the relationship between teachers and students and to end discrimination to mine-laboring students, which were formerly ignored or mistreated by some teachers.

Notwithstanding all the important project achievements related to the improvement of education quality, a worrisome situation persists in both cities that may negatively affect preventative efforts with regards to child labor: the insufficient number/capacity of secondary schools to enroll all students that finish primary studies. In Llallagua alone, there are reportedly 2,000 to 3,000 less secondary school seats. Because secondary schooling corresponds with adolescence (i.e., the age of most child laborers), and because the educational offering at the secondary level is insufficient enough that some children might opt to engage in labor, important steps should be taken by government authorities to solve these problems and keep children from entering labor as they enter adolescence.

Output 2: Mining families are aware of child labor in the mines and recognize the importance of education as a means of preventing it

Regarding awareness-raising activities with children, families, and the broader community to prevent child labor, the results of the project are also relevant, given that by year 4 of the project in both cities most people recognized that children ought not to work, especially in mining, and on the contrary, they should attend school as a priority. Accordingly to the latest survey, the adverse effects of mining labor on children are recognized by 75 percent of families and 87 percent of students, while 55 percent of families in the area recognize that education is a means to prevent child mining labor. In fact, dissemination campaigns reached more than 30,000 people in Potosí and have proven cost-effective in promoting a change in social attitudes with regards to child labor. Mining labor by children was also almost unanimously recognized as a major (eventually fatal) hazard by parents, teachers, and children during the focus groups implemented during this evaluation.

However, given the harsh reality of mining families and the scarceness of other income sources in both cities, child labor in the mines is also considered by many of the same respondents as difficult to eradicate unless family incomes are substantively increased. It also seems that one of the challenges facing the effort to eradicate child labor in the mines involves cultural attitudes. Tolerance toward child labor is deeply engrained in the artisan mining culture and is often seen as a natural part of local economic production. During periods in which the price of metals is low, the rationale for child labor is insufficient family income, but during periods in which the price is at a historic high (prices of some metals have tripled since 2003), the rationale for an eventual increase in child labor is to profit from an extraordinary moment that no one knows how long it will last. Thus, economic expectations and not only poverty seem to act as rationale for the persistence of child labor.
Independent Final Evaluation of the Combating Child Labor Through Education in Bolivia Project: PETIM

The way in which awareness-raising activities have been carried out differs between Potosí and Llallagua. In Llallagua, a smaller city with a more closely knit social réseau, the initial proposal of the project, to re-enforce the role of Community Management and Mobilization Committees (CGMs) was successful. In 2005, the CGMs implemented face-to-face awareness-raising interventions with 170 mining families. In Potosí, a bigger city with a more complex social reality, the project implemented radio and TV spots, which were adapted to the local culture (some were produced in quechua language, other involved children’s and adults’ testimonies, and some used cartoons to deliver their message). Likewise, at Potosí an important work was carried out in sensitizing the members of the local institutional network, which is to become the basis for project’s sustainability.

Output 3: Mining families are informed of alternative income generating opportunities in order to improve family income

This project component had a discontinuous implementation within the framework of the original project (before the “refocusing of targets” carried out in March 2005), and as a result, its concrete impact is difficult to measure. Although the information and training processes related to this component reached hundreds of beneficiaries, its concrete results seem to be minimal. During a “first stage” of implementation of this component, the project provided relevant information to miners at Potosí on topics regarding industrial security and commercialization of minerals (to help them improve the margins they receive from buyers). The concrete impact of this effort on parent and family income is difficult to assess.

In the case of the implementation of training activities as “direct services” for pre-targeted families, the results of these efforts are still in the initial stage, so most mothers that were trained in a specific trade have not yet managed to generate an income that could substitute the money they or their children earn through mining activities. In Potosí, only three mothers have used their training to generate income, and in Llallagua, of the 70 mothers that were originally enrolled in the training, only 43 (61 percent) completed the training and 13 (18 percent) used what they learned to generate income. Mothers have had varying degrees of success because of the differing start-up costs of certain activities. Likewise, different reasons related to beneficiaries’ education level, abilities, amount of free-time, and motivation, have had effect on the early dropout from courses. In the case of fathers only half of those who received training in the operation of small enterprises finished the course.

The lack of success with this project output is in part a result of the fact that no serious market study was carried out to determine which trades should be taught to beneficiaries. That is, the vocational training should have focused on improving skills in trades that could be supported in the local economy. The decision of which trades should be taught was primarily made on the basis of the candidates’ preferences.

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12 This activity was carried out with support from the Faculty of Mining Engineering of the Universidad Tomás Frias at Potosí.
Output 4: Theme of child labor established in public policy decisionmakers’ agenda

The fourth output of the project was difficult to implement in a sustainable manner, at the national level, because of Bolivia’s political and institutional instability. As a result of recent changes in government leadership, the country lacks an official policy on child labor and on child labor in mining, even though national legislation (Labor and Mining Codes) has been passed that is meant to reduce the practice. This law is not applied, in part, because of a cultural tolerance of child labor, which is often justified as being necessary for economic survival.

Despite CARE Bolivia and CEPROMIN’s efforts to promote decisive action on this subject (e.g., through the Mining Committee at the National Commission for the Eradication of Child Labor), most of the national child labor plans are simply unimplemented references. It is now up to the new Bolivian Government to implement such agreements and support its commitment with funding and other resources (e.g. labor inspectors). Meanwhile, as of this past May, the position of Government Commissioner for the Eradication of Child Labor remained vacant. Future projects should consider implementing benchmarks for local institutions to be implemented throughout the project’s lifetime as a way of building local ownership and networks.

Despite the challenges associated with implementing sustainable child labor agendas at the national level, PETIM has achieved positive changes in the way that local institutions in Llallagua and Potosi accept the need to improve the quality of education to prevent and eradicate child labor. This shift in cultural perceptions toward child labor should help to ensure the sustainability of the project’s outcomes at the local level.

2. Given the change in focus of the project to direct services, please discuss how successful the project has been at meeting these targets. Although the focus withdrawal and prevention of children is more recent, please discuss how successful the project has been in this regard.

In 2005, PETIM altered its methodology to provide various direct services to an initial group of 368 specifically targeted child laborers in the mining sector. From that moment on, direct services eligible members benefited, according to their age and needs, from various programs. Some of the beneficiaries’ parents received training in different trades. In Potosi, school materials and clothing were provided for children attending school.

The implementation of direct services logic meant an important, sudden, and difficult change in the project, for which the project staff of both implementing institutions (CARE Bolivia and CEPROMIN) tried to adapt on the basis of their previous experience. CEPROMIN relied on methods that they developed (during 2002–2004) for a similar USDOL-funded project in Llallagua, these are called: “Recreational and personal development,” “technical-vocational education,” and school tutoring.” In Potosi, they are called: “Pedagogic support and tutoring,” “personal and social development,” “citizenship and participation,” “cultural, artistic, creative, and recreational activities,” and “work and production” (vocational training).
Llallagua, which also focused on withdrawing children from child labor.\textsuperscript{14} This experience made it easier for CEPROMIN to adapt to the donor’s logic. However, CARE Bolivia was faced with creating a new caseload in Potosí to provide direct services. This difference in experience helps to explain the difference between the number of children withdrawn from child mining labor at Llallagua (69) and Potosí (24).

Table 2 shows the status of the direct services caseload in Llallagua and Potosí as of June 2006:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>At Risk (Prevented)</th>
<th>Under Withdrawal Process</th>
<th>Withdrawn</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Llallagua</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potosí</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>444\textsuperscript{15}</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>602</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Potosí, the project has had a limited effect upon the withdrawal of child mining laborers, although a reduction in the number of hours of children’s work has been observed. Given the recent establishment of a project cohort (the first assessment of its status was carried out in November 2005), we will have to wait until the next assessment (scheduled for August 2006) to establish reliable measurements. However, on the basis of information collected at focus groups, it seems that many children continue to work in mines to support their family. The recent rise in the price of many metals is an attractive incentive for many children to continue working in the mines, so even though children in Potosí may be attending school, many still work in the mines on the weekends and during school vacations.\textsuperscript{16}

In Llallagua, there has been a measurable decline in the number of children involved in mining since the original CEPROMIN-implemented USDOL-funded project (29, 17, and 8 through three cohorts/observation periods). However, these numbers do not involve the main mining activity in which children are involved.\textsuperscript{17} CEPROMIN actually reported an increase in the number of children involved in less dangerous mining activities in the third cohort (39 children) compared with the second cohort (32 children). Of the nine PETIM project beneficiaries from Llallagua who received instruction at SENTEC, six completed their training, one deserted, and two are

\textsuperscript{14} In fact, 23 of the actual beneficiaries of the direct services component at Llallagua were part of the first phase of ILO-IPEC’s project at Llallagua (2002–2003), while the actual caseload of PETIM direct services component at Llallagua (134 individuals as of June 2006) is composed of children who were beneficiaries of ILO-IPEC’s project second phase (2003–2004).

\textsuperscript{15} By July 2005, the intended targets proposed by CARE Bolivia and CEPROMIN included 200 children at Potosí and 168 at Llallagua (the latter coming from CEPROMIN’s database on child laborers at Llallagua). The larger number shown in this chart for Potosí demonstrates the difference in population size at both project sites as well as a greater turnover at Potosí.

\textsuperscript{16} This latter fact was assessed by a study carried out by students belonging to the Universidad Tomás Frías Social Work extension program, which collaborated with the project. The study showed that many students were absent from the tutoring classes at La Plata Center during the school-vacation period because of their involvement in mining activities.

\textsuperscript{17} In fact, the criteria agreed upon with the donor to establish the kinds of mining activities that would not be of an “exploitative character” (e.g., less than 14 hours per week in “light” chores such as mineral vendor, water vendor, filling bags with minerals, and sweeping mineral residues), seem to be more suitable to the reality of Llallagua, with most “light chores” being less frequently available within the production mode prevalent in Potosí.
currently enrolled. The system also reports that 10 children migrated to other locations (e.g., Huanuni, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz), two began military service, two reached adult age (18 years), and one was deceased. Of the 134 children registered among the three cohorts at Llallagua, there is no information on the status of 27 (20 percent) of them.

The project has surpassed the target agreed upon by CARE Bolivia and USDOL for the withdrawal of children from labor among the direct services-related population (73 out of 405 children, i.e., 18 percent). According to PETIM’s records of July 2006, that number was already attained (93/405, or 22.96 percent).

3. Please evaluate the success of each of the direct educational interventions—the boarding school, SENTEC, the vocational training programs, and the tutoring and academic support offered in both Llallagua and Potosí. Are these programs successful at removing and preventing children from work, and providing them with future opportunities?

The personalized educational attention provided by the La Plata Center (Potosí) to children, through remediation and tutoring interventions, has had a positive effect on their personal and educational development, as well as on the retention of children in school. The complementary nursery school service provided by the La Plata Center is highly appreciated by mothers and an important contribution to mining families’ children education and nutrition at the Cerro Rico of Potosí.

The tutoring and academic support provided at schools seems to be a useful strategy that has a positive effect on children’s performance at school as well as on their persistence in schooling.

The strategy of providing technical-vocational training to children seems to have promising potential in the long term with regards to the elimination of child labor, providing children with alternative employment opportunities when achieving adulthood, and stopping the vicious cycle of involvement in artisan mining activities that passes from one generation to the next. However, its results may easily be affected by beneficiaries’ motivational factors which interfere with attendance to training courses. In Potosí, 15 children have been trained in graphic design and 16 in computers at INFOCAL. The project also implemented a metal-mechanics workshop at the Sagarnaga school in Potosí, were training courses in welding are offered. Two cloth-printing courses for 16 children in Llallagua seemed successful (all students completed more than 70 percent of class time), yet a training course on pottery, which lasted four months, had a poor attendance rate (only three students out of 37 completed more than 70 percent of attendance to class time).

The only initiative that seems to guarantee the temporary withdrawal of beneficiaries from mining labor is the two-year technical-vocational training that occurs outside of Potosí or Llallagua, such as CEPROMIN’s boarding school program in the city of Oruro, at SENTEC (a well organized and equipped technical institution). Unfortunately, this is a costly option for Bolivians (US$1,400 per student/year, of which CEPROMIN covers US$1,100), which benefited a limited number of PETIM children from Llallagua (9). Additionally, starting in 2007, SENTEC plans to close its boarding school and to remain only as a non-residential provider of vocational-training services.
Regardless of the results of the tutoring and vocational training schemes implemented by the project, to promote a sustainable withdrawal of children from mining labor, this kind of activities should be implemented as a complementary means together with other types of interventions, such as government mechanisms to control children’s access to mines, economic initiatives that promote an increase in mining families’ income, and interventions that reduce the demand of child labor through an increased mechanization of the mining process.

4. The midterm evaluation indicated that communication between the partners (CARE Bolivia and CEPROMIN) could have been improved. Please assess the relationship between the partners since that time—have lessons learned been shared between the two organizations?

During the past two years, the relationship between CARE Bolivia and CEPROMIN was close and functional. Despite some small differences among project activities and the social and economic particularities of each city, project implementation in both cities was unified. Members of both institutions have periodically participated in information exchanges and specific planning and evaluation meetings. This communication has helped to promote a shared perspective on child labor-related issues and a high level of quality in the implementation of project activities by both institutions.

The permanent use of the logframe, the budget, and operational plans as a framework for inter-institutional relationships has facilitated the relationship between the implementing agencies.

5. To what extent do factors outside the control of project management affect project implementation and attainment of objectives/goal?

The PETIM project has been subjected, in a frequent and unexpected manner, to several factors outside its control, which have put at risk the attainment of its objectives/goal, such as the following:

- The increase in the price of metals, which has made mining activities more attractive to at-risk children and promoted migration at mining sites
- Political instability, which has brought frequent changes in government, making it difficult to establish long-term, stable policies
- Teachers’ strikes, which affected the timing of implementation of project activities at schools
- Massive migration in or out of mining zones, which affected both the social and economic context in the region and the validity of some of the project’s main indicators regarding rates of success at school
- The unsuspected role of adult mortality among miners, which increases pressure on orphan children enter into mining activities

18 For example, CEPROMIN does not provide school material to children under the direct services component, because they believe that this may promote dependence from beneficiaries.
However, despite these factors, the project has been highly successful in attaining its educational goals, and partly, its child-labor related ones.

6. Are there any examples of good practices or especially innovative approaches developed under the project that should be highlighted?

Please see Section 5.2.

4.3 MONITORING AND MEASUREMENT

1. Has the project developed tools and systems to monitor and evaluate project performance? How effective are these tools and systems?

The project has developed a child labor tracking system (using Access), which records a child’s social and economic status, provides information to track the process of reducing hours of work, and compiles other information to comply with the requirements of the PMP and GPRA.

All program direct or indirect interventions (e.g., teachers training plan, contents of vocational training by different institutions) are documented with a specific description of its related activities and implementation plan. The beneficiaries of the different kinds of interventions are also registered in specific listings, which include the frequency of their attendance at different activities. These listings show whether the beneficiaries are complying with the program’s different thresholds (e.g., attendance to 70 percent of a training course’s sessions) for certification purposes.

Information on all indirect services provided through schools, such as teachers training and the provision of infrastructure and pedagogic equipment, are also registered. The system also tracks the attendance of parents, teachers, and other people at program events or services, which enables the project to rapidly produce information useful for monitoring and evaluation purposes, as happened during our visit to Bolivia. To support monitoring and evaluation procedures, the project introduced at PETIM schools a modified version of UNESCO’s indicators on educational quality to be applied by LTTs.

The project has scheduled a total of six complementary studies to assess its final results, of which one (a comparative study on students’ enrolment, persistence, and completion at PETIM and control group-schools) has already been completed. At its beginning, the project carried out a baseline study that could have served to assess changes with regards to education and child labor in both cities, but when the project’s logic was modified and the direct services component introduced, this baseline study on Potosí and Llallagua lost its usefulness.

The children who benefit from direct services have a file within program records, containing key data on family, education, labor, and other issues. Data is collected from both parents and children through a specific format. In the case of the direct services component, the monitoring system includes a list of beneficiaries per cohort. Measurement of these cohorts is carried out periodically. In Potosí, a baseline on the first cohort was established in November 2005 and changes will be assessed after nine months. In Llallagua, cohorts are established and their evolution is assessed on a yearly basis. By 2006 CEPROMIN was following up three cohorts at
Llallagua. In addition to these systems and surveys, frequent visits to and contact with beneficiaries allows the project to register information about children’s and families’ progress.

The implementation of PETIM’s monitoring system can be described as a complex learning process, in which several changes were introduced to adapt to new donor requirements. The monitoring system and tools used by the project are comprehensive, of sound technical quality, and are a good practice that should be replicated by other projects. In fact, PETIM has received a request and is to provide technical assistance to transfer the knowledge related to its monitoring system to a Catholic Relief Services’ project on child labor in the banana sector in Ecuador.

2. Please evaluate the process for identifying beneficiaries for the project. Please evaluate the process for monitoring beneficiaries of the project. Has the project been able to accurately collect data on its direct beneficiaries and report on USDOL common indicators (withdrawal, prevention, retention, and completion) thus far?

The project has collected information on target schools’ main project indicators (enrollment, persistence, completion) for the indirect services component, but it did not conduct a parallel assessment of the evolution of child labor in the mines (an action that was not considered in the project’s original design). Given this situation, the effect of the project on the prevention of and withdrawal from child labor was difficult to establish. It seems that CARE Bolivia was unaware of the mandatory use of GPRA standards within USDOL projects, or that this provision was introduced after the start of the project.

By March 2005, an agreement was reached between CARE Bolivia and the donor to introduce a new set of direct services for a specific number of beneficiaries whose status with regards to child labor in the mining sector was to be monitored closely. It was easier for CEPROMIN to perform this task because it had managed a similar task under a prior ILO-IPEC project, and it already had a database that identified a certain number of children involved in labor in the mines. It took time for CARE Bolivia to collect data on its direct beneficiaries and to start reporting to USDOL on its common indicators (enrollment, retention, completion), and in the case of Potosí, these indicators had to be completed after the beginning of school year (February 2006). Given this fact, the performance report of April 2006 mainly refers to CEPROMIN/Llallagua’s previous cohorts (denominator: 117 individuals). Results on Potosí’s first cohort will be available by August 2006, near the end of the project.

An earlier introduction of USDOL’s tracking system would have allowed a more productive use of the system, as well as the ability to observe more consistent results with regard to the effects of direct services on beneficiaries. Unfortunately, although CARE Bolivia and CEPROMIN complied with donor requirements, this will not be necessarily the case by the end of the project given the belated introduction of the “new” direct services component. The short span of time between the introduction of this component at Potosí and the end of the project may not allow for a sufficient number of cohorts and assessment of its results. Otherwise, the fact that CEPROMIN used a large part of the caseload from a previous ILO-IPEC project as part of its cohorts might make it difficult to distinguish PETIM’s effects from the previous ILO-IPEC projects.

Another issue that makes difficult to track the target population is its varied motivation to actively participate in project activities and its mobility in and out of the target regions.
According to CEPRONIN’s staff, only 61 of 134 (45 percent) beneficiaries of direct services participate frequently in project activities.

3. **Assess the degree to which project staff, implementing organizations, and other stakeholders have a clear and common understanding of the concepts for identifying a child as prevented or withdrawn.**

The understanding of the concepts of withdrawal and prevention is clear among both CARE Bolivia and CEPRONIN staff. This is also reflected in the discrete number of children reported as withdrawn, which are only classified as such after complying with project’s criteria (complete stop of work in mining or reduction of hours, accordingly to children and/or families information). However, among mining families and some children, the high cultural tolerance with regard to child labor sometimes makes it difficult to assess if children have stopped working in the mines and how much of their time is involved in which kind of chores. Thus, as it was done during the focus groups for this evaluation, a set of sequential questions shall be asked to assess this issue.

### 4.4 PARTNERSHIP AND COORDINATION

1. **Evaluate the project’s success in cultivating local partners support for the project, such as teachers, parents, mining cooperatives, and local government in Potosí and Llallagua.**

The project successfully integrated itself into Bolivia’s inter-institutional context at the local and national level. It established a synergetic relationship with other institutions to design proposals, implement actions, and co-fund investments for the benefit of the target groups of schools, families, and child laborers. For example, the Pailliris association at Cerro Rico offered a piece of land where the La Plata Center could be built. Some of the project’s other investments in school infrastructure in Potosí and Llallagua included matching contributions in cash and/or in kind from local governments or parents’ associations.

CEPRONIN’s prior experience in the Llallagua region and the recognition of its work by the mining population in this zone were important assets that facilitated PETIM project’s operation in this zone.

The project’s leadership in educational and child labor issues is widely recognized in Llallagua and Potosí by most social agents and institutions. In fact, the PETIM project has successfully involved teachers, parents, children and other groups in different project activities, which incorporating the needs of diverse institutions and beneficiary groups. The involvement of such a diverse group of beneficiaries has increased the feeling of local ownership of the project’s results, so much so that many respondents hoped that the project would be extended beyond its planned end date (i.e., August 31, 2006).

The relationship between CARE Bolivia and the Federation of Mining Cooperatives (FEDECOMIN) in Potosí needs to be strengthened. At the time of the evaluation, this relationship was particularly poor. FEDECOMIN’s official policy is strict enforcement of the “mining code,” which prohibits the presence of children in a mine. However, a CARE staff
member in Potosí publicly accused cooperative members of actively recruiting child laborers. These declarations were resented as “offensive” by current leaders of FEDECOMIN.

In Llallagua, the relationship between FERECOMIN-Northern Potosí, at Llallagua (NORPO) and CEPROMIN is much more positive. This is in part a result of social differences, where Llallagua is smaller and many mining worker leaders are also community leaders or members of parents’ associations at schools, a fact which has helped to strengthen their commitment and involvement in the fight against child labor.

2. Evaluate the project’s success in building partnerships at the national level with the Government of Bolivia, NGOs such as UNICEF, etc.

CARE Bolivia and CEPROMIN established a good working relationship and exchange of information with other agencies, such as ILO-IPEC, UNICEF, and others represented at the National Commission for the Eradication of Child Labor, where CARE Bolivia chaired the sub-commission on mining labor. Forums were jointly organized on the issue of child labor, public officials sensitized on the hazardous character of child labor, and several proposals were made to Bolivia’s successive government authorities. By the end of 2005, an inter-ministerial agreement promoted by CARE Bolivia to foster actions for the prevention and eradication of child labor was signed by several ministries and representatives of the labor and entrepreneur associations. Unfortunately, the change in government in 2006 requires that these efforts will need to be ratified by the new government authorities.

3. How has the instability at the national political level affected project implementation? What lessons can be drawn from the project’s experience in this regard for the future?

The recent political and institutional instability in Bolivia negatively affected the project’s achievements with regards to Objective 4. At the time of the project evaluation (June 2006), many of the project’s achievements, including the National Commission for the Eradication of Child Labor, which was without a government-appointed commissioner, were threatened by this political instability. Bolivia also lacks a clear national agenda for the prevention and eradication of child labor.

It is unclear how the project could have operated to overcome this political instability. It may be that in the future project staff need to promote concrete, incremental government commitments related to its capacity to enforce national law regarding child labor; such efforts would complement and support NGO and other agencies’ prevention and eradication efforts.

4.5 MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

1. Assess the effectiveness of project management. How has the lack of a project director for most of the project affected project implementation?

The project team has demonstrated professionalism and high quality in its operations. The lack of a project director was overcome by a coordination of activities among project members, and most of project’s objectives seem to have been unaffected by the lack of a project director.
However, the project may have had greater influence with government authorities if there had been a permanent project director. The human resources used to cover the ensemble of tasks and beneficiary groups, including schools, was insufficient, although the personal commitment and overtime work of staff compensated for this difficulty.

CARE Bolivia and CEPROMIN developed a transparent communication style in their exchange with other institutions and groups, with regards to management issues and project achievements. The management style applied from La Paz and the level of delegation of responsibilities used in this project seems adequate. The communication process between team members and institutions also seems adequate. The centralized nature of CARE Bolivia’s administration had a positive effect on the project’s logistical needs. The relationship between CARE Bolivia and FEDECOMIN was negatively affected by certain actions of the previous project director.

2. Evaluate the ability of the project to successfully measure and track its indicators.

Please see Section 4.3 (Monitoring and Measurement) of this report.

3. Has USDOL technical assistance in understanding federal reporting requirements (e.g., GPRA, feedback on Technical Progress Reports, and overall communications between grantee and USDOL) been adequate and sufficient?

The project was subjected to a number of changes throughout the project, as USDOL redefined the definition of the project indicators and the method of measurement. Although many project staff saw these changes as burdensome, unexpected, and difficult to implement within the context of an already ongoing project, CARE made the requested adjustments without affecting the continuity of the activities.

The communication between CARE Bolivia, USDOL, and the consulting agencies that USDOL contracted to provide support to the recipient was poor. There were various misunderstandings and the project struggled to reach a consensus on the changes to be introduced and on how to monitor results. Much of this created extra work for project staff, created stress, and negatively affected the functioning of the project’s monitoring system.

To improve communications between the donor, implementing agencies, and consulting agencies in future projects, it may be helpful to—

- Avoid any unexpected changes by the donor with regards to the definition of project targets and indicators once a project is approved
- Closely monitor the relationship and the usefulness of the advice provided by consulting agencies to implementing agencies. ¹⁹

¹⁹ For example, in the case of the PETIM project, it seems that a consulting agency (i.e., Juarez & Associates) was not able clearly explain the notions of indirect and direct services with the implementing agency. They also tried to introduce software for project monitoring that did not run properly and was ultimately discarded, which delayed the overall process the implementation of a proper monitoring system for the project.
4. How successful has the project been in leveraging matching funds and other resources?

The project was successful in leveraging funds from other sources, including funds from the municipalities of Llallagua and Potosí and other institutions to invest in the improvement of infrastructure at PETIM-related schools. All project infrastructure and equipment contributions to schools were matched by parents’ contributions in cash and/or in kind. Other sources, such as the Office of the First Lady, contributed with breakfasts for PETIM-school students, and the local Education authority provided teachers for the La Plata Center and the metal-mechanics workshop at Sagarnaga school.

The project also obtained important support from the extension departments of the School Teachers’ Professional Training Center (INSEA), the Tomás Frias University of Potosí, and the Siglo XX University of Llallagua, which provided faculty to support the project’s educational and other activities, such as tutoring classes, family surveys, and courses for parents.

CARE Bolivia has been careful to give credit to all donors for their contributions to the project. The matching contributions increased the project’s effect on schools’ educational quality. Though by June 2006 the project’s original funding had been exhausted, there was an outstanding balance of 12 percent of total funds (US$192,596) that remained to be spent in the final three months of the project, which was a result of donor contributions. With three months remaining in the project, the cumulative expense of most budget lines fell within a reasonable ceiling of +/-10 percent of the original budget target. The way that CARE Bolivia’s accounting system reports expenses does not allow for an analysis of expenses by program output or a cost-effectiveness analysis.

4.6 SUSTAINABILITY AND IMPACT

1. Overall, was the project’s initial strategy for sustainability adequate and appropriate?

The project’s initial strategy for sustainability was partially adequate. CGMs were strengthened at Llallagua and offer active support to the project, but this option was unavailable at Potosí, where the actions of “community-based institutions,” as stated in the original project document, are not enough to guarantee project sustainability.

However, by June 2006 parent school boards (e.g., Juntas escolares) and LTTs promoted by the project were active at all PETIM schools. These groups are committed to following up project activities, which will contribute to the sustainability of the “improvement of education quality” component that the project implemented at schools. The projects close working relationship with local governments, universities, and local education authorities, and the financial and technical support obtained from these groups are also important factors related to the transfer of responsibilities to local institutions. It is likely that working with local institutions and interest groups (rather than national authorities and policies) is the best hope for achieving sustainability.
2. What steps have been taken so far to promote sustainability and continuation of the direct education strategies beyond the life of the project?

No action has been taken yet to promote the sustainability and continuation of the direct services strategies, and there seems to be no government authority or private group able to continue such a targeted approach on child labor in the near future. The most likely way in which these activities can continue, at least at Llallagua, is through CEPROMIN’s own standing commitment to continue working with the children through two recently initiated CEPROMIN projects on child labor, funded by the government of Navarra (Spain) and a European NGO. Support for the pottery workshop and for some recreation activities for child laborers in the mines may be continued directly by CEPROMIN for sometime. However, some vocational training options, such as SENTEC, will not be available in 2007. In Potosí, there is no clear design on how the belatedly introduced direct services strategy is to be continued.

Regarding the vocational training of child laborers, the offer of such options (technical sustainability) exists at INFOCAL and the Sagarnaga school (Potosí) as well as SENTEC (Oruro). However, given that there is no specific scholarship plan for child laborers that may remain after the project’s end, the economic sustainability of this strategy is severely hampered.

3. What steps have been taken to promote sustainability of the other project objectives, such as improving quality of teaching, and enabling families to take advantage of alternative economic opportunities?

Project staff have begun talks with the Departmental Education Authority at Potosí (SEDUCA) and the District Education Authority at Llallagua to ensure that these groups will continue supporting changes and mechanisms implemented at schools by the project, and that they will perform a supervisory role. There also seems to be a commitment from the LTTs and the parent school boards of most schools to continue project-related activities at schools.

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Some local stakeholders (such as SEDUCA) have a commitment to provide educational services as part of their institutional mandate for all children, but this does not necessarily mean that in the long run they will continue focusing their efforts on the child-laboring population. For example, while SEDUCA will continue funding the costs related to teachers salaries at both Centro La Plata and the metal mechanics workshop (as part of its institutional mandate), it will continue to do so for all (laboring and non-laboring) students. Thus, it may well be possible the metal-mechanics training workshop may continue serving students in Potosí, but not necessarily child laborers of the mining sector; likewise, it is quite probable that after the end of the project those (laboring) children that can not afford the cost of their training material will be excluded from workshop training services. In fact, a simple issue like this one may be critical for the sustainability of the success of some project activity lines. Grossly speaking, in view of remaining as an activity in support of the progressive elimination of child labor, the metal-mechanics workshop at Potosí needs five on-going inputs/actions: that somebody covers the costs of a locale & public utilities (these are currently being provided by SEDUCA at Sagarnaga school); a teacher salary (currently paid by SEDUCA); costs of machinery & tools (already donated by the project); costs of repair and replacement of tools (to be provided by SEDUCA); training material (to be paid by each student) and that a constant flow of child laborers is recruited to participate in training and monitored by some institution (this is currently being done by CARE). The continuity of the two latter inputs may be difficult to maintain: Many children’s families may not be able to pay for a child’s training material and by the end of the project no public or private institution had yet been selected or had accepted the responsibility of recruiting and monitoring children for the metal mechanics workshop in replacement of CARE.
SEDUCA says that they will continue supporting teachers, the La Plata Center, and the Sagarnaga metal-mechanics workshop within its financial and technical ability. (It may be interesting to note that teachers’ training was even more appreciated by its beneficiaries due to the fact that in the previous years most teachers had received from SEDUCA no training course aimed to improve their teaching methods.) Talks need to occur with INSEA and the Tomás Frías University so that their extension departments can continue supporting school and La Plata Center activities with the assistance of students from the Education and Social Work faculties.\(^{21}\) In principle, both institutions are favorable toward continuing their support to the project. For the La Plata Center, CARE Bolivia must contact other NGOs that can contribute to some of the center’s costs, such as pedagogic materials, preparation of meals for children (the salary of a cook, currently paid by CARE Bolivia), and transportation for the children to school.

In the case of Llallagua, the support to the project from nursing students from the Siglo XX University is likely to continue, which will contribute to the continuity of project’s activities at schools. CEPROMIN has also enlisted the City Hall of Llallagua to provide nearly US$6,200 per year (50,000 Bolivian Pesos) to cover the costs of improvements in education quality at schools (this contribution was of 20,000 Bolivian Pesos in 2005).

Therefore, CARE Bolivia and CEPROMIN are taking action to begin the transfer of responsibility for some of the project’s educational activities to local stakeholders, which will help to ensure its sustainability.

The project component regarding enabling families to take advantage of alternative economic opportunities seems unsustainable. The opportunity for vocational training does exist in both cities, but there are no public funds committed to subsidize parents’ training, and the way in which this component has been implemented shows that it has had a limited economic success.

4. Assess the extent to which the various local level community groups with which the project has worked—the mining cooperatives, the “Pailliris” women’s groups, teachers, parents, Universidad Tomás Frías—can act as agents for the initiative’s sustainability. Assess the extent to which the local governments in Llallagua and Potosí will continue project’s efforts. Has the capacity of local organizations been increased by the project?

The sustainability of the educational activities and achievements seems sufficiently guaranteed by the commitment of CGMs (Llallagua), parent school boards, and LTTs. In fact, the capacity of local organizations and particularly schools has been greatly enhanced by the project. The sustainability of activities at the La Plata Center also seems guaranteed by the commitment of SEDUCA and the Pailliris, who highly value this service. The level of ownership obtained by this project is high and many of these groups are already working independently, which will contribute to the project’s sustainability.

The local governments and educational authorities in Llallagua and Potosí seem capable of continuing the project activities related to the indirect services/improvement of school quality

\(^{21}\) The use of Social Work students in support of project activities allowed the project to detect and address other child laborers’ problems, such as family violence and child maltreatment.
component, as well as activities aimed at preventing child labor. Some of these groups have already budgeted for these investments. However, the cost and the responsibility (e.g., close monitoring of cohorts) for interventions directly related to the direct services/eradication of child labor component and to the eventual increase of opportunities of family income, have no future institutional backing and are less likely to be sustained.

5. Assess the extent to which national level NGOs and government agencies will continue to address the issue of child labor in mining when the project closes.

In Potosí, the activities related to the advocacy/local policy design component and to the public sensitization on child labor in mining component might be taken over by the members of the local institutional network that works in favor of the Rights of the Child. In Llallagua, the responsibility for these activities might be assumed by the CGMs.

Most likely, the issue of child labor in mining will continue to be addressed by national-level NGOs and government agencies. At the national level, there exists a Commission on the Eradication of Child Labor, in which several government bodies and national-level NGOs, including CARE Bolivia, have a seat, but the commission needs to be properly staffed and its actions focused on deliverables that spur specific actions so that eradication of child labor becomes, in practice, a priority for a broader number of institutions. It is important that CARE Bolivia maintains its public leadership in this field.

6. What has been the impact of the project on teaching and learning in terms of:

a. the quality of teaching (according to the teachers trained)?

The impact in this respect has been very positive. All teachers who participated in the focus groups expressed appreciation for the results of this activity and felt that it was useful. Many teachers had received no accreditation since they finished their professional studies. Teachers reported that students are now treated with more affection and attention, and that this has had an important effect on the children’s disposition toward school and learning.

b. the quality of learning (according to children, parents, and teachers)?

Most children, parents, and teachers have a positive opinion about the effect of the project on the quality of learning. Tutoring classes have also helped to ensure improvements in school performance.
c. the overall quality of new curricula and teaching methodologies??

Most parents and teachers refer with pride to the achievements obtained through the improvement of the diversified curricula, the introduction of new teaching methodologies, and the establishment of multi-active classrooms\(^{22}\) and pedagogic innovations. The documents reviewed during this evaluation concerning the diversified curricula at Llallagua and the schools’ educational projects/planning are appropriate and well designed.

7. What appears to be the project’s major impact to date, if any, on:

a. individual beneficiaries (children, parents, teachers, etc.)?

Thanks to the project, the overall quality of education provided by schools to children has dramatically improved. This reflects not only in the difference in results shown by project indicators at PETIM and control group-schools, but in the qualitative aspects of education when an observer visits schools. Children interviewed during the evaluation are thankful for the project, value the benefits received, particularly those in the areas of improvements at schools and vocational training for adolescents, and seem confident and happy with the opportunities they are being given. Most children expressed a negative opinion with regards to child labor in the mines.

Parent school board members are empowered to participate in their children’s education.\(^{23}\) Many of the parents interviewed showed concern about the issue of labor in the mines, and those who were trained in a trade valued the experience. Teachers appear motivated to do new things for their schools and are positive about the support received from the project. In all cases, the project’s message on the importance of education and the noxious nature of child labor in the mines seems to have been incorporated in people’s attitudes. The project beneficiaries’ satisfaction with PETIM is high.

b. partner organizations (local NGOs, community groups, schools, etc.)?

The project has contributed to “make visible” and to put into the local public agenda the issue of the noxious nature of child labor in the mining sector, the need to prevent and eradicate this problem, and the importance that children attend to school. This is true for schools, which previously tended to neglect this problem, local NGOs, which now have a greater interest in this subject, and the general public (including children), most of who now have, because of project efforts, a negative opinion about child labor in the mines. Schools, and to a lesser extent community groups, have been empowered and enabled to develop activities to improve the quality of education and prevent child labor.

\(^{22}\) Multi-active classrooms are physical spaces that include a small library, audiovisual aids (such as a TV set, DVD and other), toys and other pedagogic means. Primary level students assist once or twice per week to these and sit around circular tables (instead of individual desks) to engage in cooperative learning through problem-solving and research activities, play and experimentation.

\(^{23}\) In the case of the group of mothers of the La Plata Center, although these also seem empowered to carry out activities in support of education and against child labor, they seem to have developed a more dependent relationship with regard to the project. Since PETIM provides meals to children at the La Plata Center donated by the Municipality, this seems to have influenced expectations and attitudes about assistance on the part of the mothers.
c. government and policy structures in terms of system-wide change on education and child trafficking/labor issues?

Such a major change is beyond the original intent of the project, any reasonably expected outcome, and its actual outcome. The main outcome of the project seems to be the production of relevant changes in quality and functioning of the education system at the local level (in Potosí and Llallagua).

8. Have lessons learned by the project been shared with appropriate stakeholders?

The project will produce a collection of its experience, including lessons learned, and conclusions to share with stakeholders. In addition, some learning may be discussed on the basis of this evaluation’s findings. Please refer to the next section of this report.
V \hspace{1cm} LESSONS LEARNED AND GOOD PRACTICES

5.1 LESSONS LEARNED

1. The goal of effectively reducing the number of child laborers requires a combined approach including economic development, policy development, awareness-raising, health-related, and educational interventions. Notwithstanding its extraordinary contributions to the improvement of education quality in Potosí and Llallagua, PETIM produced limited results (of a mainly educational nature) to a complex problem that involves numerous other economic, demographic, and cultural variables.

2. Though in the long run, school attendance is an important means to prevent child labor and to create opportunities for withdrawal of children from hazardous labor, the improvement of education quality and of enrollment rates at schools are not necessarily effective indicators of the reduction of or withdrawal from child labor. Children might work long hours or in hazardous activities and at the same time attend school.

3. Sudden changes in a project’s organization, strategy, and/or activities tend to create confusion and resentment among implementing agencies. Results related to the withdrawal of children from labor are often cumulative in nature, so enough time should be given for changes to occur.

4. The process of building up educational quality depends greatly on the level of involvement of teachers. With adequate academic incentives, teachers become more creative and proactive. Education processes are more fruitful when they involve the whole education community.

5. Design of vocational training interventions should take into account not only beneficiaries’ preferences and abilities but also market demand for skills and products to ensure a greater probability of success in improving family income.

6. During the project design phase, greater attention should be given to demographic factors (e.g., emigration of families, orphaned children) that may hamper or affect the attainment of goals, such as increasing school enrollment or reducing involvement in child labor.

7. Vocational training is a useful method of providing adolescents with alternative means of income so that they may replace labor in the mines with other activities.

5.2 GOOD PRACTICES

The following good practices stand out as promising developments of the PETIM project that are replicable in other projects—

1. Involving members of the education community (e.g., headmasters, teachers, parents, and children) in the project contributes to mobilization and integration of efforts that benefit children.
2. Incorporating the subject of child labor within the educational curriculum helped create awareness about the need to prevent and withdraw children from mining labor.

3. Requesting that schools and parents provide matching contributions to project investments at schools promoted ownership of the initiatives by the community.

4. Designing a diversified educational curriculum at Llallagua produced a greater level of participation and involvement among teachers in school matters and made schools more relevant in the local context.

5. The La Plata Center for the provision of complementary educational services for children provides an interesting model that can be easily replicated at other sites and that was greatly appreciated by the beneficiaries.

6. The monitoring system developed by the project in Excel software is also a useful model that can be replicated by other similar projects.

7. Implementing an integral, personal development program for child laborers, complementary to school, which motivates leadership and creates opportunities for children, is an important project asset that helps provide children with a sense leadership and self-assurance and that motivates important attitudinal changes favorable to child labor prevention.
VI CONCLUSIONS

The PETIM project has made a major contribution to the improvement of the quality of school education in Potosí and Llallagua, as well as in raising awareness among the population of these mining cities (e.g., among children, parents, teachers, and institutions) about the risks and hazards of child labor. In this sense, it has had a clear preventative effect, and in a limited number of cases, it has contributed to the reduction of time that children spend in mining activities. However, project effects on the definitive withdrawal of children from child labor have been of a limited magnitude, and usually to the result of the existence of several factors that affect child labor (aside from education issues), but that were not specifically targeted by this project. Thus, with regards to the eradication of child labor, the PETIM project played a useful though insufficient role.

With regard to its first output, the improvement of the quality of education, the design of this project component was relevant to the local context and had an integral approach that allowed it to introduce multiple important changes in the educational process at beneficiary schools in both cities. Among the important changes implemented at schools, the project introduced the subject of child labor as a crosscutting theme within the educational curricula. Thus, the diverse elements of the intervention scheme carried out by the project on this issue have had a complementary and synergic effect in the improvement of educational quality.

Regarding awareness-raising activities with children, families, and the broader community to prevent child labor, the results of the project are also positive. By year 4 of the project, in both cities, most people recognized that children should not work, especially in mining-related chores, and that they should attend school as a priority.

The implementation third component of the project, related to enabling families to access alternative means of increasing their income, was unsustainable within the framework of the original project and it had a minimal effect. By June 2006, most mothers who had been trained in a trade under the direct services component had not yet generated any income associated with that training. In fact, only a few mothers have started profitable ventures on the basis of the trade they learned.

The fourth output of the project was difficult to implement in a sustainable manner, at the national level, because of Bolivia’s political and institutional instability. Laws concerning child labor are not applied because of a high level of cultural tolerance toward this phenomenon, which is often justified as being a necessary means of economic survival. However, a more clear and stable answer was obtained by the project from different local authorities and institutions at Llallagua and Potosí. The consensus generated by PETIM among local institutions Llallagua and Potosí concerning the need to improve the quality of education and to prevent and eradicate child labor has helped change the previously predominant cultural perceptions about child labor, and thus, opens a promising path for future local and self-sustained action.
RECOMMENDATIONS

1. In enclave-based economies that rely on child labor, such as in Potosí and Llallagua, projects aimed at preventing such activity through educational improvements must also encourage compliance with national laws again child labor and work to reduce the need for child labor in the workforce. Compliance with anti-child-labor laws can be improved by implementing awareness-raising activities, and by active enforcement. The need for child involvement in the workforce can be lessened by substituting semi-mechanized processes for manual labor.

2. In addition to economic and education interventions, future projects must also implement activities that promote public awareness of the hazards related to child labor. Such awareness-raising activities are necessary to overcome the strong cultural tolerance of and reliance on child labor. In Llallagua and Potosí, PETIM succeeded in raising public awareness of the hazards of child labor by incorporating awareness-raising activities within the school curricula.

3. To prevent children from entering into labor, future projects should consider strategies to compensate or supplement the income of families that have suffered the loss of a parent.

4. Future projects might want to consider implementing health and nutrition interventions in addition to education. Apart from preventing illness, such an intervention could reduce the risk of early and unwanted pregnancies, which often force children to drop out of school and enter into labor to provide for their family.

5. The persistence of children’s intensive employment during the school vacation period and on weekends among certain families underlines the economic rationale of child labor which is often supported by parents. Part of this drive may be discouraged by a clearer and more intensive application of law at mining sites, combined with increased awareness raising activities focused on pre-selected sites and children. Nevertheless, while major changes in cultural attitudes towards child labor take longer time to be attained, some more effective although provisional answer to this issue could involve implementing conditioned cash transfer programs (CCTs) in a selective manner on specific populations affected by the WFCL, such as children working in the mining sector. CCTs have been implemented with some success, as a strategy to reduce child labor, in different other countries and sectors in Latin America.

6. Future projects should work to ensure that there are a sufficient number of secondary schools so that children who finish primary school are able to continue their education, which would also help to keep them from working.

7. Likewise, within future projects, high cultural tolerance towards child labor (a fact which is often justified by authorities and many people on the rationale that child labor is a necessary means for poor families’ economic survival), should be combated through posing concrete, collective and incremental benchmarks to local institutions, aimed to be implemented throughout a project’s lifetime as a way of building ownership and networks through effective action.