For the last decade, Burma has been condemned internationally for its human
rights and worker's rights violations. The Department of Labor's 1998
Report on Labor Practices in Burma surveys, analyzes, and summarizes
major allegations concerning labor practices in Burma. It brings together and
evaluates reports from the Department of State, findings from international
organizations, reports by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), information
distributed by the Government of Burma (GOB), and testimony provided to the
Department of Labor. Because the GOB tightly controls access to Burma,
independent research in Burma is almost non-existent and is dangerous to
undertake.
I. Background
A former British colony, Burma became an independent parliamentary
democracy in 1948. A democratically-elected government led Burma until October
1958, when political differences within the government and a communist
insurgency led General Ne Win to take power and form a military government.
Democracy returned briefly in February 1960, but General Ne Win led another
military coup in 1962. Since then, Burma has been ruled by a succession of
non-elected military governments.
In 1988, students, workers, monks, and even members of the military
participated in a pro-democracy uprising to protest the economic and political
conditions imposed by Burma's military governments. The military responded with
brutal repression, and thousands of people were arrested or killed when the
army put a violent end to the peaceful demonstrations.
A new military government, the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC), imposed martial law, suspended the 1974 Constitution, and dissolved
administrative and legislative organs. The SLORC declared its intention to
transfer power to a civilian government and conducted a largely free election
in May 1990. The National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Secretary-General
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, won 80% of the seats for a new legislative body. The
SLORC, however, did not transfer power to the newly-elected government.
In November 1997, the SLORC changed its name to the State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC). However, its military character and repressive
policies are essentially unchanged; the four most senior members of the SLORC
assumed equivalent positions in the SPDC, and the other members are all
regional military commanders. At this time, the regime still refuses to
transfer power to the legitimate, elected government.
In Burma today, basic elements of the rule of
law are missing; there is no legislative
body composed of elected representatives, members of the executive branch are
not elected, and the judiciary is not independent of the executive. The laws
themselves are vague and generally inaccessible, and the government impedes
access to information, making it difficult to evaluate the country's laws with
respect to fundamental human rights.
Since before independence from Great Britain, differences between Burma's
ethnic groups have been expressed in political and social divisions.
Approximately two-thirds of Burma's 46 million people belong to the Burman
ethnic group. The rest are divided between as many as 145 other ethnic groups
and live mostly in the hill and border regions of the country, where they often
form the majority of the population. For much of the last half century, many
ethnic minorities seeking greater levels of independence have conducted armed
campaigns against the central government.
When the SLORC seized power in 1988, a third of the country was still
affected by insurgencies by ethnic minority groups, and in vast ethnic minority
areas, central control by the government was weak. One of the SLORC's
priorities was a renewed assault on armed opposition groups. In April 1992, the
SLORC began direct talks and/or cease-fire negotiations with a number of the
armed opposition groups.
Many human rights abuses, including forced relocations, have reportedly
taken place in the context of military actions against armed opposition groups
and as part of the GOB's related strategy to undercut civilian support for the
insurgents. As a result, hundreds of thousands of people have fled the country,
and the international community has consistently expressed its concern at the
significant flows of refugees from Burma.
D. Worker's rights
Over the past 40 years, the International
Labor Organization (ILO), a special U.N. agency, has repeatedly condemned
Burma's record of imposing forced labor on its people and denying them freedom
of association. Burma has been called to appear before the ILO on many
occasions, especially since the military coup in 1962, concerning the failure
to fulfill its obligations under specific ILO conventions and the ILO
Constitution. Suppression of the pro-democracy movement in 1988 and heightened
international concern in recent years have intensified the level of activity in
the ILO with respect to Burma.
The ILO has received numerous complaints and
allegations that Burma has violated its obligations under the Forced Labor
Convention (1930), No. 29. In January 1993, the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), under Article 24 of the ILO Constitution, submitted
a complaint against Burma on forced labor. A special sub-committee of the ILO's
Governing Body concluded that Burma was violating the Forced Labor Convention.
In June 1996, 25 worker delegates to the ILO's International Labour Conference
filed a formal complaint under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution alleging
Burma's non-observance of the Forced Labor Convention. This led the ILO to
establish a Commission of Inquiry (COI) in March 1997 to investigate the
complaint - only the tenth COI in the ILO's 80-year history. The COI released
its report (hereinafter "COI Report") in July 1998 concluding that
there was "abundant evidence"
before the COI showing the "pervasive" use of forced labor throughout
Burma by government and military authorities.
The ILO has also received numerous complaints
and allegations that Burma has violated its obligations under the Freedom of
Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No. 87).
The ILO Conference Committee on the Application of Conventions adopted special
paragraphs highlighting Burma's unacceptable application of Convention No. 87
in 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, and again in 1998. These paragraphs deplored the
GOB's continued failure to implement Convention No. 87 and to cooperate with
the ILO.
II. Forced Labor in Burma
Since the SLORC/SPDC took power in 1988, there
have been numerous reports and allegations that the GOB has exacted forced
labor from hundreds of thousands of people in Burma, often in conditions
accompanied by other systematic, brutal human rights abuses. The practice of forced labor in Burma takes different
forms, most notable of which is forced labor for infrastructure development
(including the development of infrastructure for the tourism industry and
possibly the Yadana natural gas pipeline) and to support military
operations. While the GOB has denied these
allegations, the ILO Commission of Inquiry and other independent observers have
concluded that government and military authorities do impose forced labor on
the people of Burma on a widespread basis.
Under growing international pressure, the GOB
appeared to have somewhat reduced its use of forced labor in and around large cities
beginning in mid-1996. In these areas, there has been more widespread use of
machinery on construction projects as well as the use of soldiers rather than
civilians on infrastructure development projects. However, forced labor still
remains at historically high levels and appears to continue exceeding the level
of forced labor used prior to the years 1992-93.
- Methods used to impose forced labor
The methods used to impose forced labor generally follow a similar pattern.
The military commonly sends written orders to civilian officials or to village
heads demanding they provide a specified number of people to perform labor for
a particular period of time. Usually the laborers must do an identified quota
of work, such as clearing a certain amount of jungle where a road or railway is
to be built. More random methods of exacting forced labor also appear to be
common. For example, there have been reports that people were abducted from
places such as schools, tea shops, video houses, and train stations and forced
to serve as porters.
In the case of formal, written demands for forced laborers, it is generally
up to the village headman to choose which families will work at which times.
Many villages have implemented rotation systems to spread the burden of forced
labor. At important times in the crop cycle, adults, and particularly men, need
to stay at home and work in the fields, and it becomes more common to see women
and children working as forced laborers. Sometimes, payments of cash or food
can be substituted for labor services.
- Allegations of forced labor on
infrastructure development projects
Allegations of the use of forced labor on
infrastructure development projects are widespread. They include charges that
forced labor has been used to construct or repair roads, railway lines,
ditches, dams, canals, dikes, airfields, and embankments. Many forced laborers
have reported that they work under very poor conditions with little food,
medical care, or rest, and there have been repeated reports of gross human
rights violations, including beatings, torture and summary execution. The
tendency of households to send family members generating the least income to
fulfill demands for forced labor may even increase the likelihood of illness
and death among workers. In general, these workers - children, the elderly,
women, and the infirm - not only earn less money than men but are also the most
vulnerable to the harsh working conditions and human rights abuses that often
accompany forced labor.
There have also been numerous allegations that
the GOB has used thousands of people as forced laborers on infrastructure
projects designed to support Burma's tourism industry. A poor infrastructure - including a shortage of
hotel rooms, lack of airports to handle large aircraft, and an antiquated road
system - has acted as an obstacle to development in this sector. In 1992, the
GOB established a Ministry of Hotels and Tourism, which initially targeted
specific areas for tourism development. In 1994, the Ministry helped launch the
"Visit Myanmar Year" initiative to attract tourists to Burma in 1996.
Many of the allegations that forced labor was used on tourism infrastructure
development projects, including hotels and other tourist facilities
which the GOB has built in more remote areas,
arose beginning in 1994.
The total number of people affected by demands
for forced labor appears to reach easily into the hundreds of thousands, and
perhaps millions. The number of people who contribute their labor to
infrastructure development projects is so large that the value of their work in
rural development projects has been reported in GOB budget figures. While
forced labor has been reported from many parts of Burma, both anecdotal and the
limited statistical evidence available suggest that the burden of forced labor
falls disproportionately on ethnic minorities and rural populations.
Observations by NGOs indicate that families are often forced to contribute
labor anywhere from 4 days to 2 weeks per month.
- Allegations of forced labor to
support military operations
There are numerous allegations and reports
charging the Burmese military with using forced labor for a variety of tasks.
Allegations include the use of forced laborers as porters for troops, support
workers in military camps, and laborers for commercial ventures designed to
support the military.
Forced portering to support military
operations is the most notorious form of forced labor. Porters usually carry
supplies for soldiers, and the military rarely travels without them. Although
unarmed, they have been placed at the head of columns to detonate mines and
booby traps, spring ambushes, and act as human shields. Porters are forced to
work for long hours without sufficient food, water, rest, or medical care, and
most are subject to physical abuse from the moment they are pressed into
service. There have been reports of women and children, as well as men, serving
as porters, and there are numerous allegations that female porters have been
repeatedly raped by soldiers.
In addition to forcing civilians to serve as
porters, military battalions often require villagers to provide other types of
labor supporting military camps and facilities. Villages have been forced to
build military camps and barracks for soldiers. People have also been forced to
provide sentry duty, dig trenches, erect fences, maintain or clean barracks,
repair roads between military camps, look after livestock, dig bunkers, clean
latrines and wash soldiers' uniforms.
The commanding officers of these military
battalions have reportedly been involved in a variety of private commercial
ventures, including shrimp cultivation, maintenance of rice paddies and fish
ponds, timber cultivation, and brick production, and local villagers have been
required to work in these enterprises as forced laborers. The U.S. Embassy in
Rangoon has reported cases involving whole villages of people forced to
cultivate and harvest crops to feed military garrisons. In many cases, the land
was also confiscated from villagers by the garrison.
- GOB responses to allegations of
forced labor
Since 1991, the GOB has responded several
times to allegations of forced labor, particularly in diplomatic communications
and reports to international organizations. In general, the GOB has denied the
use of all forms of forced labor and responded only to allegations of forced
portering for the military. According to the GOB, porters are legally recruited
in accordance with two laws, the Towns Act (1907) and the Village
Act (1908), and are not being forced to work against their will. The GOB
has also responded a number of times that there is a centuries-old tradition in
Burma where people voluntarily contribute labor in the belief that it is a
noble deed. On some occasions, the GOB has described this as a Buddhist
cultural tradition.
III. Forced Relocations in
Burma
Forced relocations in Burma generally take two
forms that affect both urban and rural populations: 1) as part of urban
redevelopment programs, or 2) in the context of counter-insurgency campaigns.
The U.S. Embassy in Rangoon has reported that tens of thousands of villagers
have been displaced. While the practice of forcibly relocating villages in
Burma started before 1988, it appears to have escalated significantly since
then.
People are usually ordered to relocate by army
troops to specific relocation sites and commonly receive only a week to ten
days' notice that they must move. People must take all their possessions, but
often there is insufficient time to move them, and soldiers confiscate whatever
is left behind without compensation. The areas to which villagers are forced to
relocate are commonly ill-prepared, if at all. People must buy or build new
accommodations on arrival, and there are often no water, sewage or health care
facilities.
There have been reports that forcibly
relocated villagers have been subjected to forced labor. It does not appear
that villagers are relocated solely for the purpose of creating available pools
of forced laborers. It is possible, however, that the locations to which
villagers have been moved were selected for their proximity to projects which
subsequently used forced labor. Forced relocations have also increased the
military's ability to exact labor from ethnic minority populations by forcibly
relocating villages near garrisons in ethnic minority areas.
IV. The Yadana Natural Gas Pipeline
One of the most controversial infrastructure
development projects in Burma is the Yadana natural gas pipeline. There have
been repeated allegations that the GOB has used forced labor on the pipeline,
that forced labor was used to build support facilities for the pipeline, and
that forced labor was used to support the operations of military troops
providing security for the pipeline. In addition, there have been allegations
that the Ye-Tavoy railway, on which the GOB is widely acknowledged to have used
forced labor, is being constructed in order to facilitate army operations near
and in support of the pipeline.
Because the GOB refused to permit independent
observation of the area and because only the oil companies investing in the
project could provide transportation to the pipeline, it was impossible to
verify or refute these allegations. The ILO's Commission of Inquiry was also
denied access to Burma when it examined allegations of forced labor associated
with the pipeline. The COI concluded that, in view of the contradiction between
the facts presented, and since the Commission was denied access to Burma to
supplement its evidence, no finding on the matter could be made.
In 1982,
large natural gas deposits, later known as the Yadana field, were discovered in
the Andaman Sea. Demand for energy in Thailand and the need for revenue led the
GOB to consider developing this resource. The GOB solicited commercial support
for a proposal to run a pipeline from the underwater gas fields, across Burma,
and into Thailand. In July 1992, the French oil company, Total, signed a
production-sharing contract with Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) for
evaluating, developing and producing gas from the Yadana field. A U.S. company,
Unocal Corporation, joined the project as a co-venturer in January 1993.
Insurgencies along much of the southern part
of the Burmese-Thai border posed serious security risks to the proposed
pipeline route. The chosen route was inhabited by the ethnic Karen and had been
held by the insurgent Karen National Union (KNU) since the 1960s. The GOB had
to assert effective military control over the region before construction could
begin, and improved logistical and transportation infrastructure was also
needed to establish control in the region.
- Allegations of forced labor on the
construction of the Yadana Pipeline
Allegations of forced labor and other human
rights abuses in the area emerged even before construction on the pipeline
started. Although expatriate staff was recruited to build the actual pipeline,
evidence suggests that Burmese nationals built the majority of support
facilities for the pipeline and that the army had recruited forced laborers.
Troops stationed in the pipeline area who are allegedly providing security for
the pipeline have also been accused of forcing civilians to build army bases,
serve as porters, and provide other support for their operations. After the
on-shore segment of the pipeline was completed, reports of forced labor
continued to emerge. However, most of the evidence of forced labor covered the
period before late 1996.
It is difficult to assess the actual extent of
the use of forced labor as the GOB has denied requests by the U.S. Government,
the ILO, and other groups to conduct independent visits to the pipeline
corridor and adjacent areas. While officials of the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon
have visited the region, the GOB has also denied them independent access,
citing security reasons. Since the pipeline is in a remote and inaccessible
region, in all cases the trips were facilitated by the oil companies, which
provided the necessary helicopter transportation, and Embassy officers were not
permitted to set their own itineraries or travel freely.
- GOB and other responses to allegations
of forced labor
The GOB, which has acknowledged using
uncompensated labor to construct at least one other gas pipeline project,
called allegations of forced labor on the Yadana project "totally
unfounded." The oil companies involved have vigorously denied allegations
of human rights abuses and particularly the association of forced labor with
the pipeline. Unocal Corporation has stated that all workers on the project are
paid, voluntary employees. The companies also emphasized their role in the
development of local communities along the pipeline route.
According to Unocal Corporation, the GOB did
not provide personnel to work on the pipeline. However, briefing materials and
documents from Total indicated that the company had relied extensively on
laborers recruited by the army during the early phases of the project through
at least January 1996 but before actual construction of the pipeline itself.
These workers were paid directly by Total, but they were housed and fed in army
battalions. While this does not prove that forced labor was used, the practice
of using laborers recruited by the army - given the history of forced labor
allegations against the military - is questionable, and it is consistent with
refugees' allegations. However, by 1998, in the final stages of the project, it
appears Total had stopped using manual labor recruited by the army.
There were numerous allegations that the
extension of the Ye-Tavoy railway was being built with unusually high and harsh
levels of forced labor. Although there was no evidence that the railway was
designed to support actual construction of the Yadana pipeline, there were
indications of some relationship between the two projects and that the Ye-Tavoy
railway was being constructed in order to facilitate Burmese army operations in
the pipeline area. Oil companies involved in the Yadana project maintained that
there was no connection between the pipeline and the Ye-Tavoy railroad.
V. Freedom of Association and the Right to Bargain Collectively
Burma ratified the Freedom of Association and
Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No. 87) in 1955 and is
bound as an ILO member to apply the principles of freedom of association.
However, the GOB has been criticized for not bringing its laws into compliance
with Convention No. 87, refusing to recognize independent trade unions,
harassing workers who attempt to organize, and for the absence of collective
bargaining.
Several Burmese laws relate to freedom of
association and union organizing, but each is inconsistent with international
standards and ignored in practice. The GOB does not recognize any independent
labor unions in Burma. The Burmese
government actively suppresses attempts by workers to organize,
and workers who try to form or join such unions are liable to be harassed,
arrested, and tortured. They are also under constant surveillance by the police
and the military intelligence agency. Workers are, however, compelled to join a state-run union, the Union
Solidarity and Development Association.
There are legal mechanisms for collective
bargaining in Burma. A Government Central Arbitration Board exists, but it is
not active, and there are township-level labor supervisory committees to
address minor labor concerns. However, collective bargaining does not occur, in
part because there are no recognized, independent labor unions and because
workers participating in union activities are actively persecuted by the
GOB.
The ILO Committee of Experts has criticized
the lack of freedom of association in Burma for over 40 years. This criticism
increased after the 1962 military coup and intensified further after the GOB's
suppression of the pro-democracy movement in 1988. Similarly, the ILO's
Conference Committee on the Application of Standards has regularly denounced
Burma's violation of Convention No. 87. In 1995, the Conference Committee
highlighted the Government's failure to implement this core convention in a
special paragraph, and it has continued to do so in each of its reports in
subsequent years.
VI. Child Labor in Burma
Child labor appears to be an endemic problem
in Burma, correlated in large part with widespread poverty and lack of
investment by the GOB in primary education. While national laws to protect
children are in place, little appears to be
done to enforce them, and exploitative and
dangerous forms of child labor have been widely reported, including work on
infrastructure development projects, in military support operations, as child
soldiers, and in the sex industry.
Very few children work in the formal sector. In the urban informal sector, child workers
are mostly found processing food, selling goods, collecting refuse,
manufacturing light goods, and attending tea shops. In rural areas, children can often be seen working
alongside their parents in the informal sector, and children contribute labor
in traditional family agricultural work.
However, children also allegedly participate
alongside adults when forced labor is demanded by government or military
authorities. Households can and do send children when they need to fulfill
forced labor quotas. At important times in the crop cycle village, men may stay
at home to work in the fields rather than attend forced labor duties. During
these times, it is more common to see children doing forced labor in place of
adults or helping women who perform forced labor in place of men.
The army
views children as an available source of labor to support the military and as a
labor pool from which to draw new soldiers. Burmese children have been forced
by the military to work in infrastructure development, portering, as sentries
and in providing other services to the military. Children may be involved in any or all types of work for military
camps, and boys as young as 14 years old have been taken to work as porters,
particularly during major offensives when the demand for porters is greatest.
Both the Burmese army and ethnic insurgent forces reportedly include child
soldiers as young as 12 years old, and these child soldiers appear to perform
the same duties as their adult counterparts.
There are documented reports of trafficking of
adults and children from Burma to Thailand. Many of the women and girls are
trafficked into the commercial sex industry, and some trafficked children
become beggars and hawkers. Trafficking of people to destinations within Burma
is also common. According to a UNICEF report, child trafficking has a long
history in Burma. Traditionally poor families deliver their children into
domestic servitude for richer families, and there have been reports that hill
tribes sell children to pay off opium debts.
The latest constitution and domestic laws in
Burma address children's work and children's right to education. Particular
provisions set the minimum age at which children may work, the types of work
they may do at different ages, and the maximum hours they may work. The use of
some forms of child labor is punishable as a crime. However, reports suggest
that these laws are not applied in practice.
VII. Conclusion
The U.S. Department of Labor's 1998 Report
on Labor Practices in Burma observed that the GOB deals with the country's
workforce without regard to internationally recognized worker's rights. A large
proportion of the population is regularly subject to demands for forced labor
and forced relocations; freedom of association is not recognized; and children
are subject to abusive work practices, including forced labor. The report
concluded that there were few indications that the GOB will voluntarily change
its policies in any significant way and that such worker's rights violations
will likely continue in Burma until steps are taken to initiate a transition to
democracy.
1. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International
Labor Affairs, Report on Labor Practices in Burma (Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of Labor, September 1999).
