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October 24, 2001
PETITION
on
Labor Law Matters Arising in the United States
submitted to the
National Administrative Office (NAO) of Mexico
under the
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC)
Regarding the Failure by Governor George Pataki, the United States of
America, the State of New York, the New York Workers' Compensation
Board (the "Board"), and Board Chairman Robert Snashall to Provide
Timely and Adequate Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Illnesses
and to Implement Standards to Minimize the Causes of Occupational
Injuries and Illnesses in the State of New York.
submitted by:
Chinese Staff and Workers' Association (CSWA), National Mobilization Against
SweatShops (NMASS), Workers' Awaaz, Asociacion Tepeyac, Mussa
Abdulkader, Aleksandra Baran, Tomas Carillo, Lan Mei Chan, Juan Flores, Eva
Herrera, Stanislawa Kocimska, Huang Sheng Ku, Maria Labuz, Zhi Hua Qian,
Agueda Santana, Arkadiusz Tomaszewski, Jinen Zhou
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Because the State of New York administers a claim system for occupational injuries and
illnesses that provides inadequate and untimely compensation to workers, it is inconsistent with the
labor-side agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"). The NAFTA labor-side agreement mandates that each signatory nation "effectively enforce its labor law"(1) and "ensure that
its administrative. . .proceedings for the enforcement of its labor law are fair, equitable and
transparent"(2) and, "that such proceedings are not unnecessarily complicated and do not entail. .
.unwarranted delays."(3) The State of New York violates the United States' obligations under these
Articles. In addition, the State of New York contravenes the United States' promise under the
NAFTA labor-side agreement to promote Labor Principle (10), which mandates compensation for
occupational injuries and illnesses, and Labor Principle (9), which requires the implementation of
standards to minimize the causes of occupational injuries and illnesses.(4)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
- Introduction and Summary of the Case
- Introduction
- Summary of Case
- The Petitioners
-
Relevant United States Law and Policy
- New York State Workers' Compensation System
- Recent Reforms Limit Access to Medical and Cash Benefits
- The State of New York and the Workers' Compensation Board violate Articles 3 and 5 of the
NAALC
- The Delays in Claim Adjudication for Occupational Injuries and Illnesses are Extreme
and Widespread
- Delays in Claim Adjudication Lowers Compensation for Workers
- Many
Workplace Injuries and Illnesses Occur in Trade-Related Industries
Characterized by Long Hours and Low Pay
- Statement of Violations of the NAALC
- The Continuing and Extreme Delays in Adjudication of Workers' Compensation Claims
in the State of New York Demonstrate a Persistent Failure by the United States to
Enforce its Labor Standards Effectively
- Statement of Jurisdiction
- National Administrative Office Jurisdiction
- Ministerial Review Jurisdiction
- Evaluation Committee of Experts Jurisdiction
- The Submission Includes Technical Labor Standards
- The Matters Addressed in the Submission are Trade-Related
- The Matters Addressed in the Submission are Covered by Mutually
Recognized Labor Laws
- The Submission Analyzes a Pattern of Practice by the United States in its
Prevention of and Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Illnesses
- Dispute Resolution Jurisdiction
- The Board's failure to Implement Standards to Minimize the Causes of Occupational Injuries
and Illnesses Requires the Appointment of an Arbitral Panel
- Workers' Compensation is a Key Component in the Occupational Health and Safety
Regime of the United States
- The Workers' Compensation Insurance Scheme Operates so as to Prescribe
Standards for the Minimization of the Causes of Occupational Injuries and
Illnesses
- Through Delays in the Adjudication of Workers' Compensation Claims the
Board Fails to Implement Standards for the Minimization of the Causes of
Occupational Injuries and Illnesses
- Enforcement of Procedural Guarantees of Article 5 Requires the Appointment of an
Arbitral Panel
- Action Requested
LIST OF EXHIBITS
LIST OF RELEVANT ATTACHED MATERIALS
New York Workers' Compensation Law §§ 1, 2, 10 (2001)
Workers Comp. Falling Down on the Job, Consumer Reports 2 (Feb. 2000)
New York State Bar Association, Report of the Special Committee on Administrative
Adjudication (Oct. 21, 1999).
I. Introduction and Summary of the Case
A. Introduction
In contravention of the international obligations of the United States, the New York Workers'
Compensation system imposes unwarranted delays on workers seeking compensation for occupational
injuries and illnesses. These delays severely impact a vulnerable population of workers suffering from
employment-related injuries and illnesses. Workers do not receive adequate compensation for the
whole or partial loss of their livelihoods. They are unable to seek necessary medical care in a timely
manner, thereby worsening their injuries and illnesses. In some cases, they are forced to go back to
work to make ends meet. Delays in adjudication exhaust the resources of working families, undermine
a worker's ability to raise children (with young children often having to care for injured parents), and
force healthy family members into the workforce to support their injured relatives. Finally, delays in the
adjudication of claims remove incentives for employers to prevent occupational injuries and illnesses.
The New York Workers' Compensation system is in violation of international law and imposes physical
and psychological pain and economic destitution on injured and ill workers and their families.
Delays occur in the claim system at the behest of parties with a direct financial interest in the
postponement and/or minimization of compensation awarded for occupational injuries and illnesses.
Delays are tolerated by administrators because the system remains unaccountable to workers.
Workers have little recourse when their claim proceedings are delayed. In some cases, workers have
been forced to attend up to 20 hearings over as much as a 10 year period in pursuit of compensation
for occupational injuries and illnesses.
Pursuant to the labor side agreement, negotiated by the United States government as a
condition of supporting the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), persons in one
signatory country may file a petition to protest another signatory nation's failure to uphold minimum
standards of protections for workers. Because the unwarranted delays in adjudication of Workers'
Compensation claims in New York result in harm to a vulnerable and growing population of injured and
ill workers, the United States is in violation of the NAFTA side agreement on labor.
B. Summary of Case
When a worker suffers an injury or illness in the course of her employment, she submits a claim
to the State of New York Workers' Compensation Board, an agency of the executive branch of the
state government of New York (the "Board"), in accordance with New York State Workers'
Compensation Law(5) and the rules and regulations promulgated under such law. These claims are
subject to a quasi-judicial process, in which administrative law judges employed by the Board
determine whether a worker presents a valid claim, the extent to which a worker has been injured or
made ill due to their employment, and the amount and configuration of compensation payments for such
injury or illness. This system is the exclusive remedy for workers with occupational injuries and illnesses
in New York, replacing the common law tort action,(6) and is an important component of the
occupational health and safety regime in the United States.(7) New York courts have recognized that the
provision of a "swift and sure" source of benefits is the central purpose of the Workers' Compensation
laws.(8) The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (the "NAALC")(9) reflects commitments
by the signatory nations to provide compensation to workers or their dependents in cases of
occupational injuries and illnesses(10) without unwarranted delays.(11)
Delays occur in the Workers' Compensation system because administrative law judges
routinely postpone cases, on their own initiative or on the request of insurance companies and
employers. A significant number of employers in New York pay insurance premiums to private
insurance companies on a per-employee basis so that they are indemnified against liability for
occupational injuries and illnesses; some employers self-insure; and others are covered by the State
Insurance Fund, an entity created by the State of New York to cover smaller businesses. Thus,
workers' claims are usually opposed by the lawyers of insurance companies (who assume liability for
compensation claims) and certain employers (who self-insure). These entities earn interest on unpaid
compensation through various investment vehicles and force workers to accept low monetary
settlements of their claims out of sheer desperation. Insurers and employers routinely request to delay
proceedings; the Board routinely grants those requests, and fails to block such tactics and award
compensation in a timely manner.
Specifically, this submission challenges a pattern and practice of the United States which
subjects workers to unwarranted delays, as they attempt to gain compensation for occupational injuries
and illnesses. Workers have little recourse when the Board demands that they make multiple
appearances before administrative law judges, produce evidence and testimony for their cases over
multiple hearings, and repeatedly submit themselves to medical examinations by doctors hired by
opposing parties. Workers have little recourse when administrative law judges make procedural and
factual errors that add many years to the pendency of their claims. The individual petitioners(12) have had
up to 20 hearings over as much as 10 years as they have navigated the adjudication process
administered by the Board.
This submission also concerns the prevention of injuries and illnesses, because the Workers'
Compensation system is an integral element of a legal regime in which insurers penalize employers with
multiple injured workers by imposing higher insurance premiums.(13) The threat of higher monthly
insurance premiums for employers whose employees frequently report injuries and apply for Workers'
Compensation is supposed to create an incentive for employers to prevent illnesses and injuries.
However, because claims are delayed, forcibly settled at low amounts, or dismissed by the Board, the
incentive structure is rendered ineffective and workplaces remain unsafe.
Petitioners seek action from the National Administrative Office (NAO) of Mexico in an effort to
bring the United States into compliance with its obligation under the NAALC. Petitioners aim to ensure
that the administrative proceedings governing compensation for occupational injuries and illnesses and
the underlying statutes do not subject claimants to unwarranted delays, that such compensation be
awarded fairly, equitably, and transparently, and that such compensation system implement standards
that minimize the causes of such injuries and illnesses.
II. The Petitioners
Petitioner Chinese Staff & Workers' Association ("CSWA") is a membership-based
community organization and workers' center in New York City composed of workers of all trades,
particularly from the garment, restaurant, domestic, and construction industries. Founded in 1979, it is
one of the oldest workers' centers in the country. With over 1,300 members and two centers in
Manhattan's Chinatown and Brooklyn's Sunset Park, CSWA organizes workers to advance rights and
dignity in the workplace and community, to speak as a voice that challenges sweatshop conditions, and
to promote workers' leadership in efforts for economic and social justice.
Petitioner National Mobilization Against SweatShops ("NMASS") is a membership-based
group organizing injured and not-yet-injured workers to pressure the Workers' Compensation system
to recognize and compensate them for their work-related injuries in a timely fashion, to pay interim
benefits while workers await decisions of the Board, to provide good health care, and to be
accountable to working people. NMASS is also pressing for the legal right of workers to refuse
overtime hours without risking any penalization by employers, in order to prevent more workers from
suffering occupational-health problems.
Petitioner Asociacion Tepeyac is a non-profit community based-organization whose mission is
to promote the social welfare and human rights of Mexican immigrants, specifically the undocumented in
New York City. The Association informs and educates immigrants and their families about their rights
and resources. Founded in September, 1997 by Mexican community leaders, the Association is the
only public resource dedicated to organizing Mexican immigrants in the five boroughs of New York
City. Through its grassroots structure and leadership the Association serves and influences over 10,000
members.
Petitioner Workers' Awaaz is a membership-based community organization of South Asian
women workers, particularly domestic workers, in New York City. Founded in 1997, it is one of the
first South Asian workers' centers in the country. Workers' Awaaz organizes workers to advance their
rights and dignity in the workplace and community, to expose sweatshop conditions, and to build
worker leaders to fight for economic and social justice. During our work in the past few years, it has
organized what has so far been an invisible workforce of domestic workers - hidden behind the closed
doors of employers' private homes. Workers' Awaaz is a member of the "It's About Time" Campaign
for reform of the Workers' Compensation System in New York, along with CSWA and NMASS.
Petitioner Mussa Abdulkader immigrated to the United States from Eritrea in 1979 and
currently resides in New York, New York. Mr. Abdulkader heard a loud crack and suffered from
intense lower back pain as he lifted a 45-pound trash bag while carrying out his duties as a custodian at
Public School 126 in the Bronx, New York in September 1995. At the emergency room he
discovered that he had suffered a hernia and a herniated disc and required surgery. Mr. Abdulkader
filed a Workers' Compensation claim on September 14, 1995. The medical witness for the insurer
missed at least four hearings which were consequently adjourned by the Board.
Petitioner Aleksandra Baran currently resides in Brooklyn, New York. Ms. Baran, a home
attendant with Family Homecare Services, was hit by a car while shopping for a client in January 1994.
She lost consciousness and suffered fractures in her knee and ankle, as well as injuries to her hand, left
shoulder, back, and neck. During the first five years that Ms. Baran worked as a home attendant, she
worked 24-hour shifts at approximately $5.00 per hour. Later, she worked 12-hour shifts, seven days
a week, at a wage of approximately $7.00 per hour. Ms. Baran filed a Workers' Compensation claim
soon after her accident. Her case was closed for unknown reasons in 1997, at which time her benefits
were also terminated. On Ms. Baran's initiative the case has been reopened but benefits were not
reinstated. She continues to wait for a final decision on her claim, 7 and a half years after filing it, and
remains unable to work.
Petitioner Juan Flores, a car mechanic, currently resides in Long Island City, New York. Mr.
Flores was hit by a rolling car from behind and pinned to a wall in 1992 as an employee at the F.
Gomez Service Station in Brooklyn, New York, where he had been working for 11 years. Mr. Flores
received injuries to his neck, lower back, and both legs, has not been able to participate meaningfully in
the workforce, and now has a degenerative condition called chronic spinal stenosis. He filed a
Workers' Compensation claim in June 1992, has had 10 hearings over 9 years, and continues to await
a final decision on his claim. The Board terminated Mr. Flores' benefits in 1993.
Petitioner Stanislawa Kocimska has no permanent home. Ms. Kocimska, formerly a home
attendant in New York, was injured as she caught a client who was falling from his bed to the floor.
Ms. Kocimska's back and knee were immobile for some time after the accident. She filed a Workers'
Compensation claim shortly after her accident in 1994. The Board did not grant Ms. Kocimska any
benefits and she only received medical treatment for 3 months after the accident. During the 4 and a
half years that Ms. Kocimska waited for a decision from the Board, she lost her apartment and became
homeless. She survives by begging for money at Polish Churches in New York.
Petitioner Huang Sheng Ku immigrated to the United States from China in 1987 and currently
resides in New York, New York. Ms. Ku was walking backwards, supporting a stack of boxes on a
forklift, when she fell over a protruding machine part on the factory floor of a packaged food company.
She broke her left leg and injured her lower back and two of the fingers of her left hand. Ms. Ku filed
a Workers' Compensation claim shortly after her accident in 1993. She has been subjected to 21
hearings over 7 and a half years and currently does not receive Workers' Compensation benefits.
Petitioner Maria Labuz immigrated to the United States from Poland and currently resides in
Brooklyn, New York. Ms. Labuz was working as a office cleaner in 1988 when she slipped and hit
her head on a waxed floor, losing hearing in her left ear and injuring the entire left-side of her body.
She filed for Workers' Compensation in 1988 and her benefits were cut off after 8 months. A doctor
told Ms. Labuz to return to work, which she did for three years, before suffering a second workplace
injury when she was hit by a loaded cart in a factory. Her case has been open since 1991 and there
have been 20 hearings over 10 years. Ms. Labuz has been forced to borrow money to receive ongoing
medical treatment for her condition.
Petitioner Agueda Santana currently resides in Ridgewood, New York and used to work as a
home attendant with Institute Home Care Services. Ms. Santana, six months pregnant at the time, was
pushed down the stairs by a client with Alzheimer's Disease in September 1996. She was confined to
her bed for three months until the birth of her baby and then filed a Workers' Compensation claim
shortly thereafter. Ms. Santana suffered permanent injuries to her legs, shoulder, back, and arm, has
been unable to work, and has lost her apartment. Ms. Santana's case remains open, after 15 hearings
over 5 years.
Petitioner Arkadiusz Tomaszewski immigrated to the United States from Poland in 1986 and
currently resides in Brooklyn, New York. Mr. Tomaszewski removed asbestos from walls and
ceilings. In 1992, working at worksite with inadequate ventilation and under other unsafe conditions, he
inhaled fumes from an industrial glue, started to feel nauseous and began vomiting. Mr. Tomaszewski
checked in to an emergency room with one of his co-workers and has suffered from headaches, cold
sweats and rashes since the date of the accident. He received a small payment in 1994. Mr.
Tomaszewski has had 30 hearings over the 7 year pendency of his case.
Petitioner Zhi Hua Qian immigrated to the United States from China in 1992 and currently
resides in Sunnyside, New York. Mr. Qian worked at the Marriot Marquis at Times Square in New
York City, lifting piles and bags of linens from the floor to metro-carts, pushing the bundles into the
carts, and then moving them. Mr. Qian was ordered to do approximately 7 hours of work in 6 hours
and had to work quickly and constantly in order complete his assigned tasks. As a result of the pace
and physical difficulty of the work, Mr. Qian suffered from repetitive stress injuries in his legs, lower
back, hands, and wrists. In March 1998, he realized that his hands were numb and in severe pain,
rendering him unable to work. Mr. Qian applied for Workers' Compensation in May 1998. Mr. Qian
received benefits for only four and a half months in 1998 and has since been subject to 7 hearings over
three years.
Petitioner Jinen Zhou immigrated to the United States from China in 1989 and currently resides
in Ridgewood, New York. Until 1996, Mr. Zhou worked with the Sing Tao newspaper company,
approximately 8 to 9 hours per day, seven days a week without any breaks. He labored in unsafe
conditions in the backs of delivery trucks, driving through the streets of Manhattan, surrounded by tall,
teetering stacks newspaper bundles. In October 1996, as the truck was taking a sharp turn, Mr. Zhou
fell to the floor and got up dizzy and suffering from pain in his neck, back, and both knees. He currently
does not receive any Workers' Compensation benefits and he has had 9 hearings over 4 and a half
years. This is the second workplace injury suffered by Mr. Zhou; his thumb was smashed by a truck
door in 1993, after which he underwent surgery and was forced to return to work by his boss before
the healing was complete. He is unable to provide for his family and suffers from severe depression and
suicidal ideation.
III. Relevant United States Law and Policy
"Workers' compensation is rare among the major social insurance programs in that it was from
the beginning legislated at the state level with no federal involvement and has remained a state
responsibility ever since."(14) The New York State Workers' Compensation Law was enacted in 1914
"to provide a swift and sure source of benefits to the injured employee or to the dependents of the
deceased employee." O'Rourke v. Long, 41 N.Y.2d 219, 222 (1976). The system was designed to
compensate injured workers regardless of fault and to return them to employment without risking their
health or welfare. Workers and employers are required to participate in the workers' compensation
system, which is an exclusive remedy for workplace injuries and illnesses, replacing the common law
tort action. Employers may self-insure, contract with private insurance carriers, or join the state-run
insurance fund.
A. New York State Workers' Compensation System
The Board is the state agency responsible for the administration of the Workers' Compensation
system in New York, which includes the processing and adjudication of individual claims. The Board is
composed of 13 Commissioners, all of whom are appointed by the Governor of the State of New York
and confirmed by the New York State Senate for terms of seven years. The agency is currently
chaired by Robert Snashall. Workers' compensation hearings are conducted before administrative law
judges (the "Judges") who are appointed by the Chair of the Board through a Civil Service competitive
process. Hearings are held before an administrative law judge but do not follow Anglo-American
common law, statutory rules of evidence, or formal rules of procedure.(15) A Judge's decision is deemed
the decision of the Board unless the Board modifies or rescinds such decision. Reviews or appeals of
their decisions are held before a panel of three members of the Board. Decisions of the Board may
only be appealed to a particular intermediate appeals court in New York State: the Appellate Division,
Third Department.(16)
In 2000, the Board indexed and scheduled for review 171, 397 cases. 2000 New York
State Workers Compensation Board Annual Report (hereinafter 2000 Annual Report) at
App. III. Overall, the district offices held a total of 475,964 "hearings". 2000 Annual Report, at
App. V. Of the claims filed in 2000, 26,492 were controverted, or contested by insurers/employers.
Id. at App. IV.
B. Recent Reforms Limit Access to Medical and Cash Benefits
Throughout the 1990's, legislatures in various states, under the pressure of national insurance
carrier corporations and business interests, enacted numerous reform laws that lowered premiums for
employers and raised profits for insurance carriers. In 1996 alone, 37 states (including the State of
New York) enacted comprehensive reforms in their respective workers compensation systems.(17) The
Consumers' Union, a respected nonpartisan research foundation, recently examined workers'
compensation systems nationwide and concluded that the recent reforms had "clamped down on
benefits, raised eligibility requirements, and put medical treatment mainly in the hands of insurance
companies, which can delay or deny medical care or income payments." Workers Comp: Falling
Down on the Job. 65 Consumer Rep. 2, 28 (Feb. 2000). The Consumers' Union report outlined
the costly, methodical campaign promulgated by insurance carriers to justify cuts in workers
compensation benefits.(18)
In the State of New York, Governor George Pataki has followed the national trend and
focused his reform efforts on reducing the costs of workers' compensation to employers and insurance
companies. In a May 14, 1999 press release, Governor Pataki proposed to cap benefits for workers
with permanent partial disabilities at 700 weeks (approximately 13.5 years). For business, the costs of
permanent partial disabilities are the most expensive component of the workers' compensation system.
By enacting the 700 week cap on benefits which are currently paid for life, the Governor advocates the
shift of the costs of workplace injuries from employers to Social Security Disability or some other form
of taxpayer-funded assistance. Pataki's goal, as stated in his press release, is to cut employers'
insurance rates by 24 percent. During the last four years, those rates have fallen 38 percent, while
insurance companies in New York State remain amongst the most profitable in the United States.
Further, Governor Pataki has pushed to keep the minimum weekly compensation at a level amongst the
lowest in the nation, $40.00 per week,(19) providing insurers and employers with further incentive to earn
interest on unpaid compensation rather than completing adjudication.
In a series of decisions, New York courts have endorsed the policy of treating workers'
compensation as an exclusive remedy for damages due to workplace injuries and illnesses. The
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of New York State government have firmly closed the door
on the possibility that damages due to workplace injuries and illnesses may be recovered through any
means other than the Workers' Compensation system. While costs to employers and insurance
companies have been a primary focus of recent reform efforts, workers continue to suffer unreasonable
delays in the adjudication of their claims, without any recourse.
IV. The State of New York and the Workers' Compensation Board violate Articles 3 and 5 of the
NAALC
The NAALC requires that each signatory nation "effectively enforce its labor law."(20) The
NAALC also includes certain procedural guarantees with regard to the administration and enforcement
of each party's labor law. According to the NAALC, "[e]ach party shall ensure that its administrative,
quasi-judicial, judicial and labor tribunal proceedings for the enforcement of its labor law are fair,
equitable and transparent and. . .such proceedings are not unnecessarily complicated and do not entail
unreasonable charges or time limits or unwarranted delays."(21) The NAALC goes on to require that
"[e]ach party shall provide that final decisions on the merits of the case in such proceedings are. . .made
available without undue delay to the parties to the proceedings and, consistent with its law, to the
public."(22) Workers' Compensation proceedings in New York State entail unwarranted delays and
there is undue delay in the availability of final decisions on the merits of cases.
A. The Delays in Claim Adjudication for Occupational Injuries and Illnesses are Extreme
and Widespread
Labor and immigrant advocates(23) report that members await final adjudication of their claims
for up to 20 years, with an average case open for approximately six years, during which time Workers'
Compensation payments and medical reimbursements are suspended.(24) Individual petitioners, who are
representative of thousands of other injured workers in New York, have had up to 20 hearings in their
cases over a period of up to 10 years.(25)
Judges frequently adjourn hearings in order to allow insurer/employers to acquire a medical
report or because of the nonappearance of insurer/employers' counsel or witnesses.(26) The duration of
many hearings is less than fifteen minutes and only a single procedural issue is dealt with by the judge in
those hearings.(27) Identical issues are discussed repeatedly in multiple hearings.(28) The gaps of time
between hearings are often as long as one year, during which time injured workers must survive without
a job or Workers' Compensation benefits.(29) Injured workers are required to answer the same
questions at hearings spread out over many years. Further, many immigrant workers are unable to
comprehend the hearings due to the lack or inadequacy of translation services.(30) Judges summarily
adjourn hearings and dismiss cases because of their procedural errors.(31) Decisions by judges in favor
of workers are most likely to be appealed to the Board by insurer/employers, thus extending the period
of time during which Workers' Compensation payments and medical reimbursements are suspended.(32)
Following up on a 1988 report which studied administrative hearing effectiveness, the New
York State Bar Association's Task Force on Administrative Adjudication issued a second study in
1999 to determine whether sufficient safeguards are now in place to ensure the integrity of agency
hearings at five state agencies, including the Workers' Compensation Board.(33) Focusing on the
Workers' Compensation system in New York, the task force stated: It is clear that the review delays described in the 1988 Task Force Report are still
occurring. Moreover, those delays are being used by insurance carriers and employers
to obtain unfair advantage over claimants. Workers' Compensation attorneys report that
the dilatory review process is used by attorneys for employers and carriers to "cower"
claimants' attorneys. The threat of a long contested claim proceeding followed by a long
review process is potent enough to force many claimants to settle for less than they might
otherwise be entitled to receive, especially in light of the automatic stay of benefits pending
the outcome of an administrative review.(34)
The State Bar Association report highlights the endemic problem of delays in adjudication, while also
unearthing the profit motive underlying the deprivation of due process. While the attention of the state
bar has been much-needed, the delays in adjudication and the suffering of injured workers and their
families has only worsened since 1999.
B. Delays in Claim Adjudication Lowers Compensation for Workers
The Board cuts off benefits well before a final decision is rendered in a case, usually on the
motion of the insurer/employer and often without substantial evidence.(35) Thus, many adjournments
occur at a time when workers are not receiving any benefits, for living expenses or medical care.(36)
Further, the Board often dismisses cases after years of minimal factual development at trial or upon
appeal, leaving workers relying upon the possibility of benefits in even more difficult straits than when
they lost their job due to injury or illness.(37) Finally, workers suffering from workplace injuries and
illnesses do not file for Workers' Compensation because of the procedural dysfunction of the system.(38)
Faced with the choice of continuing to work in a hard-earned job with an injury or illness or with falling
out of the labor market on the promise of Workers' Compensation benefits that are never granted or
that are granted after many years of minimal factual development and/or appeals, workers opt to
continue in their job, often with a great deal of pain and resulting in recurring injuries and illnesses.(39)
Because workers are partly or wholly disabled from participating in the market for labor, the
delays in adjudication and consequent lack of Workers' Compensation benefits impose heavy costs,
with formerly productive workers suffering from pain, poverty, hunger, and homelessness. Workers
are unable to support their families in the United States and in their countries of origin. Family
resources are drastically diminished by medical and living expenses. Healthy family members are
forced into the work force, while injured workers suffer from physical and mental ailments and are
unable to provide necessary care for spouses, children, and elders. Moreover, some workers eligible
for Workers' Compensation are ineligible for other governmental benefits for various reasons, including
immigration status.(40) Even when injured workers are awarded weekly benefits, some receive as low as
$40.00 per week. The Board has arbitrarily slashed weekly benefits in a number of cases to well
below $100.00.
C. Many Workplace Injuries and Illnesses Occur in Trade-Related Industries
Characterized by Long Hours and Low Pay
Petitioner Zhi Hua Qian moved bundles of linen at a large hotel in New York City owned by
the multinational Marriott Corp. He was forced to work without breaks for less hours than others, but
to complete as much work as they were assigned. His intense work schedule, as well as the difficult
work of picking up and transporting large, heavy bundles of linen, led to numerous repetitive stress
injuries all over Mr. Qian's body. The pace at which his bosses drove him, along with the severe
dysfunction of the Workers' Compensation system in New York, has led to a complete physical and
now mental breakdown for Mr. Qian.
Petitioners Aleksandra Baran served as a home health care attendant in the New York area,
caring for elderly clients at extremely low wages. She worked for well under the minimum wage with
no overtime. Ms. Baran worked 24 hour shifts caring for clients through her early years in the industry.
She earned $5.00 per hour for the first five years in her job and then made $7.00 per hour with no
overtime pay.
Petitioners NMASS and CSWA echo and expose the stories of these workers' lives.
According to organizers at NMASS, for garment factory workers, a 40-hour per week schedule is
considered part-time by factory bosses.(41) The members of these organizational petitioners work
upwards of 70 to 100 hours per week often at minimum wage or less.(42) According to The
Overworked American by Harvard Professor of Economics Juliet Schorr, on average, employed
mothers work more than 80 hours each week, including housework, childcare, and paid work.(43)
Overtime hours have jumped 48 percent since 1991 and immigrant workers are commonly forced to
work 80 to 90 hours per week.(44) The United States leads the world in the number of hours worked
per year and that rate is rising while it falls in other industrialized nations.(45)
D. Statement of Violations of the NAALC
The Workers' Compensation Board in New York State delays the adjudication of claims for
workplace injuries and illnesses and does not provide compensation to many injured and ill workers.
The systematic failure to provide fair, equitable, and transparent proceedings for injured and ill workers
and to implement standards for the prevention of workplace injuries and illnesses constitutes a violation
by the United States of its obligations pursuant to Articles 3 and 5 of the NAALC.
Injured and ill workers suffer for many years without financial support and medical care due to
unwarranted delays, in direct contravention of the U.S. obligations to provide compensation to injured
and ill workers and to prescribe and implement standards that minimize the causes of occupational
injuries and illnesses.
E. The Continuing and Extreme Delays in Adjudication of Workers' Compensation Claims
in the State of New York Demonstrate a Persistent Failure by the United States to
Enforce its Labor Standards Effectively
The Board, either on its own initiative or at the behest of insurers and employers, delays the
adjudication of Workers' Compensation cases for many years, sometimes as much as a decade or
more. During the long pendency of these cases, workers are left without income for living expenses or
medical treatment. Many are compelled to attempt to return to work, worsening their injuries. Others
watch family members add hours and jobs in an effort to support injured workers. Insurers and
employers are permitted to appeal cases repeatedly, searching for any reason to delay payments to
injured workers. Additionally, insurers and employer sometime deny payments to doctors, who in turn
refuse to provide treatment to injured workers.(46) Many workers who have sustained injuries or
developed occupational diseases have their claims dismissed without just cause, after many years of
delay.(47)
In 1999, close to 6 million people reported work-related health problems in the United
States.(48) More than 600,000 workers had serious injuries due to overexertion and repeated motions -
almost one-third of all serious job-related injuries.(49) Sixty thousand people in the U.S. died from work-related illnesses in 1998.(50) The actual number of workers suffering from occupational diseases and
injuries is much higher, as many workers do not report such problems, recognizing that there is no
remedy or that it is part of the nature of low-wage work.(51) Long hours lead to chronic stress and
anxiety, sleep deprivation, depression, high-blood pressure, cardiac problems, and digestive
problems.(52) Workers are highly susceptible to accidents and injuries as a result of exhaustion from long
hours. The pace and intensity has also escalated, forcing many workers to labor faster and produce
more in a shorter length of time.
V. Statement of Jurisdiction
A. National Administrative Office Jurisdiction
NAO jurisdiction to review this submission is provided by Article 16(3) of the NAALC
authorizing each NAO to review public communications on labor law matters arising in the territory of
another party, in accordance with domestic procedures. This submission involves labor law matters, as
defined in Article 49 of the NAALC, arising in the territory of the United States. The NAO of Mexico
has adopted procedures for such reviews under a regulation published in the Diario Oficial de la
Federacion of April 28, 1995.
The unwarranted delays in the adjudication of Workers' Compensation claims in New York
State prevents the United States from providing compensation for occupational injuries and illnesses
and from preventing such injuries and illnesses, in violation of Principles 10 and 9, respectively, in
Annex I of the NAALC. These unwarranted delays are a result of (1) inequitable laws that benefit
insurers and employers and (2) an ineffective, unjust processing method. The Petitioners and other
organizations have attempted to make changes in the New York State Workers' Compensation system
through administrative and legislative means, without success.(53)
Petitioners affirm that neither this matter not any other matter which forms the subject of this
complaint is pending before any international body.
Under Article I, the objectives of the NAALC include (1) the improvement of working
conditions and living standards in each Party's territory; (2) the promotion, to the maximum extent
possible, of the labor principles set out in Annex 1; (3) the promotion of effective enforcement by each
Party of its labor law; and (4) the fostering of transparency in the administration of labor law. Review
of this submission by the Mexican NAO would further these objectives of the Agreement.
B. Ministerial Review Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction lies with the Secretary of Labor and Social Welfare of Mexico under Article 22 of
the NAALC to request consultations with the Secretary of Labor of the United States regarding any
matter with the scope of the Agreement. The matters raised in this submission are within the scope of
the Agreement.
C. Evaluation Committee of Experts Jurisdiction
Under Article 23 of the NAALC, jurisdiction lies with an Evaluation Committee of Experts
(ECE), at the request of any consulting party, to analyze patterns or practices by the United States in
the enforcement of its technical labor standards, in matters that are trade-related and covered by
mutually recognized labor laws.
1. The Submission Includes Technical Labor Standards
Under Article 49, "technical labor standards" means "laws and regulations, or specific
provisions thereof, that are directly related" to "the establishment of a system providing benefits and
compensation to workers or their dependents in cases of occupational injuries, accidents or fatalities
arising out of, linked with or occurring in the course of employment" and "standards to minimize the
causes of occupational injuries and illnesses." This submission is "directly related" to compensation for
occupational injuries and illnesses in the United States, as well as to the negative consequences of
unwarranted delays in such compensation for prevention of injuries and illnesses in the workplace.(54)
2. The Matters Addressed in the Submission are Trade-Related
"Trade-related" means "related to a situation involving workplaces, firms, companies or sectors
that produce goods or provide services" traded between the territories of the signatory nations or that
compete with the goods or services produced or provided by persons of signatory nations in the
territory of the nation against which the petition has been filed, according to Article 49. Workers in
New York with Workers' Compensation claims subject to unwarranted delays produce goods and
provide services that are traded between the United States and Canada and Mexico and that compete
in the United States with the goods and services of Mexican and Canadian companies.(55)
3. The Matters Addressed in the Submission are Covered by Mutually
Recognized Labor Laws
The United States, Mexico, and Canada each have laws and rules related to the provision of
compensation for and prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses.(56) This submission concerns
unwarranted delays in the provision of such compensation in the United States, as a result of unfair laws
and a fault-ridden administrative process in New York State that is not fair, equitable, or transparent.
This submission also concerns the prevention of injuries and illnesses, because in the United States, the
Workers' Compensation system is an integral element of a legal regime through which employers with
multiple injuries are penalized with higher insurance premiums.(57)
4. The Submission Analyzes a Pattern of Practice by the United States in its
Prevention of and Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Illnesses
The matter that forms the subject of this Petition is not a single instance or case, but is rather a
sustained and recurring pattern of practice of the Board administering the Workers' Compensation
system in New York State, in violation of the obligations of the United States under the NAALC. The
State of New York and the Board are responsible for the endemic unwarranted delays in compensation
to workers for their occupational injuries and illnesses. Administrative law judges employed by the
Board are responsible for the efficient and fair resolution of claims, but have consistently forced
workers to bear with multiple hearings and submit to repeated medical examinations by insurance
company and employer doctors.(58) Further, the endemic delays in adjudication of claims has caused a
breakdown in the preventive occupational health and safety legal regime.(59)
D. Dispute Resolution Jurisdiction
In accordance with Article 29 of the NAALC, a two-thirds vote of the Council may confer
jurisdiction on an Arbitral Panel to consider the subject of this submission because the United States
has engaged in a "persistent pattern of failure" to effectively enforce laws pertaining to occupational
health and safety standards,(60) and that failure is trade-related(61) and the subject of mutually recognized
laws.(62)
VI. The Board's failure to Implement Standards to Minimize the Causes of Occupational Injuries
and Illnesses Requires the Appointment of an Arbitral Panel
A. Workers'
Compensation is a Key Component in the Occupational Health and Safety Regime of
the United States
Workers' Compensation law was established at least partly to provide incentives for employers
to make their work environments safer and healthier. All but five U.S. states adopted Workers'
Compensation laws between 1910 and 1921.(63) While employers were already required by common
law to compensate injured workers when the employer was at fault, Workers' Compensation laws put
the entire onus of responsibility for the maintenance of safe work environments on employers, by
shifting from fault-based negligence liability to no-fault strict liability.(64) "The liability rules, by
determining who is responsible for the damage, determine the incentives to prevent accidents for the
parties involved in a relationship."(65)
In exchange for the imposition of no-fault strict liability for workplace injuries on employers, the
government decreed that Workers' Compensation would be the exclusive remedy for injured and ill
workers, and that they could not make independent claims under the common law due to such injuries
and illnesses. "The Workers' Compensation Law was enacted to guarantee an injured employee
scheduled compensation regardless of fault in exchange for reduced costs and risks of litigation." Reich
v. Manhattan Boiler & Equipment Corp., 91 N.Y.2d 772, 779, 678 N.E.2d 939, 942 (1998).
1. The Workers' Compensation Insurance Scheme Operates so as to Prescribe
Standards for the Minimization of the Causes of Occupational Injuries and
Illnesses
New York Workers' Compensation Law requires that employers be insured for workplace
injuries and illnesses.(66) Approximately 20 percent of the state's employers administer self-insurance
programs, 35 percent of employers insure themselves through the private insurance market, and the
remaining 45 percent of employers are covered through the State Insurance Fund.(67)
Insurers determine premium levels on the basis of state and national data collected and analyzed
by the New York Compensation Insurance Rating Board (the "NYCIRB"), a non-profit association of
insurance carriers established pursuant to New York Insurance Law § 2315. A central focus of the
NYCIRB is "to help provide a safer workplace for all employees"(68) and "to encourage employers to
become active in reducing the number and severity of accidents in the workplace."(69) To determine
optimal premium rates for large employers, the NYCIRB engages in "experience rating," an evaluation
of a employers' track record to determine how much the cost of insurance will differ for an individual
employer from the average in the future.(70) A large employer with a bad health and safety record and
higher than average Workers' Compensation costs will be charged higher premium rates than an
employer with a better record.
New York Workers' Compensation and Insurance Law operate together to create an
insurance scheme that is supposed to penalize employers with relatively bad health and safety records
with higher premium rates, while rewarding employers with relatively good records. This legal regime
was intended to have a central preventive purpose.
2. Through Delays in the Adjudication of Workers' Compensation Claims the
Board Fails to Implement Standards for the Minimization of the Causes of
Occupational Injuries and Illnesses
The establishment of Workers' Compensation law placed strict liability on employers, and the
insurance scheme subsequently adopted by the state imposed a system of premium rate standards with
the intention of minimizing the causes of occupational injuries and illnesses. However, the Board
undermines the implementation of these standards through delays in the adjudication of claims and a
reduction in the total amount of benefits awarded to injured workers. The data used by the NYCIRB
to set insurance premiums fails to include unpaid, underpaid, and delayed claims, thus distorting
experience rating analysis. The Board allows employers to avoid strict liability for workplace injuries
and illnesses by artificially suppressing the cost of unhealthy and unsafe workplaces through delays and
arbitrary suspensions and terminations of benefits. Workers, meanwhile, are in legal limbo as they
await claim adjudication over many years and are pushed out of employment or into even more
marginal sectors of the economy to earn desperation wages. The Board undermines the implementation
of standards for the minimization of the causes of occupation injuries and illnesses.
B. Enforcement of Procedural Guarantees of Article 5 Requires the Appointment of an
Arbitral Panel
The signatory nations have agreed, through the NAALC, to "ensure" that certain procedural
rights in labor proceedings are protected. Article 3 requires that hearings comply with due process of
the law, remain open to the public, provide parties with the opportunity to be heard and present
evidence, and that such hearings not be complicated, expensive, or delayed. Article 5(1). Other
procedural rights required by NAALC include compulsory written decisions of decision-makers and
judicial or administrative review. Article 5(2)-(3). The specificity of these requirements differs from
other sections of the NAALC and indicate a primary focus of the signatory nations on the procedural
soundness of the proceedings in which the substantive labor law of each nation is applied. Indeed, such
specificity reflects an understanding that an acceptance of the Labor Principles and even codification of
such principles by each signatory nation would be drastically undermined by procedural faults in the
proceedings in which such principles are enforced.
The arbitral panel mechanism pursuant to Article 29 of the NAALC was reserved for an
examination of violations of certain areas of labor, both important enough to warrant the greatest
sanctions and also explicitly valued in each signatory nation's law. See International Labor and
Employment Laws 20-22,23 (BNA 1997). The procedural guarantees outlined in Article 5, such as
due process, are a central element of each signatory nation's constitutional and statutory law and
warrant the greatest possible NAO oversight.
VII. Action Requested
Compliance with the U.S. responsibilities under the NAALC requires that the Board (i) render
final decisions on all claims within 3 months of filing, (ii) provide immediate interim living expenses within
one week of the filing of a claim and ensure that the minimum benefits level is equal to the minimum
weekly wage under state and federal law, (iii) provide translation services at each compensation
hearing, (iv) report regularly to the legislature and the public on its compliance with the preceding time
requirements, (v) undertake a widespread public education program in the State of New York to
inform workers of their right to receive Workers' Compensation in an expedient manner, and (vi)
recruit injured workers, community members, lawyers, elected officials, and doctors for participation in
its decision-making and to monitor implementation of the aforementioned actions.
For the foregoing reasons, the petitioners respectfully request that:
- The NAO of Mexico:
- Undertake cooperative consultations with the NAO of the United States as
stipulated under Article 21 of the NAALC;
- Pursue investigative measures, in accord with Section 6 of the Regulation
published in the Diario Oficial de la Federacion of April 28, 1995, by:
- Accepting additional information from other interested parties,
- Engaging an independent Mexican expert in the matters of
compensation for and prevention of workplace injuries and illnesses in
the U.S. to assist the NAO with the review,
- Arranging for on-site investigations by the expert of labor rights
violations and working conditions in industries characterized by
relatively long hours and low rates of pay, and
- Arranging for detailed study by the expert, of the operations of the
New York Workers' Compensation Board and the New York
Compensation Insurance Rating Board, and
- Hold public information sessions with workers, worker advocates and
government officials affected by the Board's delays in adjudication, in locations
that would allow the maximum number of workers, other participants and
expert witnesses involved to provide testimony and additional information to the
NAO without incurring undue personal expenses or hardship, having first made
adequate arrangements for translation and having provided adequate notice to
petitioners, including, at a minimum, hearings in New York City;
- The Secretary of Labor and Social Welfare of Mexico begin consultations at the
ministerial level with the Secretary of Labor of the United States on the matters raised
in this submission in accord with Article 22 of the NAALC, and formally include the
organizations and individuals who filed this submission in those consultations;
- If ministerial consultations do not resolve these issues, the Secretary of Labor and
Social Welfare of Mexico require the establishment of an Evaluation Committee of
Experts (ECE) under Article 23 of the NAALC regarding all matters that may be
properly considered, and that such proceedings be transparent and involve public
participation of employees, employers, worker advocates, and government officials;
- If after a final ECE report the matter remains unresolved, the Secretary of Labor and
Social Welfare of Mexico request consultations under Article 27 of the NAALC, and
utilize the mechanisms specified in Article 28 of the NAALC to reach a satisfactory
resolution, and that such a Dispute Resolution Action include the participation of those
organizations which participated in earlier public communications;
- In the event that the matter remains unresolved after these consultation, the Secretary
seek the support of the Minister of Labor of Canada to request an arbitral panel under
Article 29 of the NAALC to consider the Board's persistent failure to ensure that
Workers' Compensation proceedings do not entail unwarranted delays, as well as its
undercutting of standards to minimize the causes of occupational injuries and illnesses.
Respectfully submitted,
CHINESE STAFF AND WORKERS' ASSOCIATION
NATIONAL MOBILIZATION AGAINST SWEATSHOPS
WORKERS' AWAAZ
ASOCIACION TEPEYAC
MUSSA ABDULKADER
ALEKSANDRA BARAN
TOMAS CARILLO
LAN MEI CHAN
JUAN FLORES
EVA HERRERA
STANISLAWA KOCIMSKA
HUANG SHENG KU
MARIA LABUZ
ZHI HUA QUIAN
AGUEDA SANTANA
ARKADIUSZ TOMASZEWSKI
JINEN ZHOU
By:/s/ Sameer M. Ashar
Sameer M. Ashar*
Counsel of Record
Michael J. Wishnie
Ranjana Natarajan
NYU Immigrant Rights Clinic
161 Avenue of the Americas, 4th Floor
New York, New York 10013
212-998-6430
212-995-4031 (f)
Counsel for Petitioners
October 24, 2001
ENDNOTES
1. The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (the "NAALC"), Article 3.
2. NAALC, Article 5.
3. Id.
4. NAALC, Annex 1.
5. N.Y. Workers' Compensation Law §§ 1 et seq.
6. See infra Section III.B.
7. See infra Section VI.A.
8. E.g., O'Rourke v. Long, 41 N.Y.2d 219, 359 N.E.2d 1347, 391 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1976)("It is
well recognized that the compensation statute was designed to provide a swift and sure source of
benefits to the injured employee or to the dependents of the deceased employee.").
9. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993).
10. NAALC, Annex 1.
11. NAALC, Article 5(1)(d).
12. See Exhibits E-Q.
13. See infra Section VI.A.
14. Price V. Fishback and Shawn Everett Kantor, A Prelude to the Welfare State: The Origins of
Workers' Compensation 5 (Univ. Chicago Press 2000).
15. See N.Y. Workers' Compensation Rules and Regulations § 300.9.
16. N.Y. Workers' Compensation Law §§ 11, 23; see Empire Insurance Co. v. Workers'
Compensation Bd., 607 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1st Dep't 1994).
17. See Charles A. Berreth, State workers' compensation legislation enacted in 1996,
Monthly Labor Report (Jan. 1997) (outlining the major changes in each state).
18. The reduction in availability of workers' compensation benefits to workers also reflects the
evisceration of the safety net for poor women and children, especially immigrants, stemming from the
1996 welfare reform and other government-administered benefits. See Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in
scattered sections of 8, 42 U.S.C.).
19. See CSWA Aff. (Exh. A), ¶ 12; NMASS Aff. (Exh. B) ¶ 6.
20. NAALC, Article 3.
21. NAALC, Article 5(1)(d).
22. NAALC, Article 5(2)(b).
23. See Exhs. A-D.
24. See Tomaszewski Aff. (Exh. P), ¶¶ 19-20.
25. See Flores Aff. (Exh. I), ¶ 8 (10 hearings over 9 years); Ku Aff. (Exh. L), ¶ 13 (21 hearings
over 7 and a half years; Labuz Aff. (Exh. M), ¶ 11 (20 hearings over 10 years); Qian Aff. (Exh. N) ¶
11 (7 hearings over 3 years); Santana Aff. (Exh. O), ¶ 8 (15 hearings over 5 years); Tomaszewski Aff.
(Exh. P), ¶ 15 (10 hearings over 7 years); Zhou Aff. (Exh. Q), ¶ 14 (9 hearings over 4 and a half
years).
26. See e.g., Abdulkader Aff. (Exh. E), ¶ 14.
27. See, e.g., Ku Aff. (Exh. L), ¶ 16.
28. See, e.g., Labuz Aff. (Exh. M), ¶ 13.
29. See, e.g., Kocimska Aff. (Exh. K), ¶¶ 9-10.
30. See, e.g., Kocimska Aff. (Exh. K), ¶ 15; Ku Aff. (Exh. L), ¶ 17; Labuz Aff. (Exh. M), ¶ 16;
Qian Aff. (Exh. N), ¶ 12; Santana Aff. (Exh. O), ¶ 12.
31. See, e.g., Qian Aff. (Exh. N), ¶ 11; Ku Aff. (Exh. L), ¶ 14.
32. See, e.g., Tomaszewski Aff. (Exh. P), ¶ 17.
33. NYSBA, Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Adjudication (October
1999).
34. NYSBA at 92.
35. See CSWA Aff. (Exh. A) ¶¶ 9-10; NMASS Aff. (Exh. B) ¶ 5.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See NMASS Aff. (Exh. B) ¶ 7.
39. Id.; Workers' Awaaz Aff. (Exh. D), ¶ 7.
40. See Bill Ong Hing, Don't Give me Your Tired, Your Poor: Conflicted Immigrant Stories and
Welfare Reform, 33 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 159, 162 (1998)(describing changes in eligibility of
immigrants for federal benefits programs).
41. See NMASS Aff. (Exh. B), ¶ 2.
42. See Id.; CSWA Aff. (Exh. A), ¶ 4.
43. Juliet Schorr, The Overworked American: the unexpected decline of leisure (Basic Books
1991).
44. Ron L. Hetrick, Analyzing the recent upward surge in overtime hours, Monthly Labor
Review (February 2000).
45. Jill Andresky Fraser, White-Collar Sweatshop: The Deterioration of Work and Its Rewards
in Corporate America (Norton 2001).
46. See CSWA Aff. (Exh. A) ¶ 9; NMASS Aff. (Exh. B) ¶ 5.
47. See CSWA Aff. (Exh. A) ¶ 10.
48. Jack Barnes, Working Class and the Transformation of Learning: The Fraud of Educational
Reform Under Capitalism (Pathfinder 2000).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See CSWA Aff. (Exh. A) ¶ 7.
52. See NMASS Aff. (Exh. B) ¶ 5.
53. Petitioners CSWA, NMASS, and Workers' Awaaz have met with Board officials and state
legislators to bring their attention to the problem of delays in adjudication. See CSWA Aff. (Exh. A),
¶¶ 15-16; Workers' Awaaz Aff. (Exh. D), ¶¶ 8-9. Through petitioners' lobbying efforts, a bill was
introduced in the New York State Assembly on June 21, 2001 to reform elements of the Workers'
Compensation system, including provisions to eliminate delays in the adjudication of claims. A. 9270,
2001-02 Regular Sessions (NY 2001).
54. See infra Section VI.A.
55. See, e.g., CSWA Aff. (Exh. A), ¶ 5; Chan Aff. (Exh. H), ¶ 3; Ku Aff. (Exh. L), ¶ 4; Qian
Aff. (Exh. N), ¶ 4.
56. Mexico maintains a federal workers' compensation system administered by the Instituto
Mexicano del Seguro Social (Mexican Institute of Social Security or "IMSS"). See NAALC, Income
Security Programs for Workers in North America § 2,
(www.naalc.org/english/publications/ispwna4.html).
Canada and the United States maintain individual
state, province, or territorial boards, which administer the system in a political subdivision. Id. In all
three nations, workers' compensation systems are components of expansive occupational health and
safety legal regimes. See Federal Labor Law, Articles 472-515 and Diario Oficial de la Federacion,
January 21, 1997, 23 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D-20 (February 4, 1997) (Mexico); see International
Labor and Employment Laws 21-44 to 46 (Canada); see, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2001) (United
States).
57. See infra Section VI.A.
58. See supra Section IV.A.
59. See infra Section VI.A.
60. See infra Section VI.A.
61. See supra Section V.C.2.
62. See supra Section V.C.3.
63. See supra note 14 at 3.
64. See id. at 3-4. It is important to note that workers continued to have significant incentive to
minimize unsafe workplace conditions due to the fact that the cost of accidents to workers remains
much higher than any possible monetary reimbursement and compensation, particularly because such
reimbursement and compensation was limited to two-thirds of wages and often much less. See id.
65. Id. at 4.
66. N.Y. Workers' Compensation Law § 2.
67. See www.wcb.state.ny.us.
68. See www.nycirb.org.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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