U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
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In the Matter of SAM J. MARTINEZ and DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
SAWTOOTH NATIONAL FOREST, Burley, ID
Docket No. 99-376; Submitted on the Record;
Issued October 20, 2000
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DECISION and ORDER
Before DAVID S. GERSON, A. PETER KANJORSKI,
VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL
The issue is whether appellant has established entitlement to wage-loss compensation for total disability on and after October 3, 1997 causally related to his employment-related conditions.
On November 24, 1992 appellant filed a traumatic injury claim alleging that on November 23, 1992 he sustained an injury to his left shoulder in the performance of duty. The Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs accepted appellant’s claim for left shoulder strain, left rotator cuff repair and arthroscopy and debridement of the left shoulder. On June 17, 1996 appellant was reemployed by the employing establishment in a part-time light-duty position that required that he answer telephone calls and greet visitors, four hours a day, five days a week. In a decision dated August 27, 1996, the Office found that the light-duty position was suitable and fairly and reasonably represented appellant’s wage-earning capacity and effective August 17, 1996 reduced appellant’s wage-loss compensation benefits accordingly.
Effective October 3, 1997, the employing establishment terminated appellant from his position for unprofessional conduct.
By decision dated December 16, 1997, the Office found that appellant was not entitled to wage-loss compensation for total disability.[1] The Office found that the medical evidence of record did not support that when appellant was terminated, October 3, 1997, he could no longer perform his light-duty assignment. The Office further stated that appellant remained entitled to compensation for his loss of wage-earning capacity as set forth in the Office’s August 27, 1996 decision.
The Board finds that appellant has not established entitlement to wage-loss compensation for total disability on and after October 3, 1997 causally related to his employment-related conditions.
Section 8102(a) of the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act[2] states that an employee is eligible for compensation benefits and “[t]he United States shall pay compensation as specified by this subchapter for the disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the performance of his duty.” In general, under the Act, the term “disability” means “incapacity because of injury in employment to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of such injury.”[3] This meaning, for brevity, is expressed as “disability for work.”[4]
The Board finds that the evidence of record clearly
demonstrates that appellant’s employment was terminated because of his improper
conduct and not because of any disability causally related to his accepted
employment conditions. In the instant case, appellant had been working
successfully performing light duty, 20 hours a week, answering telephones and
greeting visitors at the time of his termination, and the position would have
remained available for him had he not been terminated for improper conduct.
The record contains a copy of a January 24, 1997 letter of warning from
the employing establishment to appellant informing him that he needed to
communicate more clearly, take more accurate and complete telephone messages,
refrain from running and yelling in the hallways and refrain from making
inappropriate comments while preparing to transfer telephone calls. In its
September 2, 1997 letter, giving notice of its intent to terminate, the
employing establishment specifically stated that, while the special equipment
purchased to aid appellant in his job tasks had worked perfectly, appellant had
not performed his assignment in a manner which adequately and properly
represented the employing establishment. The employing establishment noted
that appellant continued to take incomplete or incorrect telephone messages,
continued to give out wrong or inappropriate information to callers, persisted
in attempting to answer questions he had been told to refer to others, and used
an abrupt and rude telephone manner. There is no evidence in the record that
appellant was terminated due to his physical inability to perform his assigned
duties; nor is there evidence that appellant stopped work due to his physical
condition. While appellant, through counsel, asserted that he was never
qualified for the duties of the position, had not received appropriate
training, and was terminated primarily due to a personality conflict, there is
no evidence in the record to support these assertions and the employing
establishment specifically stated, in its January 24, 1997 letter, that
appellant had been provided training in customer service and communications and
had been given one-on-one assistance. As there is no evidence in the record
that appellant was not capable of performing his assigned duties on and after
October 3, 1997, the Office correctly found that he had no total
disability within the meaning of the Act on and after that date.[5]
As appellant was not totally disabled for work within the meaning of the Act on
and after October 3, 1997, he had no entitlement to wage-loss compensation
for total disability after that date within the meaning of section 8102(a) of
the Act.
The decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs dated December 16, 1997 is hereby affirmed.
Dated, Washington, DC
October 20, 2000
David S. Gerson
Member
A. Peter Kanjorski
Alternate Member
Valerie D. Evans-Harrell
Alternate Member
[1] Prior to its December 16, 1997 decision, the Office issued a proposal to reduce or terminate compensation on October 9, 1997. Although the Office phrased the issue in terms of a reduction or termination of wage-loss compensation, the Office actually found that appellant was not entitled to additional wage-loss compensation following his termination by the employing establishment for cause.
[5] The term “disability” under the Act means incapacity because of injury in employment to earn the wage which the employee was receiving at the time of such injury; see Major W. Jefferson, III, 47 ECAB 295 (1996); John W. Normand, 39 ECAB 1378 (1988). The relevant medical evidence of record consists of progress notes from appellant’s treating physician, Dr. Paul C. Collins, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon, dated August 26, 1996, September 22 and December 1, 1997. In these reports, Dr. Collins continued to state that appellant was released for light-duty work, and he reiterated the physical restrictions, which were those upon which appellant’s light-duty position was designed.