BRB No. 00-0794
                             
RONALD E. LEWIS                    )
                         )
          Claimant-Responden       )
                         )
     v.                            )
                                   )
BAY SHIPBUILDING COMPANY      )    DATE ISSUED:   03/26/2001 26,
                                   2001
                         )
     and                           )
                         )
SENTRY INSURANCE COMPANY      )
                         )
          Employer/Carrier-             )
          Petitioners                   )    
                         )
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS'       )
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS,        )
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT      )
OF LABOR                           )    
                         )
          Respondent                    )    DECISION and ORDER
               
     Appeal of the Decision and Order Granting Benefits and the Supplemental Decision and Order Denying
     Reconsideration and Awarding Attorney Fees of Pamela Lakes Wood, Administrative Law Judge, United
     States Department of Labor.

     Holly P. Lutz, Wausau, Wisconsin, for claimant.
                                        
     Gregory P. Sujack (Garofalo, Schreiber & Hart, Chartered), Chicago, Illinois, for employer/carrier.

     Thomas Giblin (Judith E. Kramer, Acting Solicitor of Labor; Carol A. DeDeo, Associate Solicitor;
     Samuel J. Oshinsky, Counsel for Longshore), Washington, D.C., for the Director, Office of Workers'
     Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor.

     Before: HALL, Chief Administrative Appeals Judge, SMITH and McATEER, Administrative Appeals
     Judges.

     PER CURIAM:

     Employer appeals the Decision and Order Granting Benefits and the Supplemental Decision and Order Denying
Reconsideration and Awarding Attorney Fees (97-LHC-1373) of Administrative Law Judge Pamela Lakes Wood
rendered on a claim filed pursuant to the provisions of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, as
amended, 33 U.S.C. §901 et seq. (the Act).  We must affirm the administrative law
judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law if they are supported by
substantial evidence, are rational, and are in accordance with law. O'Keeffe v.
Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Associates, Inc., 380 U.S. 359 (1965); 33 U.S.C.
§921(b)(3). The amount of an attorney's fee award is discretionary and may be
set aside only if the challenging party shows it to be arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law. See, e.g., Muscella v. Sun
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 12 BRBS 272 (1980). 

     On February 29, 1996, claimant injured his lower back during the course of his
employment as a steelworker.   Employer provided work within claimant's
restrictions until he was laid off on June 21, 1996.  Claimant resided during the
week in Green Bay with his daughter for employment purposes, but he returned to his
residence in Tipler, Wisconsin, on weekends.  After his layoff in June 1996,
claimant continuously resided in Tipler, which is located approximately 180 miles
from employer's facility in Sturgeon Bay and 130 miles from Green Bay.  Claimant
was terminated by employer on November 6, 1996, for failure to report for work
without reasonable cause for four consecutive days after receiving employer's
written request that he return to work on October 23, 1996.  He has not since
returned to the workforce.

     In her Decision and Order Granting Benefits, the administrative law judge
found the medical evidence establishes  that claimant is unable to return to his
usual employment as a steelworker, which required occasional lifting up to a
hundred pounds and frequent lifting and carrying up to 50 pounds.  The
administrative law judge credited the opinions of claimant's treating physicians,
Dr. Robinson and Dr. Carlson, to find that claimant is  restricted to light duty
work involving lifting no more than 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds
frequently.  The administrative law judge next found that employer did not offer
claimant employment at its facility in November 1996, or any time thereafter, that
was within his work restrictions.  The administrative law judge then determined
that the northern counties of Wisconsin surrounding claimant's residence in Tipler
are the appropriate geographic area for establishing the availability of suitable
alternate employment.  The administrative law judge credited employer's June 8,
1998, labor market survey to find that employer identified suitable alternate
employment in the northern counties, and that this employment establishes that
claimant has a residual wage-earning capacity of $6.00 per hour.  Accordingly,
claimant was awarded compensation for temporary total disability, 33 U.S.C.
§908(b), from June 21, 1996, to September 27, 1996, compensation for permanent
total disability, 33 U.S.C. §908(a),  from September 27, 1996, to June 8,
1998, and, thereafter, compensation for permanent partial disability, 33 U.S.C.
§908(c)(21), based on a loss of wage-earning capacity.    Finally, the
administrative law judge denied employer Section 8(f) relief, 33 U.S.C.
§908(f), from continuing compensation liability.

     Subsequent to the administrative law judge's decision, Russell J. LaCourse of
the law office of Courtney, LaCourse and Little, P.A., submitted a fee petition
requesting $27,485.84, representing 70 hours of attorney services by the late James
Courtney III, at an hourly rate of $185, 21.75 hours of paralegal services by the
late Jill N.T. Swapinski, at an hourly rate of $75, 94.5 hours of paralegal
services by Joan Lindgren at an hourly rate of $60, and costs of $7,234.59.  Holly
Lutz submitted a fee petition requesting $7,307.50, representing 39.5 hours at an
hourly rate of $185, plus costs of $300.[1]   
Employer filed objections to the fee requests. 

     In her Supplemental Decision and Order Denying Reconsideration and Awarding
Attorney Fees, the administrative law judge denied both employer's and claimant's
motions for reconsideration on the issues of suitable alternate employment and
wage-earning capacity.  The administrative law judge, after considering the
objections raised by employer, approved the hourly rates requested, and the number
of hours requested for Mr. Courtney,  reduced by 3.75 the number of hours claimed
for work performed by Ms. Swapinski, reduced by one the number of hours sought for
Ms. Lundgren, and reduced by 1.25 the number of hours requested by Ms. Lutz.  The
administrative law judge granted Ms. Lutz's motion requesting an additional six
hours at $185 per hour for responding to employer's objections to her fee petition. 
Accordingly, the administrative law judge awarded the law offices of Courtney,
LaCourse and Little, P.A., $26,104.59, representing $20,097.50 for attorney and
paralegal time and costs of $6,007.09.  The administrative law judge awarded Ms.
Lutz an attorney's fee of $8,186.25, representing $7,076.25 for the initial time
requested, $1,110 for time spent responding to employer's fee objections, and costs
of $300.  
     On appeal, employer challenges the administrative law judge's findings that
claimant is capable of performing only light duty work, that employer did not offer
claimant a job at its facility within his work restrictions, and that the northern
counties surrounding Tipler, Wisconsin, are the appropriate geographic area for
purposes of  establishing the availability of suitable alternate employment.  
Employer also contends the administrative law judge erred by denying its request
for Section 8(f) relief.  Finally, employer challenges the administrative law
judge's fee awards. Claimant responds, urging affirmance of the administrative law
judge's decisions awarding benefits and attorneys' fees.   The Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs, responds, urging affirmance of the administrative
law judge's denial of Section 8(f) relief. 

     Employer initially contends that the administrative law judge erred by
crediting the opinions of Dr. Robinson and Dr. Carlson restricting claimant to
light duty work due to his  injury.  Employer argues that the opinion of Dr.
Blasier, as well as Dr. Robinson's notation in his  September 27, 1996,  report
that claimant was farming tobacco, which Dr. Robinson opined constitutes medium or
medium-heavy work, establish that claimant is capable of performing medium duty
employment lifting up to 25 pounds frequently and 50 pounds occasionally.

     It is well-established that claimant bears the burden of establishing the nature and extent of any disability
sustained as a result of a work-related injury. See generally Anderson v. Todd Shipyards
Corp., 22 BRBS 20 (1989).  In the instant case, the administrative law judge credited the assessment of
Dr. Carlson restricting claimant to lifting or carrying 10 pounds frequently and lifting 20 pounds occasionally,
which the administrative law judge found consistent with the  assessment made by Dr. Robinson on June 11,
1996.  The administrative law judge explicitly rejected employer's interpretation of Dr. Robinson's notation
regarding claimant's tobacco farming, finding that Dr. Robinson's statement does not
establish that claimant is capable of performing medium duty work on a full-time basis.  Moreover, in her decision on reconsideration, the
administrative law judge noted claimant's assertion that there has been no
showing of the nature and extent of claimant's work on his small tobacco
plot, and the administrative law judge found that much of the work was
performed by claimant's wife and children. See Tr. at 80, 82.  The
administrative law judge further found Dr. Blasier's opinion outweighed by
the opinions of claimant's treating physicians, Drs. Carlson and Robinson,
who had assessed claimant's condition over a period of time. Compare
EX 1 with CX 1-K, O.  

     In adjudicating a claim, it is well-established that the administrative
law judge is entitled to weigh the evidence, and is not bound to accept the
opinion or theory of any particular witness.  Rather, the administrative law
judge may draw his own conclusions and inferences from the evidence. See
Peabody Coal Co. v. Benefits Review Board, 560 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1977). 
In the instant case, we hold that the administrative law judge's decision
to credit Dr. Carlson's opinion, as supported by the June 1996 assessment
of Dr. Robinson, over the opinion of Dr. Blasier and Dr. Robinson's
September 1996 notation regarding claimant's farming activities is rational. 
Accordingly, we affirm the administrative law judge's conclusion that
claimant is restricted to light duty employment as it is supported by
substantial evidence of record.

     Employer next challenges the administrative law judge's finding that it
did not establish the availability of suitable alternate employment by
offering claimant a job at its facility within his work restrictions. 
Employer contends there is no evidence that claimant would not have been
offered light duty after he was recalled to return to work in October 1996,
and employer asserts it established that there were both light duty and
medium duty positions available to claimant at its facility.  Where, as
here, it is uncontested that claimant is unable to return to his usual employment, the
burden shifts to employer to demonstrate the availability of realistic job opportunities within the geographic area
where claimant resides, which claimant, by virtue of his age, education, work experience and physical or
psychological restrictions, is capable of performing.   Bunge Corp. v. Carlisle, 227 F.3d 934, 34
BRBS 79(CRT) (7th Cir. 2000). For an employer to meet its burden, it must supply evidence sufficient for the
administrative law judge to determine whether the job is realistically available and suitable for the claimant.
Id.  Merely alleging such work is available will not suffice.  Roger's
Terminal & Shipping Corp. v. Director, OWCP, 784 F.2d 687, 18 BRBS 79(CRT) (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 826 (1986).  A job in the employer's facility within the claimant's work
restrictions may meet this burden provided it is necessary work. Darby v. Ingalls Shipbuilding,
Inc., 99 F.3d 685, 30 BRBS 93(CRT) (5th Cir. 1996); Ezell v. Direct Labor, Inc., 33 BRBS
19 (1999).  However, the job must be actually available to claimant to establish the
availability of suitable alternate employment. See, e.g., Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock
Corp. v. Hord, 193 F.3d 797, 33 BRBS 170(CRT) (4th Cir. 1999); Mendez v. National Steel &
Shipbuilding Co., 21 BRBS 22 (1988).

     The administrative law judge found that employer never offered claimant light
duty work and failed to establish it could realistically offer such work to someone
with claimant's low seniority status, and she credited evidence that claimant would
have been offered medium duty work by employer had claimant reported to work in
October 1996, pursuant to employer's recall notice.  In her decision on
reconsideration, the administrative law judge rejected employer's assertion that
testimony from John Schauske, employer's production manager, established that
employer had both medium and light duty work available to claimant.  

     We affirm the administrative law judge's finding that employer's employment
offer to claimant in October 1996 of medium duty work fails to establish the
availability of suitable alternate employment inasmuch as we have affirmed the
finding that claimant was limited to light duty work.  Employer's only evidence of
light duty work at its facility is Mr. Schauske's testimony that as of the date of
the June 1998 formal hearing employer had available light duty work tinning
insulation.  Tr. at 137-138.   The administrative law judge found, however, that
this testimony fails to establish the availability of suitable alternate employment
as there is no evidence that employer ever actually offered claimant a job tinning
insulation or that employer offered claimant any other type of light duty
employment.  Roger's Terminal & Shipping Corp., 784 F.2d 687, 18 BRBS
79(CRT); Mendez, 21 BRBS 22.  Accordingly, we affirm the administrative law
judge's finding that employer failed to identify suitable alternate employment
available to claimant at its facility.

     Employer next challenges the administrative law judge calculation of
claimant's loss of wage-earning capacity, contending that claimant is capable of
earning more than the $6.00 per hour found by the administrative law judge.  In
this regard, employer argues that the administrative law judge erred by limiting
the relevant geographic area for consideration of suitable alternate employment to
the northern counties of Wisconsin within 40 miles of claimant's residence in
Tipler, and thus, improperly precluded several higher paying positions identified
by employer's vocational expert in the Green Bay/Sturgeon Bay area.  Employer
specifically maintains that the administrative law judge incorrectly relied on
See v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 36 F.3d 375, 28 BRBS
96(CRT) (4th Cir. 1994), as authority on this issue, because claimant established
Green Bay/Sturgeon Bay as his residence before and during the course of his
employment for employer, and, alternatively, the administrative law judge failed
to properly weigh all of the relevant factors enumerated therein.[2]   In See, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that where claimant relocates following an
injury, the administrative law judge should determine the relevant labor market
after considering such factors as claimant's residence at the time he files for
benefits, his motivation for relocating, the legitimacy of that motivation, the
duration of his stay in the new community, his ties to the new community, the
availability of suitable jobs in that community as opposed to those in his former
residence and the degree of undue prejudice to employer in proving suitable
alternate employment in a new location. See, 36 F.3d 375, 28 BRBS 96 (CRT);
see also Wood v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 112 F.3d 592, 31 BRBS 43(CRT)
(1st Cir. 1997); Holder v. Texas Eastern Products Pipeline, Inc.,  
   BRBS       , BRB No. 00-0602 (March 12, 2001).

     Citing See, the administrative law judge determined that the northern
counties surrounding Tipler are the relevant labor market, although she
acknowledged that the issue is a close one.  The administrative law judge found
that  Tipler is claimant's permanent home, notwithstanding that he lived with his
daughter in Green Bay until he was laid off by employer in June 1996 in order to
take advantage of the higher wages available in that area. The administrative law
judge found the limited job opportunities in the northern counties surrounding
Tipler and the resulting prejudice to employer outweighed by the length of
claimant's residence in Tipler of ten years and his wife's employment there.  The
administrative law judge also rejected claimant's contention that the relevant job
area is only Tipler, and found that jobs available in the counties surrounding
Tipler also are relevant as claimant is able to drive 30 to 40 miles.  In
calculating claimant's post-injury wage-earning capacity at $6.00 per hour, the
administrative law judge  relied on the lower paying jobs presented by the
vocational expert as more reflective of the limited and seasonal opportunities
available in the northern counties.[3] 

     We reject employer's contention that the administrative law judge's findings
are in error, as she weighed the relevant factors and her findings are rational and
supported by substantial evidence.   See Holder, slip op. at 8; Wilson
v. Crowley Maritime, 30 BRBS 199 (1996).  The administrative law judge
rationally found that, although at the date of his injury claimant resided in Green
Bay with his daughter for employment purposes, claimant's ties to that community
were otherwise limited, particularly when contrasted with Tipler, where claimant
resided before his employment in Sturgeon Bay, weekends during the course of his
employment for employer, and permanently after he was laid off by employer in June
1996.  Additionally, the administrative law judge recognized that the job market
is more limited and seasonal in the northern counties, but nonetheless found that
employer established the availability of suitable alternate employment in that
region, and thus any prejudice to employer is not "undue."  In See, the
Fourth Circuit found the most persuasive definition of the relevant labor market
to be the "community in which [claimant] lives," which in the instant case, the
administrative law judge found to be the Tipler area. See, 36 F.3d at 375,
28 BRBS at 96(CRT).  Thus, we affirm the administrative law judge's determination
that northern counties of Wisconsin surrounding the Tipler area are the relevant
labor market in the instant case, and, therefore, her finding that claimant has a
post-injury wage-earning capacity of $6.00 per hour based on positions available
in that location.

     We next address employer's contention that the administrative law judge erred
in denying its claim for Section 8(f) relief.  Specifically, employer contends it
established that claimant had  pre-existing disabilities due to a prior back injury
and  ulcers, which contribute to claimant's current permanent partial disability. 
Section 8(f) shifts the liability to pay compensation for permanent disability or
death after 104 weeks from an employer to the Special Fund established in Section
44 of the Act.  33 U.S.C. §§908(f), 944.  An employer may be granted
Special Fund relief, in a case where a claimant is permanently partially disabled,
if it establishes that the claimant had a manifest pre-existing permanent partial
disability, and that his current permanent partial disability is not due solely to
the subsequent work injury but "is materially and substantially greater than that
which would have resulted from the subsequent work injury alone."  33 U.S.C.
§908(f)(1); Marine Power & Equipment v. Dep't of Labor [Quan], 203 F.3d
664, 33 BRBS 204(CRT) (9th Cir. 2000); Two "R" Drilling Co., Inc. v. Director,
OWCP, 894 F.2d 748, 23 BRBS 34(CRT) (5th Cir. 1990); C&P Telephone Co. v.
Director, OWCP, 564 F.2d 503, 6 BRBS 399 (D.C. Cir. 1977).  Employer must
present medical or other evidence to establish that claimant's current disability
is materially and substantially greater due to the contribution of the prior
disability. Sproull v. Director, OWCP, 86 F.3d 895, 30 BRBS 49(CRT) (9th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1155 (1997).

     We affirm the administrative law judge's denial of Section 8(f) relief.  The
administrative law judge found employer established that claimant had a manifest
pre-existing back disability.  The administrative law judge also found, however,
that employer failed to establish that claimant's ulcers are a manifest pre-existing permanent partial disability, or that either condition materially and
substantially contributes to claimant's current permanent partial disability.  
With regard to the contribution element, the administrative law judge found Dr.
Blasier's statements too equivocal to establish that claimant's current back
condition would be materially greater had claimant not had ulcers or a pre-existing
back injury.  Specifically, the administrative law judge found there is no
indication that claimant would have been capable of performing more than light duty
but for his pre-existing back condition and ulcers.  We hold that the
administrative law judge rationally found Dr. Blasier's statements regarding
the contribution of claimant's pre-existing back injury and ulcers to
claimant's current disability insufficient to establish that claimant's
disability is materially and substantially greater than it would be due to
the work injury alone.[4]   See generally
Quan, 203 F.3d 664, 33 BRBS 204(CRT); Director, OWCP v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co. [Harcum II], 131 F.3d 1079, 31 BRBS 164(CRT) (4th Cir. 1997).  Thus, as the
administrative law judge's determination that employer failed to establish
the contribution element necessary for Section 8(f) relief with regard to
either claimant's ulcers or claimant's pre-existing back condition is
rational and supported by the record, that finding is affirmed.[5]   See Director, OWCP v. General Dynamics
Corp. [Bergeron], 982 F.2d 790, 26 BRBS 139(CRT) (2d Cir. 1992).

     Finally, we address employer's appeal of the administrative law judge's
fee awards.  Specifically, employer challenges the hourly rate awarded by the
administrative law judge on the basis that it is not representative of the usual
and customary rate of counsel or the rate appropriate for northeastern Wisconsin. 
Moreover, employer challenges  counsel's quarter-hour minimum billing method and
employer avers that specific time entries by Mr. Courtney and Ms. Lutz are either
vague, excessive, duplicative or clerical.  Finally, employer challenges the
administrative law judge's allowance as a cost Mr. Courtney's use of his
personal plane for case-related travel and the administrative law judge's
allowance, as either a cost or as a medical expense, of Dr. Carlson's
medical fees.

     Section 702.132, 20 C.F.R. §702.132, provides that the award of any
attorney's fee shall be reasonably commensurate with the necessary work done, the
complexity of the legal issues involved and the amount of benefits awarded.  See
generally Moyer v. Director, OWCP, 124 F.3d 1378, 31 BRBS 134(CRT) (10th Cir.
1997); see also Parrott v. Seattle Joint Port Labor Relations
Committee of the Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 22 BRBS 434 (1989).  The
administrative law judge, in awarding counsel a fee at the hourly rate
requested, found that employer failed to establish that $185 is not Mr.
Courtney's and Ms. Lutz's customary billing rate and she noted the
complexity of this multiple issue case, the skill exhibited by Mr. Courtney
at the hearing, and the competence of Ms. Lutz in taking over the case.  We
affirm the hourly rate of $185 awarded as the administrative law judge
applied the regulatory criteria and employer has not shown that the
administrative law judge abused her discretion in this regard. See
McKnight v. Carolina Shipping Co., 32 BRBS 165, aff'd on recon.
en banc, 32 BRBS 251 (1998). Similarly, the administrative law judge
adequately addressed employer's challenge to various itemized entries as vague,
excessive, duplicative, or clerical, as we decline to disturb her determinations
that the entries at issue are compensable.[6]  
See Ross v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 29 BRBS 42 (1995).  Employer's
specific objection to counsel's method of billing in minimum increments of one-quarter of an hour also is rejected.  The Board has previously determined that this
method is reasonable under the applicable regulation, 20 C.F.R. §702.132.
Neeley v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 19 BRBS 138
(1986); cf. Conoco, Inc. v. Director, OWCP [Prewitt], 194 F.3d 684, 33 BRBS
187(CRT) (5th Cir. 1999).

     Finally, we reject employer's contentions regarding the costs awarded by the
administrative law judge.  Section 28(d) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §928(d),
provides that where an attorney's fee is awarded against employer, costs also may
be assessed against employer. See Picinich v. Lockheed Shipbuilding, 23 BRBS
128 (1989).  In the instant case, a review of Mr. Courtney's fee petition does not
support employer's contention that Mr. Courtney sought a fee for time expended
piloting his private plane in addition to the cost of operating the plane. See
generally Ferguson v. Southern States Cooperative, 27 BRBS 16 (1993). 
Regarding the cost of Dr. Carlson's medical report, the administrative law judge
found employer liable for  $335 to Mr. Courtney for Dr. Carlson's  May 21, 1998,
report notwithstanding that this report was withdrawn from evidence pursuant to the
parties' stipulation that references to changes in claimant's physical condition
after April 1998 would not be submitted into evidence. See Order Approving
Stipulation.  The administrative law judge found that Dr. Carlson was a necessary
witness, and that his other reports and deposition were relied on in awarding
benefits.  Moreover, employer has failed to show that the cost of the withdrawn
report was unreasonable at the time it was incurred.  See generally O'Kelley v. Dept.
of the Army/NAF, 34 BRBS 39 (2000).   Accordingly, we affirm the administrative law judge's attorney's
fee awards.[7]   

     Accordingly the Decision and Order Granting Benefits, and Supplemental
Decision and Order Denying Reconsideration and Awarding Attorney Fees of the
administrative law judge are affirmed. 

     SO ORDERED.




                                                                   
                         BETTY JEAN HALL, Chief
                         Administrative Appeals Judge



                                                                   
                         ROY P. SMITH
                         Administrative Appeals Judge



                                                                   
                         J. DAVITT McATEER
                         Administrative Appeals Judge

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Footnotes.
 1)After the June 10, 1998, formal hearing, Mr. Courtney and Ms. Swapinski died in an
August 1998 airplane crash.  Holly Lutz entered an appearance as claimant's substitute counsel by letter dated October
15, 1998. 
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 2)We decline to address claimant's contention, raised in his response brief, that the
administrative law judge erred in finding that employer established the availability of suitable alternate employment. 
Claimant did not file an appeal of the administrative law judge's decision, and the contention does not support
the result reached by the administrative law judge. Del Vacchio v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Co., 16 BRBS 190 (1984).
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 3)Employer's vocational expert stated that the most likely rate of pay available in the
northern counties is $6.00 to $8.00 per hour, and is $7.00 to $8.00 in the Green Bay/Sturgeon Bay area.
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 4)With regard to claimant's back condition, Dr. Blasier wrote in his October 9, 1996,
medical report that, "claimant had pre-existing pathology and probably some pre-existing disability.  However, the
principle (sic) portion of his disability is due to the lifting accident of February 29, 1996."  EX 1.  In response to written
interrogatories concerning the effect of claimant's ulcers on his back condition, Dr. Blasier opined that claimant's ulcers
impair his ability to drive to the extent that claimant suffers pain resulting from his inability to tolerate anti-inflammatory
pain medications.  Employer's Application for Section 8(f) Relief, EX B.
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 5)Accordingly we need not address the administrative law judge's findings that employer
failed to establish that claimant's ulcers constituted a manifest pre-existing permanent partial disability. 
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 6)We also affirm as reasonable and within the administrative law judge's discretion the
allowance of 6 hours for time spent by Ms. Lutz preparing a 25 page response to employer's objections to her fee
petition. See Hill v. Avondale Industries, Inc., 32 BRBS 186 (1998), aff'd sub nom. Hill v. Director,
OWCP, 195 F.3d 790, 33 BRBS 184(CRT) (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 2215 (2000).

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 7)We decline  to address claimant's challenge to the administrative law judge's denial of
the $822.50 cost for the expert witness fee of William Reynolds/Vocational Assessment Services, as this issue should
have been raised in an appeal filed by claimant. See Story v. Navy Exchange Service Center, 33 BRBS 111
(1999). Ms. Lutz's request that she be allowed to file for an additional fee for time expended preparing the fee petitions
submitted to the administrative law judge and for an enhanced fee are properly addressed to the administrative
law judge. See generally Johnson v. Director, OWCP, 183 F.3d 1169, 33 BRBS 112(CRT) (9th Cir.
1999); Bellmer v. Jones Oregon Stevedoring Co., 32 BRBS 245 (1998).


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