BRB No. 93-2184

LEO NELSON BYRD                         )
                                        )
          Claimant-Petitioner           )
                                        )
     v.                                 )
                                        )
INGALLS SHIPBUILDING,                   )    DATE ISSUED:   03/13/1996
INCORPORATED                            )
                                        )
          Self-Insured                  )
          Employer-Respondent           )    DECISION and ORDER

     Appeal of the Supplemental Decision and Order Awarding Attorney Fees of
     A.A. Simpson, Jr., Administrative Law Judge, United States Department of
     Labor.

     Mitchell G. Lattof, Sr. (Lattof & Lattof, P.C.), Mobile, Alabama, for
     claimant.

     Traci M. Castille (Franke, Rainey & Salloum), Gulfport, Mississippi, for
     self-insured employer.

     Before:  HALL, Chief Administrative Appeals Judge, SMITH and DOLDER,
     Administrative Appeals Judges.     

     PER CURIAM:

     Claimant appeals the Supplemental Decision and Order Awarding Attorney Fees
(92-LHC-2424) of Administrative Law Judge A.A. Simpson, Jr. rendered on a claim
filed pursuant to the provisions of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §901 et seq. (the Act).  The amount of an
attorney's fee award is discretionary and may be set aside only if the challenging
party shows it to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in
accordance with law. See, e.g., Muscella v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co., 12 BRBS 272 (1980).

     Claimant sought benefits under the Act for a noise-induced work-related
hearing loss based on an audiogram administered on February 10, 1990, which
revealed a 33 percent binaural impairment.  A second audiogram administered on
December 17, 1990 revealed that claimant suffered from a 28.8 percent binaural
loss.  In his Decision and Order, the administrative law judge credited the second
audiogram and found that claimant sustained a work-related binaural hearing
impairment of 28.8 percent.  Thus, the administrative law judge awarded claimant
permanent partial disability compensation pursuant to Section 8(c)(13) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §908(c)(13), for a 28.8 percent binaural
impairment, as well as medical benefits under Section 7 of the Act, 33 U.S.C.
§907.

     Subsequent to the administrative law judge's Decision and Order, claimant's
counsel submitted a fee petition requesting an attorney's fee of $2,885,
representing 18.5 hours of legal services performed at $150 per hour by lead
counsel, 1 hour of legal services performed at an hourly rate of $110 by associate
counsel, and $50 in expenses.  Thereafter, employer filed objections to the fee
petition.  In a Supplemental Decision and Order, the administrative law judge
considered employer's specific objections to the fee request, reduced the number
of hours sought by counsel to 13.5, reduced the hourly rate sought for services
rendered by claimant's lead counsel to $110, and the hourly rate sought for
services rendered by claimant's associate counsel to $100, approved counsel's
request for $50 in expenses, and thereafter awarded claimant's counsel an
attorney's fee of $1,527.50. 

     On appeal, claimant challenges the reductions in his attorney's fee petition
made by the administrative law judge.  Employer responds, urging affirmance of the
fee award.

     Initially, claimant challenges the reductions made by the administrative law
judge in the hourly rates sought.  Specifically, claimant asserts that the
administrative law judge erred in reducing the hourly rate sought by claimant's
lead counsel to $110, since the facts and legal issues in the instant claim were
unique and complex, and the rate awarded is not commensurate with counsel's
qualifications.

     The complexity of legal issues is but one factor to be considered when
awarding an attorney's fee. See 20 C.F.R. §702.132; Thompson v.
Lockheed Shipbuilding & Construction Co., 21 BRBS 94 (1988).  In the instant
case, the administrative law judge specifically considered the complexity of the
legal issues, as well as claimant's lead counsel's qualifications, in finding that
an hourly rate of $110 was commensurate with the services performed.  Inasmuch as
claimant's assertions that counsel's qualifications require a higher hourly rate
are insufficient to meet his burden of proving the hourly rate awarded by the
administrative law judge was unreasonable, we affirm the rate awarded by the
administrative law judge.[1]   See Ferguson v.
Southern States Cooperative, 27 BRBS 16 (1993); Watkins v. Ingalls
Shipbuilding, Inc., 26 BRBS 179 (1993), aff'd mem., 12 F.3d 209 (5th
Cir. 1993).

     Claimant next contends that the administrative law judge erred in reducing the
hours requested in the fee petition.  Specifically, claimant contends that the
number of hours requested was not excessive, and that billing for review of the
case file should be appropriately compensable.  An attorney's fee must be awarded in accordance with
Section 28 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §928, and the applicable regulation, 20
C.F.R. §702.132, which provides that any attorney's fee approved shall be
reasonably commensurate with the necessary work done, the complexities of the legal
issues involved, and the amount of benefits awarded. See generally Ross v.
Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 29 BRBS 42 (1995); Parrott v. Seattle Joint Port
Labor Relations Committee of the Maritime Ass'n, 22 BRBS 434 (1989).

     In his Supplemental Decision and Order, the administrative law judge reduced
the time sought for review of pleadings, preparation of discovery, and preparation
for the hearing, as well as time sought for review of the case file.  In each
instance, the administrative law judge set forth the rationale upon which he relied
in reducing the hours sought by counsel.  Thus, we hold that claimant's assertions
on appeal are insufficient to meet his burden of proving that the administrative
law judge abused his discretion in reducing the number of requested hours in the
fee petition. See Maddon v. Western Asbestos Co., 23 BRBS 55 (1989);
Cabral v. General Dynamics Corp., 13 BRBS 97 (1981).

     Lastly, claimant asserts that the administrative law judge erred in following
the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Director, OWCP [Fairley], No. 89-4459
(5th Cir. July 25, 1990), and thus rejecting counsel's method of quarter-hour
billing.  In Fairley, the Fifth Circuit stated that, generally, attorneys
should charge no more than one-quarter of an hour for preparation of a one-page
letter, and one-eighth of an hour for review of a one-page letter. See also
Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Director, OWCP [Biggs], 46 F.3d 66 (5th Cir.
1995)(unpublished).  Accordingly, the administrative law judge's reductions in time
sought by counsel pursuant to Fairley are affirmed.

     Accordingly, the administrative law judge's Supplemental Decision and Order
Awarding Attorney Fees is affirmed.

     SO ORDERED.
                                                                        

                         BETTY JEAN HALL, Chief
                         Administrative Appeals Judge


                                                                        

                         ROY P. SMITH
                         Administrative Appeals Judge


                                                                        

                         NANCY S. DOLDER
                         Administrative Appeals Judge


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Footnotes.
 1)We reject claimant's reliance on fee awards issued by the
administrative law judge in other cases.  The amount of an attorney's fee award
lies within the discretion of the body awarding the fee, and the decision of an
administrative law judge regarding the amount of a fee in one case is not binding
precedent on another body, or the same administrative law judge, in a different
case.  33 U.S.C. §928(c).
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