BRB No. 93-1643
                                         

ANGEL FERNANDEZ                              )    
                                             )
          Claimant-Petitioner                )
                                             )
      v.                                     )
                                             )
MAHER TERMINALS,                             )    DATE ISSUED:   02/29/1996   
INCORPORATED                                 )    
                         )
          Self-Insured                       )
          Employer-Respondent                )     DECISION and ORDER

     Appeal of the Decision and Order Denying Benefits of Robert D. Kaplan,
     Administrative Law Judge, United States Department of Labor.

     James J. Gallo, Jersey City, New Jersey, for claimant.

     Richard P. Stanton (William M. Broderick), New York, New York, for self-insured employer.

     Before:  HALL, Chief Administrative Appeals Judge, SMITH and DOLDER,
     Administrative Appeals Judges.

     PER CURIAM:

     Claimant appeals the Decision and Order Denying Benefits (92-LHC-00777) of
Administrative Law Judge Robert D. Kaplan rendered on a claim filed pursuant to the
provisions of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, as amended, 33
U.S.C. §901 et seq. (the Act).  We must affirm the administrative law
judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law if they are supported by
substantial evidence, are rational, and are in accordance with law.  33 U.S.C.
§921(b)(3); O'Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Associates, Inc., 380
U.S. 359 (1965). 

     Claimant, a longshoreman, sought benefits for a work-related injury he
sustained while in the scope and course of his employment with employer on
September 26, 1990.  Claimant returned to work the following day but was unable to
work because of pain.  Hearing Transcript at 20-22.  Employer voluntarily paid
claimant temporary total disability benefits and medical expenses from September
27, 1990 to January 20, 1991.  33 U.S.C. §§908(b), 907.    

     In his Decision and Order, the administrative law judge found that claimant
failed to establish that he was disabled to any extent after January 20, 1991;
accordingly, the administrative law judge denied the instant claim for compensation
and medical benefits subsequent to January 20, 1991.

     On appeal, claimant challenges the denial of his claim for compensation and
medical benefits.  Specifically, claimant argues that the administrative law judge
erroneously failed to shift the burden of establishing suitable alternate
employment to employer.  Moreover, claimant avers that the administrative law judge
erred in crediting the opinions of Drs. Greifinger, D'Agostino and Koval over that
of Dr. Birotte, his treating physician.  Employer responds, urging affirmance.  

     It is well established that claimant bears the burden of establishing the
nature and extent of any disability sustained as a result of a work-related injury.
See Anderson v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 22 BRBS 20 (1989); Trask v.
Lockheed Shipbuilding and Construction Co., 17 BRBS 56 (1985).  In order to
establish a prima facie case of total disability, claimant bears the burden
of establishing that he is unable to return to his usual work. Blake v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 21 BRBS 49 (1988).  Once claimant has established his
inability to return to his usual employment, the burden shifts to employer to
demonstrate the availability of suitable alternate employment. See generally New
Orleans (Gulfwide) Stevedores v. Turner, 661 F.2d 1031, 14 BRBS 156 (5th Cir.
1981).    

     In the instant case, the administrative law judge, in concluding that claimant
sustained no residual disability subsequent to January 20, 1991, credited the
opinions of Drs. Greifinger, D'Agostino and Koval, over the opinion of Dr. Birotte,
noting that the opinions of the credited physicians are better supported by the
objective findings.    

     In a report dated January 17, 1991, Dr. Greifinger opined that claimant would
be capable of resuming his usual work responsibilities on January 21, 1991,
inasmuch as claimant had significant improvement in his shoulder function. 
Employer's Exhibit 12.  Thereafter, in a report dated January 24, 1991, Dr.
Greifinger advised claimant to return to daily activities, including work duties. 
Employer's Exhibit 13.  Likewise, Dr. D'Agostino concluded in two separate reports
dated January 23, 1991 and February 6, 1991, that claimant is able to recommence
work "on January 21, 1991 per Dr. Greifinger" since rehabilitative efforts and
medical treatment had terminated.  Claimant's Exhibit 14.  Based upon an
examination and objective tests performed on March 4, 1991, Dr. Koval opined that
he could find no objective finding to account for claimant's continued complaints,
that claimant had received the maximum benefit from treatment, and therefore, that
claimant need not undergo further diagnostic testing or surgery.  Employer's
Exhibit 14.  In contrast,  Dr. Birotte, in reports dated April 19, 1991, October
21, 1991, and December 2, 1991, opined that claimant is unable to perform his work
and gainful activities due to his inability to use his left shoulder.  Claimant's
Exhibits 4, 6, 7.


     We hold that the administrative law judge committed no error in relying upon
the opinions of Drs. Greifinger, D'Agostino and Koval, rather than the opinion of
Dr. Birotte, in concluding that claimant sustained no residual disability
subsequent to January 20, 1991.  The administrative law judge is entitled to weigh
the medical evidence and draw his own inferences from it, see Wheeler v.
Interocean Stevedoring, Inc., 21 BRBS 33 (1988), and he is not required to
accord controlling weight to the opinion of a treating physician. Phillips v.
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 22 BRBS 94 (1988).  Thus, as the
administrative law judge's credibility determinations are rational and within his
authority as fact-finder, and as these credited opinions constitute substantial
evidence to support the administrative law judge's ultimate findings, we affirm the
administrative law judge's determination that claimant sustained no permanent
disability after January 20, 1991.[1]    See
generally Cordero v. Triple A Machine Shop, 580 F.2d 1331, 8 BRBS 744 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 911 (1979).  As claimant thus has not
established an inability to return to his usual employment duties, we hold that the
administrative law judge committed no error in not requiring employer to establish
the availability of suitable alternate employment.[2]     
     Accordingly, the Decision and Order Denying Benefits of the administrative law
judge is affirmed.

     SO ORDERED.

                                                                       

                         BETTY JEAN HALL, Chief
                         Administrative Appeals Judge


                                                                       

                         ROY P. SMITH
                         Administrative Appeals Judge


                                                                       

                         NANCY S. DOLDER
                         Administrative Appeals Judge

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Footnotes.
 1)Although claimant also asserts that the administrative law judge
erred in failing to resolve all factual doubt in his favor, the United States
Supreme Court recently determined that the "true doubt rule" is invalid because it
conflicts with Section 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§556(d). Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries, ___ U.S. ___, 114
S.Ct. 2251, 28 BRBS 43 (CRT) (1994).
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 2)Given that claimants possess no cognizable interest in dispositions
of requests for Section 8(f), 33 U.S.C. §908(f), relief, we need not address
claimant's contention that the administrative law judge erred by failing to discuss
employer's request for relief under that subsection. See Coats v. Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 21 BRBS 77 (1988).
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