BRB No. 89-5019 BLA 
                         

DARRELL D. BEVERLY            )                        
                              )
          Claimant-Petitioner )
                              )
     v.                       )
                              )
GENERAL TRUCKING CORPORATION  )    DATE ISSUED:04/28/1992           
                              )
     and                      )
                              )
ROCKWOOD INSURANCE COMPANY    )
                              )
          Employer/Carrier-   )
          Respondent          )
                              )
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS'  )
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED )
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR    )
                              )
          Party-in-Interest   )    DECISION and ORDER

     Appeal of the Decision and Order of John S. Patton, Administrative Law Judge,
     United States Department of Labor.

     Vernon M. Williams (Wolfe & Farmer), Norton, Virginia, for claimant.

     H. Ashby Dickerson (Penn, Stuart, Eskridge & Jones), Abingdon,   Virginia, for
employer.

     Before:  STAGE, Chief Administrative Appeals Judge, DOLDER, Administrative
     Appeals Judge, and BONFANTI, Administrative Law Judge.*

     PER CURIAM:
     Claimant appeals the Decision and Order (88-BLA-2569) of 
Administrative Law Judge John S. Patton denying benefits on a

*Sitting as a temporary Board member by designation pursuant to the Longshore and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act as amended in 1984, 33 U.S.C. §921(b)(5)
(Supp. V 1987).
claim filed pursuant to the provisions of Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act of 1969, as amended, 30 U.S.C. §901 et
seq. (the Act).  The administrative law judge credited claimant with
in excess of twenty-eight years of qualifying coal mine employment, and found that
claimant established invocation of the interim presumption at 20 C.F.R.
§§727.203(a)(1) and 410.490(b)(1)(i), and that his pneumoconiosis arose
out of coal mine employment pursuant to Section 410.490(b)(2).  The administrative
law judge further found, however, that the evidence of record established rebuttal
of the presumption that claimant's disability was due to pneumoconiosis pursuant
to 20 C.F.R. §727.203(b).  Accordingly, benefits were denied.  Claimant
appeals, challenging the administrative law judge's rebuttal findings pursuant to
Sections 727.203(b) and 410.490(c).  Employer responds, urging affirmance.  The
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, has not participated in this
appeal.[1] 
     The Board's scope of review is defined by statute.  If the administrative law
judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law are supported by substantial
evidence, are rational, and are consistent with applicable law, they are binding
upon this Board and may not be disturbed.  33 U.S.C. §921(b)(3), as
incorporated by 30 U.S.C. §932(a); O'Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls
Associates, Inc., 380 U.S. 359 (1965).
     Initially, we note that in light of the decision of the United States Supreme
Court, claims, such as this, which are properly adjudicated pursuant to Section
727.203 are not subject to adjudication pursuant to Section 410.490. 
See Whiteman v. Boyle Land and Fuel Co., 15 BLR 1-11
(1991); see generally Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines,
Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2524, 15 BLR 2-155 (1991).  Consequently, we must vacate
the administrative law judge's findings pursuant to Section 410.490.
     Turning to the merits of this claim, claimant contends that the administrative
law judge failed to clearly explain his rationale or adequately indicate the
specific method of rebuttal which he found had been established, and thus his
Decision and Order does not comport with the terms of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §557(c)(3)(A), as incorporated into the Act by 5 U.S.C.
§554(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. §919(d), 30 U.S.C. §932(a).  We agree. 
Although the administrative law judge properly found that rebuttal of the interim
presumption was not established pursuant to Section 727.203(b)(1) or (b)(4), his
finding that the evidence of record was sufficient to establish rebuttal of the
"presumption of disability" is ambiguous and could refer to rebuttal at either
Section 727.203(b)(2) or (b)(3).  Decision and Order at 8.    The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, wherein appellate jurisdiction of this
claim lies, has held that rebuttal pursuant to Section 727.203(b)(2) is without
regard to cause, and thus rebuttal thereunder cannot be established on the basis
of no respiratory impairment.  Sykes v. Director, OWCP, 812 F.2d 134,
10 BLR 2-95 (4th Cir. 1987).  Additionally, in order to establish rebuttal pursuant
to Section 727.203(b)(3), the party opposing entitlement must rule out the causal
relationship between the miner's total disability and his coal mine employment. 
Bethlehem Mines Corporation v. Massey, 736 F.2d 120, 7 BLR 2-72 (4th
Cir. 1984).  As the administrative law judge did not articulate the applicable
standard for establishing rebuttal pursuant to each of these rebuttal methods, and
did not evaluate the evidence relevant to the respective methods in light of the
proper standard, we must vacate the administrative law judge's finding that
rebuttal had been established and remand this case for the administrative law judge
to reconsider the evidence of record and determine whether it is sufficient to
establish rebuttal pursuant to Section 727.203(b)(2) or (b)(3).
     Accordingly, the administrative law judge's Decision and Order denying
benefits is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and this case is remanded for
further consideration consistent with this opinion.
     SO ORDERED.

                                                 
                    BETTY J. STAGE, Chief
                    Administrative Appeals Judge



                                                 
                    NANCY S. DOLDER
                    Administrative Appeals Judge



                                                 
                    RENO E. BONFANTI
                    Administrative Law Judge                

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Footnotes.
 1) The administrative law judge's finding that claimant
established invocation of the interim presumption pursuant to Section
727.203(a)(1), his finding that the evidence of record was insufficient to
establish rebuttal pursuant to Section 727.203(b)(1) or (b)(4), and his findings
with regard to the length of coal mine employment, are affirmed as unchallenged on
appeal.  See Skrack v. Island Creek Coal Co., 6 BLR 1-710 (1983).
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