BRB No. 99-0392 BLA
SAMMY CAUSEY )
)
Claimant-Petitioner )
)
v. )
)
LEECO, INCORPORATED ) DATE ISSUED: 01/11/2000
C/O TRANSCO COAL COMPANY )
)
Employer-Respondent )
)
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' )
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED )
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR )
)
Party-in-Interest ) DECISION and ORDER
Appeal of the Decision and Order of Thomas F. Phalen, Jr.,
Administrative Law Judge, United States Department of Labor.
Edmond Collett, Hyden, Kentucky, for claimant.
Paul E. Jones (Baird, Baird, Baird & Jones, P.S.C.), Pikeville, Kentucky,
for employer.
Before: HALL, Chief Administrative Appeals Judge, BROWN and McGRANERY,
Administrative Appeals Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Claimant appeals the Decision and Order (98-BLA-587) of Administrative Law
Judge Thomas F. Phalen, Jr. denying benefits on a claim filed pursuant to the
provisions of Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
amended, 30 U.S.C. §901 et seq. (the Act). The administrative law
judge found at least thirteen years of coal mine employment and, based on the date
of filing, adjudicated the claim pursuant to 20 C.F.R. Part 718. Decision and
Order at 4, 7. After determining that the instant claim was a duplicate claim,[1] the administrative law judge found that the newly
submitted evidence was insufficient to establish the existence of pneumoconiosis
pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §718.202(a)(1)-(4) or total disability pursuant to 20
C.F.R. §718.204(c)(1)-(4). Consequently, the administrative law judge
concluded that claimant failed to establish a material change in conditions
pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §725.309. Accordingly, benefits were denied. On
appeal, claimant contends that the evidence is sufficient to establish the
existence of pneumoconiosis and total disability pursuant to 20 C.F.R.
§§718.202(a)(1), (4) and 718.204(c)(4). Employer responds, urging
affirmance of the administrative law judge's Decision and Order. The Director,
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, has filed a letter indicating that he
will not participate in this appeal.[2]
The Board's scope of review is defined by statute. The administrative law
judge's Decision and Order must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial
evidence, is rational, and is in accordance with law. 33 U.S.C. §921(b)(3),
as incorporated into the Act by 30 U.S.C. §932(a); O'Keeffe v. Smith,
Hinchman & Grylls Associates, Inc., 380 U.S. 359 (1965).
In order to establish entitlement to benefits in a living miner's claim
pursuant to 20 C.F.R. Part 718, claimant must establish that he suffers from
pneumoconiosis; that the pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mine employment; and that
the pneumoconiosis is totally disabling. See 20 C.F.R. §§718.3,
718.202, 718.203, 718.204. Failure to establish any of these elements precludes
entitlement. Trent v. Director, OWCP, 11 BLR 1-26 (1987); Perry v.
Director, OWCP, 9 BLR 1-1 (1986)(en banc). In addition, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that in assessing whether
the evidence is sufficient to establish a material change in conditions pursuant
to Section 725.309, an administrative law judge must consider all of the new
evidence, favorable and unfavorable to claimant, and determine whether claimant has
proven at least one of the elements of entitlement previously adjudicated against
him.[3] See Sharondale Corp. v. Ross, 42
F.3d 993, 19 BLR 2-10 (6th Cir. 1994).
After consideration of the administrative law judge's Decision and Order, the
arguments raised on appeal and the evidence of record, we conclude that the
administrative law judge's Decision and Order is supported by substantial evidence
and contains no reversible error therein. Considering the newly submitted evidence
to determine if a material change in conditions was established, the administrative
law judge found that the evidence was insufficient to establish the existence of
pneumoconiosis pursuant to Section 718.202(a)(1). Decision and Order at 9-10. The
administrative law judge properly noted that claimant submitted two x-rays in
support of his current application for benefits. Decision and Order at 9. The x-ray dated October 20, 1997 was interpreted by Dr. Broudy as negative. Director's
Exhibit 19. The administrative law judge found that only the June 5, 1997 x-ray
interpretation by Dr. Baker, a B-reader, was positive for the existence of
pneumoconiosis. Decision and Order at 9; Director's Exhibit 11. The
administrative law judge further found that Dr. Baker's positive interpretation was
reread by Drs. Sargent, Barrett, Wiot and Spitz, who are B-readers and Board-certified radiologists, as negative for the existence of pneumoconiosis. Decision
and Order at 9; Director's Exhibits 9, 10; Employer's Exhibits 6, 7. The
administrative law judge then accorded greater weight to the negative
interpretations and concluded that the x-ray evidence was insufficient to establish
the existence of pneumoconiosis. Decision and Order at 9. Since the
administrative law judge rationally accorded more weight to the negative x-ray
interpretations by the dually-qualified physicians, substantial evidence supports
the administrative law judge's finding that the newly submitted evidence is
insufficient to establish the existence of pneumoconiosis at Section 718.202(a)(1).
See Director's Exhibits 9, 10, 11, 19; Employer's Exhibits 6, 7; Decision
and Order at 9-10; Staton v. Norfolk & Western Railroad Co., 65 F.3d 55, 19
BLR 2-271 (6th Cir. 1995); Woodward v. Director, OWCP, 991 F.2d 314, 17 BLR
2-77 (6th Cir. 1993); Edmiston v. F & R Coal Co., 14 BLR 1-65 (1990);
Clark v. Karst-Robbins Coal Co., 12 BLR 1-149 (1988)(en banc);
Sheckler v. Clinchfield Coal Co. 7 BLR 1-128 (1984).
In addressing the existence of pneumoconiosis pursuant to Section
718.202(a)(4), the administrative law judge considered the entirety of the newly
submitted medical opinions of Drs. Baker, Broudy, Branscomb and Fino.
Director's Exhibits 7, 19; Employer's Exhibits 2, 3. The administrative law judge
properly accorded determinative weight to the opinions of Drs. Broudy, Branscomb
and Fino, that claimant does not suffer from pneumoconiosis, over the contrary
opinion of Dr. Baker, because their opinions are better reasoned, documented and
supported by the objective evidence. See Trumbo v. Reading Anthracite Co.,
17 BLR 1-85 (1993); Clark, supra; Fields v. Island Creek Coal Co.,
10 BLR 1-19 (1987); King v. Consolidation Coal Co., 8 BLR 1-262 (1985);
Wetzel v. Director, OWCP, 8 BLR 1-139 (1985); Lucostic v. United States
Steel Corp., 8 BLR 1-46 (1985); Fuller v. Gibraltar Coal Corp., 6 BLR
1-1291 (1984); Decision and Order at 10-11. The administrative law judge
permissibly found that Dr. Baker's opinion, diagnosing pneumoconiosis, was entitled
to less weight as his diagnosis of pneumoconiosis was based only on his x-ray
interpretation and an inaccurate history of coal mine employment, not on the
objective findings from his examination. Decision and Order at 10-11; Director's
Exhibit 7; Worhach v. Director, OWCP, 17 BLR 1-105 (1993); Anderson v.
Valley Camp of Utah, Inc., 12 BLR 1-111 (1989); Dillon v. Peabody Coal
Co., 11 BLR 1-113 (1988); Hutchens v. Director, OWCP, 8 BLR 1-16 (1985).
Thus, we affirm the administrative law judge's finding that the preponderance of
the newly submitted evidence is insufficient to establish the existence of
pneumoconiosis at Section 718.202(a)(4). Perry, supra.
With respect to 20 C.F.R. §718.204(c)(4), the administrative law judge
also rationally determined that the evidence of record was insufficient to
establish total disability.[4] The administrative
law judge properly concluded that the newly submitted evidence was insufficient to
establish total disability as no physician of record opined that claimant was
suffering from a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment.[5] Director's Exhibits 7, 19; Employer's Exhibits
2, 3; Decision and Order at 12; Tackett v. Cargo Mining Co., 12 BLR 1-11
(1988); Fields, supra; Budash v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 9 BLR 1-48
(1986)(en banc), aff'd on recon. 9 BLR 1-104 (1986)(en
banc); Gee v. W. G. Moore and Sons, 9 BLR 1-4 (1986)(en banc);
Perry, supra. Contrary to claimant's contention, opinions finding no
significant or compensable impairment need not be discussed by the administrative
law judge in terms of claimant's former job duties. Wetzel, supra.
Moreover, we reject claimant's argument that the administrative law judge failed
to consider that he is totally disabled for comparable and gainful work because of
his age, work experience and education since the newly submitted medical opinions
do not establish the existence of a totally disabling respiratory impairment under
Section 718.204(c).[6] See 20 C.F.R.
§718.204(c); Carson v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 19 BLR 1-18 (1994);
see also Ramey v. Kentland v. Elkhorn Coal Corp., 775 F.2d 485, 7 BLR 2-124
(6th Cir. 1985).
The administrative law judge is empowered to weigh the medical evidence and
to draw his own inferences therefrom, see Maypray v. Island Creek Coal Co.,
7 BLR 1-683 (1985), and the Board may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its
own inferences on appeal. Clark, supra; Anderson, supra;
Worley v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 12 BLR 1-20 (1988). Consequently, as the administrative
law judge in this case adequately examined and discussed all of the relevant newly
submitted evidence as it relates to the existence of pneumoconiosis and total
disability and permissibly concluded that this evidence fails to carry claimant's
burden of establishing a material change in conditions pursuant to 20 C.F.R.
§725.309, we affirm the administrative law judge's denial of benefits as it
is supported by substantial evidence and is in accordance with law.
Accordingly, the administrative law judge's Decision and Order denying
benefits is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
BETTY JEAN HALL, Chief
Administrative Appeals Judge
JAMES F. BROWN
Administrative Appeals Judge
REGINA C. McGRANERY
Administrative Appeals Judge
To Top of Document
Footnotes.
1)Claimant filed his initial claim for benefits on July 7, 1979,
which was denied by the Department of Labor on November 14, 1979. Director's
Exhibit 21. Claimant subsequently filed a second claim on October 18, 1991, which
was finally denied on January 31, 1995, because claimant failed to establish the
existence of pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment and total
disability due to pneumoconiosis. Director's Exhibit 22. Claimant filed his most
recent claim on May 9, 1997. Director's Exhibit 1.
Back to Text
2) The administrative law judge's length of coal mine employment determination
and his findings pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§718.202(a)(2)-(3) and
718.204(c)(1)-(2) are affirmed as unchallenged on appeal. Skrack v. Island Creek
Coal Co., 6 BLR 1-616 (1983).
Back to Text
3)This case arises within the jurisdiction of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit as the miner was employed in the coal mine
industry in the State of Kentucky. See Shupe v. Director, OWCP, 12 BLR 1-200 (1989)(en banc).
Back to Text
4)Since the record does not contain any evidence of cor pulmonale
with right sided congestive heart failure, the newly submitted evidence is
insufficient to establish total disability at 20 C.F.R. §718.204(c)(3).
Newell v. Freeman United Coal Mining Co., 13 BLR 1-37 (1989).
Back to Text
5)Dr. Baker opined that claimant does not have a pulmonary impairment and is able to return to
his former coal mine employment. Director's Exhibit 7. Dr. Broudy opined that claimant has the respiratory capacity to
return to coal mine employment or to do similarly arduous manual labor. Director's Exhibit 19. Dr. Branscomb stated that
claimant does not have an impairment in any way related to his coal mine employment. Employer's Exhibit 2. Dr. Fino
opined that claimant has the respiratory capacity to return to his coal mine employment. Employer's Exhibit 3.
Back to Text
6) Claimant's reliance on Bentley v. Director, OWCP, 7 BLR 1-612 (1982), is misplaced. In Bentley,
the Board held that age, work experience and education are only relevant to claimant's
ability to perform comparable and gainful work, an issue which did not need to be
reached in that case in light of the administrative law judge's finding at Section
410.426(a) that claimant did not establish that he had any impairment which
disabled him from his usual coal mine employment. See also 20 C.F.R.
§718.204(b)(1), (b)(2).
Back to Text
NOTE: This is an UNPUBLISHED BLA Document.
To Top of Document
|