TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary

Chapter 1: Background

Chapter 2: Forced Labor and Forced

Chapter 3: Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

Chapter 4: Child Labor

Chapter 5: Conclusion

Appendix I: Methodology

Appendix II: ILO Conventions Ratified by Burma

Appendix III: Infrastructure Projects Using Unpaid Labor, 1988-96

Appendix IV: Sworn Statement Preventing Seafarers from Contacting the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF)

Appendix V: Letter from Burmese Seafarers

Appendix VI: Letter from Burmese Seafarers Employment Control Division

Appendix VII: Bibliography

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CHAPTER 1

BACKGROUND⁽¹⁾

INTRODUCTION

For almost four decades, Burma has been ruled by authoritarian military governments. After crushing popular demonstrations for democratic reform in 1988, a military government which seized power under the name of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) has ruled Burma.⁽²⁾ In November 1997, the regime renamed itself the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). For the last ten years Burma has been condemned internationally for its human rights and worker rights violations. The abuses of fundamental rights in Burma include the widespread practice of forced labor, which probably affects thousands of people every day, and has most likely been suffered by millions in recent years. Forced labor has been one of the main causes of significant refugee outflows to Thailand and Bangladesh. The SPDC (as did the SLORC) denies basic democratic rights to the people of Burma, including worker rights such as freedom of association and the right to organize. A resource rich, mainly agricultural country, Burma is one of the world's poorest nations.⁽³⁾ A major child labor problem is associated with the absence of a governmental commitment to primary education and widespread poverty.

Since 1989, the U.S. Government has repeatedly expressed its disapproval of the GOB's human rights and worker rights record. In this regard, the U.S. Government has:

• suspended bilateral economic aid;
• withdrawn GSP benefits;⁽⁴⁾
• implemented an arms embargo;⁽⁵⁾
• successfully opposed assistance from international financial institutions;⁽⁶⁾ and
• downgraded diplomatic representation in Rangoon from Ambassador to Charge d'Affaires.⁽⁷⁾

In 1996, President Clinton implemented legislation restricting visas for Burmese nationals who formulate, implement or benefit from policies impeding Burma's transition to democracy. The President signed an executive order in May 1997 banning new U.S. investments in Burma.

A growing number of state, city and county governments in the United States have passed selective purchasing laws, which limit procurement from firms that do business in Burma.⁽⁸⁾ As of late July 1998, selective purchasing laws had been passed by one State (Massachusetts), one county (Alameda County, CA) and 18 cities including San Francisco and New York.⁽⁹⁾ The State of California and the city of Los Angeles are considering moves to pass selective purchasing laws.

RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

A former British colony, Burma became an independent parliamentary democracy in 1948 under a Constitution which guaranteed human rights, and an independent judiciary. Since before independence, however, differences between Burma's ethnic groups have been expressed in political and social divisions. Approximately two-thirds of Burma's 46 million people belong to the Burman ethnic group. The rest are divided between as many as 145 other ethnic groups,⁽¹⁰⁾ and live mostly in the hill and border regions of the country where they often form the majority of the population.⁽¹¹⁾ For much of the last half century, many ethnic minorities seeking greater levels of independence have conducted armed campaigns against the central government.

At independence from the United Kingdom, a government was democratically elected, and served under Prime Minister U Nu from 1948 until 1958. In October 1958, political differences within the government, and the difficulties of a communist insurgency led General Ne Win to take power and form a military government. Democracy returned in elections held in February 1960, in which U Nu was again elected Prime Minister. In 1962, however, Ne Win led a military coup, and since then Burma has been ruled by unelected military governments.

Following the 1962 coup, Ne Win became head of the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) and assumed the Presidency of the Union of Burma. Dominated by the army, the BSPP implemented a policy called "the Burmese Way to Socialism," which mixed "self-reliance" and socialist economic principles. In 1974, the BSPP introduced a new Constitution which made socialism Burma's official ideology and created legislative and executive bodies that were closely controlled by the BSPP. Ne Win retired as President in 1981 but retained control of the BSPP. He remained the most important political figure in the country for some years, and is thought to retain considerable influence even today.

1988 PRO-DEMOCRACY UPRISINGS AND THE SLORC

By the late 1980s, the "Burmese way to Socialism" had induced serious economic decay.⁽¹²⁾ Efforts to repair the economy by lifting import restrictions and cutting public spending slowed growth, but not inflation. Consequently, in September 1987, the GOB implemented the second of two rounds of demonetization of the local currency⁽¹³⁾ which led to student protests. In March 1988, the police and the military clamped down on student actions, leading to dozens of civilian deaths.⁽¹⁴⁾ Demonstrations continued from March through June 1988. Students were joined by Buddhist monks and workers.⁽¹⁵⁾ The military continued to respond with brutal tactics, and hundreds of civilians were arrested. Many suffered severe injuries or died from ill-treatment in detention. Many people were arbitrarily or summarily executed.⁽¹⁶⁾

Protests continued and on June 21, 1988 the government imposed a 60 day ban on public gatherings in Rangoon. Ne Win resigned as chairman of the BSPP, and his replacement, Sein Lwin, held office for only 18 days before continued public unrest forced his resignation. Dr. Maung Maung became leader, amid promises of political and economic reforms. Public protests continued, however, and even members of the military participated. During the month of August 1988, as many as three thousand people were killed in demonstrations while peacefully exercising their rights of free association, expression and assembly.⁽¹⁷⁾

General Saw Maung, Chief of Staff and Minister of Defense, reasserted direct military control on September 18, 1988.⁽¹⁸⁾ The newly formed SLORC proclaimed martial law, "declared its government to be extra-constitutional,"⁽¹⁹⁾ suspended the 1974 Constitution, and dissolved administrative and legislative organs.⁽²⁰⁾ It announced an "open-door" economic policy, and promised political reform. For a short time, new political parties were allowed to form,⁽²¹⁾ and allowed to register under Law 6/88, the Law on Associations.⁽²²⁾

The SLORC declared its intention to transfer power to a civilian government, and conducted a largely free election in May 1990. Despite the arrest and detention of many of its candidates and party members, the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) (led by its secretary-general, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi)⁽²³⁾ won 80% of the seats for a new legislative body. The SLORC, however, did not transfer power to the elected government, and the military has continued to rule with only minor personnel changes.

Instead of transferring power, the SLORC convened a "National Convention" in 1993 to draft a new constitution. The SLORC chose all the representatives for the Convention, but no more than 15% of them were people elected in 1990. The National Convention has met only intermittently since then, and it has not been convened at all since March 1996. The representatives to the National Convention are subject to severe restrictions on debate and discussion of the Convention's business. In 1995, the NLD representatives abandoned the National Convention to protest these restrictions.⁽²⁴⁾ The National Convention has concluded very little business beyond a set of "guiding principles" for the new Constitution. These principles guarantee that 25% of the seats in the new legislative assembly will be reserved for the military.

When the SLORC seized power in 1988, "a third of the country was still affected by the insurgencies and in vast ethnic minority areas central control was negligible."⁽²⁵⁾ One of the SLORC's priorities was a renewed assault on armed opposition groups. Particularly after the 1990 election, the SLORC stepped up its campaign along the borders with Thailand and China. From 1990 to 1992, Burma saw some of the heaviest fighting in the civil war that has existed since 1948.⁽²⁶⁾ In its campaign against opposition groups, the SLORC re-invigorated Ne Win's policy of "four cuts": cutting off their food, intelligence, funds and recruits. At the same time, the SLORC rapidly expanded the size of the Army from an estimated 190,000 troops in 1988 to over 300,000 by 1993.⁽²⁷⁾

In April 1992, the SLORC called a halt to all military offensives,⁽²⁸⁾ and began direct talks and/or cease-fire negotiations with 17 of the armed opposition groups. By late 1994, 13 armed groups had reached cease-fires⁽²⁹⁾ with the SLORC. Two more armed groups reached cease-fires in 1995.⁽³⁰⁾ In January 1996, the SLORC agreed to a cease-fire with drug trafficker Khun Sa,⁽³¹⁾ leader of the Shan Mong Tai Army. Most of the Mong Tai army lay down its arms, although splinter groups rejected the cease-fire. The SLORC has not yet concluded a cease-fire agreement with the Karen National Union (KNU), although the two sides have met at least four times.⁽³²⁾ The SLORC has continued to conduct offensives against the KNU in the meantime.⁽³³⁾

In November 1997, the SLORC changed its name to the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).⁽³⁴⁾ The four most senior members of the SLORC assumed equivalent positions in the SPDC. The other members are all regional military commanders. The elevation of regional military commanders to the SPDC appears to be evidence of continuing close military control, and suggests that the new name does not in fact signal a move to a more open regime.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORKER RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

Since the violent suppression of the pro-democracy uprising in 1988, there have been repeated reports of widespread human rights abuses throughout Burma. These include arbitrary, extrajudicial and summary executions, torture, rape, arbitrary arrests and detention, the imposition of forced labor on large sections of the population (including the practice of forced portering for the military), forced relocations, deprivation of property and other abuses. Many of these abuses are reported to have taken place in the context of military actions against armed opposition groups, and as part of the GOB's related strategy to undercut civilian support for the insurgents. The international community has consistently expressed its concern at the significant flows of refugees from Burma.

Freedom of expression, assembly and association are suppressed by the military regime with force. Political dissent is put down by arrest and the detention of opponents. From November 1995 to October 1996, for example, over 1,000 NLD supporters were detained.⁽³⁵⁾ The SLORC has closed schools several times since it took power in 1988, including most of the three-year period between 1988 and 1991. In late 1996, student demonstrations in Rangoon and Mandalay resulted in 609 people being detained, as well as the closure of all public education institutions, from primary schools to universities.⁽³⁶⁾ Universities remain closed at the time this report was written.

It has been widely reported that the Muslim population of Burma generally, and the concentrated minority of Muslim Rohingyas in Arakan State in particular, are actively discriminated against by the Burman dominated army and the SLORC. In Arakan State, these citizens are subject to laws which closely restrict their movement.⁽³⁷⁾

During 1991 and 1992, approximately 250,000 Muslim Rohingyas fled from Burma into Bangladesh. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) subsequently signed a memorandum of understanding with the SLORC to coordinate the return of the Rohingyas. As part of that arrangement, the SLORC agreed with UNHCR to limit the amount of forced labor it would demand from Rohingyas in the first few months after they returned. Around 200,000 Rohingyas were repatriated from 1993 to 1996, although initial reports indicated that some were returned against their will. In spite of the agreement between SLORC and UNHCR, forced labor demands and other human rights abuses continued in Arakan State, and new waves of refugees fled to Bangladesh in 1996 and 1997.⁽³⁸⁾

There has also been a sizeable flow of refugees across Burma's eastern border with Thailand. In January 1998, there were over 116,000 Burmese refugees in camps on the Thai-Burma border, the majority of them on the Thai side of the border.⁽³⁹⁾ Most of the residents of these camps are ethnically Karen, Mon, Karenni, and Tavoyan. Many Shan people have also fled into Thailand but they have not been allowed by the Thai government to establish refugee camps.⁽⁴⁰⁾ In addition to refugees, Burmese make up the overwhelming majority of Thailand's estimated 970,000 illegal workers.⁽⁴¹⁾ The recent financial crisis in Asia has prompted the Thai government to consider ways to protect Thai workers from the downturn, including by repatriating illegal workers, and taking steps to discourage employers from hiring them.

NO RULE OF LAW

Basic elements of the rule of law have been missing from Burma's legal landscape for over 35 years. As one observer stated:

Decades of military rule in Burma have prevented the rule of law from taking deep root during the country's post-colonial history. The concept of the rule of law suffered a particularly severe blow with the accession to power of the SLORC. . . What is more, the few vestiges of constitutionalism and legality that remained at the time of the coup have all but been extinguished ...⁽⁴²⁾

There is no legislative body composed of elected representatives. Members of the executive branch are not elected, and the judiciary is not independent of the executive.⁽⁴³⁾ The SLORC has declared at times that both the 1947 and the 1974 Constitutions have been suspended, yet at other times it has purported to rely on them.⁽⁴⁴⁾

Burma's laws are vague and are generally inaccessible.⁽⁴⁵⁾ Since 1988, the GOB has issued new laws on occasion, usually in the form of announcements or declarations published in the country's newspapers. The SLORC has frequently declared that laws have been repealed and/or replaced.⁽⁴⁶⁾ In July 1991, SLORC formed the Laws Scrutiny Central Body,⁽⁴⁷⁾ which is apparently responsible for updating Burma's laws, but does not seem to publish reports of its operations. In the area of fundamental human rights, including basic worker rights, the problem of identifying Burma's laws are particularly acute, as the GOB frequently refuses to cooperate with the outside world. As one observer has noted:⁽⁴⁸⁾

... successive military governments have often impeded access to vital information, especially in matters touching on the politically sensitive issue of human rights, so that the precise state of the law on such matters is often difficult to ascertain.⁽⁴⁹⁾

U.N. CONCERNS OVER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

Since 1992, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights has commissioned reports from a Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Burma, who is responsible for following several issues: the transfer of power to a civilian government and the drafting of a new constitution, the lifting of restrictions of personal freedom, and the restoration of human rights.⁽⁵⁰⁾ The Special Rapporteur has summarized the international community's fundamental concerns in Burma:⁽⁵¹⁾

• Failure of the 1990 electoral process to reach its conclusion, and the SLORC/SPDC's failure to implement its commitment to a transfer of power to a civilian government.
• Continued detention of many political leaders, including elected representatives.
• Extremely serious human rights abuses, including "the practice of torture, summary and arbitrary executions, forced labor, including forced portering for the military, abuse of women, politically motivated arrests and detention, forced displacement, serious restrictions on the freedoms of expression and association, and the imposition of oppressive measures directed, in particular, at ethnic and religious minority groups."
• Continued fighting with opposition groups (despite some cease fires having been reached) resulting in flows of refugees to neighboring countries.⁽⁵²⁾

The reports of the Special Rapporteur catalogue the many allegations of human rights abuses against the GOB, and call on the GOB to bring them to an end. The reports have urged the GOB to end the apparent impunity with which members of the military are alleged to carry out human rights abuses. Each report has reached the conclusion that the denial of democratic rights is the basic cause of other human rights abuses reported and has called for restoration of democracy as well as steps toward a transfer of power to the elected, civilian government. Each year since 1992, resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights have endorsed the Special Rapporteur's conclusions and recommendations, and condemned Burma's human rights record.

Other special procedures of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights that have addressed the human rights situation in Burma include: the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance,⁽⁵³⁾ the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,⁽⁵⁴⁾ the Special Rapporteur on Torture,⁽⁵⁵⁾ the Special Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography,⁽⁵⁶⁾ the Secretary General's Representative on Internally Displaced Persons,⁽⁵⁷⁾ and the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.⁽⁵⁸⁾

In addition, the International Labor Organization (ILO), a specialized U.N. agency, has frequently denounced Burma's record in the area of worker rights. The ILO is the agency within the U.N. system with primary responsibility for all matters relating to the rights of workers and labor unions.⁽⁵⁹⁾ It sets international labor standards in Conventions (binding treaties) and Recommendations (advisory documents). Burma joined the ILO in 1948 and has ratified 21 ILO Conventions.⁽⁶⁰⁾ These include the Forced Labor Convention (No. 29) and the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention (No. 87), both of which are among the ILO's core human rights conventions.⁽⁶¹⁾

Over the past 40 years, the ILO has repeatedly condemned Burma's record of imposing forced labor on its people and denying them freedom of association, contrary to Conventions 29 and 87.⁽⁶²⁾ Burma has been called to appear before the ILO on many occasions, especially since the military coup in 1962, concerning the failure to fulfill its obligations under these conventions. Suppression of the pro-democracy movement in 1988 and heightened international concern in recent years have intensified the level of activity regarding Burma in the ILO. In 1996, the ILO sent a senior advisor on international labor standards from Geneva, at the GOB's request, to open a dialogue on freedom of association. The GOB canceled the mission at the last minute, while the advisor was already en route to Burma.⁽⁶³⁾ In addition, while the ILO Secretariat routinely provides technical assistance to member countries, it has not started any new activities in Burma since 1991 because of Burma's poor human rights record.⁽⁶⁴⁾

The ILO Conference Committee on the Application of Conventions has adopted special paragraphs highlighting Burma's unacceptable application of Convention No. 87 in 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997 and again in 1998.⁽⁶⁵⁾ These paragraphs have deplored the GOB's continued failure to implement Convention No. 87 concerning freedom of association and its failure to cooperate with the ILO.⁽⁶⁶⁾

In January 1993, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) submitted a complaint against Burma on forced labor, and a special sub-committee of the ILO's Governing Body concluded that Burma was violating its obligations under Convention No. 29.⁽⁶⁷⁾ In June 1996, 25 worker delegates to the ILO Conference filed a formal complaint under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution alleging Burma's non-observance of Convention 29. This led the ILO to establish a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the complaint--only the tenth Commission of Inquiry in the ILO's almost 80 year history. The Commission of Inquiry completed its report in July 1998,⁽⁶⁸⁾ and found that the GOB, the military and the administration "seem oblivious to the human rights of the people and are trampling on them with impunity." This report will be considered by the ILO Governing Body in November 1998.

In addition, since 1995 the U.N. Special Rapporteur has called on the GOB to cooperate with the ILO, and to comply with its obligations under Conventions 29 and 87. The Special Rapporteur has frequently commented that there is no freedom of association in Burma, and there are no independent unions. The Special Rapporteur has also drawn the GOB's attention to repeated allegations of widespread use of unpaid, forced labor throughout the country, and to allegations that gross human rights abuses are commonly alleged to be associated with the practice of forced labor.

CHAPTER 2

Forced labor in Burma takes many forms. People have been pressed into service as porters for army troops, and made to perform manual labor on infrastructure development projects including roads, railroads, dams, and canals. Military battalions apparently rely on local villagers as a labor force for work at their camps, and for commercial projects run for the private profit of military officers. Villagers forcibly relocated to new sites have sometimes become forced laborers. Forced labor has reportedly been used in connection with tourism development, and has allegedly been used in association with the construction of the Yadana natural gas pipeline project in Tenasserim Division.⁽⁶⁹⁾

Burma's 1947 Constitution prohibited forced labor and involuntary servitude other than prison labor,⁽⁷⁰⁾ although the State was empowered to demand forced labor for public purposes on a non-discriminatory basis.⁽⁷¹⁾ Two colonial era laws, the Towns Act (1907) and the Villages Act (1908) are still in force in Burma, and each provides for forced labor in violation of ILO Convention 29.⁽⁷²⁾ The ILO has repeatedly called for these laws to be amended or repealed. The GOB has stated that these laws are being redrafted, but no drafts appear to have been published. Although Burma's Penal Code, prohibits "unlawful" exaction of labor against a person's will,⁽⁷³⁾ this appears not to prevent the use of forced labor under the Towns Act or the Villages Act.

In addition to ILO Conventions 29 (Forced Labor, 1930)⁽⁷⁴⁾ and 105 (Abolition of Forced or Compulsory Labor, 1957)⁽⁷⁵⁾, other international human rights instruments which contain provisions relating to forced labor or slavery include: the Slavery Convention,⁽⁷⁶⁾ the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery,⁽⁷⁷⁾ the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others,⁽⁷⁸⁾ the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,⁽⁷⁹⁾ and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.⁽⁸⁰⁾ Burma is bound by the Slavery Convention, and has signed but not ratified the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons.⁽⁸¹⁾

The ILO, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Burma and the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child are among the international bodies which have strongly urged the GOB to end the practice of forced labor immediately. For example, the 1998 report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur observes that:

The well-documented reports, photographs and testimonies received by the Special Rapporteur lead him to conclude that ... portering and forced labor continue to occur in Myanmar, particularly in the context of development programmes and of counter-insurgency operations in minority-dominated regions.⁽⁸²⁾

The ILO established a Commission of Inquiry concerning forced labor in March 1997, and its July 1998 report will be considered by the Governing Body in November 1998. The report of the ILO's Commission of Inquiry documents the widespread use of forced labor in Burma. The Commission states that its examination of the complaint revealed:

a saga of untold misery and suffering, oppression and exploitation of large sections of the population inhabiting Myanmar [Burma] by the Government, military and other public officers. It is a story of gross denial of human rights to which the people of Myanmar [Burma] have been subjected particularly since 1988 and from which they find no escape except fleeing from the country. The Government, the military and the administration seem oblivious to the human rights of the people and are trampling upon them with impunity. Their actions gravely offend human dignity and have debasing effect on the civil society.⁽⁸³⁾

In view of Burma's "flagrant and persistent failure to comply" with Convention No. 29 on forced labor, the ILO Commission of Inquiry urged the Government to take the necessary steps to ensure:

a that the legislation be brought into line with the Convention without further delay, at the very latest by 1 May 1999;

b that in actual practice no more forced or compulsory labor be imposed by the authorities, in particular the military; and,

c that the penalties which may be imposed for the exaction of forced labor be strictly enforced, with thorough investigation, prosecution and adequate punishment of those found guilty.⁽⁸⁴⁾

Under the ILO Constitution, the Burmese government has three months to inform the ILO whether it accepts the Commission's recommendations and if not, whether it proposes to refer the complaint to the International Court of Justice.⁽⁸⁵⁾ If Burma fails to carry out the recommendations, the Constitution further provides that the Governing Body may recommend to the ILO Conference "such action as it may deem wise and expedient to secure compliance therewith."⁽⁸⁶⁾

THE GOB'S RESPONSE TO ALLEGATIONS OF FORCED LABOR

The GOB has responded several times to allegations of forced labor since 1991, particularly in diplomatic communications and reports to international organizations. It has responded, for example, to two complaints under the ILO Constitution, and to another from the European Union GSP Committee, all of which related exclusively to forced labor. On occasion, the GOB has commented on the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Burma's conclusions concerning forced labor. In general, the GOB has responded to two sets of allegations: allegations of forced portering for the military, and other allegations of forced labor.

The GOB denies that military porters are recruited against their will, or that they serve as forced laborers. It has repeatedly referred to the texts of the Towns Act (1907) and the Villages Act (1908) as the legal justification for military portering practices. The GOB's position has consistently been that porters are recruited in accordance with these laws, according to three criteria: they must be unemployed, they must be physically fit to work as porters, and a reasonable wage must be agreed before the work starts. Since at least 1995, GOB officials have stated that the Villages Act and the Towns Act are to be repealed, and/or that they have been redrafted, excluding the provisions which allow for the exaction of forced labor.⁽⁸⁷⁾

The GOB denies allegations of all other forms of forced labor. It has responded a number of times that there is a tradition in Burma going back centuries, pursuant to which people voluntarily contribute labor in the belief that it is a noble deed. On some occasions, the GOB has described this as a Buddhist cultural tradition.⁽⁸⁸⁾ The GOB reported in 1993 that for the previous four years, local people had been voluntarily contributing their labor for the construction of roads and bridges,⁽⁸⁹⁾ and that there is no coercion involved.⁽⁹⁰⁾ These voluntary contributions, according to the GOB, should not be considered as forced labor.⁽⁹¹⁾ The GOB newspaper has reported that "the people of Myanmar are always aware of these development projects and welcome them wholeheartedly, and they are willing to take part in them whether they benefit from it directly on [sic] not."⁽⁹²⁾ Since mid-1996, the GOB press organ, The New Light of Myanmar, has repeatedly carried articles on uncompensated labor, including statements by GOB officials admitting the GOB's reliance on "community service" for public infrastructure development, but claiming that this service has been voluntary.⁽⁹³⁾

In 1995 the SLORC issued two secret directives concerning the practice of forced labor on development projects.⁽⁹⁴⁾ Directive No. 125⁽⁹⁵⁾ instructs all State/Division Law and Order Restoration Councils to stop using unpaid labor contributions in national development projects. It requires that "in obtaining the necessary labor from the local people, they must be paid their due share." Directive 125 also instructs the local authorities to "avoid undesirable incidents," so as not to cause "misery and suffering to the people in rural areas ...."

Directive No. 82⁽⁹⁶⁾ instructs the Yangon Division Law and Order Chairman and the Ministry of Agriculture "to stop the practice of obtaining labor from the local people without monetary compensation" in the construction of dams in Yangon division. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Burma commented that as these directives were secret, they were not accessible either to the people to whom they applied, or to anyone trying to protect the rights of persons accused of breaking the laws.⁽⁹⁷⁾

The GOB informed the European Union in 1996 that there are national level development projects in Burma, and that local authorities are also encouraged to carry out separate projects in their own regions.⁽⁹⁸⁾ The scale of the national level projects is so large, however, that the Government has "adopted the policy of self-reliance where the Government will provide the materials and expertise and the local people in turn participate and contribute their labor or cash."⁽⁹⁹⁾ The Ye-Tavoy Railway is among the national projects to which people have allegedly contributed their labor.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

The GOB advised the ILO in 1996 that most voluntary contributions of labor occurred in "locally initiated projects."⁽¹⁰¹⁾ It also acknowledged that "some overzealous local authorities" had carried out these projects without paying wages for the labor, but an order was issued to overcome this problem.⁽¹⁰²⁾ The GOB similarly informed the European Union that "some of the people, without fully aware [sic] of the Government's genuine intention and commitment for the people, had expressed their displeasure at first."⁽¹⁰³⁾

HOW FORCED LABOR IS EXACTED FROM THE CIVILIAN POPULATION

Most kinds of forced labor are imposed according to a typical pattern. The military commonly sends written orders to civilian officials or to village heads, demanding they provide a specified number of people to do forced labor for a particular period of time.⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ Usually the laborers must do an identified quota of work, such as clearing a certain amount of jungle where a road or railway is to be built.⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ Sometimes orders require a village to provide porters.

More random methods of exacting forced labor also appear to be common. It has been reported that many people who served as porters were abducted from places such as tea shops, video houses and train stations. It has also been reported that schools have been surrounded and students have been taken away to serve as porters. Porters are sometimes arrested directly by the soldiers who need them.⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ When the SLORC conducts military operations, demands for forced porters substantially increases, and military commanders are less discriminating about who they take. There have been reports of women and children, as well as men, serving as porters, and that porters range in age from 15 to 60.⁽¹⁰⁷⁾

In the case of formal demands for forced laborers, it is generally up to the village headman to choose which families will work at which times, on a rotating basis. Many villages have implemented rotation systems to spread the burden of forced labor, under which each household sends workers for 15 days at a time. Because Burma is a primarily agricultural country, at important times in the crop cycle, adults, and particularly men, are required to stay and work in the fields. At these times, it is common to see women and children working as forced laborers.⁽¹⁰⁸⁾

Sometimes, there is little alternative to providing forced labor when it is demanded, although formal payments of cash or food can sometimes be substituted for labor services, and informal payments or bribes to military officials may sometimes achieve the same result. If the villagers are not willing and cannot provide sufficient cash or in-kind payments in lieu of the labor demanded, they may have little choice but to flee the area.⁽¹⁰⁹⁾

THE PRACTICE OF FORCED LABOR

The practice of forced labor in Burma allegedly takes various forms. The most notorious uses are forced labor for infrastructure development and portering for the military. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Burma has commented that the worst human rights abuses of which he has been informed have occurred in the course of forced labor on development projects and in forced portering.⁽¹¹⁰⁾ Forced labor has been used in a wide variety of infrastructure projects, including projects to support the development of Burma's tourism sector. The government-controlled press has regularly reported on infrastructure projects that were built with contributions of "voluntary labor." The military primarily uses civilians to serve as porters, but also requires them to support their operations in a variety of other ways. Forced labor has reportedly been used on the construction of facilities to support the Yadana natural gas pipeline, and civilians have allegedly been forced to serve as porters for soldiers providing security on the pipeline. In addition, many villages have been forcibly relocated by the military. Forced relocations have increased the GOB military's ability to exact labor from ethnic minority populations in border areas. The military's strategy of garrisoning these areas has generated demand for forced labor from the same people who have been forcibly concentrated near the garrisons.

I. Forced Labor on Infrastructure Development Projects

Forced labor is used in Burma for a wide range of infrastructure development projects including roads, railway lines, dams, canals, dikes and airfields.⁽¹¹¹⁾ The GOB has also reportedly used forced labor to maintain roads in rural areas of Burma.⁽¹¹²⁾ A development project which has been widely reported to involve forced labor is the construction of a railway from Ye to Tavoy, in Tenasserim division. Tens of thousands of civilians have reportedly been required to provide forced labor on this project.⁽¹¹³⁾ Other examples of forced labor projects include a road from Putao to Sumprabum in Kachin State, on which 3,000 people were reportedly made to work in late 1994,⁽¹¹⁴⁾ and road construction in Arakan state.⁽¹¹⁵⁾

Forced labor has been reported from many parts of Burma, and it affects many ethnic minorities including the Rohingyas, Karens, Chins and Kachins.⁽¹¹⁶⁾ Demands for forced labor on the Ye-Tavoy railway have led to large refugee outflows of ethnic Mon and Karen.⁽¹¹⁷⁾

Forced labor on construction projects consists of manual labor to dig ditches, build embankments, and lay roads, dams and railways. Villagers are forced to work long hours, and are given no food or water. Forced laborers almost invariably have reported that they had to take their own food to the worksite. In some cases they have little opportunity to rest, although in others they are simply left to fill their quota of work before they are allowed to return to their home. Some forced laborers have reported that they were required to stay overnight at their worksites if they were far from their home villages.⁽¹¹⁸⁾ In these cases the villagers sometimes sleep on the roads they are building, or construct makeshift shelters in the surrounding jungle.

Gross human rights abuses during forced labor on development projects appear to be common-place.⁽¹¹⁹⁾ There have been repeated reports that people forced to work on construction projects suffer beatings, torture and summary execution. The old and infirm are most vulnerable to physical abuse by soldiers, particularly if they stop to rest.⁽¹²⁰⁾ A woman was reportedly killed in Chin State, while working on the Pakoku-Kalemyo railway line, after she had stopped working twice to feed her young baby. All her relatives were also working, so they could not care for the child in the village.⁽¹²¹⁾ Some women laborers have reportedly been raped at night by soldiers: a Karen woman from Kyaukkyi township who fled to Thailand reported she had been raped at knife point by an army sergeant who had been supervising her work detail while she dug ditches.⁽¹²²⁾

Forced laborers receive no medical care, although they commonly suffer from disease, particularly at forced labor sites in areas where malaria is rife.⁽¹²³⁾ There have been reports of people dying while performing forced labor duties, for example as a result of embankments collapsing. In other cases, workers who have traveled long distances to forced labor projects have suffered because of climatic change.⁽¹²⁴⁾ Illness and mortality on forced labor projects appear to be increased by the tendency of households to send their least valuable laborers -- children, the elderly, women and the infirm -- to satisfy the forced labor quota. Because the state's requirements for labor contributions have been specified in terms of persons per household, households usually contribute their least valuable labor. Labor gangs working on roads have frequently consisted disproportionately of old women and young girls.⁽¹²⁵⁾

The GOB has claimed that it accepts contributions of labor on development projects.⁽¹²⁶⁾ The use of forced labor in development projects was implicitly acknowledged by the SLORC in one of its "Secret Directives"⁽¹²⁷⁾ concerning the practice of forced labor. The GOB's published official statistics breaks down the costs of local development projects into state expenditures and "people's contributions."⁽¹²⁸⁾ The vast majority of the "people's contributions" to these projects are widely said to be in the form of uncompensated labor.⁽¹²⁹⁾

The number of people who contribute their labor in Burma is so large that the value of their work in rural development projects has been reported in GOB budget figures. The government-controlled press regularly reported on projects that were built with people's contributions of labor until mid-1996. From these reports DOL has identified more than eighty infrastructure projects which were reported to have been built with contributions of voluntary labor, from a total of over five million persons.⁽¹³⁰⁾ These eighty projects may not represent the total number of projects which are alleged to have been, or are still using, forced labor.⁽¹³¹⁾

Forced Labor to Support Tourism Development

There have been numerous allegations since 1994 that the GOB has forced many thousands of people to contribute their labor to tourism development projects.⁽¹³²⁾ The GOB established a Ministry of Hotels and Tourism in 1992, which initially targeted Rangoon, Pagan, Mandalay and Inlay Lake (Taunggyi) as areas for tourism development.⁽¹³³⁾ At the time, poor infrastructure acted as obstacles to development in this sector including a shortage of hotel rooms, a lack of airports that could handle large aircraft, and an antiquated road system.⁽¹³⁴⁾ The Ministry of Tourism created a Tourism Development Management Committee in 1994. Together with other ministries, it launched an initiative to attract tourists to Burma in 1996 called "Visit Myanmar Year."⁽¹³⁵⁾

There have been credible allegations that forced labor was used during the recent rapid development of tourism infrastructure.⁽¹³⁶⁾ The dredging of the Moat of the Golden Palace at Mandalay is widely reported to have been carried out with forced labor. Reports suggest that thousands of civilians were forced to clear the moat by hand.⁽¹³⁷⁾ This well-documented use of forced labor occurred directly across the street from a U.S. diplomatic facility. A related project which reportedly used forced labor is the construction of a ring road at Mandalay. The GOB has reported that the Mandalay ring road, moat renovation and related projects were completed with the "might and main" of 2.3 million persons contributing labor.⁽¹³⁸⁾ Many hotels and other tourists facilities which the GOB has built in more remote areas were also reportedly built with forced labor.⁽¹³⁹⁾

As many as 30,000 people were reported to have labored at Bassein airport on a runway extension project.⁽¹⁴⁰⁾ The GOB has reported voluntary contributions of labor to the construction of Hanthawaddy⁽¹⁴¹⁾ and Pathein airports.⁽¹⁴²⁾ Villagers were reportedly forced to clear Inlay Lake by hand, as part of work that appears to be related to a proposed tourist development at Moebye on the Biluchaung river.⁽¹⁴³⁾ Other large projects which apparently relate to tourism include a 50-mile road from Rangoon to Pegu,⁽¹⁴⁴⁾ and the highway from Rangoon to Mandalay. There are confirmed reports that improvements to the Rangoon-Mandalay highway involved substantial use of forced labor.⁽¹⁴⁵⁾

The Scale of Forced Labor Used in Infrastructure Development

Both anecdotal and the limited statistical evidence available suggest that the burden of forced labor falls disproportionately on the rural population. Residents of major cities, such as Rangoon, seem less likely to be subject to forced labor, especially on infrastructure development projects although there have been reports that young men are sometimes taken from cities for military porterage. Accounts in the state press also tell of city "beautification" schemes implemented with uncompensated labor.⁽¹⁴⁶⁾ GOB statistics from 1997 indicate that 73% of the workforce lives in rural areas, and that 56% of the workforce is engaged in agricultural work (including hunting, forestry and fishing).⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ Although neither the GOB nor international agencies have made systematic efforts to collect data on the extent of forced labor in rural Burma, some data collected for other purposes provides at least fragmentary evidence of the overall situation.

As part of the repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Burma from Bangladesh, the U.N. High Commission for Refugees negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding with the GOB concerning the extent to which Rohingyas in the Arakan State would be subject to forced labor. According to the UNHCR:

[C]ompulsory labor continues to be a nation-wide practice in Myanmar. The UNHCR had intervened repeatedly on behalf of returnees being called for compulsory labor, and feels it has succeeded in reducing significantly the burden for the local population and returnees. The authorities have agreed [with UNHCR] to limit compulsory labor to a maximum of four days of work per family per month.⁽¹⁴⁸⁾

Observations by non-governmental organizations indicate that the four days per family, per month measure was less a limit than a floor. Human Rights Watch Asia reported that during the dry season, the Rohingyas were forced to work on average "about one week a month and can sometimes be ten days or two weeks."⁽¹⁴⁹⁾

By comparison, a study by the Danish chapter of Physicians for Human Rights found that Shan, Karenni and Karen refugees who fled to Thailand were forced to work an average of eight days per month during the year prior to their flight, with some reporting as much as twenty days forced labor per month.⁽¹⁵⁰⁾ Although these figures do not represent the extent to which the entire rural population has been subject to forced labor, it does indicate that forced labor has been so pervasive as to make the unpleasant conditions of a refugee camp in Thailand preferable to life in rural Burma.

The total number of people affected appears to reach easily into the hundreds of thousands, and perhaps millions, on various projects.⁽¹⁵¹⁾ Human Rights Watch/Asia estimated in 1995 that at least two million people had been forced to work since 1992 on construction of roads, railways and bridges.⁽¹⁵²⁾ As noted, the New Light of Myanmar and its predecessor the Working People's Daily, have often reported that very large numbers of people contributed their labor to projects.⁽¹⁵³⁾ In 1997, the Karen Human Rights Group estimated that "close to half the population of the country -- at least 15-20 million people -- are involved in some form of labor for SLORC on a regular basis."⁽¹⁵⁴⁾

The scale of forced labor is sufficiently large that the GOB budget, published in its Annual Review of Financial, Economic and Social Conditions, includes values for "people's contributions" to rural development works.⁽¹⁵⁵⁾ The GOB's tables presenting this data include the legend: "While the State is carrying out development works for rural areas where majority of population resided, public on its side have also been participating by contributing services, cash and materials." ⁽¹⁵⁶⁾ [sic] The vast majority of the budgeted expenditures on rural development works go into "agricultural and land reclamation schemes," and road and bridge construction and maintenance.⁽¹⁵⁷⁾

Table 1 shows the value of "people's contributions" reported by the GOB on its rural development works⁽¹⁵⁸⁾ from 1962 until 1996/97, in current kyat terms. As recently as 1987/88, the value of people's contributions in rural development projects was 5.5 million kyats. In current kyat terms, the value of "people's contributions" to rural development projects, evaluated at GOB shadow prices⁽¹⁵⁹⁾, rose from 8.9 million kyat in 1989/90 to 186.9 million kyat in 1995/96, but fell to 146.8 million kyat in 1996/97. In real terms, this represents roughly a seven-fold increase at an average annual rate of 33% from 1989/90 to 1995/96, followed by a 29% decline in 1996/97. The most dramatic increase in these values occurred between 1992/93 and 1993/94, when the current value of people's contributions jumped from 18.8 million kyat to 163.2 million kyat.⁽¹⁶⁰⁾ The 1993/94 value of people's contributions accounted for more than 50 per cent of total expenditures on rural development works.⁽¹⁶¹⁾ The market value of people's contributions to rural development projects appears to have increased about twenty-five fold, from 1989/90 to 1995/96, at an average annual rate of 59%, before declining by 19% in 1996/97.⁽¹⁶²⁾ The decline in forced labor since 1996/97 is apparent only for physical infrastructure projects in central Burma.⁽¹⁶³⁾ Forced labor in ethnic minority areas along Burma's borders, including various forms of forced civilian labor for GOB military units, may have increased since 1995, as the growing GOB military has garrisoned large border areas previously controlled by the armed forces of ethnic groups and/or other opposition groups.⁽¹⁶⁴⁾

GOB data do not specify how the values for people's contributions of labor are derived. ⁽¹⁶⁵⁾ People's contributions of labor are uncompensated, so the value cannot reflect any amount of payment. In developing an estimate of the value of their contributions, the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon calculated people's contributions at a "shadow price," equal to the GOB official rate for day labor which has been 20 kyats since 1993.⁽¹⁶⁶⁾ The market rate for rural dry season day labor is usually much higher: it increased from 60 kyats in 1994/95 to 80 kyats in 1996/97.⁽¹⁶⁷⁾ The Embassy estimated that if people's contributions were valued at the market rate, the ratio of state expenditures to people's contributions for the period 1993/94 through 1996/97 was approximately three to one.⁽¹⁶⁸⁾

The GOB also uses "people's contributions" on regional and national physical infrastructure construction projects.⁽¹⁶⁹⁾ These include road, railroad, irrigation and embankment construction, renovation and improvement projects.⁽¹⁷⁰⁾ It appears that "people's contributions" represented the same proportion of inputs to regional and national projects as they did to rural development works, at least through 1993/94.⁽¹⁷¹⁾ (By 1996/97, a much higher proportion of work on regional and national projects was being done with capital equipment such as bull dozers than on local projects, where uncompensated people's labor was still a high proportion of inputs.)⁽¹⁷²⁾

The U.S. Embassy estimated the market value of people's contributions to national and regional development projects, on the assumption of the same three to one ratio of state contributions to people's contributions it had estimated for rural development works.⁽¹⁷³⁾ It then added these estimated values to the GOB's declared budget values for people's contributions in rural development works, to calculate the approximate share of GDP represented by the market value of uncompensated labor.⁽¹⁷⁴⁾ According to these estimates (after allowing for the increasing use of capital equipment in national and regional projects), the market value of uncompensated people's contributions used by the GOB in public works was estimated to have been equivalent to about 3% of recorded GDP in 1993/94, 4% in 1994/95 and 7% in 1995/96.⁽¹⁷⁵⁾

The U.S. Embassy also translated the economic data into estimated equivalent numbers of working days. Based on the same assumption that there is a three to one ratio of state contributions to people's contributions in regional and national development projects, the total value of people's contributions (calculated at the government price for day labor of 20 kyats), implies as many as 660 million person days ⁽¹⁷⁶⁾ of uncompensated labor in 1993/94, and as many as 1,270 million person days of labor in 1994/95.⁽¹⁷⁷⁾