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U.S. National Administrative Office
Bureau of International Labor Affairs
U.S. Department of Labor
December 4, 1996
BACKGROUND
- Summary of Submission
Pursuant to the provisions
of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), the labor
supplemental agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
Submission No. 940003 was filed with the U.S. National Administrative Office
(NAO) on August 14, 1994. The submitters were four human rights and workers'
rights organizations: the International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF)(1), the National Association of Democratic Lawyers
(ANAD)(2), the Coalition for Justice in the
Maquiladoras, and the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC).
The allegations raised in this submission relate to the denial of
freedom of association and the right to organize at the maquiladora operations
of the Sony Corporation, doing business as Magnéticos de Mexico (MDM),
in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, Mexico. In brief, the specific allegations
involved:
-
dismissals--workers were dismissed in retaliation for union
organizing activity;
-
union election--a union delegate election was flawed since there
was insufficient notice of election and an open vote rather than secret ballot;
-
work stoppage--workers protesting the election in front of the
plant were dispersed by police using physical force; and
-
union registration--a petition for registration of an
independent union was rejected by a labor tribunal on improper and
hyper-technical grounds.
In addition, the submission charged the Government of Mexico with
violating its obligations under the NAALC and under Conventions 87 and 98 of
the International Labor Organization (ILO), which guarantee freedom of
association and the right to bargain collectively.
- Public Report on Submission No. 940003
The NAO
Public Report of Review on Submission No. 940003 was issued on April 11,
1995.(3) In conducting its review, the NAO
"considered whether Mexico promoted compliance with, and effective
enforcement of, its labor laws that guarantee the right of association and the
right to organize freely and prohibit the dismissal of workers because of
efforts to exercise those rights (Article 3); whether Mexico ensured that
persons have appropriate access to, and recourse to, tribunals and procedures
under which labor laws and collective agreements can be enforced (Article 4);
and whether Mexico ensured that its tribunal proceedings for the enforcement of
its labor law are fair, equitable and transparent (Article 5)."(4) The NAO made findings and recommendations on
each allegation, focusing on the Government of Mexico's compliance with its
obligations under the NAALC.
The NAO recommended engaging in ministerial consultations pursuant
to Article 22 of the NAALC on the union registration issue.(5) The NAO's report concluded: "Given that
serious questions are raised herein concerning the workers' ability to obtain
recognition of an independent union through the registration process with the
local CABs [Conciliation and Arbitration Boards] and as compliance with and
effective enforcement of the laws pertaining to union registration are
fundamental to ensuring the right to organize and freedom of association, the
NAO recommends that ministerial consultations are appropriate to further
address the operation of the union registration process."(6)
Mexico accepted the U.S. request for ministerial consultations and
an implementation agreement was signed on June 26, 1995.(7) All the activities negotiated as part of the
ministerial consultations implementation agreement were completed and related
documents were published on May 10, 1996.(8) On
June 4, 1996, the NAO issued a report on the ministerial consultations
conducted pursuant to Submission No. 940003.(9)
On March 29, 1996, in a letter addressed to Secretary of Labor
Robert B. Reich, the submitters requested that the ministerial consultations
process be re-opened.(10) The request was based
on the assertion that information made available during the activities
conducted under ministerial consultations revealed that Mexico was not in
compliance with its obligations as enunciated in Article 5, paragraphs 1 and 4
of the NAALC. The submitters argued that the local Conciliation and Arbitration
Boards (CABs) are not impartial and independent in reviewing petitions for
registration filed by independent unions.
Secretary Reich declined to re-open ministerial consultations. He
did, however, instruct the NAO to continue to monitor developments in Mexico
with respect to the union registration issues raised through ministerial
consultations and prepare a follow-up report. The NAO's report was to include a
summary and analysis of two May 21, 1996 Mexican Supreme Court decisions and
their potential relevance to future union registration cases.(11) These issues are discussed below in Sections
II and III, respectively.
REVIEW BY THE U.S. NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
In conducting its review, the NAO requested information from the
Mexican NAO, the original submitters of Submission No. 940003, and the U.S.
Embassy in Mexico. The review focused on (A) the current situation of the
workers involved in the union organization efforts reported in Submission No.
940003 and (B) initiatives in Mexico to change the labor law.
- Current Status of Sony Workers
The NAO learned
from a representative(12) of the
Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras, one of the submitters, that all
the workers dismissed by the Sony subsidiary in Nuevo Laredo in the events
associated with this case remain unemployed. The NAO also learned, from the
same representative, that the workers believe they are blacklisted and
therefore unable to obtain employment anywhere in Nuevo Laredo. The
representative further reported that the dismissed workers have formed a
community activist group named the Centro de Trabajadores y Comunidad
Sony. This group is supporting some of the employees in the Sony plant in
an effort to challenge the established union leadership in union elections
scheduled to be held in April 1997.
- Initiatives in Mexico to Change the Labor Law
There are two initiatives in Mexico that might impact upon Mexican labor law
and industrial relations.
- Legislation
In 1995, the principal opposition party
in Mexico, the National Action Party (PAN), submitted for consideration a
comprehensive bill proposing to reform the Federal Labor Law (FLL) of Mexico.(13) By expressly defining registration as a
procedural formality and removing the discretionary authority currently vested
in local authorities to deny registration, the bill would address many of the
restrictions that arguably infringe on freedom of association rights. The
removal of discretionary authority, combined with specific language on the
requirements for constituting a union, also would arguably facilitate the
registration of more than one union in each workplace.
The bill further proposes to transfer jurisdiction over the
Federal and State Conciliation and Arbitration Boards from the Federal and
State executive branches to the respective judicial branches.(14) If enacted, this proposal would appear to end
the current practice of appointed tripartite labor, management, and government
representatives to these tribunals. It is this practice that resulted in the
allegations in submissions before the NAO of inherent bias and lack of
impartiality in the composition and decisions of the CABs.
This proposed legislation would address many of the issues and
concerns raised by the NAO in its Report of Review of Submission No. 940003.
After its proposal by the PAN, however, the bill was referred to the
appropriate Senate committee where no further action has been taken.
- Principles of the New Labor Culture (Principios de
la Nueva Cultura Laboral)
In an effort to improve labor-management
cooperation, competitiveness and productivity, the Government of Mexico
promoted tripartite negotiations during 1996 that resulted, on August 13, in
the signing of a document entitled Principles of the New Labor Culture, by
representatives of the major labor and business organizations of the country.(15) The importance attached to this document is
evidenced by the signing ceremony which took place at the official residence of
the President of Mexico and the considerable coverage that it received in the
Mexican press.
A review of the Principles of the New Labor Culture
indicates that it does not have the effect of law, but rather is a statement of
objectives and principles. It calls upon both labor and management to respect
each others' rights and honor respective obligations. Significant emphasis is
placed on the importance of education and skills training for improving
productivity, competitiveness, and workers' income. The document calls for the
cooperation of workers, unions, management and government in education and
training and maintains that education must occur in the home, the school, the
union, and the workplace.
The document addresses two matters of labor law which were the
subjects of the original Submission No. 940003 and the subsequent ministerial
consultations: (1) union democracy; and (2) union registration, including the
lack of impartiality in the decisions of the labor tribunals. Under the
Principles of the New Labor Culture, unions pledge to conduct their business in
accordance with the law, to observe the principle of freedom of association,
and to conduct their elections in a climate of harmony, respect and
democracy.(16) Further, both unions and
management call on the government to strengthen the system of labor tribunals
by assigning career judges, as opposed to the current practice of assigning
members of the executive branch, as the government representatives to these
bodies.(17)
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF MEXICO
On May 21, 1996, the Supreme Court of Mexico, in two unanimous
decisions, found provisions of two state statutes that prohibited employees
from forming more than one union per workplace to be unconstitutional.(18)
In Mexico, registration by the appropriate labor tribunal is necessary
for a union to have legal status (personaría jurídica(19)). A union must have legal status before it
can engage in any official activities, such as contesting representation
elections, representing its members in negotiations with employers or before
government panels, or even representing itself in court. Registration was the
central issue giving rise to ministerial consultations in the Sony Case.(20)
In that case, one of several reasons given by the local CAB for denying the
petition for registration by workers of the assembly plant was that another
union was already registered at that workplace. According to the CAB, the
Federal Labor Law (FLL) permitted the registration of only one union per
workplace. The NAO has determined that though the FLL contains no such explicit
restriction, the CABs nevertheless cite it as a basis for denial of
registration.(21)
The Sony case fell under the jurisdiction of the FLL which regulates
labor matters in the private sector, while the two Supreme Court decisions at
issue here address state laws governing state employees. Nevertheless, all
state and federal labor laws draw their authority from Article 123 of the
Political Constitution of Mexico (hereinafter the Mexican Constitution). The
FLL covers private sector employees and implements Section A of Article 123 of
the Constitution. The Law of Federal Employees (LFE) implements Section B of
Article 123 and covers employees of the Federal Government. The LFE contains a
provision specifically limiting federal workers to one union per government
entity.
The two instant cases arose from state laws that contained provisions
similar to that of the LFE's prohibition of the registration of more than one
union in each government entity or department. Essentially, the Supreme Court
asserted the supremacy of the Mexican Constitution and concluded that it does
not restrict or limit the number of unions that may be formed in the workplace.
Thus, the Court concluded that it is unconstitutional for state laws, which
draw their authority from the constitution, to restrict or limit the number of
unions.
The immediate impact of the Court's decisions is only on those
individuals and/or institutions that were parties to the appeals. In order to
ascertain the implications of the decisions, including their precedential value
within the Mexican system of jurisprudence, the NAO commissioned a study by
experts in Mexican constitutional law. Following is a summary of that study.(22)
- Mexican Jurisprudence
The Mexican legal system
requires that every law, from federal laws to individual criminal sentences to
administrative decisions, and including labor law, find their source in the
Mexican Constitution. Article 123, Section A, of the Mexican Constitution
governs relations between employers and employees in the private sector.
Section B applies to public sector employees in the federal government and in
the Federal District (Mexico City). Section B, was added in 1960 and
subsequently amended by decree in 1974. The implementing legislation for
Section B is the Law of Federal Employees (No. 112), originally enacted in
1963.
Public employees of state governments and "decentralized
federal agencies" are not covered by Section B. "Decentralized
federal agencies" include the Social Security Institute, the National
Housing Institute, the National Lottery, and a number of other agencies that
are responsible for providing services directly to the public.(23) State and municipal employees, and employees
of corporations in which the states have a controlling interest, are typically
regulated by state law. Most state laws governing labor relations are modeled
after the federal law.
The two cases reviewed here reached the Supreme Court of Mexico via
the process of amparo suit. The amparo suit is most often
used to bring a complaint of a violation of constitutional guarantees. A
decision rendered in an amparo suit, which may declare that a
violation of constitutional guarantees has occurred, affects only the parties
to the suit. The decision is not binding on the lower courts. Mexico follows a
judicial formula in which only the successful petitioner in an amparo
case is exempted from the application of the challenged law.
To establish stare decisis(24) the Mexican Supreme Court must issue five
consecutive decisions en banc on the same point. Jurisprudence may
also be created by a single decision of the Mexican Supreme Court where the
Court's decision resolves conflicting opinions of the Collegiate Circuit
Tribunals (approximately equivalent to U.S. Circuit Courts). While such
jurisprudence should theoretically be followed by the lower courts, it does not
have the same force as stare decisis in the United States.
Jurisprudence can be interrupted or modified when the Court, acting en
banc, issues a judgement which contradicts previously established
precedent.
Under constitutional reforms initiated by President Zedillo in
1994, a new law was passed which enables a statute to be nullified (except in
electoral matters) when it is deemed unconstitutional.(25) Basically, the Supreme Court will accept
actions to declare a challenged statute null and void if brought by any one of
the following: (1) at least 33% of the members of the Chamber of Deputies in
the case of federal laws; (2) at least 33% of members of the Senate in the case
of federal laws; (3) the Nation's Attorney General in the case of federal laws
and international treaties; (4) at least 33% of the members of the local
congresses in the case of state laws; or (5) at least 33% of the members of the
local Assembly of the Federal District in the case of Assembly laws. These
challenges must be brought within thirty days of the publication of the
challenged statute, however, and would therefore be limited to legislation
enacted after the passage of this law. A minimum of eight of the eleven
justices must concur in a finding of unconstitutionality.
- The Cases and Decisions
The first of the two cases
arose when academic staff of the University of Guadalajara in Jalisco State
attempted to form a union. Their petition for registration was denied by the
State Arbitration and Employee Classification Board on the ground that another
union was already registered at the university. The Board cited Article 76 of
the Law on Public Servants of the State of Jalisco and its Municipalities,(26) which provides that there can be no more than
one union in each governmental body, municipal agency, or decentralized agency
or in firms or associations of state or municipal majority participation.
The Supreme Court, in its decision, upheld the finding of the lower
court, and ruled that Article 76 of the State law was unconstitutional in that,
by limiting the number of unions that may be formed in a government workplace
of the state, the state interfered with the petitioner's constitutional rights
of association and organization. The Court further invoked Convention 87 of the
International Labor Organization (ILO) on freedom of association which was
ratified by Mexico in 1950. Although there are conflicting viewpoints on the
issue of what position international treaties occupy in the hierarchy of
Mexican law, the Court found that the state law also conflicts with the freedom
of association provisions of Convention 87.
The Court concluded that the spirit of Article 123 of the Mexican
Constitution was to uphold freedom of association in a universal sense. As
such, laws issued by State legislatures to govern labor relations must conform
to this principle.
The second of the two cases arose from an amparo petition
filed by state employees of the state of Oaxaca. The facts were similar to
those in the Guadalajara case. A group of state employees formed a union and
the Arbitration Board for Oaxaca State Employees denied their application for
registration on the ground that another union was already registered at the
workplace. In this case, the Supreme Court found that the law in Oaxaca did not
prohibit more than one government union in each workplace and, therefore, the
Arbitration Board's decision was incorrect. However, the Court did cite its
analysis of the Guadalajara decision and indicated that its reasoning in that
decision was fully applicable to the facts in the Oaxaca case.
- Potential Impact
These two decisions are
significant because they signal a departure from a restriction on the right to
organize that has existed in the government workplace since 1963. As discussed
above, the decisions do not constitute binding jurisprudence. However, the
decisions may potentially encourage an increase in amparo suits filed
against similar one union per workplace restrictions. This could result in the
establishment of jurisprudence after five consecutive decisions. The fact that
the Court issued two decisions on this point in one day may be an indication
that it would rule the same way on future suits challenging similar state laws
or against the restrictions contained in the LFE. This indication is
strengthened by the fact that the Court cited its Guadalajara decision in the
Oaxaca case, instead of attempting to distinguish the two cases and thereby
weakening the effect of the ruling. Finally, even if the two cases do not
eventually become binding jurisprudence, there is a tendency in Mexico for
lower courts to follow high court decisions as persuasive law.
The decisions also may potentially impact on private sector
employment. While the FLL does not contain any restrictions prohibiting private
sector employees from forming more than one union per workplace, numerous CAB
decisions have denied registration of private sector unions on that basis.(27) Further, the decisions may have a potential
impact on the use of exclusion clauses in collective bargaining agreements in
the private sector, which have allegedly been used as a means to restrict
freedom of association and control internal union dissent.(28)
CONCLUSION
The two Supreme Court decisions, the Principles of the New
Labor Culture, and the proposal for changes to the Federal Labor Law indicate
that potentially significant developments continue to take place in Mexico in a
wide range of labor matters, including labor legislation, labor-management
relations, labor-government relations, and within labor organizations
themselves. The extent of the impact of the developments discussed above,
however, remains to be seen.
Respectfully Submitted.
Irasema Garza
Secretary, National Administrative Office
Footnotes
1. At the time of the original submission, the official
name of the organization was the International Labor Rights Education and
Research Fund (ILRERF). The name was subsequently changed to the International
Labor Rights Fund (ILRF). For the sake of clarity and consistency, the latter
name will be used throughout this report.
2. Asociación Nacional de Abogados
Democráticos.
3. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International
Labor Affairs, U.S. National Administrative Office, North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation, Public Report of Review: NAO Submission No. 940003
(1995)(hereinafter Public Report of Review).
4. Public Report of Review, pp. 24-25.
5. Article 22 states,
- Any Party may request in writing consultations with another Party at the
ministerial level regarding any matter within the scope of this Agreement. The
requesting Party shall provide specific and sufficient information to allow the
requested Party to respond.
- The requesting Party shall promptly notify the other Parties of the
request. A third Party that considers it has a substantial interest in the
matter shall be entitled to participate in the consultations on notice to the
other Parties.
- The consulting Parties shall make every attempt to resolve the matter
through consultations under this Article, including through the exchange of
sufficient publicly available information to enable a full examination of the
matter.
6. Public Report of Review, p. 32.
7. Ministerial Consultations --Submission 940003,
Agreement on Implementation.
8. Ministerial Consultations - Submission 940003
Agreement on Implementation, Statement on Public Release of Documents.
9. U.S. National Administrative Office, Report on
Ministerial Consultations on NAO Submission 940003 under The North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation.
10. Letter to Secretary Robert B. Reich dated March 29,
1996, signed by representatives of the ILRF, the Coalition for Justice in the
Maquiladoras, the ANAD, and the AFSC.
11. Letter to Pharis Harvey, Executive Director, ILRF,
dated June 7, 1996, signed by Secretary of Labor Robert B. Reich.
12. Telephone conversation with Martha Ojeda,
representative of the Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras,
September 25, 1996. The NAO also contacted the other submitters in the case,
namely the ILRF, the AFSC, and the ANAD. These organizations had no additional
information on the status of the workers.
13. Senate of the Republic, National Action Party
Parliamentary Group, Initiative to Reform the Federal Labor Law, (1995)
Articles 253-296, pp. 106-116.
14. Ibid., Article 454, pp. 128-129.
15. Principios de la Nueva Cultura Laboral,
August 13, 1996, hereinafter Principles of the New Labor Culture.
16. Principles of the New Labor Culture, Articles
8.5-8.6.
17. Ibid., Article 2.2.
18. Amparo Decision 337/94, Union of Academic Personnel
of the University of Guadalajara, and Amparo Decision 338/95, Solidarity Union
of Employees of the State of Oaxaca and Decentralized Agencies.
19. Personaría jurídica is also
translated as legal personality.
20. Public Report of Review, p. 24.
21. It is important to differentiate between union
registration and holding title to the collective bargaining agreement. In
Mexico, a union in the private sector must obtain registration before it can
obtain title to the collective bargaining agreement, which is roughly
comparable to exclusive bargaining agency in the U.S. context. Essentially, it
must obtain registration in order to possess the legal status necessary to
challenge for title to the collective bargaining agreement. In the Federal
Government, and most of the state governments that model their statutes after
the Federal model, this distinction does not exist because the laws allow only
one union in each workplace. Registration amounts to recognition and grants the
union exclusive bargaining rights. A union without registration lacks the legal
status to initiate any official action, such as challenging for bargaining
agency.
22. Anna Torriente, National Law Center for
Inter-American Free Trade, Tucson, Arizona, Study of Mexican Supreme Court
Decisions Concerning the Rights of State Employees to Organize in the States of
Jalisco and Oaxaca, (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International
Labor Affairs, U.S. National Administrative Office, North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation, November, 1996).
23. Article 1, Law 112, Federal Law of Employees in the
Service of the State, Regulating Section B of Article 123.
24. The Spanish word used in Mexican legal terminology
is jurisprudencia, hereinafter translated as jurisprudence in this
report.
25. Decree Amending the Constitution of the United
Mexican States, Diario Oficial de la Federación, December 31,
1994.
26. Article 76, Law of Public Employees in the State of
Jalisco and its Municipalities, promulgated on March 22, 1984.
27. See U.S. National Administrative Office, Public
Report of Review.
28. Exclusion clauses are widespread in Mexican
collective bargaining agreements and are explicitly provided for in the FLL
(Article 395). They are roughly akin to closed shop agreements. Under these
clauses, union membership is required for the worker to obtain employment at
the facility covered by the contract and must be maintained. An employer can be
compelled to dismiss a worker who is expelled from the union. The procedures to
be applied for expulsion from the union are specified in the Federal Labor Law
(Article 371). Exclusion clauses are explicitly prohibited for employees of the
federal government covered by the LFE (Article 76). For additional information
on exclusion clauses, see Paul A. Curtis and Alfredo Gutierrez Kirchner,
"Questions on Labor Law Enforcement in Mexico and the Role of the Federal
and State Conciliation and Arbitration Boards," 1994.
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